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r 11.1 COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE 
LEVEL OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
The administrative law enforcement of the competition law rules is a hot topic in the 
EU. It is often contended that competition law proceedings do not comply with certain 
fundamental rights. Undertakings have for example argued before the Union Courts that 
the Commission infringes the legality principle, that there is no eff ective judicial review of 
Commission decisions, or that the nemo tenetur principle and legal professional privilege are 
infringed by the investigative powers of the Commission.1 Much has also been written on 
the compatibility of the enforcement of the competition law rules with fundamental rights. 
Some authors scrutinise the application of multiple fundamental rights in EU competition 
law proceedings,2 whereas others merely focus on the application of a particular right in those 
proceedings.3 A similar discussion also takes place at the domestic level.4 The compatibility 
of the enforcement of the competition law rules with fundamental rights is thus often subject 
to debate in and outside of courtrooms. The focus often remains on the scope and application 
of particular fundamental rights. In competition law proceedings, the Union Courts e.g. seem 
to focus increasingly on the rights from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Charter).5 The question whether higher 
safeguards than the minimum safeguards from the ECHR and the Charter6 must apply, and 
what this should look like, is not that often discussed. The present study examines whether 
higher safeguards from the criminal law domain are used by the judiciary in competition 
law proceedings. The possible impact of criminal law on (administrative) competition law 
enforcement has not been mapped up to date. 
The present study focuses on the administrative law enforcement of the competition law 
rules in the Netherlands, England and the EU.7 Competition law courts in those jurisdictions 
have dealt with claims by undertakings that enforcement proceedings or competition law 
fi nes infringe particular fundamental rights from the ECHR and the Charter. This study uses 
a broader benchmark than merely fundamental rights from those two fundamental rights 
catalogues. Hence, the main research question is: 
What is the impact of criminal law principles on the enforcement of the rules of 
competition law in the Netherlands, England, and at the European Union level?
1   See respectively e.g.: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission); ECJ, C-386/10 P (Chalkor v Commission); ECJ, 374/87 
(Orkem SA v Commission); ECJ, C-550/07 P (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission).
2   E.g. Andersson (2018); Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 895 ff ; Nazzini (2016b); Van Bael (2011), p. 98; Andreangeli (2008).
3   E.g. Veenbrink (2016); Hellström (2011); Van Bockel (2010); MacCulloch (2006); Vesterdorf (2005); Lasok (1990). 
4   For a discussion of the compatibility of Dutch competition law procedures with certain fundamental rights, see e.g. Beumer (2016).
5   Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 895. See also Rose & Bailey (2013), p. 980, who assert that “[t]he EU Courts now have frequent recourse to the 
Charter in formulating their judgments”. 
6   Charter rights corresponding to ECHR rights should provide at least the safeguards provided for by the ECHR, see Article 52(3) of the 
Charter.
7  The choice for England instead of the United Kingdom is explained below. 
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This question is deliberately formulated as a descriptive question, since it is currently unclear 
how the judiciary determines the scope and application of some fundamental principles in 
(administrative) competition law proceedings. Some guidelines are given by the legislator, 
although it becomes apparent from this research that the judiciary was left with the task 
of further developing the scope and application of some principles in competition law 
proceedings. It is thus examined whether the competition law judiciary takes, in practice, 
inspiration from criminal law proceedings when it has to determine the scope and application 
of some principles. In this research three terms are used to classify the (lack of) impact of 
criminal law, namely by the use of the terms (i) infl uence, (ii) similar, and (iii) diff erence. 
There is an ‘infl uence’ of criminal law when the competition law judiciary specifi cally refers 
to the scope and application of a principle in criminal law and applies that principle in 
competition law proceedings in a similar manner as in criminal law. In some cases, the scope 
and application of a principle in competition law proceedings is similar to that in criminal law, 
without the judiciary specifying whether criminal law was used as a source of inspiration. 
In this type of cases, the term ‘similar’ is used. Lastly, there are cases where the judiciary 
applies a principle in competition law proceedings in a diff erent manner than in criminal 
law proceedings. In these cases, the diff erent approach seems to lead to lower safeguards for 
undertakings in comparison to the safeguards for the accused in criminal law. In chapter 8, it 
is asserted that there is no unequivocal answer to the question whether criminal law has an 
impact on competition law proceedings. Sometimes competition law judges are infl uenced by 
the scope and application of a principle embedded in the criminal law domain, whereas at 
other times the approach towards a principle is the same in criminal law and (administrative) 
competition law without any statements by the judiciary whether criminal was indeed used 
as a source of inspiration. The lack of a consistent approach is criticized in chapter 9 of this 
research. The concluding chapter therefore does not only provide a conclusion on whether 
there is an impact of criminal law on (administrative) competition law proceedings, but also 
contains some normative statements and conclusions on the specifi c scope and application of 
certain principles in competition law proceedings. 
The present research is of academic and practical relevance. As mentioned above, much 
discussion exists in legal literature on the level of safeguards in competition law proceedings. 
Most authors focus on the minimum fundamental rights of the ECHR and on the protection 
off ered by the Charter. Hitherto, no exhaustive research exists on the potential impact of criminal 
law principles on the administrative law enforcement of competition law proceedings. The 
use of criminal law principles in competition law proceedings may lead to higher safeguards 
for undertakings. It is not clear whether criminal law is indeed used as a source of inspiration 
by the competition law judiciary. Nevertheless, some criminal law principles have already 
found their way into the administrative law enforcement of the competition rules.8
8  I.e. the nemo tenetur principle.
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te
r 1More clarity on the (potential) impact of criminal law on the administrative law enforcement 
of the competition law rules is also of practical relevance. The present study analyses 
the scope and application of fi ve principles in Dutch, English and EU competition law. A 
thorough examination of these principles can thus already demonstrate the manner in which 
the competition law judiciary applies legal safeguards. The discussions in courtrooms on the 
appropriate level of safeguards could also benefi t from the present research. To date, it is 
not entirely clear whether the competition law judiciary uses criminal law principles as a 
source of inspiration, and, if so, to what extent this occurs. Undertakings and competition law 
authorities could thus gain from insights on this potential impact of criminal law. 
1.2 CRIMINAL LAW SAFEGUARDS AS A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION FOR 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT?
The use in this study of criminal law principles as a benchmark instead of merely fundamental 
rights from the Charter and the ECHR is perhaps at fi rst surprising. The focus in legal literature 
on fundamental rights from the ECHR and the Charter is understandable. Competition law 
proceedings can lead to a ‘criminal charge’ according to the ECtHR,9 due to their deterrent/
punitive10 eff ect. The deterrent eff ect of competition law fi nes is apparent. Competition law 
fi nes can be imposed in the Netherlands, England and the EU for up to 10% of the turnover 
of the undertaking in a specifi c year.11 In the Netherlands, the maximum has even been raised 
up to 40% for cartels.12 The highest fi ne to date imposed upon a single undertaking by a 
competition authority in these three jurisdictions was that of 18 July 2018 imposed on Google 
by the Commission. Google was obliged to pay a fi ne of €4.34 billion for (allegedly) abusing 
its dominant position on the android devices market.13 T he UK Department of Trade and 
Justice asserted in a White Paper in 2001 that the maximum of 10% for fi nes still does not lead 
to optimal deterrence. Increasing the threshold for fi nes, however, is not the most appropriate 
manner. As the UK Department of Trade and Justice held:
A US study indicates that more than half of fi rms convicted of price-fi xing would go into 
liquidation if required to pay the optimal fi ne. This would not be fair. In many cases, the 
cartel will only have covered one aspect of the fi rm’s business and the real participants will 
have been the few executives involved. Very large fi nes would damage innocent employees, 
shareholders and creditors who have done nothing to harm consumers or break the law.14
9   ECtHR, no. 43590/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy), par. 44. This case dealt with Italian competition law proceedings. Italian 
competition law is mirrored on EU law. This case could, consequently, also be extended to EU competition law proceedings and 
competition law proceedings in Member States which also mirrored their competition law rules on EU competition law. 
10   The Strasbourg Court refers in ECtHR, no. 43590/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy), par. 40, to the “préventif et répressif” 
purposes of competition law fi nes. In other cases, e.g. ECtHR, no. 73053/01 (Jussila v Finland), par. 38, reference is made to “deterrent 
and punitive” purposes of administrative law fi nes in order to determine that there was a criminal law charge. The terminology used 
is therefore not always consistent. 
11   Netherlands: Article 57 Mededingingswet; England: Section 36(8) Competition Act 1998; EU: Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003.
12  See Chapter 6, par. 6.2.2.
13   See the press release of the Commission on: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm. (visited 19/10/2018)
14   Department of Trade and Justice (2001) A World Class Competition Regime Department of Trade and Industry. (reference omitted)
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The impact of competition law fi nes of up to 10% of the turnover of the undertaking in a 
specifi c year cannot be underestimated though. Hence, the classifi cation of competition law 
proceedings as leading to a criminal charge by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, these proceedings 
do not belong to the hard core criminal law domain. The Dutch and English judiciary have 
accepted that competition law proceedings lead to a criminal charge.15
Competition law proceedings are thus subject to the rights and principles from, for example, 
the criminal law limb of Article 6 ECHR. The Union Courts have not yet been willing to accept 
that EU competition law proceedings lead to a criminal charge.16 This might require the Union 
Courts to set aside Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 which provides that competition law 
fi nes “shall not be of a criminal law nature”. Nevertheless, this has not prevented certain 
criminal law principles from fi nding their way in EU competition law procedures. The Union 
Courts have for example applied the non bis in idem principle and the freedom from self-
incrimination in EU competition law proceedings.17
The observation that competition law proceedings lead to a criminal charge does not mean 
that all safeguards which need to be applicable in criminal law proceedings, are applicable in 
competition law proceedings. As the ECtHR has e.g. held in Jussila, tax surcharge proceedings 
which could be regarded as of a criminal law nature “diff er from the hard core of criminal 
law” and “consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their 
full stringency”.18 Competition law is also mentioned by the ECtHR as an area of law which 
does not belong to the “traditional categories of the criminal law”.19 The criminal law rights 
from Article 6(1) ECHR, consequently, do not necessarily apply in their full stringency in 
competition law proceedings. 
At the same time, it does become apparent that some (minimum) criminal law safeguards do 
apply in competition law proceedings. It can however be questioned whether a more extensive 
protection, such as that provided in (hard core) criminal law proceedings, could be used as a 
source of inspiration for the level of safeguards in competition law proceedings.20 AG Kokott 
referred e.g. in the Schenker case to problems in competition law which are, according to her, 
not that dissimilar to problems in criminal law: 
15   The Netherlands: CBb (19 January 2009) ECLI:NL:CBB:2009:BH0436; England: CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1.
16   See e.g. the evasive approach of the Court in ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 33. The Court held that 
the ECtHR has regarded a fi ne imposed by the Italian competition authority as criminal in nature, but it does not give its own ruling 
on this matter. 
17   See e.g. respectively ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v 
Commission), par. 338; and ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem SA v Commission), par. 28-35. 
18  ECtHR, no. 73053/01 (Jussila v Finland), par. 43. 
19  ECtHR, no. 73053/01 (Jussila v Finland), par. 43.
20   See e.g. Barkhuysen et al. (2014), p. 182-183, who mention that Dutch administrative law courts adhere to the minimum safeguards of 
the ECHR. They assert that this minimum level of protection is quite low for a strongly developed legal system as the Netherlands. 
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and courts are faced with problems that are not dissimilar to those in criminal law, 
whose resolution may raise delicate questions relating to the protection of fundamental 
rights. The approach taken by the Court in this regard is of fundamental importance to 
the further development of European competition law and for its practical application 
both at EU level and at national level.21
Competition law courts are, according to AG Kokott, faced with problems similar to those 
in criminal law. This does not necessarily mean that criminal law should be used by the 
competition law judiciary as a source of inspiration to solve these problems. Competition 
law authorities have, generally speaking, supervisory and enforcement powers. I n criminal 
law, the prosecution enforces the rules and does not have (administrative) supervisory 
powers. This could indicate that the principles applied in (administrative) competition 
law proceedings and criminal law proceedings do not have to be similar. Nevertheless, 
(administrative) competition law proceedings and criminal law proceedings can both lead 
t o deterrent and punitive sanctions, and thus share that characteristic. Furthermore, in 
some Member States, a process of convergence between administrative law (in general) and 
criminal law is already taking place. There is thus already some impact of criminal law on 
administrative law proceedings in some Member States. This could be an indication that the 
safeguards in criminal law could be applied to competition law proceedings as well.
1.2.1 Convergence between administrative law and criminal law: Netherlands 
and England
The blurring of lines between criminal law and administrative law takes for example place 
in the Netherlands.22 Administrative law courts already apply some criminal law safeguards 
in administrative law proceedings. The Dutch Council of State has, in an unsolicited advice, 
suggested to the legislator to create stronger safeguards in administrative law proceedings 
for some proceedings leading to a punitive sanction.23 It is not clear whether this convergence 
between some administrative law domains and criminal law also takes place in the competition 
law domain. The present study therefore analyses to which extent this alignment already 
occurs through case law of the competition law courts. 
21   See the Opinion of AG Kokott in ECJ, C-681/11 (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co AG and others), par. 
3.
22   See Raad van State, “Analyse van enige verschillen in rechtsbescherming en rechtspositie van de justitiabele in het strafrecht en in het 
bestuursrecht” Advies W03.15.0138/II, par. 5. See also Barkhuysen et al. (2014), p. 187-188.
23   Raad van State, “Analyse van enige verschillen in rechtsbescherming en rechtspositie van de justitiabele in het strafrecht en in 
het bestuursrecht” Advies W03.15.0138/II, par. 6. The Dutch government is, however, not in favour of aligning criminal law and 
administrative law more extensively, by applying criminal law safeguards in administrative law proceedings. See the response of the 
Dutch government to the unsolicited advice of the Council of State: Nader Rapport bestuurlijke boetestelsels, annex: Standpunt van 
het kabinet over de verhouding tussen het strafrecht en het punitieve bestuursrecht naar aanleiding van het advies van de Afdeling 
advisering van de Raad van State inzake sanctiestelsels, par. 2.
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The English government did perceive some substantial diff erences in the safeguards in 
(administrative) competition law proceedings and criminal law proceedings. In its White 
Paper of 2001, the Department of Trade and Justice held the following with regard to the 
introduction of a (criminal) cartel off ence:
The introduction of criminal sanctions has signifi cant implications in the way cases are 
investigated and prosecuted. Procedural safeguards are required to ensure a fair trial. 
To secure a successful criminal conviction, guilt must be proved “beyond reasonable 
doubt” rather than “on the balance of probabilities”, the required civil standard of 
proof. Only in the most serious cases are criminal charges likely to be brought against 
individuals. The majority of cases will continue to be taken forward under the existing 
civil regime. It will be important both that OFT meets the new higher safeguards for 
criminal cases and that it retains its eff ectiveness in dealing with the full range of 
competition breaches.24
An alignment between (administrative) competition law proceedings and criminal law 
proceedings was thus not noted in the UK by the Department of Trade and Justice in 2001. This 
does not mean, however, that this alignment does not take place in practice. The observations 
of the Department of Trade and Justice stem already from 2001 and could be outdated. 
1.2.2 Goals of criminal law and competition law
It is more likely that a convergence between two law domains takes place when the goals 
of both areas of law overlap. Conversely, a possible impact of criminal law on competition 
law is less likely when the goals of those two domains substantially diff er. Therefore, it is 
relevant to examine briefl y the goals of criminal law and competition law to see whether 
criminal law principles might even fi t in the competition law domain. If an area of law 
pursues predominantly diff erent goals, it is logical that the underlying ideas, or principles, 
diff er as well, or at least are not exactly the similar. If criminal law and competition law 
pursue predominantly the same goals, it might be peculiar that criminal law principles are not 
already applied in the competition law domain. Therefore, in what follows, the substantive, 
procedural and sanctioning goals of both competition law and criminal law are succinctly 
examined.25
Substantive rules
Competition laws are implemented to ensure competition on the market, and, therefore, to 
avoid market failure, whilst criminal law pursues also other objectives. Most authors agree 
24   Department of Trade and Justice (2001) A World Class Competition Regime Department of Trade and Industry. (reference omitted)
25   This study deals solely with European Union, English and Dutch law. In this paragraph I refer also to US literature, since it is the fi rst 
jurisdiction where competition laws are also enforced by criminal law means. See e.g. Baker (2001), p. 694. US literature may, therefore, 
provide useful insights on the goals of both areas of law.
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might entail solely consumer welfare or even social welfare.27 European competition law 
also pursues market integration as an overall goal. Consumer welfare and total welfare 
may, in general, go hand in hand,28 but divergence could occur when consumer welfare is 
solely focused on the transfer of surplus from producers to consumers.29 The main focus in 
competition law is on economic objectives, or perhaps better said: competition law focuses on 
effi  ciency.30 On the other hand, there is an ongoing debate, especially in the European Union, 
whether non-effi  ciency considerations should be part of the goals of competition rules.31 One 
may conclude though that competition law (still) focuses mainly on effi  ciency considerations 
and thus on economic goals.
Whilst competition law pursues predominantly economic goals, criminal law is mainly, 
although not exclusively, concerned with other, non-economic, goals. It could be argued that 
the general goal of criminal law is to prevent harm;32 nevertheless, criminal law is formed by 
confl icting social, political, and historical factors.33 The notion of harm includes (potential) 
harm done to society and (potential) harm done to individuals. The prevention of harm to 
others rules out the criminalisation of behaviour which is not predominantly regarded to be 
immoral,34 therefore, one could regard “criminal law [as] a system of quasi-moral judgment 
which refl ects a society’s basic values”.35 We can see that criminal law has a certain moral 
character, which is also refl ected by the stigmatising eff ects of criminal law punishments. 
Criminal law therefore does not merely pursue economic goals. Other goals are important for 
the application of criminal law as well. Criminal law follows in general the developments in 
society.36 As Lacey et al. mention: “[W]e can conceive of crime and criminal law as planets in 
constant motion from shifting, mutating, social, political and cultural forces.”37 A complete list 
26   Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 4-12; p. 5-7; Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 18; Report from the Commission: Report on Competition Policy 2010, 
COM(2011) 328, par. 12-18. The aim of competition laws in the United States and the European Union was not always that clear though, 
see Odudu (2010), p. 599; see also Gerber (1994), p. 143-145, who spoke in 1994 of an identity crisis with regard to the goals of European 
competition law. 
27   Which is the sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare. Italianer, the Director-General for competition, of the European 
Commission refers to the concept of general welfare as the sum of consumer and producer surplus; Alexander Italianer, speech of 24 
May 2013 in Dublin.
28  Dierx, Ilzkovitz & Schmidt (2007), p. 179; Rose & Bailey (2013), p. 8.
29  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 11.
30   Odudu (2010), p. 599-604; Lavrijsen (2010), p. 636-641; Maier-Rigaud (2012); Ezrachi (2012), p. 10-11; see also on goals of European 
competition law: Cseres (2007), specifi cally p. 152-156; Schweitzer (2012), p. 181: “To conclude, there are few who would contest that 
effi  ciency and consumer orientation are among the relevant aspirations of competition law.” See for a discussion on the goals of (EU) 
competition law, also Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 18-24; and Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 34-44.
31   Gerbrandy (2017); Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 42-44; Lavrijsen (2010); Odudu (2010); Townley (2009). Wish and Bailey assert e.g. consumer 
protection, redistribution and the protection of competitors as additional goals, see Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 19-22. Cf. Monti (2007), 
p. 123, concluding that the approach taken by the Commission “[...] suggests that the future relevance of non-economic public policy 
considerations is bleak”.
32   See e.g. B Wardhaugh (2012), p. 377; Ashworth (1991), p. 11; see also Mill (1865), p. 135-136, who argues that the state should only 
interfere when harm is done to society or other individuals,. Cf. L Farmer (1996), p. 66: “It cannot be that we fall back onto the defi nition 
of crime as an act that harms the community [...] for this is merely to refl ect the same tautology (i.e. what harms the community - a 
crime) dressed up as moral or political theory.” 
33  Ashworth (1991), p. 11. 
34  Kelk & Lindeman (2010), p. 10. 
35  Lacey, Wells & Quick (2010), p. 6.
36  See e.g. De Than & Heaton (2013), p. 2-3; and Bosch (2011), p. 185-186.
37  Lacey, Wells & Quick (2010), p. 32.
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of goals therefore does not exist, since those goals are subject to the Zeitgeist. The substantive 
rules of criminal law can thus pursue multiple goals depending on societal ideas. 
A discussion on the diff erence in nature of criminal law and competition law may in particular 
be discerned in articles discussing the criminalisation of competition law.38 As MacCulloch 
puts it: “Competition law has not generally been seen to have a moral element outside the 
unfortunate, in the sense that it tends to confuse rather than inform public rhetoric about 
price fi xing being ‘theft’; however, as soon as competition law steps into the criminal arena it 
takes on a moral face […] If we are to use criminal law, we must abide by its conventions and 
justify our off ence on its terms.”39 The substantive rules in criminal law and in competition 
law do not pursue the same goals. Economic considerations are not the overall motive for the 
creation of criminal laws, whilst competition law mainly pursues purely economic goals. The 
natures of these two domains diff er and are thus not necessarily compatible with each other. 
Procedural rules
It has been argued that diff erent procedural rules and proceedings distinguish criminal laws 
from other areas of law.40 This may imply that the goals of procedural rules in criminal law and 
e.g. competition law are substantially diff erent. Dutch, English, and EU competition law are 
enforced through administrative law means, and cases are brought before administrative law 
courts.41 Traditionally a distinction is made in administrative law between two models from 
which the procedural rules of administrative law follow, viz. the recours objectif and the recours 
subjectif.42 The fi rst model centres on protecting the general interest, and focuses specifi cally 
on the legality of state actions. In other words, the fi rst model pertains to the prevention of 
ultra vires acts by the state. The second model focuses on protecting the legal position of an 
individual in a specifi c case, and therefore on dispute settlement.43 The intensity of judicial 
review is to a high degree infl uenced by the choice of model. If one chooses the recours subjectif, 
“[j]udicial intervention is no longer premised on the idea that the courts are simply applying 
the legislative will. Their role is to articulate principles that guide administrative action, and 
interpret legislation in the light of these principles”.44 Both models prevent abuse of power 
by the state, whether this is ‘solely’ by preventing ultra vires acts or by protecting rights of 
individuals. Furthermore, regardless of the model chosen, it remains clear that the state 
38  See e.g. Kadish (1962); Coff ee (1992); Baker (2001); A MacCulloch (2012).
39   See MacCulloch (2012), p. 82-83. See also Rosochowicz (2004), p. 756, who contends: “Off ences such as hardcore cartels are intentional 
conspiracies but traditional crimes will get more moral condemnation. In the past decade, after over 100 years after the enactment 
of the Sherman Act, the quantum of criminal fi nes and the fact that directors, and not only American directors, are sentenced and 
actually serve their time in prison prove that the emphasis has started to shift slowly towards a bigger “moralisation” of the crime and 
a tougher application of the rules.”
40   Farmer (1996), p. 65. The law of administrative sanctioning, of which competition law forms a part, may follow some of the same 
procedural rules as criminal law regimes. However, in this part I discuss the goals of the procedural rules of administrative laws, and not 
procedural rules as such. 
41  I solely focus on procedural rules in the judicial phase. 
42   De Poorter & De Graaf (2011), p. 15; Schreuder-Vlasblom (2013), p. 43-46; English administrative law follows the recours objectif, 
although there is a lot of discussion on this approach, see Craig (2012), p. 3-18. In the Netherlands there is a trend towards a system 
which is based more on the recours subjectif, see De Poorter & De Graaf (2011), p. 71-72.
43  See also Craig (2012), p. 17-18, discussing three diff erent “rights based approaches”. 
44  Craig (2012), p. 16.
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must guard the boundaries within which the state may act.45 Consequently, this implies that 
the judiciary is less concerned with ruling on the merits of a decision of the state, and thus 
with the substance of a decision, but more with the validity of acts of the state, and thus with 
procedural safeguards. 
Conversely, in criminal law the judiciary is, in general, concerned with taking a decision on 
the punishability of certain behaviour.46 This review is diff erent from a review where choices 
made by the state are examined.47 Criminal procedures are aimed at achieving a correct 
application of (substantive) criminal laws, which means that wrongdoers should be convicted 
and the innocent should go free.48 In order to achieve this goal, criminal procedure allocates 
competences to offi  cials, and at the same time sets limits to those competences. These rules 
are therefore by their nature ambivalent.49 On the one hand, criminal procedure provides 
extensive powers to offi  cials, and on the other hand, it provides safeguards for individuals. 
Criminal procedure and administrative procedure are, therefore, both concerned with 
preventing abuse of power by the state. However, in criminal law there is a much greater 
emphasis on preventing errors of law, and in safeguarding rights of individuals. Even though 
goals of criminal law and administrative law might overlap, the goals of criminal procedure, 
in general, go beyond the goals of administrative procedure. The diff erence in scope of the 
goals of procedural rules in criminal law, and procedural rules in competition law, has also 
e.g. been emphasised by Advocate-General Colomer in the Volkswagen50 case.
Rights of defence, which are also relevant outside judicial proceedings, are becoming 
increasingly more important in competition law proceedings.51 This increasing relevance 
of the rights of defence may indicate some impact of criminal law on this area of law. It is 
doubtful though, as Advocate-General Colomer also contended in the Volkswagen case, 
whether the goals of administrative procedure, and in that regard also competition procedure, 
are compatible with this extended protection of the rights of legal persons. On the other hand, 
the basic similarities in both criminal law and administrative law, protecting individuals and 
preventing ultra vires acts, might be suffi  cient reasons to apply similar procedural rules in 
competition law proceedings and criminal law proceedings.
Sanctions
An overriding interest of sanctioning regimes is to ensure compliance with the rules. 
Sanctions may be imposed on natural or legal person for infringements of substantive rules 
45  Schreuder-Vlasblom (2013), p. 2. 
46  Irrespective of the adversarial or inquisitorial nature of the proceedings.
47  A criminal law court can, obviously, also review the investigative powers exercised by the state.
48  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 8; Van Bemmelen & others (2010), p. 2; Sanders & Young (2007), p. 7-8.
49  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 8. 
50  ECJ, C-338/00 P (Volkswagen AG v Commission), par. 66. This paragraph was quoted above.
51   Cf. K Lenaerts (2007), p. 1488, who argues that this takes place due to the criminal law nature of fi nes.
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or procedural rules. Both in competition law and in criminal law, substantial sanctions may 
be imposed on the persons concerned. A main diff erence however is that in the administrative 
law enforcement of competition law, incarceration is not a sanction available to the 
enforcement authorities. In competition law the overriding goal of imposing a fi ne is to ensure 
compliance by undertakings in general (general deterrence), and the undertaking concerned 
(specifi c deterrence).52 Coff ee argues that the term deterrence is rather imprecise, and that 
a distinction should be made between deterrence by pricing, and deterrence by sanctions: 
“The diff erence between a price and a sanction is at bottom the diff erence between, on one 
hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into balance by forcing the actor to internalize 
costs that the actor’s conduct imposes on others and, on the other hand, a signifi cantly 
discontinuous increase in the expected cost of the [behaviour] that is intended to dissuade the 
actor from engaging in the activity at all.”53 According to Coff ee, while sanctions in the area of 
administrative law and criminal law are both meant to deter certain behaviour, administrative 
law is concerned with pricing whereas criminal law is concerned with sanctioning. This 
point of view does not seem justifi able in competition law. Fines imposed on undertakings 
in (administrative) competition law proceedings could be regarded as criminal law sanctions 
due to their deterrent/punitive eff ect.54 In the Netherlands and England, this has been the 
status quo for some time now.55 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled 
that competition law fi nes imposed in administrative proceedings are of a criminal law nature 
due to, among others, the deterrent eff ect of the sanctions.56
Sanctions in both competition law and in criminal law pursue the same overriding goal, viz. 
deterrence,57 which includes specifi c deterrence but also general deterrence. Nonetheless, 
sanctions in criminal law pursue also other goals. Retaliation,58 prevention of taking the law 
into one’s own hands,59 retribution,60 and reparation61 may also be mentioned. Furthermore, 
incarceration and rehabilitation of off enders may be discerned as goals of sentencing as 
52   See for European competition law: Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
No 1/2003, par. 4; and English competition law: CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, CMA73, 18 April 2018, 
par. 1.4.. The 2016 Guidance of the ACM only refers to specifi c deterrence for undertakings and to specifi c and general deterrence 
for fi nes imposed on natural persons, see Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, 
met betrekking tot het opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014), 
respectively Article 2.3(6) and 2.7(1). The old NMa Guidelines referred to both specifi c and general deterrence for undertakings, see: 
Beleidsregels van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 11 september 2009, nr. WJZ/9150320, houdende richtsnoeren voor het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes op grond van wetgeving waarvan de Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit 
is belast met het toezicht op de naleving (Beleidsregels van de Minister van Economische Zaken voor het opleggen van bestuurlijke 
boetes door de NMa 2009), Article 2.
53  Coff ee (1992), p. 1876. 
54   Supra n. 10. The ECtHR is not always consistent in the use of terminology when it concerns the nature of a penalty. Sometimes it refers 
to the deterrent eff ect of a sanction, whereas at other times reference is made to the punitive eff ect of a sanction. 
55   The Netherlands: CBb (19 januari 2009) ECLI:NL:CBB:2009:BH0436; England: CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1.
56  ECtHR, no. 43590/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy), par. 44.
57   See e.g. for English criminal law Allen (2017), p. 12-14; and for Dutch criminal law De Hullu (2018), p. 6.
58  E.g. De Hullu (2018), p. 6; Kelk & Lindeman (2010), p. 11 and p. 472-473; Nieboer (1991), p. 8-9.
59  E.g. Kelk & Lindeman (2010), p. 1.
60   E.g. Allen (2017), p. 10-12; Kelk & Lindeman (2010), p. 11. Retribution seems to be more objective than retaliation. Whereas retaliation 
focuses on vengeance, retribution sees on punishment and compensation. The goals are, however, related. 
61  E.g. Allen (2017), p. 16-17; Kelk & Lindeman (2010), p. 11; de Hullu (2018), p. 6.
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may change over time to refl ect the interests of society.64 It appears, therefore, that the goals 
of criminal law sanctioning go further than the goals of administrative law sanctioning. 
Or, as Kadish argues: “[T]he purpose behind the criminal sanction in [the area of economic 
regulations] is not penalisation, but regulation. Unlike the area of conventional crime against 
persons, and property where criminalisation serves to reassure the community, to express 
condemnation, and to set in motion a corrective or restraining regime, as well as to deter 
proscribed [behaviour], here the concern is solely with this last factor.”65
The goals of competition law sanctioning and criminal law sanctioning overlap partly.66
However, criminal law sanctioning pursues, as mentioned above, more goals. In this regard, 
it is obvious that diff erent principles apply to both areas and that, in general, principles in 
criminal law are more strictly adhered to. Nonetheless, especially due to their deterrent eff ect, 
competition law fi nes are regarded as being of a criminal law nature. One could argue that 
deterrence, or ensuring compliance, is therefore the main goal of the sanctioning regimes of 
both areas of law. A possible impact of criminal law principles on administrative competition 
law proceedings may then prove to be a positive process that should be encouraged by 
courts and legislators.67 Nevertheless, there appears to exist some scepticism among authors 
whether “administratively imposed penalties will ever refl ect the same scrupulous concern 
for the defendant’s rights as displayed in criminal trial”.68
1.2.3 Nature of the accused 
The goals of procedural and sanctioning rules of competition law and criminal law seem to 
overlap partly. This could indicate that criminal law might play a role in competition law 
proceedings. Nevertheless, it has been questioned whether the nature of the accused would 
prevent such an impact of criminal law on competition law. As AG Colomer held in the 
Volkswagen69 case: 
In general [...] the body of safeguards developed in the fi eld of criminal law, which has 
as its protagonists the penalising State, on the one hand, and the individual charged 
with the off ence on the other, is not transferred en bloc to the fi eld of competition law.
62  E.g. Allen (2017), p. 14-16.
63   Clarkson and Keating (2017), p. 40-75, e.g. argue that only four theories (or goals) of punishment exist, viz. retribution, deterrence, 
incarceration and rehabilitation. Incapacitation is referred to as a incarceration, since “protective sentencing aims to render the criminal 
incapable of committing more crimes; it thus ‘incapacitates’ the off ender.” Reparation is also mentioned, although this is “not strictly 
a theory of punishment”, p. 76-80. 
64   Jörg, Kelk and Klip (2012), p. 9-11, e.g. refer to a transition from the punitive nature of criminal law proceedings towards restorative 
justice.
65  Kadish (1962), p. 441.
66  See also Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 4.
67   Cf. Kadish (1962), p. 443-444, who contends that the blurring lines between criminal law sanctioning and regulatory sanctioning may 
require courts and legislators to deal with the non-use of culpability in regulatory proceedings. One may, in my opinion, read this more 
broadly and also include other criminal law principles.
68  Coff ee (1992), p. 1885.
69  ECJ, C-338/00 P (Volkswagen AG v Commission).
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Those safeguards are designed specifi cally to compensate for that imbalance of power. 
In the case of free competition, those parameters are altered, since it is sought to protect 
the community of individuals which constitutes society, and is composed of groups 
of consumers against powerful corporations with signifi cant resources. To accord 
such off enders the same procedural safeguards as those accorded to the most needy 
individuals, apart from being a mockery, would entail, essentially, a lower degree of 
protection, in this case economic protection, for the individual as the main victim of 
anti-competitive conduct. I therefore consider it important that the procedural rules be 
adapted to the specifi c fi eld of competition.70
The ECtHR has, by contrast, applied criminal law safeguards to legal persons.71 As Emberland 
contends: “Some rights have always and without discussion been regarded as applicable 
to companies including the right to enjoyment of the procedural guarantees in [Article 6 
paragraph 1].”72 This means that criminal law safeguards are, in practice, already applied to 
legal persons. The statement of AG Colomer negates the fact that undertakings can be subject 
to criminal law proceedings, and are, as such, already provided with the protection of (some) 
safeguards in those proceedings.73
It is assessed whether the competition law judiciary does in practice apply criminal law 
safeguards in competition law proceedings, and, if so, whether these safeguards are adapted 
to the specifi c needs and characteristics of the competition law domain. It should, however, 
be emphasised that (some) criminal law safeguards are in practice already applied to legal 
persons in criminal law proceedings. Furthermore, as mentioned above, some criminal law 
principles also have found their way in competition law proceedings. The nature of the 
accused does therefore not necessarily prevent an impact of criminal law safeguards on 
competition law proceedings. 
1.2.4 Criminal law: a rich source of inspiration for legal safeguards
As contended before, some convergence between criminal law and administrative law is 
already taking place in some Member States. There is thus an impact of criminal law on some 
administrative law proceedings. It is, however, not clear whether this is the case for competition 
law. The goals of procedural rules and sanctioning rules partly overlap. Therefore, it would be 
logical if there is some impact of criminal law on competition law. Furthermore, the nature of 
the accused does not necessarily prevent a possible impact of criminal law on competition law. 
It could thus be the case that some impact of criminal law on the administrative enforcement 
of competition law in the Netherlands, England and the EU is already occurring. Criminal law 
70  Opinion AG Colomer in ECJ, C-338/00 P (Volkswagen AG v Commission), par. 66. 
71   See e.g. ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 11598/85(Société Stenuit v France); ECtHR, no. 14902/04 (OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompa niya Yukos v Russia); and ECtHR, no. 43509/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy).
72  Emberland, (2006), p. 110.
73  See for the position of the legal person e.g. in Dutch criminal law, Kesteloo (2013). 
Introduction | CHAPTER 1
37
Ch
ap
te
r 1can provide a rich source of inspiration for the judiciary on the legal safeguards which should 
apply in competition law proceedings. 
The current competition law regimes in the Netherlands, England and the EU are relatively 
young. Criminal law has a much longer tradition. Safeguards for a suspect have therefore 
been developed over a longer period of time. Bosch for example demonstrates the gradual 
developments in Dutch criminal law of the safeguards of a suspect. Where a suspect was at 
times merely regarded as an object of proceedings, he slowly became part of those proceedings. 
A suspect gradually received more legal protection in criminal law proceedings.74 Legal 
safeguards were thus developed and adapted over many years. 
In England as well, rights of the defence were over the years gradually acknowledged. As 
Baker e.g. sums up about the development of criminal procedure in England: 
The most important reforms were put off  until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
After the 1730s, prisoners on trial for felony were frequently allowed counsel to help 
them present their case, as a matter of grace; and it was made a legal right in 1836. A 
criminal Bar came into existence, and in consequence of its eff orts some improvements 
were made in trial practice. Rules of evidence designed to protect the prisoner, such 
as the exclusion of hearsay and the need for accomplices’ evidence to be corroborated, 
were developed by the courts in the Georgian period. […] In 1898 defendants were 
fi nally accorded the dangerous privilege of giving sworn evidence themselves.75
The gradual development of legal safeguards in criminal law has led to a well-developed area 
of law. As asserted above, there is much discussion on the legal safeguards for undertakings 
subject to competition law proceedings. This is not surprising because of the relatively young 
nature of this area of law. Criminal law could perhaps provide inspiration for the development 
of legal safeguards in competition law proceedings. 
1.2.5 Criminal law as a source of inspiration?
Criminal law is a well-developed area of law. The legal safeguards applicable to a suspect 
have gradually been developed. In competition law, there is still much discussion on the level 
of legal safeguards for undertakings. The deterrent eff ect of competition law fi nes has led the 
ECtHR, the Dutch competition law courts and the English competition law courts to conclude 
that competition law proceedings lead to a criminal charge. It can be questioned whether 
merely the minimum safeguards of the ECHR are adhered to in competition law proceedings, 
or whether more extensive protection is provided by the judiciary. The inspiration of this 
higher level of safeguards could be drawn from criminal law. This is not an inconceivable 
74  Bosch (2011), p. 136-150. 
75  Baker (2002), p. 510-511.
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approach, since, as mentioned above, in some Member States there is already an ongoing 
process of convergence between criminal law and administrative law. Administrative law 
courts, for example in the Netherlands, do already apply some criminal law safeguards in 
administrative law proceedings. Whether this is the case for (administrative) competition law 
proceedings has not yet been researched. It could be argued that the nature of the accused 
in criminal law and competition law proceedings would prevent such an impact of criminal 
law on competition law. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, legal persons can also be subject 
to criminal law proceedings. It is examined in the present research whether competition law 
courts do indeed apply criminal law principles in competition law proceedings, and, if so 
whether these principles are adapted to the needs and characteristics of competition law. 
It has also been mentioned that the procedural and sanctioning goals of criminal law and 
competition law do overlap to a certain extent. Procedural and sanctioning rules in criminal 
law pursue, however, more goals than the respective rules in competition law. Nevertheless, 
it could not be argued that the diff erence in goals is as such that criminal law principles 
can never be used in competition law proceedings. The substantive goals of both areas of 
law do, however, diff er substantially. This would make a convergence in substantive rules 
less likely. Procedural and sanctioning rules are more important than the substantive rules 
for this research, since it deals with the use of criminal law principles and safeguards in the 
enforcement of the competition law rules. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The main research question is, as mentioned above: what is the impact of criminal law 
principles on the enforcement of the rules of competition law in the Netherlands, England, 
and at the European Union level? 
Multiple rights are applicable in competition law proceedings. Jones and Sufrin list for 
example the “rights of the defence (the right to a fair trial – eff ective judicial protection – and 
the consequent procedural rights)” as well as other rights which “include the presumption 
of innocence, legitimate expectation, legal certainty, equal treatment, non-discrimination, 
privacy, non-retroactivity, proportionality, sound administration, and the protection of 
confi dential information”.76 In order to determine the impact of criminal law principles on 
competition law, it is necessary to discuss the principles which are applicable in competition 
law proceedings. This analysis makes it possible to select relevant criminal law principles for 
the present study. An answer is thus sought to the following sub-question: 
•  Which principles (procedural and substantive, including fundamental rights) that 
traditionally belong to the realm of criminal law, have an impact on English, Dutch, and 
EU competition law? 
76  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 895. 
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•  How are these principles applied in practice by the respective competition authorities 
and competition courts, and what possible mutations and deviations have manifested 
themselves so far?
1.4 DELIMITATION
This study deals with two diff erent areas of law and their interaction. These areas are the 
area of criminal law and the area of competition law. Furthermore, three diff erent systems 
of enforcement are discussed, namely the English, Dutch and EU enforcement systems. The 
ECHR system is also examined. This study is of an internal comparative nature (comparison 
of criminal law and competition law) and has some external comparative elements as well 
(comparison of the developments in Dutch, English competition law with EU competition 
law). Considering the scope of this research, three jurisdictions and multiple areas of law, a 
sound demarcation is crucial. In what follows, the diff erent delimitations of this research are 
discussed. 
1.4.1 Delimitation I: The Netherlands, England and the EU
The Netherlands and England have been chosen because of their advanced experience 
with competition law enforcement, and due to their diff erent enforcement systems. In the 
Netherlands, a decriminalisation trend of competition law has taken place, which means 
that nowadays competition laws are solely administratively enforced.77 On the other hand, 
in England the Cartel Off ence was introduced in 2002, which means that some competition 
law provisions are enforced by criminal law means. Reference in this study is made in general 
to England and not to the United Kingdom due to the three diff erent criminal law systems 
in the UK.78 For competition law enforcement there is only one system in the UK. The CMA 
enforces the competition law rules throughout the whole of the country. Nevertheless, due 
to the particularities of the criminal law systems in the UK, reference is made in general to 
England.79
An intriguing divergence has occurred between the Netherlands and England. The 
decriminalisation trend on the one hand and, on the other hand the criminalisation trend, 
might provide some interesting insights. As mentioned above, in the Netherlands, the 
77   Mok (2004), p. 596-597, proposed to re-embed the competition law regime in the criminal law domain, but only partly. This would 
lead to a mixed regime where criminal law enforcement is available for the most serious infringements, whereas administrative 
law enforcement remains an option for the other infringements. Nevertheless, the legislator decided with the creation for the 
Mededingingswet to enforce the competition law rules in the Netherlands only through administrative law means. This in contrast to 
other regimes which were changed from a purely criminal law regime to a dual enforcement regime. The choice to embed competition 
law in the administrative law domain was due to the complexity of the competition law rules. See Raad van State, “Analyse van enige 
verschillen in rechtsbescherming en rechtspositie van de justitiabele in het strafrecht en in het bestuursrecht” Advies W03.15.0138/II, 
par. 4.
78   Strictly speaking reference should be made to England and Wales. However, in this research the choice is made for the sake of clarity 
to merely refer to England. 
79   As mentioned, there are three diff erent criminal law systems in the UK, namely in Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales. 
These three systems have diff erent criminal laws and criminal procedures. 
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general process of decriminalisation has nonetheless not prevented administrative law 
courts from applying criminal law safeguards. Criminal law principles could thus still play 
a role in the administrative law enforcement of the competition law rules, even though the 
legislator decided to transpose the enforcement regime from the criminal law fi eld into the 
administrative law domain. One could also argue that the use of criminal law principles is 
not necessarily in line with the intention of the legislator when it decided to change the Dutch 
competition law enforcement regime. 
Conversely, the criminalisation of competition law in England might have led to a sharper 
division between administrative competition law enforcement and criminal competition 
law enforcement. This potential sharper division between administrative and criminal law 
enforcement of competition law could mean that criminal law has less of an impact on 
the administrative law enforcement of the English competition rules. However, one could 
also argue that the introduction of both administrative law enforcement and criminal law 
enforcement for competition law infringements could lead to a more mixed enforcement 
regime, where criminal law principles are also applied in administrative competition law 
proceedings. 
It is thus intriguing to examine whether the administrative competition law judiciary in 
the Netherlands and England apply criminal law principles in their case law, and if so, in 
what manner. Criminalisation and decriminalisation of competition law enforcement could 
both for diff erent reasons, as mentioned above, lead either to the application of criminal law 
principles in administrative law proceedings or to a sharper divide between administrative 
law and criminal law. 
The enforcement of European competition law is also discussed here, since it provides for 
various jurisdictions the foundation of their competition laws.80 The infl uence of European 
competition law on principles in the enforcement of national competition laws cannot be 
underestimated, especially since national authorities are obliged, under certain circumstances, 
to apply the substantive European competition law rules as well.81
1.4.2 Delimitation II: Exclusion of the Directive on the empowerment of 
domestic competition authorities
The Directive aimed at empowering domestic competition law authorities is, in general, not 
discussed in this study. Political agreement was reached on this Directive on 30 May 2018,82
and it was offi  cially adopted on 11 December 2011.83 This Directive contains specifi c powers 
for domestic competition authorities, such as the powers to inspect business premises, inspect 
80   The cartel prohibition and the prohibition of abusing a dominant position are, in the Netherlands and England, mirrored on respectively 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU.
81  See Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003.
82   See the press release of the Commission on http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-3996_en.htm. (visited 19/10/2018)
83   See Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of 
the Member States to be more eff ective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.
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English competition law authority already have these powers. Furthermore, the Directive 
also provides that domestic authorities shall comply with general principles of EU law and 
the Charter when they enforce Article 101 or 102 TFEU. Such general principles of EU law and 
the Charter are discussed in this research. The added value of the Directive for this research 
is thus limited. 
1.4.3 Delimitation III: Exclusion of merger control and state aid
The focus in the present research is on the cartel prohibition and the prohibition on the abuse 
of a dominant position. Merger control and state aid are not discussed. The state aid rules 
are not discussed, since they are aimed at Member States. Merger control is of a completely 
diff erent nature than the cartel prohibition and the prohibition on the abuse of a dominant 
position. In merger control, an ex ante enforcement approach is taken and it revolves around 
proper notifi cation issues and economic assessments, which is not at the centre of this study. 
Furthermore, even though merger control has a sanctioning regime, it gives less rise to 
penalties than in procedures under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their respective national 
counterparts.
1.4.4 Delimitation IV: Time period 
A further delimitation is made with regard to the time period that is researched. The starting 
point for my inquiry is 1998. The reason for this starting point is that the Competition Act 
was adopted in England in that year. In the Netherlands, a system mirrored on European 
competition law was introduced in 1998. Furthermore, in 1999 a White Paper on the 
modernisation of EU competition law was published by the European Commission.85 This 
year thus also marked a shift in the enforcement system of the European Union. Even though 
this research departs from 1998, important precedents predating that year are also discussed, 
since subsequent case law builds on these. The case law research has been conducted up till 1 
January 2018. A period of 20 years is thus covered in this study. 
There are relatively few (administrative) competition law cases in England. In the Netherlands, 
the number of cases is, compared to EU competition law cases, relatively limited. Therefore, it 
84   Respectively Articles 6, 7 and 8 of Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower 
the competition authorities of the Member States to be more eff ective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market.
85  White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.
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proved manageable to examine all (administrative) competition law cases between 1 January 
1998 and 1 January 2018 in these two jurisdictions.86 There are much more competition law 
rulings from the Union Courts than from the English and Dutch competition law courts. 
Therefore, the search term for this jurisdiction was narrowed down per principle. From 1 
January 1998 up till 12 May 2016, cases were searched by specifi c terms instead of a general 
‘competition law’ term. For each principle specifi c terms were used.87 A fi nal analysis of all 
competition law cases before the Union Courts was conducted from 13 May up till 1 January 
2018. It cannot be excluded that some cases were not found, because the search terms were too 
specifi c or because the cases were not published online. Cases not found by the use of these 
search terms, were referred to in the cases found. This means that all relevant cases have been 
found. 
1.4.5 Delimitation V: Five criminal law principles
A fi nal delimitation is made with regard to the principles which are analysed in this study. As 
it is nearly impossible to discuss all criminal law principles in competition law, a selection is 
inevitable. The author researched competition law cases of the CJEU from between 1998 and 
2012, in order to fi nd relevant principles for the purpose of this writing.88 In general, 25% of 
the cases brought before the General Court (formerly known as the Court of First Instance89) 
were appealed to the European Court of Justice.90 The European Court of Justice quashes the 
rulings of the General Court, amongst others, when they are not in line with the precedents 
it created. The method of reviewing case law of the ECJ from 1998 up till 2012 thus ensures 
that only principles are discussed in this research which are relevant to the enforcement of the 
competition law rules. A total of twenty principles emerged from this research. Six substantive
86   For England, fi rst a search with the term ‘competition law’ was conducted via www.bailii.org. The relevant cases were then entered into 
Westlaw UK, to search for appeal cases and related cases. In this manner, it was attempted to fi nd all relevant cases from 1 January 
1998 until 1 January 2018, since the bailii website does not contain all (appeal) cases. A fi nal check was done, by checking the list of 
competition law decisions in the 2015 and 2018 edition of ‘Competition Law’ from Whish and Bailey. The 2018 edition only deals with 
cases from 6 February 2015 to 8 December 2017, since the cases before February 2015 were referred to in the 2015 edition. See Whish 
and Baliey (2015), p. 447-450; and Whish and Bailey (2018), p. 393-394.
   Case law in the Netherlands was found by using the search term ‘mededingingswet’ (Competition Act) via www.rechtspraak.nl. Not all 
appeal cases appeared independently in this search. Therefore, it was decided to limit the research to cases from the District Court of 
Rotterdam, which is the court of fi rst instance in (administrative law) competition law cases in the Netherlands. Additional appeal 
cases were found in the information box at each District Court case on www.rechtspraak.nl. This approach ensured that all relevant cases 
in fi rst instance and in appeal were found. 
87   The search terms used in Curia for the freedom from self-incrimination were: ‘privilege against self-incrimination’; ‘freedom from self-
incrimination’; ‘self-incriminat*’; and ‘Orkem’.
   For the non bis in idem principle the search terms were: ‘non bis in idem’ + ‘competition law’; and ‘ne bis in idem’.
   The following terms were used for the burden and standard of proof: ‘standard of proof’ + ‘competition law’; and ‘presumption of 
innocence’ + ‘competition law’.
   For legality and legal certainty the following terms were used: ‘legality’ + ‘competition law’. 
   Lastly, for the proportionality of sanctions ‘proportionality’ + ‘competition law’ was used. 
   This research was updated in the summer of 2018 by examining all cases from 12 May 2016 until 1 January 2018 by searching 
‘competition law’ via htt ps://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/index.html.
88   A discussion of these twenty principles took place in a separate chapter. Nevertheless, the author decided not to include this research 
into the present writing. A copy of this chapter can always be requested from the author.
89   I refer in this research in general to the General Court as a matter of clarity. If a specifi c case ruled upon before 2009 is discussed, 
reference is made to the Court of First Instance. 
90  House of Lords: European Union Committee (2007), p. 67, fn.7.
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certainty,92 détournement de pouvoir, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of 
equal treatment, and the fault principle. A total of thirteen procedural principles were found. 
These principles are: the principle of equality of arms, the right to an adversarial trial, rules 
of evidence, the immediacy principle, the freedom from self-incrimination, the right to legal 
representation, the principle of res judicata, the right to eff ective judicial review, the right to a 
public hearing, the right to a trial within a reasonable time, the presumption of innocence,93
non bis in idem,94 and the obligation to give reasons. Lastly, one sanctioning principle was 
found, namely the proportionality of sanctions. 
Narrowing down the selection of principles
Certain principles discussed in this chapter do not play a major role in competition law 
proceedings. One example is the fault principle. The Dutch, English and EU competition 
law rules can be enforced without the need to determine whether an infringement was 
committed intentionally. As the European Court of Justice e.g. ruled: “[T]he parties’ intention 
is not a necessary factor in determining whether an agreement between undertakings is 
restrictive.”95 The fault principle therefore does not play a role in establishing a competition 
law infringement. It does play a role when imposing a fi ne on an undertaking. Fines can 
in general only be imposed when the infringement of the competition rules was intentional 
or negligent, although it is not necessary to pinpoint whether the infringement occurred by 
intent or by negligence. It could, however, be relevant to determine whether the infringement 
occurred intentionally or negligently when considering this as respectively an aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance. Some aspects of the fault principle do therefore come back in the 
discussion on the proportionality of sanctions. Lastly, it should be stated that exculpatory 
defences do not play a major role in Dutch, English and EU competition law proceedings. The 
fault principle has therefore, due to its limited application in competition law proceedings, 
not been included in this research.
Other principles, such as the equality of arms, the right to an adversarial trial, the immediacy 
principle, the right to legal representation, the principle of res judicata and the right to a public 
hearing, do not play a major role in EU competition law proceedings. These principles are not 
91   It should be mentioned that the right to privacy can be regarded as both a procedural principle and as a substantive principle, see: De 
Hert & Gutwirth (2006), p. 87-91.
92   The principle of legality can be both a substantive principle as well as a procedural principle. However, in the case law of the ECJ in 
competition law proceedings one can only discern clearly the substantive principle of legality. The procedural principle of legality can 
be found when other principles are discussed, e.g. the right to privacy. There is not a separate discussion on the procedural principle of 
legality in this chapter, since there is no clear reference to the procedural principle of legality in competition law cases brought before 
the ECJ. 
93   The presumption of innocence also has a substantive element to it, e.g. when dealing with presumptions of law. 
94   The non bis in idem principle is capable of being a legal impediment to prosecution, and can thus be regarded as a procedural principle 
(prevention against double jeopardy). However, the prevention of double liability falls more under the substantive rules of a criminal 
law. This principle thus has a procedural and substantive element. Van Kempen and Bemelmans (2018), p. 253, assert that the “core [of 
the non bis in idem principle] is of a substantive nature”. 
95   ECJ, C-67/13 P (Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission), par. 54, although “there is nothing prohibiting the competition 
authorities, the national courts or the Courts of the European Union from taking that factor into account”. 
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extensively discussed in competition law cases before the ECJ. Therefore, they are excluded 
from the current selection.
There are, moreover, principles which are related to each other and are, in that regard, 
sometimes even examined together. Case law on the principle of détournement de pouvoir 
focuses mainly on the use of evidence obtained in one procedure for another procedure. 
This aspect is also discussed by the ECJ as a safeguard under the right to privacy. Similarly, 
some aspects of the rules of evidence relate to the standard of proof and can therefore be 
discussed under the presumption of innocence. Another example is the principle of legitimate 
expectations. This principle is, in EU competition law proceedings, mainly discussed in the 
same breath as the principles of legality and legal certainty. 
Selecting the fi ve principles central to this research
From the twenty principles, a smaller selection could thus be made of nine principles. These 
principles are (i) the right to privacy, (ii) legal certainty and legality, (iii) equal treatment, (iv) 
the freedom from self-incrimination, (v) a trial within a reasonable time, (vi) the presumption of 
innocence, (vii) non bis in idem, (viii) the obligation to give reasons and (ix) the proportionality 
of sanctions. 
Two selection methods were used to narrow down the nine principles to a selection of fi ve. 
First, in this research, substantive, procedural and sanctioning principles are discussed. These 
three diff erent types of principles are chosen to ensure a representative discussion on the 
impact of criminal law principles on competition law principles. It could for example be 
that criminal law principles play a bigger role with respect to sanctioning, because of the 
similarities with the criminal law domain.96 Higher criminal law safeguards could perhaps be 
used when determining a competition law fi ne to negate the negative consequences of that 
fi ne. Overlooking such a particularity is prevented by choosing substantive, procedural and 
sanctioning principles. 
Second, it is important to choose principles which traditionally belong to the criminal law 
domain and to choose more neutral principles which can be found in all areas of law. The 
application of (traditional) criminal law principles might, on its own, already show an impact 
of criminal law on competition law proceedings. Conversely, neutral principles might be 
interpreted in competition law proceedings in a similar vein as their criminal law counterparts. 
This could reveal an impact of criminal law principles as well. Therefore, principles which 
have criminal law as their roots and more neutral principles, which can be found in multiple 
areas of law, are examined. 
96  See for more information on this, the discussion in par. 1.2.2 on the goals of competition law and criminal law. 
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The legality and legal certainty principle have, for this research, been chosen as the substantive 
principles. These principles are founding principles in a society based on the rule of law. The 
fundamental nature of these principles was thus the reason to choose these principles over 
the other substantive principle, namely the right to privacy. The legality and legal certainty 
principle are of a neutral nature, and could therefore reveal an impact of criminal law if they 
are interpreted in light of their criminal law counterparts. 
Procedural principles
The burden and standard of proof and the freedom from self-incrimination have been chosen 
as procedural principles. The right to a trial within a reasonable time and the obligation 
to give reasons are thus excluded for this research. The freedom from self-incrimination is 
chosen since it is a typical criminal law principle.97 Moreover, this principle belongs to the 
heart of a fair trial and is therefore of a fundamental nature. The burden and standard of proof 
are, by contrast, of a neutral nature and can therefore be found in diff erent areas of law. These 
principles are coloured by the fi eld of law in which they operate. The impact of criminal law 
on competition law proceedings could therefore easily be discerned if these principles are 
applied in a similar manner as their criminal law counterparts. The burden and standard 
of proof are, in the list of principles mentioned above, not referred to as separate principles. 
These principles, nevertheless, do play a role in light of the presumption of innocence and 
the rules of evidence. The presumption of innocence and the rules of evidence contain many 
diff erent aspects. It would go beyond the scope of the current research to examine all these 
diff erent aspects. Two important aspects were therefore chosen for this research, namely the 
burden and standard of proof. 
Substantive and procedural principle
The non bis in idem principle contains both substantive and procedural aspects and is therefore 
an interesting principle, since it might show an impact of both substantive and procedural 
criminal law principles on competition law. This is furthermore a traditional criminal law 
principle,98 which has found its way in competition law proceedings.
Sanctioning principles
Lastly, a sanctioning principle was picked for this research. The proportionality of sanctions 
is obviously a sanctioning principle. The equality principle is, in EU competition law 
97   See e.g. MacNair (1990), Langbein (1994) and MacCulloch (2006), p. 213-215 (and literature there cited) who discuss the origin of this 
principle in criminal law. 
98   Lelieur (2013), p. 199, refers to the origin of this principle in Roman law, where it was used in both criminal and civil law actions. 
She also contends, p. 200-201, that “[s]ince the Enlightenment, ne bis in idem has not been just an instrument to make the maxim of 
res judicata pro veritate habetur concrete, it has been a fundamental guarantee for the individual against the possible abuse of criminal 
procedure by prosecutors – and by civil parties with the right to prosecute.” The latter statement implies that the non bis in idem 
principle could generally be regared as a criminal law principle. It should be mentioned though that the term “criminal” is applied by 
the ECtHR and the CJEU in non bis in idem cases in a lenient manner and relates also to some administrative law penalties. For more 
information see chapter 2.   
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proceedings, mainly invoked in relation to sanctions, and can as such, be regarded as a 
sanctioning principle. The equality principle could be applied as a factor when assessing the 
proportionality of a fi ne. Therefore, the proportionality of sanctions has been chosen as the 
sanctioning principle, since it is capable of encompassing the equality principle. This principle 
is, obviously, of a more neutral nature and can also play a role in administrative proceedings 
which lead to administrative law sanctions. 
Selection of principles
Ultimately, a selection of fi ve principles has been made. These fi ve principles are:
•  the freedom from self-incrimination, and partly the principle of legal professional 
privilege in so far as this is relevant; 
• the principle of non bis in idem; 
• rules regarding burden and standard of proof; 
• the principle of legality and the principle of legal certainty; 
• the proportionality of sanctions. 
These principles are discussed, as mentioned above, in case law of the Union Courts, the 
Dutch courts and the UK courts in (administrative) competition law cases from between 
1998 and 2018. This means that these fi ve principles are (merely) discussed in light of their 
application by the judiciary. It could be that some aspects which could or should play a role 
in competition law proceedings and which relate these principles are not discussed. This is a 
logical consequence of the delimitation of this research. It is is for the present study more useful 
to examine the application and scope of the fi ve principles as they are currently interpreted 
by the judiciary. This ensures that a proper comparison can be made with criminal law, in 
order to determine whether criminal law has an infl uence on administrative competition law 
proceedings. 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
This study consists of four parts. In part II, criminal law principles are discussed. Each chapter 
in this part highlights a diff erent jurisdiction. Chapter 2 examines criminal law principles in 
the EU and under the ECHR system, chapter 3 discusses those principles in the Netherlands, 
and chapter 4 examines the criminal law principles in England. The European Convention on 
Human Rights is discussed in chapter 2, although its infl uence can also be found in chapters 3 
and 4. In part III, the application and interpretation of the fi ve principles in competition law is 
analysed extensively. Part III follows the same outline as part II and consists therefore of three 
chapters, namely 5, 6, and 7, each discussing the competition laws of respectively the EU, the 
Netherlands, and England. The fi nal part IV consists of two chapters. Chapter 8 evaluates 
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47
Ch
ap
te
r 1the possible impact of criminal law principles on competition law enforcement. In chapter 9, 
conclusions are drawn and recommendations are provided. 

PART II
Criminal Law
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The EU and the ECHR
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this study, the impact of criminal law principles on competition law proceedings is 
analysed. As stated in the fi rst chapter, three jurisdictions play a central role, namely the EU, 
the Netherlands and England. The principles in the ECHR and in EU criminal law have a 
major infl uence on all three jurisdictions. The fi ve, for this research chosen principles, are in 
this chapter further discussed under the ECHR framework and in EU criminal law. 
EU law does not provide a clear-cut defi nition of ‘EU criminal law’.1 Klip defi nes EU criminal 
law as “the multilevel fi eld of law in which the European Union has a normative infl uence 
on either substantive criminal law / criminal procedure, or on the co-operation between the 
Member States. It is supplemented by the areas where the European Union directly enforces 
criminal law”.2 In this research, the term ‘EU criminal law’ is used in line with the defi nition 
of Klip. This means that all cases before the CJEU in which the EU criminalised certain 
behaviour, or where Member States enforce or abrogate from EU law by criminal law means 
are discussed. In these cases the CJEU developed and still develops criminal law concepts. 
In the EU, there are two main sources for criminal law principles, namely the general principles 
of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Charter). There are currently 
also multiple harmonisation measures in place that codify specifi c principles for criminal law 
proceedings.3 The Charter codifi es multiple general principles of EU law.4 This codifi cation 
is subject to two caveats; (i) there might be rights and principles which are not to be found in 
existing case law,5 and (ii) the Charter might contain principles and rights which are narrower 
than their counterpart as a general principle of EU law.6 General principles of EU law bind 
the Union institutions7 and Member States when Union law is applicable.8 This means that 
Member States are bound by the general principles of EU law when they implement or 
execute EU law,9 when they derogate from EU law,10 and when they act within the scope of 
Union law.11 This approach has been extended to the rights and principles from the Charter.12
1  Klip (2016), p.190-194. 
2   Klip (2016), p. 2. Klip refers to competition law and the European Public Prosecutor’s Offi  ce as areas of law where the EU directly 
enforces criminal law. The Court of Justice has, however, never accepted that competition law proceedings are of a criminal law 
nature. 
3   See for an overview of all measures in place up till December 2017, the overview of the Council of Europe entitled “European Union 
instruments in the fi eld of criminal law and related texts”. It is regularly updated and accessible via http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-union-instruments/, visited 20/8/2018.
4  See the preamble of the Charter. 
5  Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons (2014), p. 1576. 
6  Hofmann & Mihaescu (2013), p. 101
7  See e.g. ECJ, 240/83 (Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d’huiles usagées (ADBHU)), par. 9.
8  ECJ, C-260/89 (ERT), par. 42.
9  ECJ, 5/88 (Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft).
10  ECJ, C-112/00 (Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich).
11  ECJ, C-555/07 (Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG).
12   Article 51(1) of the Charter. See for the interpretation of this article: ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson); and ECJ, 
C-198/13 (Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno de España en Alicante) and others).
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It is important to focus on the hard core criminal law cases when it concerns cases brought 
before the ECtHR. The freedom from self-incrimination is for example triggered when there 
is a criminal law charge, which is a broad concept encompassing administrative law penalties 
as well. In order to determine an impact of criminal law on competition law proceedings, it 
is thus relevant to focus only on the hard core criminal law charges. Otherwise, the approach 
towards a principle would be compared between competition law and another administrative 
law domain. That defi es the purpose of this research. Furthermore, the ECtHR has made clear 
in Jussila13 that certain principles may be applied more leniently in cases involving a non-hard 
core criminal law charge. 
The European Convention on Human Rights is applicable on the territory of all contracting 
parties to the Convention.14 It diff ers however per Member State what the eff ect will be of 
the ECtHR in national law. Even though all contracting parties have incorporated it in their 
national legal systems, its eff ect depends “on the details of incorporation and the approach 
taken by the judiciary in response to it”.15 It appears however that national courts in majority 
follow the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the interpretation of the 
Convention.16 The Court of Justice of the EU has accepted that the ECHR forms an important 
source of inspiration for defi ning general principles of EU law,17 although the EU is not formally 
bound by it,18 since it has not yet acceded to the Convention.19 The ECHR thus has an important 
infl uence on EU criminal law and the criminal laws in England and the Netherlands.
In subsequent order, the freedom from self-incrimination (2.2), the non bis in idem principle (2.3), 
the burden and standard of proof (par. 2.4), the principle of legality and legal certainty (2.5), and 
the proportionality of sanctions (2.6) is examined in the ECHR and in EU criminal law. 
2 .2 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
An accused person has a privilege not to incriminate himself. This privilege however is not 
absolute in EU criminal law, nor in the ECHR. The term freedom from self-incrimination is 
used in this study to describe the right to remain silent as well. The latter can be regarded as 
the core of the freedom from self-incrimination.20
Nevertheless, in legal literature, a discussion exists whether the right to remain silent can 
indeed be regarded as the core of the freedom from self-incrimination. Some authors argue 
that the right to remain silent sees mainly on the drawing of adverse inferences.21 Implicitly, 
13   ECtHR, no. 73053/01 (Jussila v Finland), par. 43. 
14  Article 1 European Convention on Human Rights.
15  Harris et al. (2014), p. 27.
16  Harris et al. (2014), p. 28.
17  See e.g. ECJ, C-299/95 (Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich), par. 14.
18  See e.g. ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), par. 44.
19   There is an obligation for the EU to accede to the ECHR, see Article 6(2) TEU. However, accession in the near future seems unlikely in 
light of ECJ, Opinion 2/13. 
20   As the ECtHR e.g. stated in no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 69, for the freedom from self-incrimination in Article 6(1) 
ECHR, “[t]he right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will of an accused person to remain 
silent”.
21  Bogan (2009), p. 347-348 and Ashworth & Redmayne (2005), p. 134.
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one could therefore not regard the right to remain silent as the core of the freedom from self-
incrimination. Trechsel and Summers make a distinction between the freedom from self-
incrimination and the right to remain silent. According to these authors, the latter is in a 
way narrower since it only deals with “acoustic communication”, but, on the other hand, it 
is broader since it pertains to all statements and not only detrimental statements.22 For this 
research it is less relevant whether the right to remain silent belongs to the ‘core’ of the freedom 
from self-incrimination, since the practical application of the freedom from self-incrimination 
under the ECHR and EU criminal law is compared to that in competition law proceedings. 
Closely related to the freedom from self-incrimination is the principle of legal professional 
privilege and thus the duty of confi dentiality, which is discussed here insofar as relevant. 
It should be mentioned that the freedom from self-incrimination can also have an impact in 
administrative law proceedings.23 In the present study though, the focus lies on the scope of 
the freedom from self-incrimination in criminal law proceedings, and thus not on potential 
implications of this principle for administrative law proceedings. It is important to focus on 
the criminal law cases instead of the administrative law cases in which the freedom from self-
incrimination, since the purpose of this research is to examine whether criminal law principles 
are infl uencing their (administrative) competition law counterparts. 
In what follows, some general aspects of the freedom from self-incrimination in criminal law 
are examined fi rst (2.2.1). In each subparagraph, a distinction is hereby made between the 
specifi c aspect of the freedom from self-incrimination in the ECHR and in EU criminal law. 
Secondly, it is discussed when compulsion should be regarded as improper (2.2.2). Thirdly, 
the consequences of a possible violation are discussed (2.2.3) and, lastly, a comparison of this 
privilege in EU criminal law and the ECHR is made (2.2.4). 
2 .2.1 General aspects of the principle in criminal law
2.2.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights nor any Protocol to the Convention contains 
an explicit provision providing the freedom from self-incrimination.24 The European Court 
of Human Rights, however, has found the freedom from self-incrimination to be part of the 
right to a fair trial as contained in Article 6(1) ECHR.25 Harris et al refer to three sources of 
this principle, namely “the autonomy of the individual, the need to avoid miscarriages of 
justice and the principle that the prosecution should prove its case without the assistance
22  Trechsel & Summers (2005), p. 342.
23   The freedom from self-incrimination may play a role with regard to punitive administrative law sanctions, see Zeeman (2012), p. 
72-76. Furthermore, an obligation of exclusion of evidence in criminal law proceedings may exist when the evidence was obtained in 
administrative law proceedings, see e.g. Zeeman (2012), p. 76-77 and Stijnen (2011), p. 623-624. See also ECtHR, no. 38544/97 (Weh v
Austria), par. 42-43 where the ECtHR refers to two types of cases where the freedom from self-incrimination may come into play (i) 
when a person has been charged with a criminal off ence, and (ii) when incriminating information obtained in other proceedings is 
used in later criminal law proceedings.
24  Harris et al. (2014), p. 422.
25  As stated for the fi rst time in: ECtHR, no. 10828/84 (Funke v France). 
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of the accused”.26 This privilege has its origin in criminal law. The case law of the ECtHR 
focuses, consequently, on the concept of a criminal charge in order to determine whether the 
freedom from self-incrimination can be invoked.27 The ECtHR has not accepted an absolute 
freedom from self-incrimination,28 since only “improper compulsion by the authorities”29 is 
prohibited. A restriction from the freedom from self-incrimination must not destroy the very 
essence of this privilege.30 Four criteria should be used to determine whether compulsion 
is improper, namely “the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the 
existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, [...] the use to which any material so 
obtained was put”31 and the public interest.32
In the Ibrahim case, the ECtHR seems to explain how these criteria need to be applied. The 
ECtHR ruled with regard to the fi rst criterion the following: “It is the existence of compulsion 
that gives rise to concerns as to whether the freedom from self-incrimination has been respected. 
For this reason, the Court must fi rst consider the nature and degree of compulsion used to 
obtain the evidence.”33 The ECtHR continued that the freedom from self-incrimination is not 
absolute. It seems that the other three criteria are used to determine whether the compulsion 
is allowed. It ruled with reference to previous case law that “the degree of compulsion applied 
will be incompatible with Article 6 where it destroys the very essence of the privilege against 
self-incrimination […]. But not all direct compulsion will destroy the very essence of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and thus lead to a violation of Article 6”.34
One could thus conclude that the ECtHR will fi rst establish whether there was compulsion. 
This is done on the basis of the fi rst abovementioned criterion, namely the nature of 
compulsion. When there was compulsion, a second step should be taken to determine 
whether the compulsion was improper and thus whether it destroyed the “essence of the 
freedom from self-incrimination”. This second step is examined on the basis of the other three 
criteria, namely the existence of safeguards in the procedure, the use to which the material 
obtained under compulsion were put and the general interest protected by the measure. There 
are nonetheless also cases where the Court uses the fi rst category as an open criterion in order 
to determine whether the compulsion was improper. In O’Halloran and Francis, the ECtHR 
e.g. seems to mix up two steps by discussing the public interest under the fi rst criterion.35
26  Harris et al. (2014), p. 422.
27  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 67. See also: Trechsel & Summers (2005), p. 349.
28   E.g. ECtHR, no. 18731/91 (John Murray v United Kingdom); ECtHR, no. 34720/97 (Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland); ECtHR, no. 
54810/00 (Jalloh v Germany); and ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom).
29  ECtHR, no. 18731/91 (John Murray v United Kingdom), par. 45.
30  ECtHR, no. 34720/97 (Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland), par. 55.
31  E.g. ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 55. 
32   ECtHR, no. 54810/00 (Jalloh v Germany), par. 117; and ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), 
par. 57. 
33  ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 267.
34  ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 269 (emphasis added).
35  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 57. See also Harris et al. (2014), p. 426.
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Furthermore, the nature of the evidence which the authorities required was also discussed in
O’Halloran and Francis under the fi rst criterion.36
It is thus, in the author’s view, necessary to determine fi rst whether there is compulsion 
on the basis of part of the fi rst criterion, namely the nature of the compulsion. The degree of 
compulsion and the other three criteria are then used to determine whether the compulsion is 
improper. Furthermore, the degree of compulsion seems to be an open criterion under which 
multiple factors, such as the nature of the evidence which a person is obliged to provide, are 
discussed. 
Compulsion might exist in diff erent forms. Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick refer to diff erent 
forms of compulsion.37 In the Ibrahim case, the ECtHR summed up three types of situations 
which the Court itself regarded to form improper compulsion. As the Strasbourg Court ruled:
The Court, through its case-law, has identifi ed at least three kinds of situations which 
give rise to concerns as to improper compulsion in breach of Article 6. The fi rst is 
where a suspect is obliged to testify under threat of sanctions and either testifi es 
in consequence (see, for example, Saunders, cited above; and Brusco v. France, no. 
1466/07, 14 October 2010) or is sanctioned for refusing to testify (see, for example, 
Heaney and McGuinness, cited above; and Weh v. Austria, no. 38544/97, 8 April 2004). 
The second is where physical or psychological pressure, often in the form of treatment 
which breaches Article 3 of the Convention, is applied to obtain real evidence or 
statements (see, for example, Jalloh, Magee and Gäfgen, all cited above). The third 
is where the authorities use subterfuge to elicit information that they were unable 
to obtain during questioning (see Allan v. the United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, ECHR 
2002-IX).38
These three situations are obviously caught by the fi rst step to determine whether there is an 
abrogation from the freedom from self-incrimination, namely the question whether there is a 
form of compulsion. For the present study, only those cases by which compulsion was exerted 
on a person by way of a (hard core) criminal law penalty are relevant. In Quinn however, the 
ECtHR ruled that the nature of the criminal law sanction itself (penalty or imprisonment) 
is irrelevant to determine whether the compulsion exerted from the measure is improper.39
Nevertheless, since imprisonment is not a sanction open to competition law authorities in 
the UK, Netherlands and EU, when enforcing competition law by administrative law means, 
the focus is only on cases where the ECtHR had to examine whether a criminal law penalty 
36   ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 58. The same happened in ECtHR, no. 38544/97 
(Weh v Austria), par. 54; and ECtHR, no. 63207/00 (Rieg v Austria), par. 31 (reference to Weh v Austria). Van Toor (2017), p. 398, insists 
on the basis of an analysis of the Saunders case and other case law that the nature of the evidence is used by the ECtHR to determine 
the amount of compulsion which may be used by authorities.
37  Harris et al. (2014), p. 422-423.
38  ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 267.
39  ECtHR, no. 36887/97 (Quinn v Ireland), par. 49.
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amounts to improper compulsion. A penalty for failing to provide information is, until now, 
always regarded as compulsion by the ECtHR.40 This would thus mean that the nature of 
compulsion by a fi ne is suffi  cient to meet the fi rst criterion.
Legal persons, natural persons which are regarded as undertakings, and natural persons 
not being regarded as undertakings41 may be subject to competition law proceedings in the 
Netherlands and in England. EU competition law merely focuses on undertakings. This 
research only examines competition law proceedings instigated against undertakings42 and 
not the enforcement of the competition law rules by administrative or criminal law means 
against natural persons not regarded as undertakings. Multiple authors have argued that the 
scope of the freedom from self-incrimination in competition law proceedings is diff erent from 
the scope in criminal law proceedings.43 Some authors argue that the diff erence in scope is 
justifi ed due to the nature of the “accused” in both type of procedures.44 This would imply 
either that the freedom from self-incrimination is not all applicable to legal persons, or that a 
distinction is made between cases dealing with legal persons and natural persons. 
Both views are, in my opinion, based on an inaccurate view of the case law of the Strasbourg 
Court. The ECtHR has not yet ruled on the applicability of the freedom from self-incrimination 
to legal persons. Consequently, one cannot argue that the nature of the accused plays an 
important role in the application of the freedom from self-incrimination. Conversely, as 
Emberland argues, “[s]ome rights have always and without discussion been regarded as 
applicable to companies including the right to enjoyment of the procedural guarantees in 
[Article 6 paragraph 1]”.45 Moreover, legal persons could always invoke other Article 6 ECHR 
rights, without any discussion at the ECtHR.46 There is no certainty as to whether this approach 
will be extended to the freedom from self-incrimination. However, it would be strange were 
the Court to rule that diff erent aspects of the right to a fair trial do not apply to legal persons, 
or to diff erentiate in scope of protection for natural and legal persons under Article 6 ECHR. 
One might therefore come to the conclusion that the freedom from self-incrimination also 
extends to legal persons.47
2.2.1.2 European Union
The freedom from self-incrimination is part of the rights of the defence for an accused and 
can, consequently, fall under the scope of Article 48(2) of the Charter. The ECJ however did
40  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 70.
41  E.g. the director of an undertaking. 
42  These may be natural or legal persons, due to the functional approach taken towards the concept of “undertaking”. 
43   This is further discussed in the competition law chapters. For now, see e.g. Aslam & Ramsden (2008), p. 71-74; Giannakopoulos (2011), 
p. 147; and Van Bael (2011), p. 101 and p. 158-159. Redmayne (2007), p. 210, argues that ‘[t]he European Court of Justice [...] recognises 
a narrower privilege than Strasbourg.’. 
44   E.g. Wils (2003), p. 577; Macculloch (2006), p. 235; and Aslam & Ramsden (2008), p. 72-73. See also the proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at trial in criminal proceedings, par. 26 of the explanatory memorandum.
45  Emberland, (2006), p. 110.
46   See e.g. ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 11598/85(Société Stenuit v France); ECtHR, no. 14902/04 (OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v Russia); and ECtHR, no. 43509/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy).
47  See e.g. Veenbrink (2015), p. 128-129; and Andreangeli (2008), 127-128. 
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 not rule yet on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination in criminal law pursuant 
to Article 48(2) of the Charter. The Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of 
the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal 
proceedings48 also provides rules on the freedom from self-incrimination. Noteworthy 
though is that this particular Directive is not applicable to legal persons. As the Directive 
provides, the Court of Justice “has, however, recognised that the rights fl owing from the 
presumption of innocence do not accrue to legal persons in the same way as to natural 
persons”.49 Moreover, the Directive provides that “[t]he presumption of innocence with 
regard to legal persons should be ensured by the existing legislative safeguards and case-
law, the evolution of which is to determine whether there is a need for Union action”.50
Certain points can still be construed from this Directive, even though its relevance might 
not be that signifi cant, since this study deals with the enforcement of competition rules 
against legal persons only. The rationale of the freedom from self-incrimination can be found 
in “the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby 
contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfi lment of the aims of 
Article 6 of the ECHR”.51 This rationale can, in my opinion, be applied to legal persons as 
well. The scope ratione personae of this Directive is nevertheless, as already asserted, limited 
to natural persons. 
The freedom from self-incrimination prevents improper compulsion, according to the 
Commission, and is furthermore not absolute. The proposal for the Directive referred to the 
same phrasing as the ECtHR for determining whether compulsion is improper. The proposal 
provided that it is relevant to examine “the nature and degree of compulsion to obtain the 
evidence, the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the off ense 
at issue, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure and the use to which any 
material so obtained is put”52 to determine whether compulsion is improper. Currently, 
the preamble of the Directive merely refers to the obligation of national authorities to take 
into account case law of the ECtHR in order to determine whether the freedom from self-
incrimination is infringed.53 The diff erence between compulsion and improper compulsion is 
not strictly made in the Directive itself. The preamble merely states that “force” is not allowed 
to obtain answers, statements, documents or information.54 It is unclear what “force” means 
in this regard, although, it should probably be explained in light of case law of the ECtHR. 
48  Directive (EU) 2016/343. 
49  See recital 13 of the preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/343.
50  See recital 15 of the preamble of the Directive (EU) 2016/343. 
51   See recital 33 of the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings.
52   See recital 17 of the preamble of the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the strengthening of certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings.
53  See recital 27 of the preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/343.
54  See recital 25 of the preamble to Directive (EU) 2016/343.
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2.2.2 Improper compulsion
2.2.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The ECtHR regards penalties for non-compliance with requests of information as compulsion. 
In order to determine whether pressure by state authorities amounts to improper compulsion, 
four criteria should be examined: (i) the nature and degree of compulsion, (ii) the safeguards 
in the procedure, (iii) the use to which the materials obtained are put, and (iv) the general 
interest served by the measure of the state authorities. The fi rst part of the fi rst criterion is, as 
contended above, mostly used to determine whether there is compulsion. A fi ne amounts, up 
till now, always to compulsion. 
The ECtHR has regarded a criminal law penalty to amount to improper compulsion in Funke,55
Saunders,56 J.B.,57 Shannon58 and Marttinen.59 By contrast, in Weh,60 Rieg61 and O’Halloran and 
Francis,62 the ECtHR did not found the compulsion exerted by a penalty to be improper. In 
what follows, the four criteria to examine whether compulsion is improper are discussed in 
light of case law that is relevant for this research. 
Degree of compulsion
The nature of the information requested from a person is, as mentioned above, sometimes 
discussed under the heading of the fi rst criterion. Case law of the ECtHR on the relevance of 
the nature of evidence is nevertheless confusing.
The ECtHR has e.g. held in some cases that the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination 
is not merely confi ned to the use of improper compulsion in order to obtain incriminating 
statements or admissions of guilt. State authorities are not allowed to use improper 
compulsion in order to obtain incriminating evidence, but also in order to obtain testimony 
which “appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature – such as exculpatory remarks 
or mere information on questions of fact”.63 This line of reasoning of the ECtHR is especially 
relevant for competition law in light of the Orkem distinction made by the Court of Justice 
between admissions of guilt and factual information. 
Strikingly, the ECtHR does seem to make the information requested relevant in three cases 
dealing with traffi  c violations, namely Weh,64 Rieg65 and O’Halloran and Francis.66 In these 
cases, the Strasbourg Court referred to the requirement of a person to merely state a “simple 
55  ECtHR, no. 10828/84 (Funke v France), par. 44. 
56  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 76.
57  ECtHR, no. 31827/96 (J.B. v Switzerland), par. 68-69.
58  ECtHR, no. 6563/03 (Shannon v United Kingdom), par. 38-41.
59  ECtHR, no. 19235/03 (Marttinen v Finland), par. 73.
60  ECtHR, no. 38544/97 (Weh v Austria), par. 52-56.
61  ECtHR, no. 63207/00 (Rieg v Austria), par. 31-32. The ECtHR cites in paragraph 31 the relevant passages from Weh v Austria.
62  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 62.
63   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 71; ECtHR, no. 39660/02 (Aleksandr Zaichenko v Russia), par. 54; and 
ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 268.
64  ECtHR, no. 38544/97 (Weh v Austria), par. 52-56.
65  ECtHR, no. 63207/00 (Rieg v Austria), par. 31-32. The ECtHR cites in paragraph 31 the relevant passages from Weh v Austria.
66  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 62.
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fact”.67 This was a relevant factor in light of the fi rst criterion. The ECtHR ruled that merely 
stating a simple fact “is not in itself incriminating”.68
In the Saunders case, the ECtHR also held that the nature of the evidence can be relevant to 
determine whether improper compulsion exists. The ECtHR made a distinction in this case 
between materials which exist dependent and independent of the will of a suspect.69 Materials 
which exist independent of the will of a suspect are e.g. blood and urine samples, but also, 
more relevant for this research, pre-existing documents. These are documents which existed 
before they had to be produced by a suspect in an investigation. In line with the Saunders case, 
authorities are allowed to oblige a suspect to cooperate in the obtainment of materials which 
exist independent of the will of a suspect. Conversely, a suspect may not be obliged to provide 
materials which exist dependent of the will of a suspect. This is the so-called “materials based 
approach”. 
The distinction between materials existing dependent and materials existing independent of 
the will of a suspect is not as sharp as may appear at fi rst sight. Problems may especially arise 
with regard to obligations to provide documents that already exist before a warrant is issued. 
In Funke v France,70 decided pre Saunders, but also J.B. v France,71 decided post Saunders, the 
ECtHR stated that an obligation to provide pre-existing documents violates the freedom from 
self-incrimination. 
The question then is how to explain the diff erence in approach by the ECtHR. Harris et al. 
contend that Funke can be distinguished from Saunders insofar as the suspect in Funke had to 
produce the documents himself “as opposed to being subjected to the execution by others of a 
search warrant for them, [which means that] the evidence was not obtained independently of 
his will”.72 This means that the method used to obtain the documents, namely obtaining the 
documents by way of search warrant or by compelling a person to search for the documents 
and to hand them over himself, could be decisive to determine whether improper compulsion 
exists. Redmayne also argues that the possibility of the police to acquire the materials by force 
could be decisive in the question whether the freedom from self-incrimination is infringed.73
This would mean that requesting a person to hand over documents will always amount 
to improper compulsion. This strict approach is probably not the correct reading of these 
judgments. 
The documents referred to in Saunders seem, at fi rst sight, to diff er from the documents at 
stake in Funke and J.B.74 The diff erence lies, nevertheless, not in the nature of the documents, 
but in the means used to obtain the documents. In Funke, the authorities were fi shing for 
67   ECtHR, no. 38544/97 (Weh v Austria), par. 54; ECtHR, no. 63207/00 (Rieg v Austria), par. 31 (reference to Weh v Austria); and ECtHR, 
no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 58.
68  ECtHR, no. 38544/97 (Weh v Austria), par. 54; ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 58.
69  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 69; see also ECtHR, no. 31827/96 (J.B. v Switzerland), par. 68. 
70  ECtHR, no. 10828/84 (Funke v France). 
71  ECtHR, no. 31827/96 (J.B. v Switzerland).
72  Harris et al. (2014), p. 422.
73  Redmayne (2007), p. 215.
74  E.g. Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 352.
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information without knowing whether they existed, and in J.B., the authorities required 
the handing over of documents without knowing their size and contents. The authorities 
thus requested the persons to make a substantive appraisal which evidence to hand over. 
One could thus argue that the existence of the documents in J.B. and in Funke as evidence
was dependent on the will of the person. The authorities did not know in those cases which 
documents existed or which documents were relevant as evidence. The suspect in both case 
thus had to determine whether certain documents could be used as evidence. The existence 
of the documents as evidence was therefore based on the substantive appraisal of the suspect. 
A more direct request for specifi c documents would probably not amount to improper 
compulsion, since the degree of compulsion will be less.75 The person concerned would not 
have to make a substantive appraisal of the documents which should be handed over. Van 
Toor e.g. argues that materials which exist independent of the will of a person can be obtained 
by the use of compulsory powers. Materials which exist dependent of the will of a person can 
only be used in criminal law proceedings when they are handed over voluntarily, in other 
words, without any compulsion. For such materials, most forms of compulsion will amount 
to improper compulsion.76
The nature of evidence thus seems to play some role in the determination whether the degree 
of compulsion leads to improper compulsion. Obviously, the other criteria are discussed 
as well in those cases to determine whether improper compulsion existed. The degree of 
compulsion that can be used for obtaining diff erent types of evidence is merely one factor to 
determine whether compulsion as such is improper. 
Nevertheless, some preliminary points of view can be already be noted. It does, at fi rst sight, 
not matter whether a person is forced to provide factual or incriminating evidence to trigger 
the freedom from self-incrimination. However, merely requiring a person to state a simple 
fact can be allowed. Furthermore, a person can be forced to hand over documents as long 
as the request specifi es which documents. By contrast, forcing a person by means of a fi shing 
expedition or by requests to hand over documents without having any idea of the size and 
content of those documents, would probably amount to improper compulsion. 
Safeguards in the procedure
A suspect should be informed of his right to remain silent before an investigation starts.77 In 
the case of Brusco, the suspect was required to take an oath to tell the truth before a police 
interrogation. This amounted to improper compulsion. The ECtHR also ruled that the 
combination of not being informed of the right to remain silent and not having the assistance 
of a lawyer at the start of the interrogation amounted to a violation of the right to a fair 
trial.78 It follows from the reasoning of the ECtHR that a suspect should be informed of his 
75  See in this regard also Van Toor (2017), p. 398.
76  Van Toor (2017), p. 398.
77  ECtHR, no. 1466/07 (Brusco v France), par. 54.
78  ECtHR, no. 1466/07 (Brusco v France), par. 54.
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right to remain silent, although it appears that it might be suffi  cient for a lawyer to have the 
opportunity to inform a suspect of this right to remain silent.79 The interrogating authorities 
thus do not necessarily have to administer the caution when a lawyer has had the opportunity 
to inform a suspect of this right.
Access to a lawyer from the moment of the fi rst interrogation by criminal law authorities is, 
according to the ECtHR, “part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have 
particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of 
the privilege against self-incrimination”.80
In the Ibrahim case, the ECtHR emphasised the presence of a lawyer in light of the freedom 
from self-incrimination. As the ECtHR ruled:
In the light of the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to 
silence, the Court considers that in principle there can be no justifi cation for a failure to 
notify a suspect of these rights. Where a suspect has not, however, been so notifi ed, the 
Court must examine whether, notwithstanding this failure, the proceedings as a whole 
were fair (see, for example, the approach taken in Schmid-Laff er, cited above, §§ 36-40). 
Immediate access to a lawyer able to provide information about procedural rights is 
likely to prevent unfairness arising from the absence of any offi  cial notifi cation of these 
rights. However, where access to a lawyer is delayed, the need for the investigative 
authorities to notify the suspect of his right to a lawyer and his right to silence and 
privilege against self-incrimination takes on a particular importance (see Brusco, cited 
above, § 54). In such cases, a failure to notify will make it even more diffi  cult for the 
Government to rebut the presumption of unfairness that arises where there are no 
compelling reasons for delaying access to legal advice or to show, even where there are 
compelling reasons for the delay, that the proceedings as a whole were fair.81
The presence of a lawyer may thus remedy some failures to inform a suspect of his rights. 
In Ibrahim, the failures referred to were specifi cally the failure to administer the caution and 
the failure to notify the suspect of his right to a lawyer. Overall, one can say that the presence 
of a lawyer before the fi rst interrogation is a valuable safeguard which might prevent the 
compulsion exercised on a person to amount to improper compulsion. 
Use to which materials are put
The use to which materials, obtained in defi ance of the will of a suspect not to cooperate 
with an investigation, are put, is an important element for the ECtHR to determine whether 
the very essence of the freedom from self-incrimination is destroyed. In Saunders, the ECtHR 
ruled that “the Court’s sole concern in the present case is with the use made of the relevant 
79  See ECtHR, no. 1466/07 (Brusco v France), in particular par. 45 and 54. 
80  ECtHR, no. 36391/02 (Salduz v Turkey), par. 54.
81  ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 273.
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statements at the applicant’s criminal trial”.82 The use of statements obtained in administrative
law proceedings during a criminal law trial was regarded as an infringement of the freedom 
from self-incrimination.83 Excluding the use of evidence at trial which was obtained in violation 
of the freedom from self-incrimination during a criminal law investigation seems to be suffi  cient 
to protect this principle, and will therefore not lead to an infringement of Article 6 ECHR.84
The use of information obtained in defi ance of the will of a person does not always have to be 
an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination. As the ECtHR noted: “Regard must 
be had to whether the rights of the defence have been respected and whether the applicant 
was given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing 
its use. In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, including 
whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy.”85
In O’Halloran and Francis, the Strasbourg Court found that the evidence obtained by coercion 
was merely one element to prove the infringement.86 Furthermore, during trial all other 
(counter)evidence could be discussed.87 Ultimately, the ECtHR did not fi nd an infringement of 
the freedom from self-incrimination. In Bykov v Russia, the authorities “tricked”, according to 
Bykov himself, the person in providing evidence of a plan to commit a murder. The statements 
made by Bykov were subsequently used in criminal law proceedings. This evidence was 
corroborated by other conclusive evidence.88 The ECtHR ruled, amongst others:
The Court also attaches weight to the fact that in making their assessment the domestic 
courts did not directly rely on the recording of the applicant’s conversation with V., or its 
transcript, and did not seek to interpret specifi c statements made by the applicant during 
the conversation. Instead they examined the expert report drawn up on the conversation 
in order to assess his relations with V. and the manner in which he involved himself in 
the dialogue. Moreover, at the trial the recording was not treated as a plain confession or 
an admission of knowledge capable of lying at the core of a fi nding of guilt; it played a 
limited role in a complex body of evidence assessed by the court.89
The use of evidence obtained by compulsion is thus not always regarded as an infringement 
of the freedom from self-incrimination, as long as there are other safeguards during trial and 
as long as the evidence is not used as the sole or main evidence to prove an infringement. 
82  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 67.
83  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 75.
84  ECtHR, no.22978/05 (Gäfgen v Germany), par. 179-188.
85  ECtHR, no. 39660/02 (Aleksandr Zaichenko v Russia), par. 57; see also ECtHR, no.22978/05 (Gäfgen v Germany), par. 165.
86  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 60.
87  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 60.
88  ECtHR, no. 4378/02 (Bykov v Russia), par. 98.
89  ECtHR, no. 4378/02 (Bykov v Russia), par. 103.
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The threat to use evidence obtained by compulsion might be a reason for the ECtHR to fi nd 
an infringement of Article 6(1) ECHR. In J.B. v Switzerland, this was one of the elements to 
determine that the compulsion by way of penalty in order to obtain documents from a person 
during a tax investigation destroyed the essence of the freedom from self-incrimination.90
General interest
Sometimes the ECtHR does not regard compulsion to be improper when the measure is 
taken in the general interest. In O’Halloran and Francis, the ECtHR interestingly referred to the 
Scottish case of Brown v Stott and ruled:
[T]hat “[a]ll who own or drive motor cars know that by doing so they subject themselves 
to a regulatory regime. This regime is imposed not because owning or driving cars is 
a privilege or indulgence granted by the State but because the possession and use of 
cars (like, for example, shotguns ...) are recognised to have the potential to cause grave 
injury”. Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted 
certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to 
motor vehicles.91
A public interest requirement can thus be discerned from the reasoning of the ECtHR. The 
same reasoning was also used in Weh and in Rieg. Authors have attempted to fi nd a rationale 
behind the general interest limitation in these cases. Ashworth asserts e.g. that there is a 
“pressing social need for an eff ective means of regulating those who drive on the roads”.92
Furthermore, in some areas of law it is necessary, according to Ashworth, to compel a person 
to cooperate, otherwise the system “would be unable to operate fairly and fully”.93 Redmayne 
argues that people choose to participate in “heavily regulated activities”,94 and thus the 
acceptance of certain benefi ts following from participation in those activities submits them to 
the procedures regulating such activities.95 The author also asserts that this argument can be 
“potentially very unruly”,96 since it might extend to “legitimating all kinds of demands, some 
self-incriminatory, that might be made in the name of public safety and security”.97
In a decision on the admissibility of a case in Allen, the ECtHR seemed to refer to a public 
interest requirement as well, as one of the factors in order to conclude that there was no 
improper compulsion. The ECtHR stated that “[t]he obligation to make disclosure of income 
and capital for the purposes of the calculation and assessment of tax is indeed a common 
90  ECtHR, no. 31827/96 (J.B. v Switzerland), par. 66.
91  ECtHR, no. 15809/02 and 25624/02 (O’Halloran and Frances v United Kingdom), par. 57.
92  Ashworth (2008), p. 771. 
93  Ashworth (2008), p. 772, calls this restriction a discrete exception to the freedom from self-incrimination, see p. 771. 
94  Redmayne (2007), p. 229.
95  Redmayne (2007), p. 230.
96  Redmayne (2007), p. 230.
97  Ashworth (2008), p. 770-771.
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feature of the taxation systems of Contracting States and it would be diffi  cult to envisage them 
functioning eff ectively without it”.98
In other cases, the ECtHR explicitly ruled that a public interest requirement is not relevant as 
a factor to determine whether compulsion is not improper. In Marttinen, the ECtHR excludes 
this possibility with reference to other case law by ruling the following:
As to the concerns detailed by the Government regarding the eff ective functioning of 
the enforcement procedure, the Court notes that in the case of Saunders v. the United 
Kingdom (cited above, § 74) it found that the argument of the respondent government 
that the complexity of corporate fraud and the vital public interest in the investigation 
of such fraud and the punishment of those responsible could not justify such a 
marked departure from one of the basic principles of a fair procedure. It considered 
that the general requirements of fairness contained in Article 6, including the right 
not to incriminate oneself, “apply to criminal proceedings in respect of all types of 
criminal off ences without distinction from the most simple to the most complex”. It 
concluded that the public interest could not be relied on to justify the use of answers 
compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused 
during the trial proceedings. Likewise, in the case of Funke v. France (cited above, § 
44) the special features of customs law were found insuffi  cient by the Court to justify 
such an infringement of the right of anyone charged with a criminal off ence, within 
the autonomous meaning of that expression in Article 6, to remain silent and not to 
incriminate himself.
The Court, accordingly, fi nds that the concerns for the eff ective functioning of the debt 
recovery procedure relied on by the Finnish Government cannot justify a provision 
which extinguishes the very essence of the applicant’s rights to silence and against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Convention. This was the situation in the applicant’s 
case at the material time. The mechanism introduced by a subsequent amendment to 
the legislation prohibiting the use of incriminating information in order to circumvent 
provisions on testimony or in order to have the debtor charged with a criminal off ence, 
came too late for the applicant (see paragraph 34 above).99
Overall, it can be said that the public interest factor is only accepted in two types of cases, 
namely in traffi  c violations cases where a person merely had to state a simple fact, and in one 
taxation case. Strikingly, in corporate fraud proceedings, insolvency proceedings and customs 
proceedings, the general interest could not be used at all as a factor to determine whether the 
compulsion used was improper or not. 
98  ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 76574/01 (Allen v United Kingdom).
99  ECtHR, no. 19235/03 (Marttinen v Finland), par. 74-75.
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2.2.2.2 European Union
As stated above, there is an EU directive which deals among others with the freedom from 
self-incrimination, although the scope ratione personae is limited to natural persons. 
Article 7(1) of Directive 2016/343 states that a suspect does not have to respond to questions 
relating to an off ence which he is suspected to have committed or for which he is accused 
of having committed it. Other questions, relating to e.g. the identifi cation of a suspect or an 
accused person, do not abrogate from the freedom from self-incrimination.100
The obligation to “promptly” administer a suspect the caution, which could be found in the 
proposal for the Directive,101 did not make it into the eventual text. The Directive itself merely 
refers to the obligation on authorities to “ensure that suspects and accused persons have the 
right not to incriminate themselves”.102
The Directive allows for “the use of legal powers of compulsion” in order to obtain evidence 
“which has an existence independent of the will of the suspects or accused persons”.103
This provision seems to adhere to a strict interpretation of the ECtHR’s Saunders ruling. 
As explained above, it seems that the degree of compulsion is more important to determine 
whether the freedom from self-incrimination is infringed than the nature of the evidence at 
stake, although the nature of the evidence could allow for more compulsion. This provision 
thus may actually not be in line with case law of the ECtHR. Case law of the ECtHR is not 
that straightforward, but a categorical exclusion of certain materials does not seem to respect 
the core of the freedom from self-incrimination. The current provision makes it diffi  cult for 
national authorities to comply with the obligation in the preamble of the Directive to “take 
into account” case law of the ECtHR.104
2.2.3 Consequences of a possible violation
2.2.3.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The freedom from self-incrimination may be limited in the general interest. When an 
infringement has been established, there will be an infringement of the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6(1) ECHR. The ECtHR has held “that the most appropriate form of redress for 
a violation of Article [6(1)] would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in 
the position in which he would have been had this provision not been disregarded”.105 This 
could e.g. entail a retrial in which the information obtained in violation of the freedom from 
self-incrimination is excluded. However, when evidence is obtained during an investigation 
the most logical consequence for a violation of the freedom from self-incrimination is to 
100  See recital 26 of the preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/343.
101   Article 7(2) of the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings.
102  Article 7(2) of Directive (EU) 2016/343.
103  Article 7(3) and recital 29 of the preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/343.. 
104  See recital 27 of the preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/343.
105  ECtHR, no. 36391/02 (Salduz v Turkey), par. 72.
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exclude in a trial the use of evidence obtained through compulsion. The use to which such 
evidence is put is a factor which the ECtHR takes into account to determine whether improper 
compulsion was exercised by state authorities.
2.2.3.2 European Union
The Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and 
of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings does not provide a completely clear 
rule on the consequences of the freedom from self-incrimination. Article 10(2) of Directive 
2016/343 provides: 
Without prejudice to national rules and systems on the admissibility of evidence, 
Member States shall ensure that, in the assessment of statements made by suspects 
or accused persons or of evidence obtained in breach of the right to remain silent or 
the right not to incriminate oneself, the rights of the defence and the fairness of the 
proceedings are respected.106
Exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from self-incrimination seems 
to be a likely consequence, if national law allows for this exclusion. Nevertheless, the only 
obligation on Member States is to ensure that the rights of defence and the fairness of 
proceedings is respected when the freedom from self-incrimination is infringed. 
2.2.4 A comparison of the freedom from self-incrimination under the ECHR and 
the EU legal system
It is diffi  cult to compare the application of the freedom from self-incrimination in EU criminal 
law and case law of the ECtHR, since EU criminal law currently only marginally deals with 
this principle. Reference is made in Directive 2016/434 to the freedom from self-incrimination 
and the application of this principle to case law of the ECtHR. However, there seems to exist 
some inconsistency, which hinges on the application of the Saunders ruling of the ECtHR. 
Both systems prevent ‘force’ or ‘compulsion’ in order to obtain evidence. However, in order to 
determine whether compulsion is improper, and thus leads to an infringement of the freedom 
from self-incrimination, it is necessary to examine diff erent factors. The ECtHR refers to four 
factors, namely the degree of compulsion,107 the safeguards in the procedure, the use to which 
materials obtained under compulsion are put, and the general interest served by the measure. 
These factors were also mentioned in the preamble of the proposal for Directive 2016/343, but 
did not make it into the fi nal version of the directive. 
106  Article 10(2) of Directive (EU) 2016/343. 
107   As argued above, the nature of the compulsion is used to determine fi rst of all whether compulsion exists. According to the ECtHR, 
criminal law penalties always lead to a form of compulsion.
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The most likely consequence of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination in 
the investigative phase seems to be, in both ECtHR case law and under Directive 2016/343, 
exclusion of the evidence. 
2.3 NON BIS IN IDEM
The principle of non bis in idem may prohibit a further prosecution, trial or punishment for 
the same off ence or act.108 It is a substantive but also a procedural principle, which may thus 
secure against double jeopardy or double punishment. In the following subparagraph, some 
general aspects of this principle in the ECHR and in EU criminal law are examined (2.3.1). 
Thereafter, the concept of idem is discussed in both jurisdictions (2.3.2). Lastly, a comparison 
shall be made of the non bis in idem principle in the ECHR and in EU criminal law (2.3.3). 
2.3.1 General aspects in criminal law
2.3.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The non bis in idem principle cannot be found in the text of the ECHR itself.109 This principle 
has found its way into the ECHR domain by way of Protocol 7. On the 1st of November 
1988 it entered into force, although many states submitted declarations110 to this Protocol. 
Furthermore, up until now, the Netherlands and Germany have not ratifi ed this Protocol, 
and the United Kingdom has not signed it.111 Article 4(1) of Protocol 7 prohibits the double 
prosecution and punishment in criminal proceedings of a person for the same off ence for 
which he was acquitted or convicted. The aim of this provision is “to prohibit the repetition 
of criminal proceedings that have been concluded by a ‘fi nal’ decision”.112 Furthermore, 
the ECtHR has stated that “Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 is not confi ned to the right not to be 
punished twice but extends to the right not to be prosecuted or tried twice”.113 The ECtHR 
continued by stating that the non bis in idem rule “contains three distinct guarantees [namely] 
no one shall be (i) liable to be tried, (ii) tried or (iii) punished for the same off ence”.114
Article 4(1) of Protocol 7 refers solely to criminal law proceedings, and not to administrative 
law proceedings. The ECtHR has interpreted this requirement in a broad manner in light of the 
Engel criteria. These criteria were established under the right to a fair trial.115 Administrative 
law proceedings may therefore fall under Article 4(1) Protocol 7 when those proceedings lead 
to a criminal charge. There are three criteria to establish whether a sanction is a criminal 
108  See e.g. Neagu (2012), p. 955; and De Graaf (2013), p. 371. 
109  Vervaele (2013), p. 213.
110   Besides the many declarations made to this Protocol, there are also four reservations submitted by Denmark, France, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland; see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=18/02/2015&CL=ENG, visited 
on 17/04/2018.
111 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=18/02/2015&CL=ENG, visited on 17/04/2018.
112  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 107.
113  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 110 (emphasis added). 
114  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 110.
115  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 53.
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charge, namely (i) the classifi cation of the off ence in national law, (ii) the nature of the 
off ence, and (iii) the nature and severity of the possible punishment.116 The non bis in idem 
principle is thus not solely confi ned to criminal law procedures stricto sensu. It should 
be mentioned though, that the scope of Article 4 of Protocol 7 is limited to subsequent 
proceedings in one Member State. This provision does not deal with subsequent proceedings 
in multiple states, whereas in the competition law parts of this study emphasis is placed 
on subsequent or parallel proceedings by diff erent national competition authorities117
or subsequent proceedings by the Commission and a national competition authority.118
In order for the non bis in idem principle to be applicable four conditions need to apply: (i) 
the person prosecuted or punished is the same, (ii) the acts are the same (idem), (iii) two 
proceedings are initiated (bis), and (iv) one of these has become fi nal. It should be mentioned 
though that in Pirttimäki v Finland, the ECtHR considered whether the person is the same under 
the idem requirement.119 The fi rst and second condition were thus interchangeably discussed. 
In order to determine whether the acts were the same, the ECtHR examined whether the 
person committing the illegal behaviour was the same. It ruled in this case that the person 
against whom the proceedings were initiated was not the same. The tax surcharge dealt with 
the applicant’s personal taxation, and was thus aimed at the applicant in his private capacity. 
The criminal tax fraud charges were aimed at the applicant as representative of the company, 
and thus at the applicant in his commercial capacity.120 The fi rst two conditions are thus not 
always clearly separated by the ECtHR.
Duplication of proceedings (bis) and fi nality of proceedings
When a person has been prosecuted and is fi nally acquitted or convicted, he or she cannot be 
prosecuted for a second time. The prior conviction or acquittal should have acquired the force 
of res judicata.121 A decision will acquire the force of res judicata “when it is irrevocable, that is to 
say when no further ordinary remedies are available or when the parties have exhausted such 
remedies or have permitted the time-limit to expire without availing themselves of them”.122
Furthermore, “extraordinary remedies such as a request for the reopening of the proceedings 
or an application for extension of the expired time-limit are not taken into account for the 
purposes of determining whether the proceedings have reached a fi nal conclusion”.123 It
116   See ECtHR, no. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72 (Engel and others v the Netherlands), par. 82; and ECtHR, no. 14939/03 
(Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 53.
117   NCAs will in general coordinate their behaviour via the ECN, although there is no prohibition to initiate parallel or subsequent 
procedures.
118   Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that an NCA is relieved of its duty to apply 101 or 102 TFEU if the Commission enforces the 
same behaviour. Parallel proceedings between NCAs and the Commission are thus not allowed. Parallel or subsequent proceedings 
by NCAs are allowed, although Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides the possibility for NCAs to reject a complaint when a case is 
already handled or was handled by another NCA. Similarly, the Commission may reject a complaint on the basis of this article when 
an NCA is already dealing with the case. 
119  ECtHR, no. 35232/11 (Pirttimäki v Finland), par. 51.
120  ECtHR, no. 35232/11 (Pirttimäki v Finland), par. 50. The ECtHR held briefl y in par. 51 that the circumstances were diff erent as well.
121  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 107.
122  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 107.
123  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 108.
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 should be determined whether a decision has acquired res judicata on the basis of the relevant 
national procedural rules.124 Moreover, from the wording conviction or acquittal it appears 
there should be a decision taken on the merits. The case law of the ECtHR on the fi nality of 
a decision pre Zolotukhin concerned merely consecutive prosecutions, but not “prosecutions 
which were conducted (more or less) at the same time”.125 Nowadays, the principle “[...] applies 
from the point in time at which the outcome of the fi rst prosecution acquires fi nality onward”.126
In 2016, the ECtHR shook things up127 by concluding that an administrative law penalty 
and a subsequent criminal law penalty do not infringe the non bis in idem principle.128 The 
Strasbourg Court concluded this on the basis of the bis requirement. As the ECtHR ruled:
On the basis of the foregoing review of the Court’s case-law, it is evident that, in relation 
to matters subject to repression under both criminal and administrative law, the surest 
manner of ensuring compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 is the provision, at 
some appropriate stage, of a single-track procedure enabling the parallel strands of 
legal regulation of the activity concerned to be brought together, so that the diff erent 
needs of society in responding to the off ence can be addressed within the framework 
of a single process. Nonetheless, as explained above (see notably paragraphs 111 and 
117-120), Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not exclude the conduct of dual proceedings, 
even to their term, provided that certain conditions are fulfi lled. In particular, for 
the Court to be satisfi ed that there is no duplication of trial or punishment (bis) as 
proscribed by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the respondent State must demonstrate 
convincingly that the dual proceedings in question have been “suffi  ciently closely 
connected in substance and in time”. In other words, it must be shown that they have 
been combined in an integrated manner so as to form a coherent whole. This implies 
not only that the purposes pursued and the means used to achieve them should in 
essence be complementary and linked in time, but also that the possible consequences 
of organising the legal treatment of the conduct concerned in such a manner should be 
proportionate and foreseeable for the persons aff ected.129
The Strasbourg Court will thus determine whether the two proceedings are suffi  ciently closely 
connected in substance and in time. If this is the case, then the diff erent proceedings are part of 
one overall procedure. In order to determine whether this is the case, the ECtHR provided 
some factors to take into consideration. It will be relevant to determine (i) whether the 
proceedings pursue “complementary purposes” and thus address “diff erent aspects of the 
124  See e.g. ECtHR, no. 50178/99 (Nikitin v Russia), par. 37-39. 
125  Van Bockel (2010), p. 184 (original emphasis) .
126   Van Bockel (2010), p. 185 (original emphasis). See for a more extensive discussion of the case law of the ECtHR on this matter, Van 
Bockel (2010), p. 184-190.
127  See Attard (2017), who refers to older case law which “resonated” in the tax world and led to an “unprecedented” “spill-over eff ect”.
128  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway).
129  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 130.
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social misconduct”; (ii) whether the “duality of the proceedings concerned is a foreseeable 
consequence”130 on the basis of the same facts; (iii) “duplication in the collection as well as 
the assessment of the evidence” should be avoided as much as possible, and ; (iv) the second 
penalty should take into account the fi rst penalty which became fi nal in order to prevent 
an overall penalty which is disproportionate.131 The ECtHR also referred to the diff erence 
between criminal charges belonging to the hard core criminal law domain and other criminal 
law charges. Hard core criminal law proceedings have a more stigmatising eff ect and it is 
therefore less likely, but not completely excluded, that proceedings leading to two hard core 
criminal law charges will be held not to infringe the non bis in idem principle.132 Conversely, it 
is more likely that parallel or subsequent administrative and criminal law proceedings will be 
allowed than parallel or subsequent criminal law proceedings.133 Obviously, the ECtHR will 
examine whether the administrative law proceedings are meant to stigmatise as well. 
The aforementioned criteria mainly focus on the connection in substance. A connection in 
time should also exist. As the ECtHR held:
Moreover, as already intimated above, where the connection in substance is suffi  ciently 
strong, the requirement of a connection in time nonetheless remains and must be 
satisfi ed. This does not mean, however, that the two sets of proceedings have to be 
conducted simultaneously from beginning to end. It should be open to States to opt 
for conducting the proceedings progressively in instances where doing so is motivated 
by interests of effi  ciency and the proper administration of justice, pursued for diff erent 
social purposes, and has not caused the applicant to suff er disproportionate prejudice. 
However, as indicated above, the connection in time must always be present. Thus, 
the connection in time must be suffi  ciently close to protect the individual from being 
subjected to uncertainty and delay and from proceedings becoming protracted over 
time (see, as an example of such shortcoming, Kapetanios and others, cited above, 
§ 67), even where the relevant national system provides for an “integrated” scheme 
separating administrative and criminal components. The weaker the connection in 
time the greater the burden on the State to explain and justify any such delay as may 
be attributable to its conduct of the proceedings.134
In A and B v Norway, the ECtHR eventually decided that the dual tax proceedings at stake in 
this case, one administrative and one criminal, were allowed under Article 4(1) of Protocol 
7. The administrative law proceedings had a deterrent eff ect to ensure that everyone fi lls 
in their tax declarations in a correct manner, whereas the criminal law proceedings added a 
130  It should be foreseeable in law and in practice, see ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 132.
131  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 132. 
132  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 133.
133  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 133.
134  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 134.
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punitive element “involving the additional element of the commission of culpable fraud”.135
Moreover, the multiple penalties which could be imposed were foreseeable, the proceedings 
were conducted in parallel and were interconnected, the facts established in one procedure 
were used for the other procedure, and the administrative law penalty was taken into account 
in the criminal procedure.136 By contrast, in Johannesson, a tax case as well, the ECtHR did 
not fi nd a suffi  cient link in substance and time to be present.137 The police had access to 
the fi le of the tax authorities, but did pursue an independent investigation on its own.138
Therefore, no suffi  cient link in substance existed. Moreover, the criminal law proceedings 
were concluded years after the ending of the administrative proceedings.139 Therefore, 
there was a lack in connection in time, which was not explained and justifi ed by Iceland.140
In Šimkus v Lithuania, the ECtHR did not allow for dual proceedings either. The applicant 
had to pay an administrative law fi ne for minor hooliganism, since he used swearwords. 
Furthermore, he was prosecuted in criminal law proceedings for “threatening to murder 
or seriously injure law enforcement offi  cers, and insulting them in the exercise of their 
offi  cial duties”.141 The ECtHR briefl y ruled that: “The Court observes that the domestic 
authorities acknowledged on multiple occasions that the applicant had already been given 
an administrative penalty, although they eventually decided that it did not preclude the 
continuation of the criminal proceedings.”142 Unfortunately, the comparison and the contrast 
with A and B v Norway was not made.143 In the next sentence, the ECtHR did provide that 
“[a]ccordingly, [the ECtHR] fi nds that the domestic authorities permitted the duplication of 
proceedings against him in the full knowledge of his previous administrative penalty.”144 This 
seems to indicate that the previously imposed penalty is not taken into account in the criminal 
law proceedings. However, the ECtHR also held the following: 
The senior prosecutor held that, in line with the case-law of the domestic courts, 
an administrative penalty did not preclude the institution of subsequent criminal 
proceedings concerning the same conduct; however, in order to comply with the ne 
bis in idem principle, if a person was found guilty in the criminal proceedings, the 
previous administrative penalty had to be annulled or, if that was impossible, it had to 
be taken into account during sentencing. Accordingly, the prosecutor considered that 
the administrative penalty given to the applicant did not preclude the continuation of 
the criminal proceedings against him.145
135  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 144.
136  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 145-146.
137  ECtHR, no. 22007/11 (Johannesson v Iceland), par. 55-56.
138  ECtHR, no. 22007/11 (Johannesson v Iceland), par. 53 and 55.
139  ECtHR, no. 22007/11 (Johannesson v Iceland), par. 54 and 55.
140  ECtHR, no. 22007/11 (Johannesson v Iceland), par. 54.
141  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 12
142  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 47 (references omitted).
143   ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 47. The ECtHR did refer to A and B v Norway though, but no further explanations were 
given. 
144  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 15. This reasoning was also confi rmed on appeal by a higher domestic court, see par. 16.
145  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 52.
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It is thus not likely that the criterion of taking into account a previously imposed fi ne was 
the problem in this case. Later on, in its conclusion, the ECtHR does mention that Lithuanian 
law is unambiguous in not allowing criminal law prosecutions when an administrative law 
penalty is imposed.146 Ultimately, the second condition from A and B v Norway did not seem 
to be met in this case.
Member States are allowed to apply dual proceedings “in which a combination of proceedings are 
integrated to form a coherent whole – which may involve parallel stages of a legal response to the 
wrongdoing in question by diff erent authorities and for diff erent purposes”.147 It will be easier to 
justify parallel or subsequent administrative law and criminal law proceedings, due to, in general, 
the lack of stigmatisation in administrative law proceedings. Nevertheless, on the basis of A and 
B v Norway, it cannot be ruled out that parallel or subsequent criminal law proceedings might be 
allowed, as long as they comply with the factors mentioned by the ECtHR.148
2.3.1.2 European Union
The non bis in idem principle can be found in multiple provisions in Union legislation,149
and is regarded a general principle of EU law.150 Perhaps the most important, and explicit, 
provisions are Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) 
and Article 50 of the Charter. As Vervaele states, “[t]he CISA Convention can be qualifi ed as 
the fi rst multilateral convention that establishes an international ne bis in idem principle as an 
individual right erga omnes, be it limited to the regional Schengen area”.151
Article 50 of the Charter codifi es the general principle of non bis in idem.152 It is not only 
applicable in subsequent proceedings in multiple Member States, but can also be invoked 
when multiple authorities start proceedings in one Member State, when there are subsequent 
proceedings started by an authority in a Member State and a Union institution or vice versa, or 
when a Union institution and authorities of a third country initiate proceedings for the same 
off ence.153 The overarching principle in Article 50 of the Charter has the potential to become 
146   It is quite strange that the ECtHR discussed this element in its conclusion. The ECtHR held that the non bis in idem principle does 
not allow for any exceptions. Secondly, it referred to the unforeseeability of dual proceedings in national law. Lastly, because of this 
unforeseeability, the duplication of proceedings could not be “justifi ed”. It would have been more logical for the ECtHR to mention the 
foreseeability requirement under the discussion of the bis element.
147  Leach (2017), p. 584. 
148   The ECtHR is sometimes quite concise in applying the conditions from ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway) to a case. 
In ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 47, the ECtHR merely provided the following: “The Court observes that the domestic 
authorities acknowledged on multiple occasions that the applicant had already been given an administrative penalty, although they 
eventually decided that it did not preclude the continuation of the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 13-16 above; compare and 
contrast A and B v. Norway, cited above, §§ 121-34 and 144-47).” It is unclear why the conditions from A and B v Norway were not met. 
149  See e.g. Tomkin (2014), p. 1383-1384; and Vervaele (2013).
150   ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others 
v Commission), par. 59.
151  Vervaele (2013), p. 218.
152  See the Opinion of AG Kokott, par. 13, at ECJ, C-489/10 (Criminal proceedings against Lukasz Marcin Bonda).
153   Tomkin (2014), p. 1390. Article 54 CISA is, by contrast, only applicable in the fi rst situation, namely where authorities in diff erent 
Member States start proceedings. Van Kempen & Bemelmans (2018), p. 258, refer to the application of Article 50 of the Charter “to both 
national and transnational situations”, as “fairly unique”. They compare this provision with other provisions in international treaties. 
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the dominant source in EU law of the non bis in idem principle; this is especially the case since 
the Court of Justice will interpret Article 54 CISA in light of its counterpart in the Charter.154
Article 54 CISA allows for multiple limitations and derogations155 to the non bis in idem rule, 
namely Article 55 of the Charter, the ‘execution’ condition156 in Article 54 CISA and the general 
limitation ground under Article 52(1) of the Charter. A for this research (potentially) relevant 
exception to the non bis in idem principle in the Schengen Convention can be found in Article 
55(1)(a) CISA, which provides that Member States may, at the time of ratifi cation, accepting 
or approving the Convention, declare that the non bis in idem principle is not applicable 
“where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates took place in whole or in part in its own 
territory; in the latter case, however, this exception shall not apply if the acts took place in part 
in the territory of the Contracting Party where the judgment was delivered”.
Article 50 of the Charter is only subject to the limitation in Article 52(1) of the Charter.157 The 
general limitation ground under Article 52(1), which is applicable to both Article 50 of the 
Charter and Article 54 CISA, are discussed after the examination of both provisions. 
For both Article 54 CISA and Article 50 of the Charter applies that (i) the person should be 
the same,158 (ii) the act/off ence should be the same (idem), (iii) there should be a duplication 
of proceedings (bis), and one of the proceedings should be fi nally concluded.159 In order to 
provide a proper background of the non bis in idem principle in EU criminal law, both Article 
54 CISA and Article 50 of the Charter are discussed below.
Article 54 CISA
As indicated before, Article 54 CISA provides an international non bis in idem principle. 
Furthermore, it is regarded “as the most developed expression of an internationally applicable 
non bis in idem rule in force in the way it is worded”.160 It has a supranational scope and may 
prohibit a Member State from starting another procedure against a person when an authority 
in another Member State has fi nally disposed of the trial of that person, and when “it has 
been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under 
154   ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 31; and ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 35; cf. Klip 
(2016), p. 296, who refers to the reverse situation that “the reliance of the Court on principles, rather than on express references in a 
legal instrument, supports the conclusion that Article 54 CISA case law guides the interpretation of Article 50 Charter”.
155   Exceptions to Article 54 CISA can be found in Article 55 CISA. Moreover, Article 54 CISA also gives an ‘execution’ requirement. Lastly, 
Article 52(1) of the Charter is, according to the explanations to Article 50 of the Charter, applicable to Article 54 CISA as well. 
156   The ‘execution’ condition means that a penalty should be “enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be 
enforced”. The ‘execution’ condition was found by the Court to constitute a justifi ed limitation that is compatible with Article 50 of the 
Charter, since it could be justifi ed under Article 52(1) of the Charter, see ECJ, 129/14 PPU (Criminal proceedings against Zoran Spasic), 
par. 55-74.
157   In 2018, the ECJ for the fi rst time applied Article 52(1) of the Charter to Article 50 of the Charter, see: ECJ, C-524/15 (criminal proceedings 
against Luca Menci); and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob). These cases are discussed below due to their potential 
relevance for EU competition law proceedings. 
158   This condition was discussed e.g. in ECJ, C-217/15 and C-350/15 (Criminal proceedings against Orsi and Baldetti), par. 17-26, where the 
Court made a distinction between administrative law proceedings against a legal person and criminal law proceedings against the 
natural persons committed in their capacity as legal representatives. The second proceedings therefore were not aimed at the company 
itself, but against the acts of the legal representatives of the company.
159  As stated, for Article 54 CISA, the extra ‘execution’ condition applies.
160  Van Bockel (2010), p. 21.
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the laws of the sentencing [Member State]”.161 Article 54 specifi cally refers to the prohibition 
of double prosecution, whilst Article 56 refers to the prohibition of double punishment.162
The former article has been designed to deal with concurring criminal law procedures. This 
would exclude administrative law penalties from its scope, although it has been argued that 
the Court could use the so-called Engel criteria of the ECtHR to establish whether a penalty 
has a criminal law nature.163 This might also be in line with the case of M.164 In this case the 
Court specifi cally stated that Article 54 CISA should be interpreted in light of Article 50 of the 
Charter.165 Furthermore, the Court also referred to the explanations relating to Article 50 of 
the Charter and mentioned that the case law of the ECtHR is also relevant in this regard. Even 
though the Court has not yet ruled upon the question whether administrative law penalties 
may be penalties in light of Article 54 CISA, one could argue that the Engel criteria used for the 
application of Article 50 of the Charter should be applied to Article 54 CISA as well. 
The trial against a person should be fi nally disposed of before the non bis in idem principle 
can apply. There should be a defi nite bar on prosecution in the fi rst Member State before this 
criterion is met.166 When a decision has been taken by a competent authority not to proceed 
with the prosecution, it might trigger the non bis in idem rule,167 but only when this decision 
defi nitely bars further prosecution in that Member State and when it is a decision on the 
substance of the case. The fact that a case can be reopened when there are new facts and/
or evidence against a person does not change the fi nality of the decision in light of Article 
54 CISA.168 Out of court settlements can also lead to a fi nal decision, and  thus make 
Article 54 CISA applicable.169 A conviction in absentia,170 an acquittal for lack of evidence,171
and an acquittal because the prosecution was time barred all trigger Article 54 CISA.172 The 
outer limits of Article 54 CISA are reached when there is no decision which bars any further 
prosecution.173 Moreover, as stated already, a decision is only fi nal when taken on the merits 
of a case.174
161  See Article 54 CISA. 
162   Van Bockel (2012), p. 330, has argued that the prohibition of double prosecution is, in the European context, the real non bis in idem rule.
163  Van Bockel (2010), p. 22.
164  ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.).
165   ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 35. See also ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 31. Cf. 
Vervaele (2013), p. 228, who states that up till 2013 there was still a diff erent interpretation of the non bis in idem principle in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice on the one hand and the interpretation of this principle in the internal market and competition policy 
on the other. See also Van Bockel (2012), p. 339.
   Interestingly, an Italian court and the Greek Supreme Court had, before the M. case was decided, set aside the reservations/derogations 
from Article 54 CISA, since these were, according to them, incompatible with Article 50 of the Charter. The German Constitutional 
Court in contrast, ruled in line with the later M. case of the Court. See Vervaele (2013), p. 225-227.
166   ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 34-38; ECJ, C-491/07 (Vladimir Transký), par. 36; see also ECJ, C-398/12 
(Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 32.
167  ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 39.
168  ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 37; ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 41.
169  ECJ, C-187/01 and C-385/01 (Gözütok and Brügge), par. 27-30.
170  ECJ, C-297/07 (Bourquain), par. 34-37.
171  ECJ, C-150/05 (Jean Leon van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië), par. 58.
172  ECJ, C-467/04 (Gasparini and others), par. 33.
173  See e.g. ECJ, C-469/03 (Filomeno Mario Miraglia), par. 30.
174  ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 42-48.
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Article 50 Charter
Article 50 of the Charter codifi es, as mentioned before, the general non bis in idem principle 
in the EU. It prevents the double prosecution and the double punishment of a person. Even 
though this article refers to the non bis in idem rule in “criminal proceedings”, it does not 
limit itself to the criminal law domain stricto sensu. The Court has made clear that the so-
called Engel criteria, or in the EU context, the Bonda criteria, should be taken into account 
to determine whether a sanction is of a criminal law nature.175 This means that one should 
examine the “the legal classifi cation of the off ence under national law, [...] the very nature of 
the off ence, and [...] the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned 
is liable to incur”.176 There thus seems to be a convergence between the concept of a criminal 
law charge as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU and as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights. It is unclear, however, whether the acceptance of the Engel criteria 
by the CJEU will also lead to concurring case law between both European courts. The ECtHR 
has, for example, accepted that (Italian) competition law proceedings lead to a criminal 
charge,177 whilst the Court of Justice is not willing to do so up until now for EU competition 
law proceedings.178 It remains therefore to be seen how the Court will interpret the Engel 
criteria in various administrative law proceedings. Nonetheless, the non bis in idem principle 
in Article 50 of the Charter is not solely reserved to criminal law sanctions stricto sensu. 
Practically, the non bis in idem principle in Article 50 of the Charter applies thus fi rst to 
situations “where a Member State is implementing substantive or procedural Union criminal 
law or where a Member State is applying national criminal law to enforce provisions that 
have their source in Union law. Second, Article 50 may apply in certain Union administrative 
law contexts in which public authorities examine or punish breaches of EU law provisions 
and which, though administrative by defi nition, closely resemble criminal proceedings”.179
Article 50 of the Charter will only be applicable when a person “has been fi nally acquitted 
or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law”.180 There should therefore be a 
fi nal decision in light of Article 50 of the Charter. In the case of M., the Court reviewed the 
compatibility of the case law on the fi nality of a decision under Article 54 CISA in light of 
Article 50 of the Charter and Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR.181 It appears that the Court 
takes a harmonising approach in this regard, and therefore it seems likely that the case law 
of the Court on the fi nality of a decision under Article 54 could be applied to Article 50 of the 
175   ECJ, C-489/10 (Criminal proceedings against Lukasz Marcin Bonda), par. 37-44; ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), par. 35.
176  ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), par. 35.
177  ECtHR, no. 43590/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy), par. 44.
178   See e.g. the evasive approach of the Court in ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 33. The Court held that the 
ECtHR has regarded a fi ne of the Italian competition authority as criminal in nature, but it does not give its own ruling on this matter. 
179  Tomkin (2014), p. 1385.
180  Article 50 of the Charter.
181   ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.). Another explicit reference by the Court of Justice in Article 50 Charter cases to the non 
bis in idem principle in Article 4 of Protocol 7 can be found in ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 60-62. In this 
case, the ECJ found a limitation on Article 50 of the Charter not in confl ict with the ECHR system. This case is discussed below in light 
of the limitation ground in Article 52(1) of the Charter.
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Charter as well.182 This means that a person is fi nally acquitted or convicted when there is a 
bar on the prosecution in the fi rst set of proceedings, subject to the caveat that a procedure is 
still regarded barred even when it could be reopened if there are new facts and/or evidence.183
The “execution” requirement which is inserted in Article 54 CISA cannot be found in Article 
50 of the Charter, and is therefore not a requirement for the non bis in idem rule in the Charter.
Limitation ground in Article 52(1) Charter
Article 52(1) provides a limitation ground to the Charter rights. In March 2018, the ECJ ruled 
in two Grand Chamber judgments that dual proceedings – administrative and criminal law 
proceedings – may in some cases be justifi ed by Article 52(1) of the Charter.184 In the Menci
case, the Italian public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings after the conclusion of the 
administrative proceedings. Both proceedings were initiated due to the failure to pay VAT. By 
contrast, in Garlsson Real Estate, administrative proceedings were initiated fi rst, but during the 
appeal stage, a fi nal decision was taken in a subsequent criminal procedure. Both proceedings 
concerned “manipulation with the objective of drawing attention to the securities of [a 
particular company] to support the price of the securities with a view to personal gain”.185 In 
both cases, the Court concluded that the off ence was the same,186 which meant that the non bis 
in idem principle applied.
A limitation to the non bis in idem principle can, according to the ECJ, be justifi ed on the basis 
of Article 52(1) of the Charter. As the Court ruled:
In accordance with the fi rst sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by that Charter must be provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. According to the 
second sentence of Article 52(1) thereof, subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations to those rights and freedoms may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.187
In Menci, the dual proceedings were allowed, whereas the Court seemed not to allow the dual 
proceedings the Garlsson case, although the assessment thereof was left to the discretion of the 
national court. National law provided in both cases for the dual proceedings. Moreover, in both 
cases a general interest objective was served by the dual proceedings. In the Menci case, the Court 
182   Klip (2016), p. 295-296, contends that Article 50 of the Charter is “more limited [than the CISA provisions] because it does not mention 
the eff ect of out-of-court settlements”. However, in his opinion it seems likely that the CJEU will interpret the fi nal acquittal or 
conviction in light of the case law under Article 54 CISA. 
183  ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 41.
184   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci); and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob).
185  ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 12.
186  This is discussed below (par. 3.3.2.2).
187   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 41; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 43.
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referred to the objective of ensuring “the collection of all VAT due”,188 and in Garlsson, the objective 
was the “protection of the integrity of the fi nancial markets of the European Union and public 
confi dence in fi nancial instruments”.189 Dual enforcement proceedings may be justifi ed as long 
as the proceedings pursue “complementary aims relating […] to diff erent aspects of the same 
unlawful conduct at issue”190 in order to achieve the objectives at stake. The Court then continued 
by examining the proportionality of the dual proceedings. The proportionality of the measure 
was discussed in three steps. First, the test of strict necessity which requires that the rules are 
clear and precise.191 Secondly, the measure should be the least restrictive.192 Thirdly, the Court 
referred to the obligation on the referring court to balance the interests at stake.193 The second step 
of the proportionality requirement was in both cases extensively discussed and led to diff ering 
conclusions. It was allowed, according to the Court, to prosecute Luca Menci after the administrative 
proceedings had been closed, since (i) there were rules to coordinate administrative and criminal 
law proceedings,194 since criminal law penalties were limited to particularly serious off ences,195
and (ii) the principle of proportionality of sanctions applied in criminal law procedures, which 
meant that an obligation should exist on the competent authorities “to ensure that the severity 
of all the penalties imposed does not exceed the seriousness of the off ence”.196 The rules for 
coordination were more explicit in the Garlsson case, where the Court referred to the obligation on 
the public prosecutor to inform the administrative authority of an alleged off ence, the obligation 
on the administrative authority to grant access to the documents collected during its monitoring 
activities and the obligation on both authorities to exchange information.197 However, the Court 
found the dual proceedings not to be proportionate on the basis of two points: (i) “the bringing of the 
proceedings relating to an administrative fi ne of a criminal nature exceeds what is strictly necessary 
in order to achieve the [objective at stake] in so far as that criminal conviction is such as to punish 
the off ence committed in an eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive manner”;198 (ii) criminal law 
fi nes could be (partially) recovered when an administrative law fi ne was imposed upon a person, 
but terms of imprisonment could not be taken into account in this mechanism.199 Both criminal law 
and administrative law penalties seemed to be intended to punish a person which was, according 
to the Court, not proportionate. Moreover, the possibility to set off  penalties did not seem to work 
properly. These rulings seem to exclude dual criminal law proceedings, although it remains to be 
seen whether the opening which the ECtHR left for possible dual criminal law proceedings exists 
in EU law as well. This might also depend on the development of case law by the Strasbourg Court. 
188  ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 44.
189  ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 46.
190   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 44; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 46.
191   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 49-51; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 
51-53.
192   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 52-58; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 
54-62.
193  ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 58-59.
194  ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par.54.
195  ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 54.
196  ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 55.
197  ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 57.
198  ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 57.
199  ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 60.
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It becomes apparent from the cases discussed above that the Court of Justice allows dual 
proceedings when (i) this is provided for in law, (ii) when there are complementary aims to 
achieve a general interest, (iii) when the law clearly defi nes the possibility of dual proceedings, 
and is thus foreseeable, (iv) when there are coordination mechanisms, (v) when the overall 
penalties are not excessive. It is should be mentioned that administrative law proceedings 
which follow a fi nal decision in criminal law proceedings, or possibly also dual criminal law 
proceedings, are, as is apparent from the two cases discussed above, less likely to survive the 
proportionality test of the Court of Justice.
The inclusion of coordination mechanisms to justify a limitation of the non bis in idem 
principle, might lead to problems in the transnational setting in which Article 50 of the 
Charter operates. The ECtHR also applied such a criterion in A and B v Norway. Nevertheless, 
it should not be forgotten that Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR is confi ned to dual 
proceedings in one Member State. Van Kempen and Bemelmans also refer to the diffi  culties 
to align and coordinate criminal law proceedings in a supranational setting.200 Coordination 
in one Member State might be already diffi  cult, but coordination in a transnational setting is, 
according to Van Kempen and Bemelmans “much harder (if not impossible)”.201
The aforementioned criteria seem to overlap with the criteria created by the ECtHR in A 
and B v Norway.202 These criteria were created by the ECtHR to examine the bis requirement. 
Both Courts therefore deal with the same elements, but under a diff erent heading – the ECJ 
discusses these elements as a justifi cation ground for an infringement of the non bis in idem
principle, whereas the ECtHR uses the criteria to determine whether there are subsequent 
proceedings or merely one overall procedure, and thus whether there is an infringement of 
the non bis in idem principle.
Some notable diff erences in application of the criteria exist as well. The ECtHR requires 
coordination also in respect to the collection of evidence. This was not an issue which was 
discussed in the Menci case, although it was an issue in Garlsson. Furthermore, the ECtHR 
does require more proof by a Member State of the necessity of dual proceedings when they 
are conducted with a greater lapse of time between them. 
An element which is not explicitly referred to by the ECJ is the stigmatising eff ect of penalties. 
Nevertheless, the Court does take this implicitly into account in Garlsson when discussing 
the proportionality of administrative law proceedings after criminal law proceedings are 
concluded. The amount of the administrative law fi ne is in the same range as the criminal 
law fi ne. Moreover, if the criminal law fi ne is eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive,203 the 
initiation of administrative law proceedings is not allowed. 
200  Van Kempen & Bemelmans (2018), p. 262-263.
201  Van Kempen & Bemelmans (2018), p. 262.
202  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 132-133.
203  Which is for the national court to determine. 
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Judge Pinto de Albuquerque was not happy with the majority ruling in A and B v Norway, and 
held that “[t]he progressive and mutual collaboration between the two European courts will 
evidently once again be deeply disturbed, Strasbourg going the wrong way and Luxembourg 
going the right way”, by allowing dual proceedings under certain prescribed conditions.204
The Court of Justice prevented this from happening in its two Grand Chamber judgments. 
AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona was not in favour of this approach. He asserted in his opinion 
at the Menci case the following:
I repeat that I do not believe that the Court of Justice should follow the ECtHR down 
that route. The interpretation of Article 50 of the Charter cannot depend on the degree 
of willingness of States to comply with its legally binding provisions. And since the 
case-law of the Court has consolidated a statement of the law to the eff ect that two 
parallel or consecutive sets of proceedings, which lead to two substantively criminal 
penalties in respect of the same acts, continue to be two sets of proceedings (bis) and 
not one, I can fi nd no sound reasons for abandoning it.
Further, the introduction into EU law of a criterion for interpretation of Article 50 of 
the Charter which rests on the degree of the substantive and temporal connection 
between one type of proceedings (criminal proceedings) and another (administrative 
proceedings in which a penalty is imposed) would add signifi cant uncertainty and 
complexity to the right of individuals not to be tried or punished twice for the same 
acts. The fundamental rights recognised in the Charter must be easily understood by 
all and the exercise of those rights calls for a foreseeability and certainty which, in my 
view, are not compatible with that criterion.205
The ECJ indeed did not change its approach on the bis requirement in light of the judgment 
of the ECtHR A and B v Norway. The ECJ merely elaborated upon the possibility to justify a 
limitation of the non bis in idem principle. Dual proceedings can therefore be allowed in EU 
law if the conditions for Article 52(1) of the Charter are met. This approach ensured that the 
Court did not have to abandon or adapt its previous case law on the non bis in idem principle. 
Instead, it applied Article 52(1) of the Charter to a limitation of the non bis in idem principle. 
2.3.2 The concept of idem
2.3.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The Strasbourg Court used to adopt three206 diff erent approaches to determine whether 
a person was tried or punished for the same off ence (idem). It used to focus either on the 
identity of the facts, on the legal classifi cation of an off ence, or on the essential elements of 
204  Dissenting Opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque at ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 80.
205  Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona at ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 72-73.
206  Buruma (2010), par. 2 asserts that the third approach could be regarded as part of the second approach.
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two off ences to determine whether a person was tried or punished for the same off ence. These 
approaches created uncertainty as to the scope of the non bis in idem principle from Article 4 
of Protocol 7. Therefore, the ECtHR decided to provide a case in which the status quo of this 
principle was explained. In Zolotukhin, the ECtHR provided its long-awaited clarity on the 
idem element. A harmonised interpretation of the same off ence was given by the ECtHR. The 
non bis in idem rule will be applicable when a person is prosecuted for second time on the basis 
of “identical facts or facts which are substantially the same”.207 The facts are substantially the 
same when the relevant facts “constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the 
same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which 
must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings”.208
The ECtHR appears to align its case law with the approach of the CJEU in cases dealing with 
Article 54 CISA.209 An objective, factual approach should be taken before one can speak of the 
same “off ence”.210
Applying the legal rules to the case at hand, the ECtHR found that the off ence was the same 
in the two procedures. The off ence of “minor disorderly acts”,211 enforced in administrative 
law proceedings, was based on the same factual constellation as the criminal law off ence of 
“disorderly acts”,212 even though the criminal law off ence was based on two more incidents. 
The ECtHR discussed the off ences as well in order to determine on what facts they were 
based.213 This has raised questions in literature on the approach of the ECtHR. Did the ECtHR 
actually intend to use a completely facts-based approach? It is e.g. argued that the Strasbourg 
Court could have come to a diff erent conclusion if the off ences were completely diff erent, 
even though still based on the same factual situation.214
A similar approach as taken in the Zolotukhin judgment, can be found e.g. in Šimkus v Lithuania, 
where the ECtHR focused on the facts referred to in both proceedings, namely “to the words 
and statements spoken by the applicant in the hospital on the night of 23 July 2006 in the 
presence of the border offi  cers guarding K.B.”,215 although an extra fact was added for the
207  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 82.
208  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 84.
209   See the reference of the ECtHR to the case law of the CJEU: ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 79; see also Harris et al. 
(2014), p. 972, fn. 181; Vervaele (2013), p. 222. Neagu (2012), p. 970-971, argues that the application of this approach in Zolotukhin 
“seems to be contrary to the [CJEU’s] assertion that acts committed over an extended period of time and even in diff erent states are to 
be considered as inextricably linked together in time and space”. However, Neagu concludes that the approach of the ECtHR is in line 
with the case law of the CJEU. Cf. De Graaf (2013), p. 377-379.
210   See also ECtHR, no 78477/11 (Ramda v France), in particular par. 87, where the Strasbourg Court held: “The Court notes that, contrary 
to what the [French] Government appeared to assert (see paragraph 79 above), it is clear from the principles set forth in Sergey 
Zolotukhin, cited above, that the issue to be determined is not whether the elements of the off ences with which the applicant was 
charged in the proceedings before the criminal courts and those before the assize courts were or were not identical, but whether the 
facts at issue in the two sets of proceedings referred to the same conduct. Where the same conduct on the part of the same defendant 
and within the same time frame is at issue, the Court is required to verify whether the facts of the off ence of which the applicant was 
initially convicted, and those of the off ence for which proceedings continued, were identical or substantially the same (see Sergey 
Zolotukhin, cited above, § 94).” Cf. De Graaf (2013), p. 377-379, who still sees room for a legal analysis under the case law of the ECtHR. 
211  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 90.
212  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 91.
213  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia), par. 95-96.
214  De Graaf (2013), p. 379-380.
215  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 49.
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criminal law proceedings.216 This additional element, however, is not suffi  cient to speak of 
diff erent off ences. As the ECtHR held: 
Furthermore, although the criminal charges also included additional facts, namely the 
telephone conversation between the applicant and an offi  cer (see paragraphs 7 and 49 
above), that does not change the fact that the criminal charges embraced the facts of the 
administrative off ence of minor hooliganism in their entirety and that, conversely, the 
administrative off ence did not contain any facts not contained in the criminal charges 
(see, mutatis mutandis, Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 97, and Khmel v. Russia, no. 
20383/04, § 65, 12 December 2013).217
The ECtHR thus discussed all factual circumstances218 to determine whether the off ence is the 
same. By focusing on the identity of the facts, and not solely on the legal classifi cation, the 
Strasbourg Court put more emphasis on the protection of a suspect.219 In the Grand Chamber 
judgment of Grande Stevens, the ECtHR was, nonetheless, quite brief in its discussion of the 
factual situation. It mentioned fi rst, with reference to Zolotukhin, that the conduct on which the 
off ences are based should be the same in both proceedings.220 It ruled that both proceedings 
were based on “the same conduct by the same persons on the same date”.221 Furthermore, it 
referred to the statement of the national court that the administrative law proceedings and the 
criminal law proceedings were both based on the “dissemination of false information”.222 This 
was suffi  cient for the ECtHR to rule that the off ence was the same.
In his dissenting opinion in A and B v Norway, Pinto de Albuquerque contends that the pro persona
approach taken in Zolotukhin is qualifi ed and limited223 by the A and B v Norway judgment.224 It 
is indeed true that the ECtHR might come to the conclusion that dual proceedings based on the 
same facts, and thus the same off ence, are still allowed when the proceedings themselves are 
suffi  ciently linked in substance and time. Enforcing a minor off ence and an off ence based on the 
same facts could be allowed if the off ences pursue complementary purposes, the enforcement is 
foreseeable, evidence is as much as possible collected by one authority or the combined eff orts 
of them and when the second penalty imposed takes into account the fi rst penalty. This could 
even have led to a diff erent conclusion in e.g. Zolotukhin, if these four conditions had been met.225
216  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 49.
217  ECtHR, no. 41788/11 (Šimkus v Lithuania), par. 50.
218  See also the extensive discussion of the facts of two prosecutions in e.g. ECtHR, no 78477/11 (Ramda v France), par. 88-95.
219  Buruma (2010), par. 5.
220  ECtHR, no. 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10 and 18698/10 (Grande Stevens v Italy), par. 224.
221  ECtHR, no. 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10 and 18698/10 (Grande Stevens v Italy), par. 227.
222  ECtHR, no. 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10 and 18698/10 (Grande Stevens v Italy), par. 227.
223   See also Wattel (2017), p. 239 who insists that the ECtHR might have regretted its Zolotukhin judgment by ruling there that it would 
solely focus on the identity of the facts for the idem requirement.
224   Dissenting Opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque at ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 79.
225   The ECtHR did mention in A and B v Norway that it will be less lenient in the application of the non bis in idem principle when there are 
parallel or subsequent criminal law proceedings instead of criminal law and administrative law proceedings. The reason for this is, 
according to the ECtHR, the stigmatising eff ect of criminal law proceedings. 
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The identity of the facts is used to determine whether a person is tried or punished twice for 
the same off ence (idem), whereas the ECtHR will use, amongst others, the identity of the legal 
interest to determine whether the two off ences pursue complementary purposes (part of the 
bis test). In my opinion, as understandable as the case law of the ECtHR may be, this might 
bring us back to the pre Zolotukhin era where the ECtHR sometimes used the legal interest 
protected, and at other times the identity of the facts, to determine whether the non bis in idem 
principle had been infringed. 
2.3.2.2 European Union
The non bis in idem principle only applies to the same person,226 prosecuted for a 
second time for the same act or off ence.227 There is extensive case law on the idem 
element of the non bis in idem rule, although the Union courts have, according to Van 
Bockel “taken a piecemeal approach”228 regarding this element. Again, a distinction 
is made here between Article 54 CISA and Article 50 of the Charter, in order to 
provide a proper framework of the criminal law non bis in idem principle in Union law.
Article 54 CISA
There is extensive case law on the idem requirement of the non bis in idem rule in Article 54 
CISA. The leading case concerning the interpretation of “the same acts” under Article 54 CISA 
is the Van Esbroeck case.229 In this case the Court adopted a more factual approach instead of 
a legal approach. The legal classifi cation of the acts230 nor the “identity of the protected legal 
interest”231 are criteria which should be taken into consideration. According to the Court, “the 
only relevant criterion for the application of Article 54 of the CISA is identity of the material 
acts, understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are 
inextricably linked together”.232 An objective,233 factual analysis should thus be conducted 
to determine whether certain acts are inextricably linked together. 234 This analysis should 
make clear whether a set of facts is “inextricably linked in time, in space and by their subject-
matter”.235 The facts for which a person is prosecuted a second time do not have to be identical 
to be regarded as being the “same act”.236
226  Tomkin (2014), p. 1391-1392.
227   Article 54 CISA speaks of the “same acts”, whilst Article 50 of the Charter refers to the same “off ence”. 
228  Van Bockel (2010), p. 161.
229  ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck).
230   ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 31; see also ECJ, C-367/05 (Criminal proceedings against 
Norma Kraaijenbrink), par. 23.
231  ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 32.
232   ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 36; see also ECJ, C-467/04 (Gasparini and others), par. 54; 
ECJ, C-150/05 (Jean Leon van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië), par. 48; and ECJ, C-367/05 (Criminal proceedings against 
Norma Kraaijenbrink), par. 26.
233   See also ECJ, C-367/05 (Criminal proceedings against Norma Kraaijenbrink), par. 29, where the Court stated that acts merely connected by 
criminal intent does not suffi  ce to regard those acts as inextricably linked. 
234   De Graaf (2013), p. 375-376, however, points out that this does not necessarily exclude a legal analysis. 
235   ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 38; see also ECJ, C-467/04 (Gasparini and others), par. 56; 
ECJ, C-150/05 (Jean Leon van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië), par. 52; and ECJ, C-367/05 (Criminal proceedings against 
Norma Kraaijenbrink), par. 27.
236  ECJ, C-150/05 (Jean Leon van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië), par. 49. 
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Article 50 Charter
Article 50 of the Charter uses a diff erent terminology from Article 54 CISA. Whereas Article 
54 CISA refers to the “same acts”, the Charter non bis in idem rule refers to “off ences”. In both 
Van Esbroeck237 and Van Straaten238 the Court referred to this diff erence. In Van Esbroeck, the 
Court ruled:
It must also be noted that the terms used in that article diff er from those used in other 
international treaties which enshrine the ne bis in idem principle. Unlike Article 54 of 
the CISA, Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms use the term ‘off ence’, which implies that 
the criterion of the legal classifi cation of the acts is relevant as a prerequisite for the 
applicability of the ne bis in idem principle which is enshrined in those treaties.239
In light of this ruling, it could be argued that the Court should adhere to a more legal 
classifi cation of the same off ence under Article 50 of the Charter. Furthermore, in EU 
competition law proceedings the Court also examines the legal interest protected by the 
respective provisions.240 There are therefore arguments to make for a diff erent approach under 
Article 50 of the Charter than under Article 54 CISA, namely an approach where the legal 
analysis is an important element of the examination of the idem element. On the other hand 
there are also strong arguments that the Court should adopt the same approach with regard 
to the idem element under Article 50 of the Charter and Article 54 CISA. Firstly, reference can 
be made to the reasoning of the Court under Article 54 CISA not to follow a legal approach. 
According to the Court, taking a legal approach “might create as many barriers to freedom 
of movement within the Schengen territory as there are penal systems in the Contracting 
States”.241 This reasoning could also be extended to other areas than the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Secondly, the desire of the Court to unite242 the approaches under Article 
54 CISA and Article 50 of the Charter could be used as an argument for the Court to take a 
factual approach under Article 50 of the Charter, even though the latter refers to “off ences” 
and not “acts”. Thirdly, the explanations at Article 50 of the Charter seek a close connection to 
the interpretation of the ECtHR under Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR.243 Since the ECtHR 
has taken a more factual approach in the Zolotukhin case, seemingly in line with the case law 
237  ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 28.
238  ECJ, C-150/05 (Jean Leon van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië), par. 42.
239  ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 28.
240   Vervaele (2013), p. 228, and Van Bockel (2012), p. 339 both refer to the diff erence in interpretation of the idem element in competition 
policy and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
241  ECJ, C-436/04 (Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri van Esbroeck), par. 35.
242   See ECJ, C-486/14 (Criminal proceedings against Piotr Kossowski), par. 31; and ECJ, C-398/12 (Criminal proceedings agains M.), par. 35, 
in which the ECJ ruled that Article 54 CISA should be interpreted in light of Article 50 of the Charter. Klip (2016), p. 296, asserts the 
opposite; in his view Article 50 of the Charter should be interpreted in light of Article 54 CISA. He argues that: “the reliance of the 
Court on principles, rather than on express references in a legal instrument, supports the conclusion that Article 54 CISA case law 
guides the interpretation of Article 50 Charter.”
243  See also Article 52(3) of the Charter.
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of the CJEU under Article 54 CISA, it does not appear realistic that the Court of Justice of the 
EU will suddenly take a completely diff erent approach under Article 50 of the Charter. 
The Court of Justice settled the question which approach to take for Article 50 of the Charter 
in two Grand Chamber rulings of 20 March 2018. The Court ruled: “[a]ccording to the Court’s 
case-law, the relevant criterion for the purposes of assessing the existence of the same off ence 
is identity of the material facts, understood as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances 
which are inextricably linked together which resulted in the fi nal acquittal or conviction of 
the person concerned […]. Therefore, Article 50 of the Charter prohibits the imposition, with 
respect to identical facts, of several criminal penalties as a result of diff erent proceedings 
brought for those purposes.”244 The legal classifi cation cannot be relevant to determine 
whether the off ences are the same.245 The Italian authorities argued in both cases that the 
off ences were not the same, since the criminal law off ence required an additional constituent 
element.246 The Court stuck, however, to its factual approach as described in the previous 
subparagraph. It ruled that this diff erence in the off ences is “not, in itself, capable of calling 
into question the identity of the material facts at issue”.247
In order to reach the conclusion that a factual approach needs to be taken, the Court referred 
“by analogy” to its case law under Article 54 CISA. There was no further explanation by the 
Court why it harmonised its approach under both provisions, even though the wording in 
those two articles is diff erent. However, as illustrated, there are good reasons for the Court to 
align its approach under both provisions. It has thus been settled that the Court will approach 
the idem element under Article 54 CISA and Article 50 of the Charter in the same way, namely 
by focusing on the identity of the facts and not on the legal classifi cation of an off ence. 
2.3.3 A comparison of the non bis in idem principle in the ECHR and the EU
The non bis in idem principle may prevent double jeopardy and/or a double punishment. In 
the ECHR, one may fi nd this principle in Article 4(1) of Protocol 7. In the EU, by contrast, 
there are multiple provisions codifying the non bis in idem principle. The most important 
codifi cations are Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) 
and Article 50 of the Charter. A double prosecution and a double punishment are prohibited 
under Protocol 7 to the ECHR and Article 50 of the Charter. Article 54 CISA only prohibits the 
double prosecution of a person, whereas the prohibition of double punishment in the CISA 
can be found in Article 56. The EU and the ECtHR system both require that the (i) the person is 
the same, (ii) the facts/off ences are the same (idem), (iii) there are duplicate proceedings (bis), 
(iv) one of the proceedings is concluded with a fi nal decision.248 Moreover, the case should 
244   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 35; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 37.
245   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 36; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 38.
246   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 38; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 40.
247   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 38; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 40.
248  Article 4(1) of Protocol no 7 ECHR.
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fi nally be disposed of,249 or there should be a fi nal acquitt al or conviction.250 In order to speak 
of a fi nal decision there should be a decision on the merits. 
The idem requirement is explained by both the ECtHR and the ECJ in a factual manner. It is 
necessary to determine whether the facts are the same. The legal classifi cation of the off ence is 
not a relevant criterion. There seems to be an alignment between both Courts. 
A diverging approach between the ECtHR and the ECJ exists with regard to the bis requirement. 
The ECtHR further refi ned this element in the A and B v Norway case and ruled that dual 
proceedings are not always prohibited if they are suffi  ciently linked in time and space. This 
is examined on the basis of four elements. The ECJ, by contrast, decided not to follow this 
approach under the bis requirement. Nevertheless, it did allow for dual proceedings as well. It 
decided to incorporate similar elements as the ECtHR, but then in order to determine whether 
a limitation of the non bis in idem principle can be justifi ed under Article 52(1) of the Charter. 
The approaches taken by the two Courts therefore in the end converge once more, even 
though the paths taken to get there diverged. 
2.4  BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
The burden and standard of proof are two principles that can be found in many areas of law. 
The scope of these principles diff ers though in the diff erent areas of law. In criminal law, 
they are coloured by the presumption of innocence, which can be found in e.g. Article 48(1) 
of the Charter and Article 6(2) ECHR. A distinction is made here between two “principle 
kind of burdens”251 of proof, namely the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of 
proof. These concepts follow from the English legal system. They are also useful to explain the 
approach of the competition law courts with regard to the burden of proof on undertakings 
when the relevant competition authority adduces direct or indirect evidence to prove its case. 
The legal burden of proof entails that a party should adduce enough evidence to meet the 
requisite standard of proof.252 The evidential burden of proof is referred to as the proof needed 
to establish a case prima facie.253 In criminal law, this means that the prosecution should give 
suffi  cient evidence before the case will be dealt with, either by the judge or by trial jury. Both 
the burden (2.4.1) and the standard of proof (2.4.2) are discussed in the context of the ECHR 
and in the EU. After a discussion on the burden and standard of proof, a comparison is made 
between the approaches in both jurisdictions (2.4.3).
249  Article 54 CISA.
250  Article 50 of the Charter. 
251  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80. See also Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 73; Munday (2013), p. 60.
252  Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 73-74; Munday (2013), p. 60; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80-81.
253  Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 74; Munday (2013), p. 60-61; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 82-83.
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2.4.1 Burden of proof
2.4.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The burden of proving an off ence rests on the authorities. In general, this means that the 
burden of proof rests on the prosecution.254 The ECtHR also emphasises the role of national 
courts in criminal law proceedings.255 As Harris et al. argue: “[Article 6(2) ECHR means that] 
in terms more appropriate for civil law systems, […] the court, in its inquiry into the facts, 
must fi nd for the accused in case of doubt”.256 This means, generally, that there is an evidential 
and legal burden of proof on the prosecution, and that the national court should start the 
case without any preconceived ideas of guilt. Both notions follow from the overarching 
presumption of innocence.257 Harris et al. seem to discuss both aspects, the burden of proof 
and the open mind of the judge, as part of the same coin, namely the burden of proof.258 By 
contrast, Bemelmans, when distinguishing between four diff erent evidential matters, regards 
both notions as separate elements of the presumption of innocence.259 Similarly, Leach refers 
to three evidential matters, namely the open mind of the judge, the burden of proof, and the 
standard of proof as elements of the presumption of innocence.260
It should be mentioned that, in some Member States, national courts have to prove an off ence, 
and can even conduct an investigation.261 The role of the national court may be of infl uence 
on the concept of burden of proof.262 It could even be argued that, strictly speaking, no burden 
of proof exists in jurisdictions where the national courts have a larger role in the truth-fi nding 
process.263 Arguably, though, as a general rule it can still be said that the burden of proof rests 
on the prosecution.264 The prosecution should thus present its evidence (evidential burden of 
proof) to the requisite legal standard (legal burden of proof). 
The general rule that the burden of proof rests on the authorities does not exclude the 
possibility that the burden may shift to the accused when the elements of an off ence are 
proven. Two circumstances where this might occur are of relevance for this research. Firstly, 
it might mean that authorities discharged their burden of proof and the person concerned 
acquired an evidential burden of proof.265 The suspect should then raise doubt as to elements 
254   See e.g. ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 8803/79 (Lingens and Leitgeb v Austria), p. 178; ECtHR, no. 10590/83 (Barberà, 
Messegué and Jabardo v Spain), par. 77; ECtHR, no. 42914/94 (Capeau v Belgium), par. 25; and ECtHR, no. 23572/07 (Zschüschen v 
Belgium), par. 22.
255  See e.g. ECtHR, no. 10590/83 (Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain), par. 77.
256  Harris et al. (2014), p. 461.
257  See e.g. Harris et al. (2014), p. 461-463; and Bemelmans (2018), p. 78.
258  Harris et al. (2014), p. 461-463.
259   Bemelmans (2018), p. 78. Bemelmans, however, examined these elements not only in light of ECtHR jurisprudence.
260  Leach (2017), p. 376-377.
261  This is e.g. the case in the Netherlands; see chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.2. 
262   Cf. Bemelmans (2018), p. 86-87, who refers to the role of judges in an inquisitorial or adversarial regime and the consequences of these 
systems on the evidential burden of proof. He also examines the discussion in Dutch literature on the presence in Dutch criminal law 
of a burden of proof, see p. 345-348. This is further discussed in chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.2.
263  See e.g. the discussion of Bemelmans (2018), p. 345-348, on the Dutch system.
264  As stated, this is further discussed for the Netherlands in chapter 3, par. 3.4.2.
265  See in general Glover (2017), p. 92-93.
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put forward by the authorities in order not to be convicted. Secondly, a suspect can also bear 
a burden of proof when invoking a defence. 
The burden of proof when the authorities have discharged their burden of proof
A suspect cannot merely stay passive during the whole process and hope that a judge or 
jury does not fi nd him/her guilty of the alleged off ence. Sometimes it might be necessary 
for a suspect to raise doubts as to the elements which need to be proven by the authorities. 
A burden of proof therefore may therefore rest on a suspect when the prosecution has 
discharged its burden of proof, otherwise the suspect might lose its case.266 It is, however, not 
an obligation imposed on a suspect to produce counterevidence, but merely the possibility 
to produce that evidence combined with the risk of losing a case. Nevertheless, there are 
situations where a suspect might experience the possibility of providing counterevidence as 
an obligation to provide counterevidence. Adverse inferences might e.g. be drawn from the 
silence of a suspect, which could give the impression that the burden of proof is reversed from 
the authorities to a suspect, and thus that an obligation is placed upon a suspect. The ECtHR, 
however, has allowed for the drawing of adverse inferences from the moment the authorities 
establish a prima facie case and when certain conditions are met. This is a matter of “common 
sense” and not a reversal of the burden of proof.267
In competition law proceedings, a distinction is made between direct evidence and indirect 
evidence to determine the particular burden of proof on the undertaking to provide 
counterevidence.268 Therefore, it is relevant fi rst to examine the approach of the ECtHR 
towards the use of direct and indirect evidence, and secondly, to determine the (type of) 
burden of proof on a suspect required to raise doubt. 
In criminal law proceedings, both direct and indirect evidence can be used by the authorities 
to prove an off ence. The ECtHR has made clear that, besides direct evidence, it is allowed for 
authorities to use indirect evidence in criminal law proceedings. In its admissibility decision 
in Lawless v United Kingdom, the ECtHR examined the impossibility of a convicted person to 
cross-examine a witness. The ECtHR referred to the importance of circumstantial evidence 
in this particular case. It ruled that “while [the witness’s] evidence was important, without 
it there was a formidable collection of circumstantial evidence; [moreover] this evidence was 
quite suffi  cient for the prosecution properly to ask the jury to convict of murder”.269 Indirect, 
or circumstantial, evidence may thus be used in criminal law proceedings. Even though 
266   See e.g. ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 44324/11 (Lawless v United Kingdom), par. 29-30, where the ECtHR refers to the 
“corrobative evidence”, which was “unchallenged” and overall “suffi  cient” to prove the off ence. See e.g. also ECtHR, no. 7299/75 and 
7496/76 (Albert and Le Compte v Belgium), par. 40. 
267   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 18731/91 (John Murray v United Kingdom), par. 51-54. By contrast, see ECtHR, no. 33501/96 (Telfner v Austria), par. 
18, where no prima facie case was established. See also Stumer (2010), p. 93-94. A burden of proof might thus rest on a suspect, although 
a reversal of the burden of proof from the authorities to a suspect is not allowed, see ECtHR, no. 33501/96 (Telfner v Austria), par. 15.
268  See chapter 4, par. 4.5.
269  ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 44324/11 (Lawless v United Kingdom), par. 30.
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the ECtHR is not an appeals tribunal which deals with the assessment of facts,270 there are 
some boundaries developed in case law to which courts should adhere when using indirect 
evidence. The European Commission of Human Rights did e.g. emphasise that the national 
court “had properly assessed the causal relationship between the circumstantial evidence 
and the consequences”.271 An examination of the causality between indirect evidence and the 
consequences fl owing from that evidence is thus a safeguard when authorities use indirect 
evidence. Furthermore, the European Commission of Human Rights has made clear that 
circumstantial or indirect evidence should, as a whole be unambiguous.272
It is not entirely clear what the burden of proof will be for a suspect when the authorities have 
discharged their evidential and/or legal burden of proof. However, to determine whether 
presumptions of law or fact have stayed within reasonable limits, and thus whether they 
comply with the presumption of innocence, an evidential burden of proof on the suspect has 
been regarded as an important factor to allow for those presumptions.273 Bemelmans argues 
also that a legal burden of proof on a suspect, namely a burden which requires a suspect to 
disprove a presumption beyond reasonable doubt, does not necessary exceed the reasonable 
limits of a reversal of the burden of proof.274 In cases dealing with presumptions, the burden 
of proof may shift to a suspect and may amount to an evidential, or sometimes even a legal 
burden of proof. 
Case law on presumptions thus allows for an evidential burden of proof on a suspect, and 
sometimes even a legal burden of proof. It thus seems logical that an evidential burden of 
proof could therefore also rest on a suspect to raise doubt in a case where the authorities 
have discharged their evidential and legal burden of proof on the basis of direct and/or 
indirect evidence. To allow for a legal burden of proof on a suspect to raise doubt in a case 
does go quite far. However, there is no case law on this matter, since the ECtHR is not an 
appeals tribunal that deals with the assessment of facts. Legal burdens of proof are, as stated, 
sometimes allowed when dealing with presumptions which shift the burden of proof. This is 
even allowed when the legal burden requires proof beyond reasonable doubt from a suspect. 
It might therefore occur that a suspect should raise doubt to a requisite legal standard, and 
thus bear a legal burden of proof, in order to raise doubt in a case.
270   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 13071/87 (Edwards v United Kingom), par. 34, where the ECtHR ruled that “it is not within the province of the 
European Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for these courts 
to assess the evidence before them”.
271  ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 25399/94 (H M A v Spain), p. 124.
272  ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 33995/96 (Mabro and Fioravanti v Italy).
273   See Bemelmans (2018), p. 248, who refers to ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 23456/94 (Hardy v Ireland); and ECtHR, 
partial decision as to the admissibility, no. 13881/02 (King v United Kingdom).
274   Bemelmans (2018), p. 248, who refers to ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 16269/90 (Tollefsen v Norway). In this case 
the European Commission of Human Rights ruled that the requirement on a suspect to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he spoke 
the truth in order to prevent a conviction for defamation did not amount to an “insurmountable presumption of guilt”. The ‘proof of 
truth’ is part of the establishment of the off ence and not a separate defence which can be invoked after an off ence has been established. 
See also ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 8803/79 (Lingens and Leitgeb v Austria), p. 178-179, where the European 
Commission of Human Rights refers to the “legal technique of a defence, commonly referred to as the ‘proof of truth’, to cover the 
exculpating element”. (italics added) Regardless, of the confl icting, and perhaps unhappily worded phrasing, this statement indeed 
implies that the “proof of truth” is not a defence as such, but actually part of establishing the off ence.
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The burden of proof for defences
The second situation to be discussed is where the burden of proof may rest on an accused 
is when he or she invokes a defence. In H. v United Kingdom, the European Commission of 
Human Rights discussed the insanity defence under English law. In the UK, a suspect bears 
the evidential and legal burden for that defence. The Commission ruled the following:
The Commission does not consider that requiring the defence to present evidence 
concerning the accused’s mental health at the time of the alleged off ence, constitutes in 
the present case an infringement of the presumption of innocence. Such a requirement 
cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. It fi nds, therefore, no appearance of a 
violation of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention in the present case.275
From H. v United Kingdom, it follows that an evidential and legal burden of proof may rest on 
a suspect when invoking a defence. 
The Strasbourg Court itself also allows for a burden of proof on a suspect. In Salabiaku, the 
onus of proof shifted to the suspect due to a presumption of fact. In this case, the suspect 
was prosecuted for smuggling cannabis. The goods were found in the possession of the 
suspect, who was caught at the customs exit of the airport of Paris. This was according to 
French law, suffi  cient evidence to convict Mr. Salabiaku for smuggling. In light of this 
presumption, the ECtHR also discussed the possibility for the applicant to invoke a force 
majeure defence. A suspect should invoke the defence, although it is not entirely clear from 
the case whether this could amount to a legal burden of proof, or merely an evidential burden 
of proof. There are indications, though, that in practice an evidential and a legal burden 
of proof rests on a suspect when invoking the force majeure defence in smuggling cases.276
The Salabiaku case led to a discussion in e.g. England on whether the burden of proof imposed 
upon a suspect, by way of a presumption or a defence, should be changed from an evidential 
and legal burden of proof to only an evidential burden of proof. In many cases the English 
courts have “read down” the proof requirements of a suspect to an evidential burden of 
proof.277 This in order to, as the ECtHR puts it, “confi ne [presumptions of fact or law] within 
reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain 
the rights of the defence”.278 However, it cannot be discerned from the case law of the ECtHR 
whether an evidential and legal burden of proof or merely an evidential burden of proof 
275  ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 15023/89 (H. v United Kingdom), par. 1.
276   In Court of Cassation, 67-90348, 14 December 1967, the French Court of Cassation refers to the evidential burden of proof on a suspect 
to make at least a prima facie force majeure case: “Que, des lors, apres avoir constate que Y... s’etait rendu coupable des faits constitutifs 
du delit de contrebande, sans admettre l’existence d’un cas de force majeure, qui n’etait meme pas allegue par le prevenu, la cour 
n’a pu prononcer la relaxe au profi t de celui-ci qu’au prix d’une violation fl agrante des textes vises aux moyens”. The ECtHR, no. 
10519/83 (Salabiaku v France), par. 29, does mention that French courts will acquit a suspect “if he succeeds in establishing a case of 
force majeure”. This seems to imply more than merely an evidential burden of proof. 
277  Infra. chapter 3, par. 3.4.1.2. 
278   ECtHR, no. 10519/83 (Salabiaku v France), par. 28; see e.g. also ECtHR, no. 53984/00 (France Radio v France), par. 24.
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should rest on a suspect when raising a defence. The European Commission of Human 
Rights did accept nevertheless an evidential and legal burden of proof for the insanity 
defence under English law. Unfortunately, there persists a lack of legal certainty as to the 
scope of the burden of proof which might rest on a suspect in criminal law proceedings exists. 
2.4.1.2 European Union
Member States in the European Union are, within the limits of equivalence and eff ectiveness, 
free to determine their own procedural rules. The procedural autonomy of Member States 
extends also to the burden of proof. The Court has always held that Member States are free 
to determine their own procedural rules in the absence of Union law.279 Furthermore, there 
is at this point in time no European prosecutor which can enforce EU criminal law before the 
Union courts.280 Therefore, there is not much case law of the CJEU on the burden of proof in 
criminal law. Nevertheless, the Court did sporadically refer to the burden of proof in cases 
where Union law is criminally enforced. 
In the case of Thomasz Rubach, the Court discussed the presumption of innocence, the burden 
of proof, and presumptions of law in light of Regulation 338/97 on the protection of species 
of wild fauna and fl ora. Mr. Rubach bought certain exotic spiders and started to breed and 
sell them. In this case, a presumption was in place that certain specimens were unlawfully 
acquired. The burden of proof lay on the defence to show that the specimens were lawfully 
acquired. The question posed by the national court was whether this reversal of the onus 
of proof was acceptable in light of the presumption of innocence. The Court held that the 
burden of proof should in general rest on the prosecution.281 It appears though that the Court 
allows presumptions of law and fact. In this case, the burden of proof at fi rst still rested on 
the prosecution, since the presumption of law did not resolve the prosecution to prove that 
the accused used the specimen for commercial purposes.282 Once this is proven, it is up to the 
defendant to rebut the presumption.283 The burden of proving a criminal law infringement 
thus rests on the prosecution, but there may also be a burden on the suspect to rebut a 
presumption of law or fact. In common law terms, we can say that the prosecution should 
bear the evidential and legal burden of proof in order to establish an off ence. The prosecution 
should thus substantiate its claim to establish a case prima facie (evidential burden of proof), 
and prove its claim to the requisite legal standard (legal burden of proof). It is unclear from 
the case of Thomasz Rubach whether a suspect bears the evidential and legal burden of proof, 
or merely the evidential burden of proof, in order to rebut a presumption of law or fact. 
279   E.g. ECJ, 33/76 (Rewe-Zentralfi nanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland), par. 5.
280   The European Public Prosecutor’s Offi  ce is in the process of being set up. Regulation 2017/1939 on implementing enhanced cooperation 
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Offi  ce (‘the EPPO’) entered into force on 12 October 2017. Certain fraud 
prevention rules can, in accordance with Article 4 of this regulation, be enforced by the EPPO in the national courts of the Member 
States. This Offi  ce is probably operational by the end of 2020, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-
cooperation/networks-and-bodies-supporting-judicial-cooperation/european-public-prosecutors-offi  ce_en, visited 20/8/2018. 
281  ECJ, C-344/08 (Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach), par. 32.
282  ECJ, C-344/08 (Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach), par. 32.
283  ECJ, C-344/08 (Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach), par. 33.
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There are furthermore no cases on how to rebut direct or indirect evidence adduced by the 
authorities, or cases on the burden of proof on a suspect when invoking a defence. 
In 2013, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Directive on the strengthening 
of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in 
criminal proceedings,284 which also contains provisions dealing with the burden of proof. 
This Directive was adopted on 9 March 2016 and contains provisions on the burden and 
standard of proof. It is only applicable to natural persons.285 Therefore, its holds less relevance 
for this study. Recital 13 explicitly refers to the “diff erent needs and levels of protection of 
certain aspects of the presumption of innocence as regards natural and legal persons”. The 
presumption of innocence for legal persons should, according to Directive 2016/343, “be 
ensured by the existing legislative safeguards and case-law, the evolution of which is to 
determine whether there is a need for Union action”.286
A broad interpretation of criminal law proceedings in light of the so-called Engel criteria,287 or 
in EU context the so-called Bonda criteria288 is also explicitly excluded, since the Directive only 
applies to criminal proceedings stricto sensu.289
Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343 provides that the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of 
a suspect should rest on the prosecution. This appears to be an evidential and legal burden of 
proof similar to the considerations in the case of Thomasz Rubach. Article 6(1) of this Directive 
leaves room for ex offi  cio fact-fi nding powers of national courts. 
Directive 2016/343 does not provide any rules on a possible burden of proof on a suspect 
when challenging indirect or direct evidence or when invoking defences. This Directive 
merely refers to “the right of the defence to submit evidence in accordance with the applicable 
national law”.290 Member States should allow a suspect to present its evidence, but the rest 
is left to the procedural rules of the Member States. It is thus unclear whether a suspect only 
bears an evidential burden of proof when presenting evidence or also a legal burden of 
proof. In other words, Member States are free to decide whether a suspect merely needs to 
substantiate its arguments in order to establish a prima facie case, or whether a suspect should 
substantiate its arguments to a requisite legal standard. 
284  COM(2013) 821/2.
285   See Article 2 of Directive 2016/343, and recital 13-15. See also paragraph 26 of the explanatory memorandum.
286  Recital 15 of Directive 2016/343.
287   ECtHR, no. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72 (Engel and others v the Netherlands), par. 82.
288   ECJ, C-489/10 (Criminal proceedings against Lukasz Marcin Bonda), par. 37; see also: ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), 
par. 35.
289   See Article 2 of Directive 2016/343. Recital 11 provides that the Directive “should not apply to civil proceedings or to administrative 
proceedings, including where the latter can lead to sanctions, such as proceedings relating to competition, trade, fi nancial services, 
road traffi  c, tax or tax surcharges, and investigations by administrative authorities in relation to such proceedings”.
290  Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343.
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2.4.2 Standard of proof
2.4.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights
It is not quite clear what the required standard of proof for the authorities should be under 
Article 6(2) ECHR.291 The European Commission on Human Rights held in 1963 that the 
evidence in a case should be “suffi  ciently strong in the eyes of the law to establish [the] 
guilt [of the accused]”.292 However, “suffi  ciently strong” has not been further defi ned by the 
Commission, which makes it unclear whether a standard of reasonable doubt applies. In 1997, 
it explicitly held that Article 6(2) does not lay down specifi c rights in relation to the standard 
of proof.293
The ECtHR has ruled that “any doubt should benefi t the accused”.294 This consideration of 
the Court seems to indicate a standard of beyond reasonable doubt.295 The in dubio pro reo 
principle is, moreover, regarded by the ECtHR as a specifi c expression of the presumption 
of innocence.296 Nevertheless, both statements by the ECtHR that any doubt should benefi t 
the accused and the statement that the in dubio pro reo principle applies in criminal law 
proceedings, are not specifi c confi rmations of a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
The ECtHR is, as mentioned, not a fourth instance court, which might explain why it has 
not formulated a clear standard of proof.297 By not requiring a specifi c standard of proof, 
the ECtHR seems to respect the diff erent legal systems in Convention States, and notably, 
the more general diff erence between the continental system of the conviction intime and the 
common law system which adheres to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt in criminal 
law proceedings.298 In Taxquet v Belgium, the ECtHR referred to the diff erent criminal law 
systems in the Contracting States, and explained that harmonising those rules is not the task 
of the Court. This case dealt with the fair trial rights under Article 6(1) ECHR, although the 
reasoning behind it can, in the author’s view, also be extended to the other fair trial rights 
under Article 6 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court held that: 
The Court notes that several Council of Europe member States have a lay jury system, 
guided by the legitimate desire to involve citizens in the administration of justice, 
291   See Harris et al. (2014), p. 463; Bemelmans (2018), p. 235. Bemelmans (2018), p. 237, also asserts that contracting parties to the ECHR are 
not required to use a lower standard than the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, even though the ECtHR has not explicitly ruled 
so. 
292  ECommHR, Report of 31 March 1963, no. 788/60 (Austria v Italy), Yearbook of 1963 740 (at 784).
293   See ECommHR, Report of 9 April 1997, no. 24838/94 (Steel and others v United Kingdom), par. 71 where it was held that “[t]he 
Commission notes that it is not clear whether, in domestic law, the courts should apply the criminal standard of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ or the civil one of ‘balance of probabilities’, when deciding whether facts exist which warrant a binding over order under 
Section 115 of the 1980 Act. Article 6 par. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention does not, however, lay down any specifi c rights in relation to 
the standard or burden of proof […]”.
294   ECtHR, no. 10590/83 (Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain), par. 77. See e.g. also ECtHR, no. 26711/07, 32786/10, and 34278/10 (Poletan 
and Azirovik v The Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia), par. 64.
295   The European Commission of Human Rights also referred to this standard, see ECommHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 
8803/79 (Lingens and Leitgeb v Austria), p. 178.
296  See e.g. ECtHR, no. 48144/09 (Cleve v Germany), par. 52.
297   See also Bemelmans (2018), p. 236, who contends that this “fourth instance”-docrine does not stand in the way of formulating a 
standard of proof. 
298  For a further discussion on these two systems, see Sorvatzioti and Manson (2018).
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particularly in relation to the most serious off ences. The jury exists in a variety of forms 
in diff erent States, refl ecting each State’s history, tradition and legal culture; variations 
may concern the number of jurors, the qualifi cations they require, the way in which 
they are appointed and whether or not any forms of appeal lie against their decisions 
(see paragraphs 43-60 above). This is just one example among others of the variety of legal 
systems existing in Europe, and it is not the Court’s task to standardise them. A State’s choice of 
a particular criminal-justice system is in principle outside the scope of the supervision carried 
out by the Court at European level, provided that the system chosen does not contravene the 
principles set forth in the Convention (see Achour v. France [GC], no. 67335/01, § 51, 
ECHR 2006-IV). Furthermore, in cases arising from individual petitions the Court’s 
task is not to review the relevant legislation in the abstract. Instead, it must confi ne 
itself, as far as possible, to examining the issues raised by the case before it (see, among 
many other authorities, N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 56, ECHR 2002-X).
Accordingly, the institution of the lay jury cannot be called into question in this context. 
The Contracting States enjoy considerable freedom in the choice of the means calculated 
to ensure that their judicial systems are in compliance with the requirements of Article 6. 
The Court’s task is to consider whether the method adopted to that end has led in 
a given case to results which are compatible with the Convention, while also taking 
into account the specifi c circumstances, the nature and the complexity of the case. In 
short, it must ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole were fair (see Edwards v. 
the United Kingdom, 16 December 1992, § 34, Series A no. 247-B, and Stanford v. the 
United Kingdom, 23 February 1994, § 24, Series A no. 282-A).299
The ECtHR does not wish, as can be seen from the quote above, to standardise criminal 
procedural rules in the Member States. The diff erences in the Member States with regard to 
their approach to the standard of proof are quite substantial and make it diffi  cult to identify 
a common denominator. It is therefore only logical for the Strasbourg Court not to assess this 
criminal law principle too extensively. 
It is not entirely clear whether a suspect can even bear a legal burden of proof, and thus 
whether a suspect has to prove certain elements to a requisite legal standard. Consequently, 
there are also no cases dealing with the potential standard of proof on a suspect when trying 
to rebut direct or indirect evidence or to substantiate its defence. 
2.4.2.2 European Union
Up until now the Court has never ruled on the scope of the standard of proof. Directive 
2016/343 on the presumption of innocence does refer to the standard of proof in criminal law 
299  ECtHR, no. 926/05 (Taxquet v Belgium), par. 83-84 (emphasis added).
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proceedings. The principle of in dubio pro reo applies in criminal law,300 which is, according the 
explanatory memorandum, also in line with the standard set by the ECtHR.301 The Directive 
does not explicitly prescribe a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.302
With regard to the standard of proof on the suspect in case of a presumption, the proposal for 
the Directive did contain a provision which stated that “it suffi  ces that the defence adduces 
enough evidence as to raise a reasonable doubt regarding the suspect or accused person’s 
guilt”.303 This was inserted as the proposal allowed for presumptions. However, the fi nal 
version did not contain a provision on presumptions, which meant that the aforementioned 
principle was not inserted either. It is moreover, as stated before, unclear whether the Directive 
allows for legal burdens of proof on a suspect. Since it is unclear whether a legal burden of 
proof may rest on a suspect, it is also unclear what the standard of proof in such case would 
be. 
2.4.3 A comparison of the burden and standard of proof in the ECHR and the EU
Both the ECtHR and the CJEU require that the authorities should bear the evidential and 
legal burden of proof in the establishment of a criminal law off ence. The authorities could 
be the prosecutor, but also a court.304 Some burden of proof might rest on a suspect. This is 
strictly speaking not a reversal of the burden of proof. A suspect might e.g. fi nd it necessary 
to provide counterevidence in order to raise doubt as to the evidence in order to prevent a 
conviction. Furthermore, it will be necessary for a suspect to invoke a defence in order to 
rely on it. EU law does not contain any rules with regard to the particular burden of proof 
on a suspect. The approach of ECtHR on the burden of proof for a suspect is only slightly 
clearer. Authorities can use both direct and indirect evidence to prove a case. An evidential 
burden of proof might rest on a suspect to raise doubt in its case. It is not clear whether a 
legal burden of proof could be allowed, although case law on presumptions of law or fact, 
provides indications that a legal burden of proof may sometimes rest on a suspect. It is thus 
not inconceivable that a legal burden of proof could rest on a suspect to raise doubt in a case. 
For defences, the ECtHR seems to allow at least an evidential burden of proof. A legal burden 
of proof might be allowed under the presumption of innocence, although this is, again, not 
entirely clear. 
The standard of proof on the authorities is also not entirely clear. There are indications that 
the ECtHR requires Contracting Parties to apply a standard of beyond reasonable doubt, 
300  See Article 6(2) of Directive 2016/343.
301  See par. 32 of the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for the directive on the presumption of innocence.
302   Lopéz (2017), p. 351, argues that the “criterion in dubio pro reo, […] does not – in our view correctly – introduce any common standard 
of proof, as the Anglo-Saxon rule of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’”. 
303  See Article 5(2) of the proposal for the directive on the presumption of innocence. 
304   The ECtHR will not interfere with the choice of Member States to impose a burden of proof on the prosecution or on the judge. For 
the EU, Directive 2016/343, recital 23 of the preamble, provides the following: “In various Member States not only the prosecution, but 
also judges and competent courts are charged with seeking both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Member States which do not 
have an adversarial system should be able to maintain their current system provided that it complies with this Directive and with other 
relevant provisions of Union and international law.”
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but this is not explicitly confi rmed. The ECtHR seems to leave room for states to determine 
the standard of proof without any interference by the Strasbourg Court. Directive 2016/343, 
prescribes the in dubio pro reo principle, which is in line with ECtHR case law, according to 
the explanatory memorandum. The Directive does nonetheless not set an explicit standard. 
For both jurisdictions, it is unclear whether a suspect can bear a legal burden of proof when 
providing counterevidence and when invoking a defence. Therefore, it is also unclear what a 
possible standard of proof might entail.
2.5 LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
The principle of legality binds the power of public authorities and ensures that citizens have 
the liberty to act unless restricted by public authority.305 This principle can be divided into 
a procedural and substantive part. In this research, the focus is on the substantive legality 
principle. Reliance on the procedural legality principle in EU competition law proceedings 
does not occur often and when it does it is mostly invoked in combination with other 
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy. 
The “essence” of the (substantive) legality principle is “is that no person can be punished for 
an act that is not criminalised by law”.306 This principle contains, in general, four diff erent 
qualitative requirements:
1)  there is no crime without a written criminal norm (nullum crimen sine lege scripta – or 
lex scripta), 
2)  there is no crime without a pre-existing criminal norm (nullum crimen sine lege praevia 
– or lex praevia), 
3)  there is no crime without a precise criminal norm (nullum crimen sine lege certa – or 
lex certa) and 
4)  fi nally, there is no crime without a strictly applied norm (nullum crimen sine lege 
stricta – or lex stricta)307
In the EU, the codifi ed principle of legality can be found in Article 49 of the Charter, whilst in 
the ECHR context it can be found in Article 7 of the ECHR. Both articles “[hold], inter alia, that 
only a legitimate lawmaker may criminalise conduct and that this lawmaker may only do so 
with respect to the lex certa principle”.308
The legality and legal certainty principle can be seen as two separate principles, although there 
are also authors who regard the legal certainty principle as a characteristic or requirement of 
305   From a continental European perspective the rationale of the legality principle is limiting the power of public authorities, whilst the 
UK perspective focused more on the liberty of citizens; see Besselink et al. (2010), p. 6. See also for more theoretical rationales of the 
legality principle, Peristeridou (2015), p. 33-64.
306  Peristeridou (2015), p. 3.
307   Peristeridou (2015), p. 6. The lex mitior principle is not regarded as a characteristic of the legality principle by Peristeridou (2015), 
p. 16, but as a separate principle which “is interpreted from Article 7 ECHR and codifi ed in Article 49 of the Charter”. See also M. 
Timmerman (2018), p 70, who refers to the “general requirement that only the law can defi ne a crime and prescribe a penalty” and to 
the specifi c requirements of lex certa, lex stricta and lex praevia.
308  Luchtman (2012), p. 351.
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the legality principle.309 The ECJ e.g. does not seem to make a strict distinction between the 
legality principle and the principle of legal certainty. According to the ECJ, the principle of 
legal certainty entails that “rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain 
unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly”.310
The principle of legality of criminal off ences and penalties requires clearly defi ned off ences 
and penalties, which should ensure that an “individual can know from the wording of the 
relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what 
acts and omissions will make him criminally liable”.311 It appears thus that the diff erence 
between the principle of legality and the principle of legal certainty is not that clear in the 
case law of the CJEU. Furthermore, the ECJ has also ruled that the principle of legality is “a 
specifi c expression of the general principle of legal certainty”.312 According to Woltjer, the 
approach of the ECJ and the ECtHR are comparable. In this regard he argues that “[b]oth 
the ECJ and the ECtHR apply a ‘quality of law’ test in case of alleged arbitrary interferences 
by national authorities that have taken place while imposing obligations on individuals 
or restricting their fundamental rights”.313 The principle of legality and the principle of 
legal certainty shall, for this study, therefore be discussed as two sides of the same coin. 
In the following subparagraphs, fi rst some general aspects of the legality and legal certainty 
principle are discussed. Secondly, the requirement of suffi  ciently accessible and precise 
off ences and penalties is examined (2.5.2), after which the requirement that the law may not be 
applied retrospectively and the lex mitior principle are discussed (2.5.3). Lastly, the application 
of these principles under the ECHR and EU criminal law is compared (2.5.4). 
2.5.1 General aspects
2.5.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The ECtHR has described the legality principle in Article 7(1) ECHR as “an essential element 
of the rule of law”.314 Furthermore, it “occupies a prominent place in the Convention system 
of protection”.315 The ECtHR ruled on the multiple qualitative requirements. Three diff erent 
requirements can be discerned in case law of the ECtHR. The retrospective application of 
criminal law is prohibited, criminal law should be suffi  ciently precise and accessible, and, lastly,
309  See e.g. Peristeridou (2015), p. 6.
310   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par. 69.
311   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par. 71.
312   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par. 70.
313  Woltjer (2010), p. 108.
314  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 137.
315  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 137.
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the lex mitior principle should be applied as well.316 The main focus of the ECtHR appears to be 
on the foreseeability of the prosecution or penalisation on the basis of a criminal law off ence.317
Article 7(1) ECHR is not concerned with a prosecution which does not lead to a conviction.318
Criminal law off ences, and the penalties for those off ences, should be defi ned by law.319 The term 
“law” has an autonomous convention meaning and includes, according to the ECtHR, statute 
law, but also case law.320 The term “penalty”321 also has an autonomous convention meaning. 
The substance of the penalty should be distinguished from the execution or enforcement of 
the penalty.322 For this research, the distinction between the substance of a penalty and the 
execution or enforcement of one, is not that relevant. The legality principle is in competition 
law proceedings, when dealing with penalties, mainly invoked to scrutinise fi ning guidelines 
or the legal basis for imposing a fi ne,323 and thus not concerned with the execution of the 
penalty. It should also be mentioned that the ECtHR applies its so-called Engel criteria to 
determine whether there is a “criminal” law conviction. This means that regulatory off ences or 
administrative law off ences may fall under the legality principle of Article 7(1) ECHR as well.324
2.5.1.2 European Union
The CJEU regards the legality principle as a longstanding principle of EU law,325 which 
is codifi ed, as stated, in Article 49 of the Charter. The Union Courts have interpreted the 
legality principle for the specifi c needs of the EU.326 Dougan e.g. contends that diff erent 
factors next to the “usual ECHR considerations”327 should be taken into account by national 
courts for determining whether the legality principle, and more specifi cally the foreseeability 
requirement, can discharge a national court from its duty of consistent interpretation. 
Furthermore, the CJEU has had to rule on the legality of Union measures, but also on the 
legality of measures of national authorities when they implement or execute Union law. 
However, sometimes this distinction between rulings on the legality of Union measures and
316   Leach (2017), p. 393-400. The legality principle also protects against arbitrariness, although case law on this for the substantive legality 
principle is scarce. This safeguard is in particular discussed by the ECtHR with regard to procedural requirements, see Gerards (2011), 
p. 127-128.
317  Peristeridou (2015), p. 95
318   Harris et al. (2014), p. 494. Imposing a penalty without a preceding conviction does lead to an infringement of the legality principle, 
see ECtHR, no. 17475/09 (Varvara v Italy), par. 50.
319  ECtHR, no. 14307/88 (Kokkinakis v Greece), par. 52; ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 138.
320  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 139.
321   In ECtHR, no. 17440/90 (Welch v United Kingdom), par. 28, the Court made clear that “the starting-point in any assessment of the 
existence of a penalty is whether the measure in question is imposed following conviction for a ‘criminal off ence’. Other factors that 
may be taken into account as relevant in this connection are the nature and purpose of the measure in question; its characterisation 
under national law; the procedures involved in the making and implementation of the measure; and its severity.”
322   ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 142. For more information on this distinction see Timmerman (2018), p. 64-66. See also 
Murphy (2010), p. 203, who argues that this distinction between substance of a penalty and execution of a penalty is not that clear. 
Moreover, he claims that the ECtHR has reduced the diff erence between the imposition of a penalty and the execution of a penalty in 
the Kakfaris case to nothing. 
323  See par. 5.6.4-6, par. 6.6.2-3, and par. 7.3.4.
324  Harris et al. (2014), p. 495. See also ECtHR, no. 37462/09 (Žaja v Croatia), par. 86-89.
325   See e.g. ECJ, C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad), par. 49; and ECJ, C-405/10 (Özlem Garenfi eld), par. 
48. See also Mitsilegas (2014), p. 1358-1359.
326  Mitsilegas (2014), p. 1362-1365.
327  Dougan (2012), p. 118.
100
CHAPTER 2 | The EU and the ECHR
 rulings on the legality of measures of Member States leads to complex problems. A question 
in this regard which is still left open by the CJEU is whether the eff ectiveness of EU law 
prevails when a Member State enforces a regulation or a Treaty provision with national law, 
the latter which does not meet the requirements of the EU legality principle. In these cases, 
the legality principle and the eff ectiveness principle will be balanced by the CJEU.328 There are 
cases where the CJEU let the principle of eff ectiveness prevail over the principle of legality.329
This seemed to have happened e.g. in the highly criticised Taricco I judgment.330 Timmerman, 
in his commentary on this case, asserted the following:
The Taricco judgment shows that the ECJ is not always willing to provide a high level 
of fundamental rights protection. Instead, the Court here prioritized the primacy and 
eff ectiveness of EU law. In the interest of the eff ective penalization of serious VAT 
fraud, the Court, in fact, merely provided the ECHR’s minimum level of protection 
to the legality principle enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter. Since a higher level 
of protection would hamper the eff ectiveness of criminal penalties for VAT fraud, the 
Court, in eff ect, required Italy to make the protection of the, constitutionally enshrined, 
Italian legality principle conform to this minimum standard.331
The legality principle (and the legal certainty principle) in EU law prescribe three diff erent 
requirements.332 This is similar to the ECtHR jurisprudence.333 Firstly, a clear legal basis 
should exist for criminal law off ences and penalties.334 Secondly, the retroactive application 
of criminal law off ences and penalties is prohibited.335 Thirdly, by way of exception to the 
prohibition of the retroactive application of a criminal law, authorities should apply the most 
lenient rule, even when it was not in place at the time the behaviour occurred.336
328  Dougan (2012), p. 125-126. See also Frese (2014), p. 74.
329  For a discussion on this, see Frese (2014), p. 74. 
330   C-105/14 (Criminal proceedings against Taricco and others). The Italian Constitutional Court questioned the compatibility of the Taricco I 
judgment with the principle of legality under national law, Article 7(1) ECHR, and Article 49 of the Charter. Thereupon it put questions 
to the Court of Justice, which, in turn, ‘clarifi ed’ the Taricco I judgment and met some of the objections by the Italian Constitutional 
Court. See ECJ, C-42/17 (Criminal proceedings against M.A.S. and M.B. (Taricco II)), in particular par. 58-61. See also  Manes (2018), p. 12, 
who refers to the judgment in Taricco I as “judicial adventurism”. 
331   Timmerman (2016), p. 780.
332  See Prechal & Widdershoven (eds.) (2017), p. 291-293.
333   Article 49 of the Charter should, according to the Explanatory Note to this article, have “the same meaning and scope as the right 
guaranteed by the ECHR”. The lex mitior rule is, however, added by the Union legislator when this rule was not applicable under 
the ECHR. The ECtHR actually used this endorsement of the lex mitior principle in EU law in its judgment in ECtHR, no. 10249/03 
(Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 105, to incorporate this principle in the safeguards under Article 7(1) ECHR.
334   See e.g. ECJ, C-405/10 (Özlem Garenfeld), par. 48; ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of State for Transport), par. 71; ECJ, C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van 
de Ministerraad), par. 50.
335   See e.g. C-105/14 (Criminal proceedings against Taricco and others), par. 54; ECJ, C-7/11 (Fabio Caronna), par. 55; ECJ, C-60/02 (Criminal 
proceedings against X), par. 63and Case 63/83 (Regina v Kent Kirk), par. 21.
336   The lex mitior rule is explicitly codifi ed in Article 49(1) of the Charter. See also e.g. ECJ, C-650/13 ( Thierry Delvigne v Comunne de 
Lesparre-Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde), par. 53; ECJ, C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (criminal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi, 
Sergio Adelchi, Marcello Dell’Utri and others), par. 68-69.
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The legality and legal certainty principles are applicable to criminal law off ences and punitive 
penalties. The ECJ has also applied the legality principle to reparatory sanctions though.337
Moreover, the ECJ has ruled that these principles can also be invoked when administrative 
law off ences are enforced.338 This is also in line with the approach taken by the ECtHR. 
2.5.2 Suffi  ciently accessible and precise law
2.5.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The legality principle as codifi ed in Article 7(1) ECHR possesses certain qualitative elements. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph (3.5.1.1), the law, which means both the off ence 
and the penalties for that off ence, should fi rst of all, be suffi  ciently accessible and precise.339
This fi rst qualitative requirement demands that a law is suffi  ciently accessible and precise. 
In the present study, emphasis lies on the requirement that a law should be suffi  ciently 
precise. Accessibility340 is, in general, not an issue in competition law proceedings, since the 
infringements are codifi ed in a law.341 Furthermore, as is explained in chapters 5, 6 and 7, in 
the three jurisdictions which form the subject of this research, the legal basis for penalties 
can be found in a national act or in Regulation 1/2003, and are further elaborated upon in 
Guidelines. 
According to the ECtHR, “[a]n individual must know from the wording of the relevant 
provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it what acts 
and omissions will make him criminally liable and what penalty will be imposed for 
the act committed and/or omission”.342 Foreseeability is thus an important element to 
determine whether a law is accessible and precise.343 As Peristeridou states, it is possible 
to discern certain guidelines from the case law of the ECtHR to determine whether a law 
is foreseeable and thus whether it is suffi  ciently accessible and precise.344 The wording of 
the law is the starting point to determine whether it is suffi  ciently accessible and precise.345
337   Frese (2014), p. 73 insists that the ECJ applied the legality principle in ECJ, C-230/01 (Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce v
Penycoed Farming Partnership). The ECJ however did not explicitly refer to this principle.
338   See e.g. ECJ, C-367/09 (Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau v SGS Belgium NV and others), par. 39; and GC, T-256/11 (Ahmed Abdelaziz 
Ezz and others v Council), par. 71-72.
339   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 35343/05 (Vasiliauskas v Lituania), par. 154; ECtHR, no. 42750/09 (Del Río Prada v Spain), par. 79; ECtHR, no. 
21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 140.
340   For more information, see e.g. Gerards (2011), p. 119-120, who argues that the ECtHR does not require high standards with regard to 
the accessibility requirement. See also Timmerman (2018), p. 86, who asserts the following: “Kokkinakis indicates that the accessibility 
requirement will not generally be hard to satisfy. This requirement merely calls for the offi  cial publication of the statutory provisions 
and/or the applicable case-law at the time of the material conduct. The offi  cial publication of the text in a separate brochure can already 
satisfy the accessibility requirement, certainly when this is accompanied by a publication of the synopsis of the offi  cial text in other 
publications that target the rules’ intended audience. For this reason, the accessibility requirement does not require the publication of 
the full text in an offi  cial journal.”
341   For the UK in the Competition Act 1998; for the Netherlands in the Mededingingswet; and for the EU in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU. 
342  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 140.
343   See e.g. also ECtHR, no. 42750/09 (Del Río Prada v Spain), par. 79, where the ECtHR specifi cally combined the obligation to provide 
clear criminal laws with the foreseeability requirement. As the ECtHR held: “It follows that off ences and the relevant penalties must be 
clearly defi ned by law. This requirement is satisfi ed where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision, if need be 
with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it and after taking appropriate legal advice, what acts and omissions will make him 
criminally liable and what penalty he faces on that account […]”. (emphasis added)
344  Peristeridou (2015), p. 98.
345  Peristeridou (2015), p. 98.
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Foreseeability of the criminal law consequences of certain behaviour does not only have 
to come from the law itself. Jurisprudence which explains a specifi c provision can make 
criminal law consequences foreseeable.346 Furthermore, obtaining legal advice can ensure 
that a person could foresee the legal consequences of his/her behaviour.347 This, in turn, 
makes a law suffi  ciently precise and ensures that Article 7 ECHR is not derogated from. 
Foreseeability and thus clarity can come from a criminal law itself. This does not mean that 
a law should be entirely clear. A law, or defi nitions in a law, does not have to be completely 
clear, since grey areas348 or vague terms349 may exist. The ECtHR held e.g. in Kafkaris that: 
There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation 
to changing circumstances. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring 
in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing 
circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to 
a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are 
questions of practice […].350
The (potential) lack of clarity or ambiguity in criminal law creates an important task for the 
judiciary351 to interpret and explain the terms in that criminal law. Jurisprudence might ensure 
that criminal law off ences and the penalties for those off ences are foreseeable for a person. 
Criminal liability can therefore be determined on the basis of the law itself in combination 
with jurisprudence. Even when a provision is “very generally worded or obscurely drafted 
law”, it can still be saved from a breach of Article 7(1) ECHR by the judiciary.352 In Vasiliauskas, 
the ECtHR held, with reference to other case law, the following:
There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation 
to changing circumstances. Indeed, in the Convention States, the progressive 
development of the criminal law through judicial interpretation is a well-entrenched 
and necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as 
outlawing the gradual clarifi cation of the rules of criminal liability through judicial 
interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent 
with the essence of the off ence and could reasonably be foreseen […]. The role of 
346  Peristeridou (2015), p. 99.
347   Peristeridou (2015), p. 99. Peristeridou mentions also that a fourth guideline can be distilled from case law of the ECtHR, namely the 
weighing of the legality principle against the protection of other fundamental rights by the criminal law norm. She refers e.g. to the 
fundamental rights at stake in the UK marital rape cases. This is, for competition law purposes, less relevant. 
348  ECtHR, no. 17862/91 (Cantoni v France), par. 32.
349   ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 100; ECtHR, no. 14307/88 (Kokkinakis v Greece), par. 40.
350  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 141.
351   The judiciary can also defi ne crimes and penalties through case law, which means that it is not only up to the legislator to create those 
crimes and penalties. See Timmerman (2018), p. 71.
352  Harris et al. (2014), p. 497; see also ECtHR, no. 42750/09 (Del Río Prada v Spain), par. 93.
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adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts 
as remain […].353
The law in combination with jurisprudence should thus lead to a foreseeable application of 
criminal law. A “defi cient legal basis”354 should, however, be interpreted restrictively, so that 
it leads, as is discussed in par. 2.5.2.1, to the most favourable outcome355 for a suspect in order 
“to mitigate the eff ects of the law’s unpredictability”.356
The judiciary can ensure that an outcome is foreseeable even when the law itself is not entirely 
clear. The case of C.R. v United Kingdom provides an example of the approach taken by the 
ECtHR in this regard. The national courts in this case did not allow an exception by which rape 
can never exist in a marriage. The suspect got convicted for rape, whilst marital rape was not 
an off ence which existed under national law. However, the ECtHR accepted the conviction of 
that person for marital rape, since the national courts “did no more than continue a perceptible 
line of case-law development dismantling the immunity of a husband from prosecution for 
rape upon his wife”.357 This can be seen as an adaption of the criminal law off ence of rape. It 
was ultimately foreseeable that marital rape would become criminalised, and thus the ECtHR 
found no infringement of Article 7(1) ECHR. 
There are, however, also boundaries to the interpretation practices of national courts. An 
extensive interpretation, “for instance by analogy”, is not allowed.358 This means that national 
courts may not make use of an analogy to convict or penalise a person where there is no 
precedence on the mater. In Del Río Prada, the change in case law was not reasonable foreseeable, 
since the “departure from case-law in the present case did not amount to an interpretation of 
criminal law pursuing a perceptible line of case-law development”.359 In Navalnyye v Russia,
the Navalnyy brothers were convicted for fraud and money laundering. The fraud charges 
were based on non-compliance with contractual obligations.360 These obligations did not fl ow 
from any national law nor from civil contracts concluded between them and other commercial 
parties.361 The national courts nonetheless ruled that those obligations did exist. Fraud also 
required the authorities to prove the essential element of “motives of personal gain”. The 
ECtHR held that “some “motives of personal gain” may be identifi able in every commercial 
activity, unless clear criteria exist to distinguish it from the lawful objective of a limited 
353   ECtHR, no. 35343/05 (Vasiliauskas v Lituania), par. 155. The ECtHR has also ruled in other cases that there is always “an inevitable 
element of judicial interpretation”, see e.g. ECtHR, no. 67503/13 (Koprivnikar v Slovenia), par. 54; ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy 
(No 2)), par. 100; and ECtHR, no. 20190/92 (C.R. v United Kingdom), par. 34.
354  ECtHR, no. 67503/13 (Koprivnikar v Slovenia), par. 55.
355  ECtHR, no. 67503/13 (Koprivnikar v Slovenia), par. 56 and 59.
356  ECtHR, no. 67503/13 (Koprivnikar v Slovenia), par. 56.
357  ECtHR, no. 20190/92 (C.R. v United Kingdom), par. 41.
358   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 66847/12 (Haarde v Iceland), par. 127; and ECtHR, no. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96 
(Coëme and others v Belgium), par. 145. Interpretation by the judiciary is thus limited by the lex scripta principle, see Timmerman (2018), 
p. 74-75.
359  ECtHR, no. 42750/09 (Del Río Prada v Spain), par. 115. 
360  ECtHR, no. 101/15 (Navalnyye v Russia), par. 62. 
361  ECtHR, no. 101/15 (Navalnyye v Russia), par. 64-65.
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liability company”.362 The national courts did not distinguish criminal motives of personal 
gain from a lawful commercial pursuit.363 The ECtHR therefore concluded:
In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that in the determination of the 
criminal charges against the applicants the off ence set out in Article 159.4 of the 
Criminal Code, in force at the time of their conviction, was extensively and unforeseeably 
construed to their detriment. It considers that such an interpretation could not be said to 
have constituted a development consistent with the essence of the off ence (see Liivik, cited 
above, §§ 100-01, and Huhtamäki, cited above, § 51; cf. Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. 
Russia, nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05, §§ 788 et seq., 25 July 2013). In view of the above, 
it was not possible to foresee that the applicants’ conduct, in their dealings with MPK and 
Yves Rocher Vostok, would constitute fraud or commercial fraud. Consequently, it was 
equally unforeseeable that GPA’s profi ts would constitute the proceeds of crime whose 
use could amount to money laundering under Article 174.1 of the Code.364
By contrast, in Huhtamaki, the ECtHR did not fi nd an infringement of Article 7 ECHR, even 
though there was no “perceptible line of case-law development”. The national court was 
“presented with a new situation in which it had to take a stand for the fi rst time” on this particular 
issue and on which “[b]oth domestic law and jurisprudence were silent”.365 However, the two 
alternative interpretations “were foreseeable and consistent with the  essence of the off ence in 
question”.366 The ECtHR also ruled that “[e]ven when a point is ruled upon for the fi rst time 
in an applicant’s case, a violation of Article 7 of the Convention will not arise if the meaning 
given is both foreseeable and consistent with the essence of the off ence”.367 Foreseeability is 
thus an important element which the ECtHR uses to determine whether the interpretation 
of a national criminal law by the judiciary leads to an infringement of Article 7(1) ECHR. 
It is not always necessary for an individual to be able to know the law by himself in 
order for that law to meet the requirement of “foreseeability”. A criminal law can still be 
foreseeable when a person was able to foresee the consequences of his/her behaviour by 
obtaining legal advice.368 The foreseeability requirement is met when a person “could and 
ought to have expected”, with or without legal advice, that he could be tried for a certain 
off ence.369 According to the ECtHR, persons carrying on a professional activity have 
in particular a care of duty to try to know the law.370 This is also in particular relevant 
362  ECtHR, no. 101/15 (Navalnyye v Russia), par. 66.
363  ECtHR, no. 101/15 (Navalnyye v Russia), par. 66.
364  ECtHR, no. 101/15 (Navalnyye v Russia), par. 68.
365  ECtHR, no. 54468/09 (Huhtamaki v Finland), par. 50.
366  ECtHR, no. 54468/09 (Huhtamaki v Finland), par. 51.
367   ECtHR, no. 54468/09 (Huhtamaki v Finland), par. 51. See e.g. also ECtHR, no. 66847/12 (Haarde v Iceland), par. 131, where the ECtHR 
ruled that “the conclusions drawn by the Court of Impeachment as regards the meaning to be given to the relevant provisions and their 
application to the conduct of the applicant must be considered to have been well within its remit to interpret and apply national law”.
368  ECtHR, no. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v Cyprus), par. 140.
369  ECtHR, no. 59552/08 (Rohlena v the Czech Republic), par. 63.
370   For an overview of case law on foreseeability and the professional capacity of a person, see Timmerman (2018), p. 90-94.
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for this research, since competition law proceedings always deal with undertakings, 
which pursue professional activities. The ECtHR ruled in Varvare the following: 
Foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law concerned, 
the fi eld it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is 
addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of “foreseeability” where the person 
concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. This is particularly 
true in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to 
proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on 
this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails 
[…].371
Overall, three “guidelines” are thus used to determine whether a criminal law is suffi  ciently 
accessible and precise. First, the ECtHR will examine the wording of the phrasing itself. 
Jurisprudence on the matter will, as a second aspect, be taken into account. Lastly, the 
possibility to obtain legal advice on the basis of which the criminal law consequences might 
be foreseeable is taken into account as an additional element. This is in particular true for 
persons carrying out a professional activity. 
2.5.2.2 European Union
The approach of the Union Courts towards the requirement of a clear legal basis is similar to the 
approach taken by the ECtHR. The legality principle entails that there should be a legal basis 
for a criminal law off ence or a for a penalty.372 This includes a qualitative requirement, since the 
legal basis should also be clear. It is not necessary for a criminal law off ence, or a penalty, to be 
completely clear. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, the ECJ ruled that a criminal law off ence 
and/or a penalty are clearly defi ned “where the individual concerned is in a position, on the 
basis of the wording of the relevant provision and with the help of the interpretative assistance 
given by the courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him criminally liable”.373
Not much guidance is given by the Union Courts with regard to the clarity of the legal basis.374
There are e.g. cases dealing with this issue where national authorities enforce national law 
implementing a directive. The ECJ had to rule on compliance of the enforcement of the EU 
norm codifi ed in national law. In those cases, the ECJ obviously leaves it up to the national 
courts to determine whether the norm is suffi  ciently clear,375 which means that those cases do
371  ECtHR, no. 17475/09 (Varvara v Italy), par. 56.
372   See e.g. ECJ, C-7/11 (Fabio Caronna), par. 53-55; ECJ, C-405/10 (Özlem Garenfeld), par. 48; ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application 
of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of State for Transport), par. 71; ECJ, C-303/05 
(Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad), par. 50. 
373   ECJ, C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad), par. 50. See also ECJ, C-405/10 (Özlem Garenfeld), par. 48.
374  In competition law cases, much more guidance is given on this matter; see further par. 5.6. 
375  See e.g. ECJ, C-7/11 (Fabio Caronna), par. 53-55.
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 not provide much guidance for the purpose of this research. Some cases exist where the Union 
Courts had to determine whether EU law was suffi  ciently clear to meet the requirements set 
by the legality and legal certainty principle. In both Advocaten voor de Wereld and Intertanko, 
the Court reviewed the terminology used in, respectively, the applicable framework decision 
and directive. The approach taken in both cases diff ers somewhat. In Advocaten voor de Wereld, 
it concerned a list of criminal law off ences for which a European Arrest Warrant could be 
issued. The Court referred to the defi nition of those off ences under the laws of the Member 
States, since this framework decision did not intent to harmonise these off ences. In order 
to determine whether the off ences for which a European Arrest Warrant could be issued 
comply with the principle of legality and legal certainty, one has to examine the particular 
criminal law off ence at stake as defi ned by the criminal law of a particular Member State.376
Conversely, the Court of Justice fi rst examined in Intertanko whether the terms “with intent, 
recklessly or by serious negligence”377 were suffi  ciently clear. The Court fi rstly determined 
that these terms were common in the Member States and explained their meaning in 
general.378 Secondly, just like in Advocaten voor de Wereld, reference was made to the national 
laws of the Member States. The “actual defi nition” of these concepts was to be determined 
by the Member States, since they have to implement the directive in national law.379
A law itself does necessarily have to be entirely clear. As asserted, the Union Courts refer to 
the “help” by national courts to clarify vague terms. Here again, not that much case law can 
be found which clarifi es this statement of the Union Courts. An extensive interpretation does 
not appear to be prohibited.380
2.5.3 Retroactive application of criminal law and lex mitior
2.5.3.1 European Convention on Human Rights
States remain in general free to determine their criminal law policy, as long as this does not 
infringe the safeguards of the legality principle in Article 7(1) ECHR.381 A prospective change 
in law by which heavier penalties are imposed for certain criminalised behaviour therefore 
does not have to lead to problems with Article 7(1) ECHR when that change of penalties is
376  ECJ, C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad), par. 52-54.
377   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par.72.
378   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par.74-77
379   ECJ, C-308/06 (The Queen on the application of: international Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v Secretary of 
State for Transport), par.78.
380   This can be seen in the approach taken by the Court of Justice in relation to the boundaries of harmonious interpretations of directive 
provisions. The interpretation of national law in light of EU law can be quite extensive. See e.g. C-321/05 (Hans Markus Kofoed v 
Skatteministeriet), par. 45, where the Court ruled “[…] that all authorities of a Member State, in applying national law, are required 
to interpret it as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the Community directives in order to achieve the result 
pursued by those directives. Moreover, although it is true that the requirement of a directive-compliant interpretation cannot reach the 
point where a directive, by itself and without national implementing legislation, may create obligations for individuals or determine 
or aggravate the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of its provisions, a Member State may nevertheless, in 
principle, impose a directive-compliant interpretation of national law on individuals”.
381   ECtHR, no. 42750/09 (Del Río Prada v Spain), par. 116; ECtHR, nos. 2312/08 34179/08 (Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia Herzegovina), par. 
75.
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 foreseeable.382 The sentence of the applicant in Anchour was increased due to his recidivism. 
This increase in sentence was not possible at the time of committing the fi rst off ence, but 
it was possible at the time of committing the second off ence. The ECtHR therefore did not 
identify any problems with regard to the legality principle, since the applicant was “able 
to foresee the legal consequences of his actions and to adapt his conduct accordingly”.383
Article 7(1) ECHR does prevent the retroactive application of a criminal law to the disadvantage 
of a suspect.384 This means as the ECtHR held that it will “[…] verify that at the time when an 
accused person performed the act which led to his being prosecuted and convicted there was 
in force a legal provision which made that act punishable, and that the punishment imposed 
did not exceed the limits fi xed by that provision”.385 This means in particular for penalties that 
the ECtHR will examine whether “the penalty imposed on the applicant did not exceed the 
maximum one provided for in the former [criminal law] applicable at the relevant time”.386
In both Veeber and Pukh, the applicants were convicted for a tax off ence for behaviour which 
partly took place before the entering into force of that criminal law. The ECtHR focused 
in these cases on foreseeability.387 In 1995, Estonia amended existing criminal law. Estonia 
mentioned in both cases that the Supreme Court extended the 1995 law to off ences committed 
before that date, as long as part of the off ence took place after the entering into force of the 
new criminal law.388 The ECtHR did not fi nd this suffi  cient in order for the state to avoid an 
abrogation from Article 7 ECHR. As the ECtHR held: “At that time, considering the terms of 
the criminal law in force during that period, the applicant could not have foreseen that he would 
face criminal conviction at the fi rst discovery of his activity.”389
The retroactive application of a law is allowed when this is to the advantage of the person concerned 
(retroactivity in mitius).390 The lex mitior principle even leads to an obligation on authorities on 
the basis of Article 7(1) ECHR to apply the more lenient criminal law rule retroactively.391 A new 
criminal law rule should be applied when it is more lenient than the old rule. 
By contrast, the ECtHR also stated that an old rule should apply even when it is not sure 
whether that would have resulted in a lower penalty, as long as there is a real possibility that a 
382  ECtHR, no. 67335/01 (Achour v France), par. 52-53.
383  ECtHR, no. 67335/01 (Achour v France), par. 53.
384   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 93; ECtHR,  no. 45771/99 (Veeber v Estonia (no.2)), par. 31; and ECtHR, no. 
55103/00 (Puhk v Estonia), par. 25.
385  ECtHR, no. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96 (Coëme and others v Belgium), par. 145.
386  ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 13113/03 (Ould Dah v France).
387   ECtHR, no. 45771/99 (Veeber v Estonia (no.2)), par. 33; and ECtHR, no. 55103/00 (Puhk v Estonia), par. 28.
388   ECtHR, no. 45771/99 (Veeber v Estonia (no.2)), par. 26; and ECtHR, no. 55103/00 (Puhk v Estonia), par. 20. In Pukh v Estonia, the applicant 
was also convicted for behaviour occurring before the entering into force of the 1993 act on the basis of that 1993 act, see par. 38-42. 
389   ECtHR, no. 45771/99 (Veeber v Estonia (no.2)), par. 37 (emphasis added). A similar phrasing was used in ECtHR, no. 55103/00 (Puhk v 
Estonia), par. 32, namely: “During that period the applicant could not expect that at the fi rst discovery of his behaviour he would risk a 
criminal conviction, considering the terms of criminal law in force at that time.” (emphasis added)
390   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 67503/13 (Koprivnikar v Slovenia), par. 59; ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 93; ECtHR, no. 
15312/89 (G v France), par. 26-27.
391   ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 109. It has been argued that this ruling does not only oblige the judiciary to apply a 
more lenient penalty, but also to acquit a person when a previous criminal law off ence is decriminalised after the behaviour occurred, 
see Bohlander (2011), p. 635; see also Harris et al. (2014), p. 494.
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lower penalty could have been imposed under the old rule.392 The ECtHR’s reasoning in the 
Maktouf case is worth quoting in length:
Admittedly, the applicants’ sentences in the instant case were within the latitude 
of both the 1976 Criminal Code and the 2003 Criminal Code. It thus cannot be 
said with any certainty that either applicant would have received lower sentences 
had the former Code been applied (contrast Jamil v. France, 8 June 1995, Series 
A no. 317-B; Gabarri Moreno v. Spain, no. 68066/01, 22 July 2003; Scoppola, 
cited above). What is crucial, however, is that the applicants could have received 
lower sentences had that Code been applied in their cases. [S]ince there exists a 
real possibility that the retroactive application of the 2003 Code operated to the 
applicants’ disadvantage as concerns the sentencing, it cannot be said that they 
were aff orded eff ective safeguards against the imposition of a heavier penalty, in 
breach of Article 7 of the Convention.393
In the Maktouf case, the law provided for maximum, but also minimum penalties.394 The 
minimum penalty in the old law was lower and should therefore be applied retroactively, 
according to the ECtHR. It thus appears that there is an obligation on authorities to apply the 
most lenient rule. This could result in the retroactive application of a new rule, but it might 
also mean that the new rule should be set aside in a specifi c case in favour of an old rule. 
2.5.3.2 European Union
In the EU, the retroactive application of a criminal law to the detriment of a person is not 
allowed,395 unless the retroactive application would lead to a more lenient penalty.396 This 
means that, in general, a comparison should be made between the criminal law at the time of the 
off ence and the criminal law at the time of the proceedings in order to determine whether the 
retrospective application is not allowed, or whether it is actually required. In most cases this is, 
again, left for the national courts to determine, since most cases deal with the enforcement of EU 
law by national authorities. In competition law cases, these requirements are more extensively 
discussed, since in those proceedings the Commission enforces EU law against undertakings.397
392   ECtHR, no. 59552/08 (Rohlena v the Czech Republic), par. 56; ECtHR, nos. 2312/08 34179/08 (Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia Herzegovina), 
par. 70.
393  ECtHR, nos. 2312/08 34179/08 (Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia Herzegovina), par. 70.
394  ECtHR, nos. 2312/08 34179/08 (Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia Herzegovina), par. 68.
395   See e.g. C-105/14 (Criminal proceedings against Taricco and others), par. 54; ECJ, C-7/11 (Fabio Caronna), par. 55; ECJ, C-60/02 (Criminal 
proceedings against X), par. 63; ECJ, 63/83 (Regina v Kent Kirk), par. 21; see also Article 49(1) of the Charter.
396   ECJ, C-61/11 PPU (Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi  Karim), par. 61; ECJ, C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (criminal proceedings against Silvio 
Berlusconi, Sergio Adelchi, Marcello Dell’Utri and others), par. 68; see also Article 49(1) of the Charter.
397  See chapter 5, par. 5.6.
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2.5.4 A comparison of the principle of legality and legal certainty in the ECHR 
and the EU
The principles of legality and legal certainty are codifi ed in Article 7(1) ECHR and Article 
49(1) of the Charter. Criminal laws should be suffi  ciently clear and accessible. Furthermore, 
criminal laws may not be applied retrospectively, unless this is advantageous to the suspect. 
The so-called lex mitior principle is an obligation on national authorities to apply the most 
lenient rule. 
The ECtHR and the Union Courts have made clear that the legality principle and the legal 
certainty principle are not restricted to criminal law off ences stricto sensu, but also apply to 
administrative law off ences which can be regarded to be of a criminal law nature. 
The ECtHR has created three steps or guidelines to determine whether a criminal law is 
suffi  ciently clear. First, the law itself is examined. Secondly, a law can still be suffi  ciently 
foreseeable with the help of the interpretation of that law by the judiciary. Lastly, a law is 
foreseeable when a person could have foreseen the consequences of his/her behaviour by 
obtaining legal advice in advance. This last step is in particular used for persons acting in their 
professional capacity. Foreseeability seems to be the key element in case law of the ECtHR. 
The CJEU has only referred to the fi rst two steps.398 Not much guidance can be found for EU 
criminal law, since the CJEU leaves it up to the national courts to determine whether their 
national law, often implementing EU law, is suffi  ciently clear. 
The retroactive application of criminal laws is prohibited under the ECHR and under EU 
criminal law. There is a duty to apply the most lenient rule, even when this leads to the retroactive 
application of a criminal law. Again, not much guidance is given by the Union Courts on these 
matters. Case law of the ECtHR is more developed. Foreseeability is again the element mostly 
used by the ECtHR to determine whether an infringement of Article 7(1) ECHR can be found. 
2.6 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
The principle of proportionality of sanctions is not a principle which can be found separately 
in the ECHR. The general principle of proportionality is, however, one of the benchmarks 
the ECtHR uses to determine whether there is a justifi able derogation from a derogable 
ECHR right. Member States are in principle free to create criminal laws and to impose 
criminal law sanctions on a person, although interferences with a derogable right should 
be proportionate.399 The ECtHR uses the proportionality principle not only when there is a 
limitation of a derogable ECHR right, since “[t]he search for [a fair] balance is inherent in the 
398  The step of obtaining legal advice is often referred to in competition law proceedings though. 
399   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 73797/01 (Kyprianou v Cyprus), par. 174; ECtHR, nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94 (Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v Turkey) par. 62.
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whole of the Convention”.400 It should be noted though that the case law of the ECtHR on the 
principle of proportionality is “highly casuistic and case sensitive”.401
The principle of proportionality contains, in general, a threefold test in Union law:402 a 
measure should be suitable, necessary and not excessive. By contrast to the ECHR, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does contain a specifi c principle of 
proportionality of sanctions. This principle can be found in Article 49(3) of the Charter. This 
principle is used as a benchmark in three diff erent scenarios.403 Firstly, the Union legislator 
has to take this principle into account when creating criminal law legislation. Secondly, 
Member States should take this principle into account when enforcing EU law by criminal 
law means. Thirdly, Member States should comply with this principle when limiting EU law 
by criminal law means. 
In the following subparagraphs, fi rstly the principle of proportionality is discussed in general 
(2.7.1). Secondly, more specifi cally the proportionality of criminal law fi nes is discussed (2.7.2). 
Lastly, the proportionality of sanctions under the ECHR and in the EU is compared (2.7.3). 
2.6.1 Proportionality in general
2.6.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The proportionality principle is, as mentioned, not a separate principle which can be found in 
the ECHR. The ECtHR uses the proportionality principle to determine whether an interference 
with a fundamental right is necessary in a democratic society. One may distinguish diff erent 
formulations of this principle in the case law of the ECtHR. In Handyside v United Kingdom 
the Court held that a restriction of fundamental rights by a Member State should be 
proportionate, which means that the restriction must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued”.404 By contrast, in Paulet v United Kingdom the Court stated with reference to the 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden case that “[a]n interference with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 will 
be disproportionate where the property-owner concerned has had to bear “an individual and 
excessive burden”, such that “the fair balance which should be struck between the protection 
of the right of property and the requirements of the general interest” is upset”.405 A third, 
diff erent, formulation the Court uses can e.g. be found in Peruško v Croatia, where it provided 
that it “will examine whether the limitation imposed impaired the essence of the right and, in 
particular, whether it pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved”.406
400   ECtHR, nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75 (Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden), par. 69. In this case the ECtHR found that there was an excessive 
burden placed on an individual, which meant that there was no fair balance between the general interest protected by the national rule 
and the interest of the individual. 
401  Christoff ersen (2009), p. 31.
402   Tridimas (2006), p. 139, asserts that the second and third are normally taken together by the ECJ, and that therefore only two conditions 
exist.
403  Mitsilegas (2014), p. 1366.
404  ECtHR, no 5493/72 (Handyside v United Kingdom), par. 49.
405   ECtHR, no. 6219/08 (Paulet v United Kingdom), par. 65; see e.g. also ECtHR, no. 28336/02 (Aff aire Grifhorst v France), par. 105.
406  ECtHR, no. 36998/09 (Peruško v Croatia), par. 45.
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Christoff ersen concludes, after an analysis of case law of the ECtHR, that the Court does 
not use the principle of suitability, the principle of strict necessity,407 nor an absolute 
doctrine of the very essence of the Convention rights.408 According to Christoff ersen, the 
ECtHR uses a fair balance test. Conversely, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick discuss case law 
where the Court still uses the principle of suitability and the principle of strict liability as 
a decisive factor.409 By contrast, Gerards states, with reference to the Sunday Times case,410
that the Strasbourg Court divides the proportionality test into four diff erent elements.411
Firstly, ECtHR might examine the “pressing social need” which the infringement of the 
fundamental right should serve. Secondly, the eff ectiveness or suitability of a measure can 
be discussed. Thirdly, the measure infringing a fundamental right should be relevant and 
suffi  cient. Finally, a proportionality stricto sensu could be conducted, which means that 
diff erent interests at stake should be balanced. According to Gerards, these four elements, are 
not strictly separated in case law of the ECtHR nor does the Strasbourg Court always discuss 
all four elements.412 In general though, the ECtHR seems to focus on the proportionality 
stricto sensu,413 and will therefore weigh the diff erent interests and factors at stake.
The use of the proportionality principle by the ECtHR is very casuistic.414 It will depend on the 
arguments of the parties which part(s) of the proportionality test will be used.415 Moreover, 
the margin of appreciation also infl uences the application of the proportionality test, since 
a wide margin of appreciation will entail a more limited review of the proportionality of 
a measure.416 In the following subparagraph (2.6.2), case law of the ECtHR dealing with 
the proportionality of criminal law sanctions is discussed. The proportionality test is 
mostly used in relation to infringements of Articles 8-11 ECHR, Article 14 ECHR, and to 
determine whether a derogation of fundamental rights in emergency situations under 
Article 15 ECHR is allowed.417 The principle of proportionality is also relevant in light of 
a restriction to the right of property which can be found in Article 1 of Protocol 1.418 For 
this research, it is necessary to focus solely on cases where national authorities derogated 
from one of the mentioned fundamental rights by way of imposing a criminal law sanction.419
407  Which means that the least restrictive means should be chosen, see Christoff ersen (2009), p. 114. 
408   Christoff ersen (2009), p. 111-192. Christoff ersen does refer to case law where the possibility of a less restrictive measure was used by 
the ECtHR as one of the multiple factors which were weighed for the fair balance test, see e.g. p. 117.
409  Harris et al. (2014), p. 519-520.
410  ECtHR, no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v United Kingdom), par. 146.
411  Gerards (2011), p. 141-142. See also for a similar reasoning of Gerards: Gerards (2013), p. 467-468.
412  Gerards (2011), p. 142. See also for a similar reasoning of Gerards: Gerards (2013), p. 467-468.
413  Gerards (2013), p. 469.
414  Christoff ersen (2009), p. 31.
415  Gerards (2011), p. 142.
416  Gerards (2011), p. 143. See also Leach (2017), p. 189.
417   Harris et al. (2014), p 13. However, in ECtHR, no. 4837/06 (Segame SA v France), the ECtHR examined the proportionality of a fi ne in 
light of the right to eff ective judicial review under Article 6 ECHR. 
418  Harris et al. (2014), p. 872-876.
419   One could e.g. think of authorities initiating criminal law proceedings for defamation, which leads to a restriction of the freedom of 
speech in Article 10 ECHR, but which might, in turn, be justifi ed if amongst others the penalty is proportionate.
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2.6.1.2 European Union
The proportionality principle for Union measures can be found in Article 5(4) TEU and Article 
52(1) of the Charter. The principle of proportionality contains, in general, a three-fold test 
which means that a measure should be suitable, necessary and not excessive.420 This measure 
can be a measure of the Union or a measure of a Member State. A measure should be suitable 
to achieve the aim, the least restrictive, and lastly a weighing of interest should take place 
(proportionality stricto sensu). There is, however, as Craig mentions uncertainty as to whether 
the proportionality stricto sensu is part of the EU test.421 The EU proportionality principle is 
applicable to EU measures,422 but also to measure by Member States.423
The proportionality of Union measures can in general be challenged in three diff erent types 
of cases, namely “cases involving discretionary policy choices, rights, and penalties”.424
With regard to the fi rst type of cases, it should be mentioned that the Union Courts use a 
“manifest disproportionality” test, although that does not mean that the review is merely 
marginal.425 The Union Courts use an in-depth review to determine whether a discretionary 
policy choice is not manifestly disproportionate.426 Case law on penalties focuses mainly 
on administrative law penalties.427 Here as well, the general approach to judicial review 
of penalties seems to be the “manifest disproportionality” test, at least “when the penalty 
is an integral substantive part of a discretionary policy, which is itself subject to the Fedesa 
test”.428 The Union Courts determine “[t]he appropriateness and necessity of a penalty or 
fi nancial burden […] in the light of the legislative objectives pertaining to the particular 
area”.429 With regard to cases dealing with fundamental rights, the Union Courts use 
a strict approach to determine whether an interference with such a right is allowed. 
Therefore, the suitability and necessity of the measure will be scrutinised by the Courts.430
However, if the underlying policy that potentially infringes a fundamental right pertains 
to social, economic and political choices, a manifest proportionality test is used as well.431
Actions of Member States can also be scrutinised in light of the proportionality principle. A 
distinction can be made between cases where Member States infringe or derogate from EU law 
and cases where Member States enforce EU law. The intensity of review of the proportionality 
420   Tridimas (2006), p. 139, mentions that the second and third are normally taken together by the ECJ, and that therefore only two 
conditions exist. See also Prechal & Widdershoven (eds.) (2017), p. 178-180.
421  Craig (2012), p. 591-592.
422  For more information see, Craig (2012), p. 560-615.
423   See for an elaborate discussion of the approach of the CJEU towards the proportionality principle and measures by Member States, 
Craig (2012), p. 616-640.
424  Craig (2012), p. 592.
425  Craig (2012), p. 600-601. See also Prechal & Widdershoven (eds.) (2017), p. 180-183.
426  For an overview of case law see Craig (2012), p. 592-600.
427   See Öberg (2013), p. 308, who argues that there is no case law on the matter up to 2013. For an overview of case law on the proportionality 
of administrative law measures, see Craig (2012), p. 611-614.
428  Craig (2012), p. 612.
429  Craig (2012), p. 614.
430  Craig (2012), p. 604-605.
431  Craig (2012), p. 605-608.
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of measures by Member States is, although aff ected by the subject matter and nature of a 
particular case, in general more intense than the review of Union measures.432
In paragraph 2.6.2.2, an examination takes place of more specifi cally the proportionality 
of sanctions and thus the approach of the Union Courts where in particular criminal law 
sanctions are imposed by the EU or by Member States on persons. 
2.6.2 Criminal law sanctions and proportionality
2.6.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights
When an interference with an ECHR right is enforced by a fi ne, the Court fi nds it necessary to 
take into account the nature and severity of a fi ne when determining whether the interference 
is proportionate.433 Especially in cases dealing with the freedom of speech, in particular for 
journalists, politicians or publishers, the Court scrutinises penalties for their possible chilling 
eff ect to determine whether there is an infringement of Article 10 ECHR.434 In its Grand 
Chamber judgment in Bédaz, the ECtHR ruled e.g. the following:
The Court reiterates that the nature and severity of the penalties imposed are further factors to 
be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference (see, for example, 
Stoll, cited above, § 153). Furthermore, the Court must be satisfi ed that the penalty does 
not amount to a form of censorship intended to discourage the press from expressing 
criticism. In the context of a debate on a topic of public interest, such a sanction is likely 
to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues aff ecting the life of 
the community. By the same token, it is liable to hamper the press in performing its 
task as purveyor of information and public watchdog. In that connection, the fact of a 
person’s conviction may in some cases be more important than the minor nature of the 
penalty imposed (ibid., § 154).435
Deterrence for journalists seems to be an important factor to determine whether a “chilling 
eff ect” exists in these types of cases.436
Sometimes the ECtHR refers to “common standards” to determine whether a certain 
punishment is allowed. In e.g. Skałka v Poland,437 the Strasbourg Court had to determine 
whether a letter send by the applicant to a court calling the judges, amongst others, 
“irresponsible clowns” was worth a prison sentence of eight months. Ultimately, the ECtHR 
432   Craig (2012), p. 629-631. Craig also explains this diff erence in review. He states e.g. that the inclusion of the market access approach 
next to the non-discrimination approach requires the Union Courts to divide lawful and unlawful measures by Member States through 
the proportionality test. Since every measure can be a restriction due to the market access approach, it will in the end boil down to the 
proportionality of the measure to determine whether it is allowed or not. Therefore, review of the proportionality of Member States 
measures is naturally more intense than review of Union measures. See also Prechal & Widdershoven (eds.) (2017), p. 182.
433   ECtHR, no. 29369/10 (Morice v France), par. 127 and 175; ECtHR, no. 56925/08 (A.B. v Switzerland), par. 59, see also the Grand Chamber 
judgment in this case: ECtHR, no. 56925/08 (Bédat v Switzerland), par. 79.
434  Gerards (2011), p. 161.
435  ECtHR, no. 56925/08 (Bédat v Switzerland), par. 79 (emphasis added).
436  See e.g. ECtHR, no. 56925/08 (Bédat v Switzerland), par. 81.
437  ECtHR, no. 43425/98 (Skałka v Poland).
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ruled it would take into account “common standards” to determine whether there was an 
interference with Article 10 ECHR. It ruled that “[t]hese standards are the gravity of the guilt, 
the seriousness of the off ence and the repetition of the alleged off ences”.438 In this case, the 
ECtHR found the seriousness of the penalty not in proportion to the facts:
In the Court’s view, the severity of the punishment applied in this case exceeded the 
seriousness of the off ence. It was not an open and overall attack on the authority of the 
judiciary, but an internal exchange of letters of which nobody of the public took notice. 
Furthermore, the gravity of the off ence was not such as to justify the punishment infl icted 
on the applicant. Moreover, it was for the fi rst time that the applicant overstepped the 
bounds of the permissible criticism. Therefore, while a lesser punishment could well 
have been justifi ed, the courts went beyond what constituted a “necessary” exception 
to the freedom of expression.439
The ECtHR specifi cally examined the factors in this case, and ruled on the basis of the gravity 
of the off ence and the fact that it was the fi rst time that the applicant committed the off ence, 
that the sanction was not proportionate. 
The Court does not always refer to “common standards” as it did in the aforementioned cases. 
In a copyright case, the ECtHR referred to the attitude of the parties in the case. Two applicants 
in Neij and Kolmissopi were involved in the operation of The Pirate Bay. They were prosecuted 
for infringing copyright rules. The applicants argued that these criminal law proceedings 
infringed Article 10 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court held, in an admissibility decision, that this 
was not the case. To assess whether the penalty “nature and severity” of the penalty could 
lead to an infringement of Article 10 ECHR, the ECtHR took into account the attitude of the 
parties.440 The aforementioned “common standards” were not used by the ECtHR. 
In an Article 6 ECHR case, the Strasbourg Court focused, to determine whether there was 
eff ective judicial review, on the proportionality of the sanction which could be imposed by the 
domestic courts. In this case, the ECtHR mainly focused on the eff ectiveness of a sanction.441
The lack of a common approach in case law of the ECtHR makes it not possible to distil a list 
of factors which the Strasbourg Court will take into account to determine whether a penalty is 
not proportionate and therefore whether the national measure infringes a Convention right. 
The type of proceedings, but e.g. also the role of the parties in the proceedings, have, as asserted 
438  ECtHR, no. 43425/98 (Skałka v Poland), par. 41.
439  ECtHR, no. 43425/98 (Skałka v Poland), par. 42.
440   See ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 40397/12 (Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v Sweden), in which the Court ruled: 
“In the present case, the Court considers that the prison sentence and award of damages cannot be regarded as disproportionate. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court has regard to the fact that the domestic courts found that the applicants had not taken any action 
to remove the torrent fi les in question, despite having been urged to do so. Instead they had been indiff erent to the fact that copyright-
protected works had been the subject of fi le-sharing activities via [The Pirate Bay].”
441  ECtHR, no. 4837/06 (Segame SA v France), par. 59.
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in paragraph 3.6.1.1, an infl uence on the review by the ECtHR. Some factors were referred to 
before. The ECtHR might look at the nature and severity of a penalty, the eff ectiveness of the 
penalty, deterrence, the attitude of the parties, the gravity of the off ence and recidivism. 
2.6.2.2 European Union
As mentioned in the introduction of the paragraph (3.6), the principle of proportionality of 
sanctions, which can be found in Article 49(3) of the Charter, is used as a benchmark in three 
diff erent situations. It can have (i) an infl uence on the creation of criminal law legislation by 
the Union institutions and it has an infl uence on Member States when (ii) they enforce EU law 
by criminal law means or (iii) when they limit EU law by criminal law means. 
The Union institutions should take the principle of proportionality of sanctions into account 
when they create legislation. For the creation of legislation under Article 83(2) TFEU, this 
means that “i) criminal sanctions are conducive to achieve the eff ective implementation of 
Union policies, ii) criminal sanctions are more effi  cient than other less restrictive measures 
to achieve the pursued objective of securing the eff ective implementation of Union policies, 
iii) the disadvantages caused by criminal sanctions must not be disproportionate in relation 
to the pursued objective of ensuring the eff ective implementation of Union policies”.442 It 
is, however, unclear how this threefold test is used by the CJEU in relation to criminal law 
measures created by the Union, since there is no recent case law on the matt er.443 In the EU 
multiple harmonisation measures were created which criminalise certain behaviour.444 The 
enforcement of the measures is left to the Member States, since these measures are meant to 
harmonise the laws in the Member States. 
There is more case law where it concerns criminal law measures imposed upon a person by 
a Member State for the enforcement of Union law or when limiting Union law. Criminal law 
sanctions should be eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive when a Member State enforces 
Union law with criminal law sanctions.445 The Commission has explained the eff ectiveness, 
proportionality and dissuasiveness of a sanction in a Communication from 2011 as follows: 
Eff ectiveness requires that the sanction is suitable to achieve the desired goal, 
i.e. observance of the rules; proportionality requires that the sanction must be 
commensurate with the gravity of the conduct and its eff ects and must not exceed
442  Öberg (2013), p. 301.
443   See also Öberg (2013), p. 308, who contends that there is no case law on the matter up till 2013. Conversely, there is case law on the 
proportionality principle and the enforcement by penalties of administrative law measures created by the Union. For an overview of 
case law on the proportionality of administrative law measures, see Craig (2012), p. 611-614.
444  Such as framework decisions and directives.
445   See e.g. ECJ, C-418/11 (Texdata Software GmbH), par. 50; ECJ, C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (criminal proceedings against Silvio 
Berlusconi, Sergio Adelchi, Marcello Dell’Utri and others), par. 65; ECJ, 68/88 (Commission v Greece), par. 24.
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 what is necessary to achieve the aim; and dissuasiveness requires that the sanctions 
constitute an adequate deterrent for potential future perpetrators.446
In general the Court leaves it up to the national courts to apply the principle of 
proportionality.447 However, guidance on the application of this principle is given in 
preliminary ruling procedures. A penalty must be eff ective while still complying with the 
principle of proportionality.448 This means that the least restrictive sanction should be chosen 
when “there is a choice between several appropriate measures”.449 Furthermore, the severity 
of a penalty should be weighed against the interests of the Union measure which is protected 
by the national rule.450 A balancing exercise, taking into account all elements in a case, should 
thus take place to determine whether the penalty is not excessive.451 The ECJ has ruled that 
diff erent factors must be taken into account such as “the nature and the degree of seriousness 
of the infringement which that penalty seeks to sanction [and] the means of establishing the 
amount of that penalty”.452 Moreover, in Paraskevas Louloudakis v Elliniko Dimosio, the 
ECJ held, although without reference to the proportionality principle, that “in the light of 
the purpose of the directive, which is to promote the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, 
account must be taken of the good faith of the off ender when determining the penalty actually 
imposed on him”.453 Good faith might therefore be a factor which may be taken into account 
when assessing the proportionality of a measure. The impossibility of adapting a penalty 
to the specifi c circumstances of a case may lead to an infringement of the proportionality 
principle.454
Member States can also restrict Union law with criminal law measures. A restriction 
of Union law can only be justifi ed when it complies with the proportionality principle. 
Measures by Member States must thus be suitable, necessary and not excessive. The 
Court stated e.g. with regard to the free movement of persons: “As regards [...] penalties, 
such as fi nes and detention, whilst the national authorities are entitled to impose penalties 
in respect of a failure to comply with the terms of provisions requiring foreign nationals 
to notify their presence which are comparable to those attaching to infringements of 
provisions of equal importance by nationals, they are not justifi ed in imposing a penalty 
so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement that it becomes an obstacle to 
446   Communication from the Commission “Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the eff ective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law”, p. 9.
447   See e.g. ECJ, C-430/05 (Ntionik Anonymi Etaireia Emporias H/Y, Logismikou kai Paroxis Ypiresion Michanografi sis and Ioannis Michail 
Pikoulas v Epitropi Kefalaiagoras), par. 54.
448   ECJ, C-418/11 (Texdata Software GmbH), par. 51. Merely symbolic penalties are not eff ective, see ECJ, C-81/12 (Asociaţia Accept v Consiliul 
Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării), par. 64.
449  ECJ, C-418/11 (Texdata Software GmbH), par. 52.
450  ECJ, C-418/11 (Texdata Software GmbH), par. 57.
451   ECJ, C-45/08 (Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)), par. 
73; ECJ, C-83/94 (Criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Ott o Krauskopf and Ott o Holzer), par. 40; ECJ, C-367/89 (Criminal 
proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifi ques SNC) par. 25.
452   ECJ, C-272/13 (Equoland Soc. coop. arl v Agenzia delle Dogane — Uffi  cio delle Dogane di Livorno), par. 35.
453  ECJ, C-262/99 (Paraskevas Louloudakis v Elliniko Dimosio), par. 76.
454  ECJ, C-272/13 (Equoland Soc. coop. arl v Agenzia delle Dogane — Uffi  cio delle Dogane di Livorno), par. 45.
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the free movement of persons.”455 EU law in general may thus not be impaired by the 
criminal laws of Member States when the criminal law measure is not proportionate.456
2.6.3 A comparison of the proportionality principle in the ECHR and the EU
The proportionality of sanctions is a codifi ed right in the EU and can be found in Article 
49(3) of the Charter. In general, the proportionality principle can be found in the Treaties and 
in the Charter. In contrast, the ECHR does not contain the proportionality of sanctions as a 
separate principle, even though proportionality in general is used by the ECtHR to determine 
whether an interference with a right is justifi ed. The focus of the ECtHR seems to rest on 
the proportionality stricto sensu and not on other aspects of the proportionality principle. In 
the EU, the Union Courts use the suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu to 
review Union measures and measures by Member States. In many cases the Union Courts use 
a “manifest disproportionality” test to determine whether EU measures are proportionate. 
This is in particular true for areas where discretion exists as to economic, social or political 
choices, although this category is quite broad. The proportionality test is used more intensely 
to review measures by Member States. This is not surprising, since the proportionality test in 
general determines whether a restriction of an EU right is lawful or not. 
The ECtHR often reviews proportionality of (criminal law) sanctions to determine whether an 
interference with a right is proportionate. Multiple factors are used by the ECtHR, depending 
on the arguments of the parties, the margin of discretion of the Member States and the type 
of proceedings. Under EU law, the Union Courts will also examine all relevant factors to 
determine whether a penalty is suitable, necessary and not excessive. For both jurisdictions, it 
remains diffi  cult to distil a list of factors which should be used to determine the proportionality 
of a criminal law sanction. 
2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, fi ve diff erent principles have been discussed from a criminal law perspective 
under the ECHR and EU law. There is no such thing as a comprehensive EU criminal law 
domain, although the Union has engaged in more harmonisation in the previous years. The
freedom from self-incrimination is for example harmonised in the presumption of innocence 
Directive. In general though, the fi ve criminal law principles central to this research have not 
been extensively elaborated upon in EU criminal law. The ECHR regime shows an inconsistent 
approach towards these principles. Some principles are more elaborated upon than others. 
This is not completely unsurprising. The burden and standard of proof are for example only 
marginally discussed, since the ECtHR is not a fourth instance court. By contrast, the freedom 
455  ECJ, 118/75 (Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann), par. 21
456   See e.g. ECJ, C-193/94 (Criminal proceedings against Sofi a Skanavi and Konstantin Chryssanthakopoulos), par. 36; ECJ, 203/80 (Criminal 
proceedings against Guerrino Casati), par. 27. Sometimes Union legislation limits Member States when they enforce that legislation by 
criminal law means, by requiring proportionate sanctions in order not to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of that legislation; 
see e.g. ECJ, C-61/11 PPU (Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi  Karim), in particular par. 52-58, where the Court refers to the proportionality 
principle incorporated in Directive 2008/115.
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from self-incrimination or the legality principle are principles which can be found implicitly 
and explicitly in the Convention, and are thus often at stake in proceedings before the ECtHR. 
In the next two chapters, the fi ve principles are examined from the perspective of the criminal 
laws of, respectively, the Netherlands and England. The approach in those jurisdictions is 
more elaborate, since there are authorities on the domestic level enforcing domestic criminal 
law as well as EU law by criminal law means. The lack of a criminal law authority in the 
EU resulted in a less extensive framework against which the principles in competition law 
proceedings can be assessed. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the scope and application of the fi ve principles subject to this research 
in Dutch criminal law. Traces of the infl uence of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the case law of the respective European 
courts, can be found in Dutch criminal law.1 The Dutch legal system can be characterised 
as a monist system, which means that certain provisions of international agreements can be 
directly eff ective.2
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but also general principles of 
EU law, are of importance to Dutch criminal law. With the entering in force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon the Charter became offi  cially legally binding. Member States should abide by the 
rights and principles in the Charter when acting within the scope of Union law.3 It is therefore 
possible that the Charter, but also general principles of EU law have an infl uence on the Dutch 
criminal law system when there is a connection with Union law.4 A degree of connection 
might even exist where Union law leaves discretion to the Member States.5 Specifi cally with 
regard to national legislation, this means that the Union courts may use the following points 
to determine whether there is a connection with Union law, namely “whether that legislation 
is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether 
it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly 
aff ecting EU law; and also whether there are specifi c rules of EU law on the matter or capable 
of aff ecting it”.6 An example of this is where national legislation implements a directive,7
although national legislation which existed before the relevant Union legislation may also be 
regarded as implementing it.8
The safeguards for the accused are in Dutch criminal (procedure) law also infl uenced by the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of its Court.9 The ECHR is directly 
applicable in the Dutch legal order, as follows from Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution. 
Furthermore, statutory regulations will be set aside if they are in confl ict with provisions of 
international agreements that are self-executing.10 This means that Dutch criminal law should 
not infringe the fundamental rights standards of the ECHR and the interpretation of those rights 
by the ECtHR. The Dutch judiciary might thus directly apply the articles of the ECHR as well. 
1  See chapter 2 for a discussion of the fi ve principles in the EU and the ECHR.
2  See Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution. 
3   ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), par 20-22; ECJ, C-206/13 (Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni 
Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo), par. 21. See also A Ward (2014), p. 1449-1454.
4   ECJ, C-299/95 (Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich), par. 16; and ECJ, C-206/13 (Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza 
Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo), par. 24.
5   ECJ, C-411/10 and C-493/10 (N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E., A. S. M.,M. T., K. P., E. H. v Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform).
6   ECJ, C-206/13 (Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo), par. 25.
7  See e.g. Wet van 28 februari 2013 tot implementatie van richtlijn nr. 2010/64/EU.
8  ECJ, C-550/07 (Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG).
9   E.g. the post-Salduz jurisprudence of the Dutch Supreme Court, see Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 315-316. See also Hoge Raad (1 April 
2014) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1424, par. 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.
10  Article 94 of the Dutch Constitution. 
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This chapter examines, in subsequent order, the freedom from self-incrimination (3.2), the 
principle of non bis in idem (3.3), rules relating to the burden and standard of proof (3.4), 
the principle of legality and the principle of legal certainty (3.5), and the proportionality of 
sanctions in criminal law (3.6). 
3.2 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
The freedom from self-incrimination is a principle which protects the accused in criminal 
law proceedings from having to provide evidence against him- or herself. The freedom 
from self-incrimination may protect a suspect from providing incriminating answers, as it 
includes the right to remain silent, but it may also protect a person from providing other 
evidence incriminating oneself. The duty of confi dentiality and thus the principle of legal 
professional privilege is closely related to the freedom from self-incrimination. The principle 
of legal professional privilege provides protection against disclosure of materials in situations 
where the freedom from self-incrimination might not be applicable. Its rationale is, however, 
diff erent, since this principle ensures that persons can seek legal advice without the threat 
of those communications being used in criminal law proceedings. The principle of legal 
professional privilege is discussed in this paragraph as well insofar as it is relevant. 
In subsequent order, I discuss some general aspects in Dutch criminal law of the freedom 
from self-incrimination (3.2.1), testimonial evidence and the freedom from self-incrimination 
(3.2.2), the use to which materials obtained by coercion are put (3.2.3),11 and the duty of 
confi dentiality (3.2.4).12
3.2.1 General aspects of the principle in criminal law
A source of the freedom from self-incrimination is Article 29 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure (DCCP).13 This specifi c provision contains the right to remain silent, whilst other 
provisions in the DCCP prevent authorities from obtaining materials from a suspect.14 There 
is, however, no general freedom from self-incrimination in the DCCP. The right to remain 
silent has been introduced by the legislator to prevent improper compulsion; this in order 
to prevent a suspect from providing evidence against his will, to protect the integrity of the 
criminal justice system, and to prevent incorrect statements from suspects.15 The freedom 
from self-incrimination, overall, tries to ensure a fair trial for a suspect. In general, the rule 
nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum applies in Dutch law,16 although the Dutch Supreme Court has 
ruled that the freedom from self-incrimination in Dutch law is not absolute.17 The Dutch 
legislator has the possibility to deviate from this principle. Obviously, some pressure is 
11  The focus is on documents and not on materials in general.
12   The duty and right to refuse to disclose is also referred to ass professional secrecy, legal professional privilege or the attorney/lawyer-
client privilege, see Van Gerven (2013), p. 2.
13   For another source of the right to remain silent see e.g. Article 271 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (DCCP).
14  See e.g. 96a(2) DCCP and 105(3) DCCP.
15   Memorie van Toelichting (Explanatory Memorandum) to the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure of 1921, p. 70-71.
16  E.g. Minkenhof & Reijntjes (2009), p. 75.
17  Hoge Raad (15 February 1977) ECLI:NL:HR:1977:AC3994.
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always allowed. Certain pressure during an interrogation, by e.g. interrogating a suspect for a 
long time multiple times a day, is allowed,18 whilst violence and threats are prohibited.19 It is 
allowed to make certain promises during an interrogation, unless the promises are misleading 
or unrealistic.20
Since this study deals with the possible impact of criminal law principles on the administrative 
law enforcement of competition law, it is necessary to determine whether each criminal law 
principle is also applicable to legal persons, since undertakings can be legal and natural 
persons. In the Netherlands the Dutch Supreme Court also applies this principle to legal 
persons without any further discussion.21 There is, however, discussion as to scope of 
the persons which can rely on, in particular, the right to remain silent of a legal person.22
Employees can be heard during the investigation and prosecution in four diff erent capacities, 
namely (i) as witness, (ii) as a suspect involved in the alleged crime of the legal person, (iii) as 
legal representative, and (iv) as the one giving instructions / the actual director.23 Categories 
ii and iv always have an own right to remain silent. By contrast, a legal representative of 
the legal person does have a right derived from the undertaking to remain silent during 
the prosecution,24 but it is not clear whether this also applies in the investigating phase.25
Doorenbos e.g. argues that all employees should have a right to remain silent from the 
moment an investigation starts.26 The witness does not have a right to remain silent, although 
he does not have to respond to questions put to him by police offi  cers.27
Exerting compulsion in order to obtain a statement or materials is in general not allowed. The 
right to remain silent from Article 29 DCCP prevents against compulsion to obtain testimonial 
evidence.28 Moreover, other specifi c provisions, such as e.g. article 96a(2) DCCP and 105(3) 
DCCP, prevent materials from being obtained from a suspect. Special legislation may, however, 
require a person to cooperate.29 The Dutch judiciary will determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether that compulsion is improper. Cooperation requirements in special legislation can 
apply to both testimonial information and other materials. It is generally accepted that a 
person, suspected of a crime, can rely on his right to remain silent when authorities request 
information from him or her. A person does not have to provide testimonial evidence, even 
when there is a cooperation requirement in special legislation.30 In contrast, it appears that 
18  See e.g. Hoge Raad (22 September 1998) ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1277.
19  Minkenhof & Reijntjes (2009), p. 109. 
20  Minkenhof & Reijntjes (2009), p. 110.
21  E.g. Hoge Raad (21 December 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0666.
22   See e.g. the discussion between Bakker & Mooijen (2014), a lawyer and a public prosecutor on the scope of the freedom from self-
incrimination for employees of a company. 
23  See Peek & Tonino (2010), p. 151. See also Bakker & Mooijen (2014), p. 11.
24  See for more information, De Ruyter (2008); and Peek & Tonino (2010).
25  See De Ruyter (2008); and Doorenbos (2013), p. 176-177.
26  Doorenbos (2013), p. 177-181.
27   De Ruyter (2008). The witness can be forced to cooperate during the trial or before the investigating judge, but will have a right to 
remain silent when being heard as a legal representative at that stage. Cf. Bakker & Mooijen (2014), p. 12.
28   Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 306-308; Van Bemmelen & others (2010), p. 200; Minkenhof & Reijntjes (2009), p. 109-110.
29  See e.g. Corsten and Borgers (2014), p. 347-349; and Koops (2000), p. 69.
30  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 349. Infra par. 4.2.2.
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the broader freedom from self-incrimination is not extended by the Dutch judiciary to other 
cooperation requirements than the requirements in the Dutch Criminal Code of Procedure.31
This means that special legislation can require a suspect to provide materials to investigating 
authorities. 
The application of the freedom from self-incrimination by the Dutch judiciary focuses more 
on the materials instead of the means by which those materials are obtained.32 The Dutch 
freedom from self-incrimination extends, as mentioned, only to testimonial evidence. This is a 
diff erent approach from the one taken by the ECtHR, which focuses on improper compulsion. 
Nevertheless, as Van Toor argues, the diff erence in approach between ECtHR and the Dutch 
judiciary does not necessarily mean that the outcome in cases dealt with by the Dutch 
judiciary and the ECtHR would always diff er. Van Toor discusses fi ve categories of evidence, 
namely oral statements, written statements, documents from which it is unclear whether they 
exist, other documents and goods.33 The approach by the Dutch judiciary and the ECtHR for 
the fi rst three categories would probably lead to the same outcome, according to Van Toor.34
For the fourth and fi fth category, the protection for the suspect would diff er, since the Dutch 
judiciary does not seem to protect evidence which is not testimonial in nature.35
The Dutch judiciary applies the freedom from self-incrimination merely to testimonial 
evidence. Materials which do not contain testimonial evidence are not protected, unless 
the DCCP specifi cally prevents authorities from obtaining those materials from a suspect.36
If testimonial evidence is obtained on the basis of a cooperation requirement, it will be 
necessary to determine whether the use of that evidence infringes the essence of the right to 
remain silent.37 Therefore, in the following two paragraphs, the focus is fi rst placed on the 
question what testimonial evidence is, in contrast to other evidence, since the freedom from 
self-incrimination will only be triggered by testimonial evidence. Secondly, the use of that 
evidence is discussed. 
3.2.2 Testimonial evidence
Article 29(1) of the DCCP prevents the imposition of any obligation on a suspect to provide 
answers. In two cases, the Dutch Supreme Court e.g. ruled that an obligation in Dutch traffi  c 
legislation to provide information on the identity of the driver of a car led to an infringement 
31  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 351-354.
32   Van Toor (2017), p. 414. See also Hoge Raad (16 November 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BY3272; and Hoge Raad (21 December 2010) 
ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0666.
33  Which thus could lead to fi shing expeditions by authorities. 
34  Van Toor (2017), p. 423-424.
35   Van Toor (2017), p. 424-425, mentions though that there might be highly exceptional cases where protection is off ered by the Dutch 
judiciary. The ECtHR focuses on the means by which the evidence is obtained, although the type of evidence is of infl uence on the 
means which can be exerted on a suspect. Supra chapter 2, par 2.2. The third and fourth category are relevant for this research.
36  See e.g. 96a(2) DCCP. See e.g. also Hoge Raad (5 July 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6144, par. 5.2.
37   See Van Toor (2017), p. 418-419. See also e.g. Hoge Raad (5 July 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6144, par. 5.2.
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of the right to remain silent contained in Article 29 of the DCCP.38 According to the Supreme 
Court, it would be a fair application of the Dutch law to set aside the obligation in special 
legislation in favour of the right to remain silent. Furthermore, it did not appear that the 
legislator wanted to make an exception to the right to remain silent. Special legislation 
(administrative law or criminal law) may require persons to cooperate, and thus to provide 
information. Even so, the freedom from self-incrimination in criminal law may not be violated 
by these obligations. This means that a person does not have an obligation to provide answers 
orally or in writing in e.g. administrative law proceedings if the answers relate to information 
relevant to a criminal investigation.39
An obligation to provide materials may be imposed upon a suspect when it is (i) provided 
for by special legislation40 and (ii) when the materials exist independent of the will of a 
suspect. This limitation of the freedom from self-incrimination from Article 6 ECHR is 
justifi ed by the general interest requirement which that special legislation pursues. The Dutch 
Supreme Court applies a far-reaching ‘materials based approach’ with regard to documents 
in particular. One could argue that (pre-existing) documents are always independent of the 
will of a suspect. However, the Supreme Court will examine the nature of a statement in a 
document to determine whether that statement is independent of the will of a suspect or 
not. If the statement contained in a document is dependent on the will of a suspect, then 
the document falls foul of the freedom from self-incrimination.41 The Dutch judiciary thus 
examines whether the information in the document is of a testimony nature, and not whether 
obtaining the document was dependent on the will of a suspect.42 Documents obtaining 
objective information will not fall under the freedom from self-incrimination.43
A duty to cooperate in special legislation does not mean that authorities have a carte blanche 
to obtain information or materials. The Supreme Court ruled in a taxation case that a person 
is not obliged to provide materials when the tax authorities do not suffi  ciently substantiate 
which information or materials they want to acquire or when it leads to a fi shing expedition.44
This case law is, quite logically in the author’s view, extendable to criminal law proceedings 
as well.45
38   Hoge Raad (26 October 1993) ECLI:NL:HR:1993:ZC9457, and Hoge Raad (16 September 2008) ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD1707. See also 
Hoge Raad (22 June 1931), NJ 1931, 1602, where the Supreme Court held that an obligation in the Dutch Labour Law should be set 
aside based on the right to remain silent as codifi ed in Article 29 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
39  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 349; and Van Bemmelen & others (2010), p. 206. 
40  E.g. Hoge Raad (27 June 1927) ECLI:NL:HR:1927:BG9434.
41   Hoge Raad (21 December 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0666, see also the case note of Reijntjes (2011), par. 3. 
42   Hoge Raad (25 November 2015) ECLI:NL:2015:3354, par. 2.4, see also the case note of Reijntjes (2016), par. 5.
43  Van Toor (2017), p. 417.
44  Hoge Raad (24 April 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1130, par. 4.3.3.
45   Cf. Van Toor (2017), p. 242; Stevens (2007), par. 3, who both mention that open requests for materials and fi shing expeditions can be 
seen as testimonial evidence and therefore would probably fall, in light of the case law of the Supreme Court, within the scope of the 
freedom from self-incrimination. 
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3.2.3 Use of evidence
Obtaining testimonial information, whether in writing or orally, through compulsion or 
obtaining materials through compulsion by asking broad questions or through fi shing 
expeditions, does not necessarily lead to an infringement of the freedom from self-
incrimination. The essence of this principle has to be derogated from before one can speak of 
an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination. For this assessment, it is important 
to determine the use to which the information or the materials are put.46 This is also a factor 
which is important for the ECtHR to determine whether there is improper compulsion and 
thus to determine whether the freedom from self-incrimination has unlawfully been limited 
by coercing a person to provide information or materials.47
A limitation of the freedom from self-incrimination, whether or not by the use of improper 
compulsion to obtain answers, or the improper acquisition of materials, should in general 
lead to exclusion of evidence.48 A failure to administer the caution could lead to exclusion 
of evidence, unless the rights of the defence have not been infringed.49 This could occur in a 
situation when a suspect is interrogated for a second time after the caution was administered, 
and when, during that second interrogation, the suspect provides a similar statement as with 
the fi rst interrogation.50
3.2.4 The duty of confi dentiality 
A right of non-disclosure is closely linked to the duty of confi dentiality. The right of non-
disclosure is, in the Netherlands, also applicable to lawyers51 employed by a company.52
Lawyers do not have any obligation to provide documents when these relate to matters 
falling under their duty of confi dentiality.53 Furthermore, public authorities may not seize any 
documents from a lawyer that fall under the aforementioned duty.54 All information related 
to the client falls in principle under the duty of confi dentiality,55 which also means that all 
communications between lawyer and client are in principle protected.56 There are only two 
exceptions to this protection of documents of a lawyer, namely if the documents do not relate 
46   Hoge Raad (21 December 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0666, par. 4.3. See e.g. also Hoge Raad (24 April 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1130, par. 
4.3.6.
47  Supra chapter 2, par. 2.2.2.1.
48   For the consequences of the use of improper compulsion to obtain answers, see e.g.: Hoge Raad (3 March 1981) ECLI:NL:HR:1981:AB8320, 
par. 6. For the consequences of the improper gaining of materials, see e.g.: Hoge Raad (21 December 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0666, 
par. 4.3, where the Supreme Court held that the use of evidence might infringe the nemo tenetur principle, if, in this case, the statement 
in the document is dependent on the will of a suspect. See also Van Toor (2017), p. 418-419.
49  E.g. Hoge Raad (2 October 1979) ECLI:NL:HR:1979:AB7396, par. 6.
50  Hoge Raad (4 March 1980) ECLI:NL:HR:1980:AB7445.
51   A lawyer is not entitled to this privilege if he or she acts in another capacity than that of a lawyer (e.g. as a trustee in a bankruptcy), see 
Fernhout (2013), p. 372-373.
52   E.g. Hoge Raad (15 March 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY6101, par. 5.4-5.5; see also Fernhout (2013), p. 367.
53  Article 96a(3)(b) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. 
54  Article 98 ibid; see also Fernhout (2013), p. 387-388.
55   It is not relevant in which way the lawyer received the information. Information received from a third party, but relating to the case of the 
client of the lawyer concerned, falls also under the duty of confi dentiality, see Hoge Raad (24 January 2006) ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU4666, 
par. 3.5; see also Fernhout (2013), p. 372.
56   This is referred to as the principle of legal professional privilege. A distinction between confi dential and less confi dential information 
cannot be made, according the Supreme Court in a case on the right of non-disclosure of a notary, Hoge Raad (1 March 1985) 
ECLI:NL:HR:1985:AC9066, par. 3.4.
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to the right of non-disclosure,57 or if the documents are subject of a criminal off ence or are 
instrumental to a criminal off ence.58
3.2.5 Résumé
Dutch criminal law does not accept an absolute freedom from self-incrimination. Perhaps this 
illustrates the nature of this principle as a freedom instead of a right. Legal persons may rely 
on this principle, although it is unclear whether all employees may rely on the freedom from 
self-incrimination derived from the undertaking. The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure 
protects, in general, from coercion being exerted on a person. However, special legislation – 
administrative law or criminal law – may require a person to provide answers or materials. 
This duty to cooperate is limited by the freedom from self-incrimination. The Dutch judiciary 
has only accepted the freedom from self-incrimination in two types of situations. A suspect 
may be required to provide testimonial evidence. This can be evidence in the form of (pre-
existing) documentation or oral evidence. In order to safeguard the personal freedom of a 
suspect, it is not allowed to coerce such a person in providing that information. Secondly, it is 
not allowed to request information in a broad manner or to fi sh for information. Authorities 
have to substantiate suffi  ciently which information they want to acquire from a suspect. 
If coercion is used in one of these two situations, it does not necessarily mean that the 
freedom from self-incrimination is infringed. It will be important to assess the use to which 
the materials are put in order to determine whether the essence of this principle is infringed. 
In general, evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from self-incrimination should be 
excluded in criminal law proceedings. 
The duty of confi dentiality is another limit on the powers of authorities to obtain information. 
Lawyers do not have to hand over any communication between them and a client. Privileged 
information between lawyer and client is thus protected. Dutch criminal law also protects 
communication between an in-house lawyer and a client. 
3.3 NON BIS IN IDEM
The non bis in idem principle in Dutch law protects against double prosecution and double 
punishment of a suspect.59 Even though this principle can be regarded as a substantive 
principle, it also has strong procedural elements.60 The procedural elements, which prevent 
against double prosecution, also include substantive elements, which prevent against double 
liability.61 However, the non bis in idem principle as a whole encompasses both substantive 
and procedural elements. Overall it is not particularly relevant to make this distinction for the
57  Hoge Raad (20 June 1988) ECLI:NL:HR:1988:AD0367, par. 7.1.
58   Hoge Raad (20 February 2007) ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ3564, par. 4.2.3; see also Fernhout (2013), p. 377.
59  E.g. Van Hattum (2012), p. 3 and Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 194-195.
60  Van Hattum (2007); Corstens (2003), p. 99.
61  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 195.
130
CHAPTER 3 | The Netherlands
principle of non bis in idem, since both elements are discussed and applied largely in the same 
manner.62 The protection of the non bis in idem principle against double prosecution only 
extends to the same person prosecuted for the same facts. 
In what follows, I fi rst highlight some general aspects of the non bis in idem principle in Dutch 
criminal law (3.3.1). After that, I discuss the condition(s) for the non bis in idem principle to 
apply (3.3.2). 
3.3.1 General aspects in criminal law
The non bis in idem principle can be found in Article 68 of the Dutch Criminal Code (DCC). 
This is not the only provision in Dutch law mentioning the non bis in idem principle. Article 
255a of the DCCP, which is related to Article 68 DCC,63 also refers to the non bis in idem 
principle. Article 68 DCC only pertains to a decision of a criminal court, which means that 
the non bis in idem principle, as provided by this article, does not prevent the initiation of 
criminal proceedings after an administrative decision has been taken on the same matter.64
One could say that the ne bis in idem principle in the Dutch Criminal Code is limited to the 
area of criminal law, and thus only has an internal eff ect. It appears, though, that the Supreme 
Court is loosening the condition of a decision of a criminal court. In a 2012 judgment, the 
Supreme Court ruled that an (administrative) disciplinary decision taken in a prison could 
lead to a prohibition of a second prosecution on the basis of the non bis in idem principle.65 The 
Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the non bis in idem principle in this case in light of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights.66
This seemed to broaden the scope of Article 68 DCC to dual administrative and criminal 
law proceedings. However, in 2015 the Supreme Court, in its so-called Alcolock-judgment, 
decided that this provision could only be invoked when there are multiple decisions by a 
criminal tribunal.67 This judgment thus closed the door for the application of Article 68 DCC in 
case of dual administrative and criminal law proceedings. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
did rule that the dual administrative and criminal law procedure led in this particular case to 
a situation at odds with the underlying principle of Article 68 DCC, which prevents double 
prosecution and punishment for the same facts.68 The principles of due process require, 
according to the Supreme Court, a bar on the prosecution pursuant to the principle that a 
person cannot be prosecuted or sanctioned twice.69 It has been said that the Supreme Court 
applied an unwritten non bis in idem principle in this judgment.70
62   de Hullu (2018), p. 546-547, states that the substantive and procedural aspect of the non bis in idem principle could be interpreted 
diff erently.
63  See e.g. Hoge Raad (10 December 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1734, par. 2.3.1-2.3.3.
64  de Hullu (2018), p. 548; Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 196.
65  Hoge Raad (15 May 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW5166, par. 2.3.6; see also: Borgers (2013), p. 29-30. 
66  Hoge Raad (15 May 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW5166, par. 2.3.6.
67   Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.3.1.
68  Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.3.2.
69  Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.4.
70  Noorduyn (2015), p. 1425; Pluimer (2015), par. 5.5.
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It should be mentioned though that the una via principle will prevent the use of both 
administrative law and criminal law means, specifi cally in case of administrative law fi nes.71
Since this research compares the scope of some criminal law principles with the scope of those 
principles in competition law proceedings, no more attention is given to the issue of dual 
administrative and criminal law proceedings. In what follows, the focus in the following is 
therefore placed on dual criminal law proceedings. 
Th e non bis in idem principle only applies to fi nal decisions based on the facts,72 which means 
that there should be a decision on the merits of the case and not a procedural decision. Article 
68 DCC also protects against prosecution when there is already a decision on the facts from 
a court in another country,73 or when there is a punitive measure from a competent authority 
in another country.74 If there is a criminal law sanction imposed on a person, it should have 
been executed completely, a pardon should have been given, or the period of limitation for the 
execution of the sanction should have expired. Non-execution of a sanction can occur due to 
the conduct of the accused, but the conduct of the executing state can also lead to prevention 
of the execution. According to the Supreme Court, a second prosecution may take place in the 
Netherlands when a sanction is not executed, regardless of whether the conduct of the person 
concerned leads to this non-execution.75
3.3.2 Conditions
In the Netherlands, the non bis in idem principle is only applicable when there is a defi nitive 
decision taken in criminal proceedings with regard to the same person and the same facts. 
The same person
The person who has been convicted already and is prosecuted for a second time should be one 
and the same. In 2002 a case came before the Supreme Court in which a person was convicted 
for causing a traffi  c accident by car and for leaving the site of this accident. A second suspect 
was indicted for the same off ence. The legal counsel of the second suspect mentioned that 
it was physically impossible that there were two drivers of the same car. Furthermore, she 
argued that the fi rst conviction should prevent the prosecution of the second person. The 
Supreme Court ruled that there are no prohibitions to prosecute another person for an off ence, 
when there is already one person convicted for that off ence.76 Th e rationale underlying this 
judgment, and also the condition of the ‘same person’ for the purpose of the non bis in idem 
principle, is the individual criminal liability of a person. 
71   See Article 5:44 of the General Administrative Law Act and Article 243(2) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
72   In the Netherlands this means that decisions on the basis of 349(1) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure are not suffi  cient to trigger 
the safeguards of Article 68 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
73  Article 68(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code.
74   Article 68(3) of the Dutch Criminal Code. The punitive measure should be given by a competent authority, see e.g.  Hoge Raad (31 
October 2017) ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2796, par. 4.3.1.
75  Hoge Raad (4 February 1969) ECLI:NL:HR:1969:AB3700.
76  Hoge Raad (17 September 2002) ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE4268, par. 4.4.
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A legal person may be prosecuted for a criminal law off ence. In Dutch criminal law, the 
concept of a legal person is aligned with the concept in civil law.77 This means that a corporate 
structure is irrelevant for the determination of the legal person which can be prosecuted, 
since each entity with legal personality in the group can be prosecuted.78  This means that 
it is not possible to prosecute the group for an infringement of Dutch criminal law. In some 
extraordinary cases though, when the multiple identities of the legal persons are used to 
abuse the law, they can still be regarded as one legal person.79 Problems may occur in this 
regard when the de facto director and a legal person are prosecuted. Nevertheless, consecutive 
prosecution of a natural person, even if it is e.g. the director of an undertaking, and a legal 
person for the same facts is allowed.80 Moreover, the concept of the functional perpetrator81
by which the acts of a natural person can be attributed to a legal person, does, in general, not 
prevent a second prosecution against the natural or legal person.82
The same facts
A previous conviction and a subsequent prosecution should also cover the same facts83 in order 
for the non bis in idem principle to prevent this second prosecution. The case law on this matter is 
quite complex, and therefore the Supreme Court issued a judgment in 2011 in which it explained 
the condition of the ‘same facts’ in a comprehensive manner.84 The approach of the Supreme Court 
in this judgment has been criticised mainly for ruling that ‘previous case law’ confi rmed in this 
judgment,85 is in conformity with the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU and the ECHR.86 Even so, it does provide a good overview on the elements which should be 
taken into consideration to determine whether the facts are the same. Two elements should be 
examined,87 namely (i) the legal nature of the facts,88 and (ii) the behaviour of the suspect.89
If a second prosecution is not based on the same legal basis, one should examine the legal 
nature of the diff erent off ences. If the legal nature of the off ences is diff erent, the non bis in 
idem principle will not prevent a second prosecution. This determination entails a comparison 
of the diff erent legal provisions. For this comparison, consideration shall be given to (a) the 
rights which the provisions protect and (b) the maximum of the sanctions.
77  See e.g. Dolman (2018), par. 1.b; Machielse (2016), par. 4.
78  Hoge Raad (29 June 1999) ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZD1362, par. 3.4.
79  Hoge Raad (13 October 2000) ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA7480, par. 3.5.
80  E.g. Corstens (2003), p. 101-102.
81   See for more information on this concept e.g. De Hullu (2005); and Vellinga & Vellinga-Schootstra (2005). 
82   There might be complications when the de facto director and the legal person are prosecuted, although this does not necessarily lead to 
non bis in idem problems. See e.g. Dolman (2018), par. 2.b; Machielse (2016), par. 8; and Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 197.
83   The Dutch judiciary has elaborated on the condition of the ‘same facts’ in proceedings dealing with Article 68 of the Dutch Criminal 
Code, but also in proceedings dealing with a change of the indictment as prescribed in Article 313 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure. For both provisions, the same interpretation of the condition of the “same facts” is used, see: Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, par. 2.2.3.
84  Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102.
85  Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, par. 2.8.
86  See Borgers (2013), p. 23-24.
87  Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, par. 2.9.1.
88   This element has been referred to in previous case law as the ‘similarity of the aim of the off ence’, see Corstens & Borgers (2011), p. 194.
89   This element has been referred to in previous case law as the ‘similarity of the accusation’, see Corstens & Borgers (2011), p. 194.
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If a second prosecution is not founded on exactly the same facts, it might be necessary to 
compare the diff erent facts, in order to determine whether it concerns the same behaviour of 
the suspect. If the behaviour of the suspect is not the same, the facts will diff er, and the non 
bis in idem principle will not prevent a second prosecution. This comparison can include the 
nature and aim of the behaviour, and the time and place where and the circumstances under 
which the behaviour took place.90 The application of the guidelines should take place on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Both legal and factual elements can thus be considered. The elements can be decisive when 
viewed together, but it is also possible that only one element is decisive for a case.91 As the 
Supreme Court has indicated, these are only guidelines and not hard rules.92 Even though the 
emphasis of the Dutch judiciary might have been on the factual comparison,93 it appears that 
the Supreme Court is, after its judgement in 2011, increasingly referring to the importance 
of the legal comparison.94 This has led to some criticism in light of the developments in 
the EU and under the ECHR, notably due to the Zolotukhin judgment of the ECtHR, since 
both jurisdictions focus on a factual assessment and not on a legal assessment.95 The Dutch 
judiciary applies a diff erent approach from that of the European Courts. 
Perhaps the Supreme Court has waited for the right time, because the legal interest did fi nd 
its way back in case law of both the ECtHR and the Union Courts. The former uses the legal 
interest as a factor to determine whether there are dual proceedings.96 The Union Courts use 
the legal interest as a factor to determine whether a limitation to the non bis in idem principle 
is allowed.97 The approaches of the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court lead, in the 
author’s view, to the same result.98 The change in case law of the ECtHR was unexpected 
after its judgment in Zolotukhin. Wattel asserts e.g. that the ECtHR might have regretted its 
Zolotukhin judgment by ruling in that judgment that it would solely focus on the identity of the 
facts for the idem requirement and therefore started to “tampers” with the bis requirement.99
Even though the legal interest is a factor which can be taken into account to determine whether
90  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 199-200.
91  Cf. Corstens & Borgers (2011), p. 199. 
92  Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, par. 2.9.2.
93   Buruma (2011) asserts in his case note under Hoge Raad (1 February 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, that the factual analysis is 
performed more often in case law of the Supreme Court than the legal analysis, see par. 3. Van Hattum (2012), p. 554, contends that 
there is an emphasis on the factual component in Dutch case law, but that the legal component is not negligible.
94   See the case note of Borgers (2010) under Hoge Raad (25 September 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX5012, par 2-3. Borgers mentions that 
the legal comparison might have become decisive. According to him, the factual comparison is not so relevant anymore when the legal 
comparison already leads to the conclusion that the facts are not the same. When this is not the case, one still needs to make a factual 
comparison. See e.g. also Hoge Raad (10 December 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1734, par. 2.6.1-2.6.2, where the Supreme Court only makes 
a legal comparison. See also Hoge Raad (4 February 2014) ECLI:NL:HR:2014:228, where the factual comparison was only relevant after 
the Supreme Court found that the legal provisions protect the same rights (par. 2.4.3). 
95  See e.g. Buruma (2010), par. 5.
96   CtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway). For a discussion on this case see chapter 2, par. 2.3.1.1.
97   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci); and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob). For a discussion 
of these cases, see chapter 2, par. 2.3.1.2.
98  For a further discussion, see chapter 2, par. 2.3.1.2 and par. 2.3.3.
99   See Wattel (2017), p. 239 who argues that the ECtHR might have regretted its Zolotukhin judgment by ruling in that judgment that it 
would solely focus on the identity of the facts for the idem requirement.
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dual proceedings are allowed, both the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court require 
also that other factors are taken into account. There should e.g. be a mechanism to set off  
penalties before dual proceedings are allowed. 
The legal interest has found its way in case law of the Strasbourg Court and the CJEU, 
whereas it was already present for quite some time in case law of the Supreme Court. There 
are, however, notable diff erences. First, the Supreme Court in the Netherlands merely focuses 
on the legal interest and on the factual circumstances to determine whether the facts are 
the same. The other elements created by the European courts are not considered. Secondly, 
the two European Courts still have in common that they do not discuss the legal interest 
under the idem heading. Therefore, some divergence still exists in the approach of the Dutch 
judiciary and the European Courts. Lastly, and most importantly, the legal interest protected 
is used by the Dutch judiciary to prevent a double prosecution and/or punishment, whereas 
the Strasbourg Court and the CJEU use this factor to allow for a double prosecution and/
or punishment. The application of this factor thus leads to a completely diff erent outcome, 
namely preventing or allowing a double prosecution and/or punishment. 
Interestingly, and as a side note, some of the other requirements in the A and B v Norway case 
of the ECtHR and the Menci and Garlsson cases of the ECJ, were used by the Supreme Court to 
prevent dual administrative law and criminal law proceedings.100 The approach on these other 
factors has some similarities to the approach taken by the ECtHR and the CJEU. 
In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the administrative law measure of the alcolock and a 
criminal law prosecution were not allowed on the basis of an unwritten non bis in idem principle, 
in particular because the coordination between the two procedures was not properly arranged 
by the Dutch legislator.101 There were no procedural coordination mechanisms, rules dealing 
with the possibility of a double prosecution, and off -setting mechanisms for the penalty.102
 These factors are not relevant for dual criminal law proceedings, since Article 68 DCC explicitly 
prohibits dual criminal law proceedings. The ECtHR also indicated that it would scrutinise dual 
“hard core” criminal law proceedings more intensely than dual administrative and criminal law 
proceedings, due to the stigmatising eff ect of criminal law proceedings.103 The approach in Dutch 
criminal law, distinguishing between dual criminal law proceedings and dual administrative 
law and criminal law proceedings, seems to fi t quite well within the ECHR framework. 
100   Klaasse & De Boer (2017), p. 244, mention that the case law of the ECtHR in A and B v Norway might provide the background against 
which the Supreme Court could examine in the future dual administrative and criminal law proceedings, when the una via principle 
is not applicable (for this principle see par. 3.3.1.). This would be in cases where there is no administrative law fi ne, but another 
administrative law measure leading to a criminal charge. 
101  Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.3.4.
102   Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.3.4. These factors seem to be similar to the third and fourth condition created 
by the ECtHR in ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), namely the “(iii) “duplication in the collection as well as the 
assessment of the evidence” should be avoided as much as possible, and; (iv) the second penalty should take into account the fi rst 
penalty which became fi nal in order to prevent an overall penalty which is disproportionate”. In light of ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal 
proceedings against Luca Menci) and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), they seem to be similar to the fourth and 
fi fth factor, namely (iv) whether there are coordination mechanisms, and (v) whether the overall penalties are not excessive.
103  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 133.
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3.3.3 Résumé
The non bis in idem principle ensures that a person is not prosecuted, nor held criminally liable, 
for a second time for the same facts. In the Netherlands multiple provisions codify the non bis 
in idem principle. In general, dual criminal law proceedings are prohibited by Article 68 of the 
Dutch Criminal Code. The non bis in idem principle also applies when there is a fi nal decision 
on the facts by a foreign court or competent authority. 
Dutch criminal law requires two conditions to be met before a second prosecution is prohibited. 
There has to be a previous fi nal decision with regard to the same person and the same facts. 
The condition of the same person is quite straightforward, whilst the second condition, the 
same facts, is a bit more complicated. To determine whether the facts are the same a twofold 
analyse is required: one should conduct a legal and a factual analysis. Both can be conclusive 
of themselves to determine whether the facts are the same. The legal analysis is not used by 
the European Courts to examine the idem requirement, although in later case law it did found 
its way in jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU. The approach of the Dutch judiciary 
has been subjected to criticism for its divergence as compared to that of the European Courts. 
The diff erences have become less pronounced, since the European Courts did incorporate a 
legal test in the application of non bis in idem, although the approach taken is still completely 
diff erent from that of the Dutch criminal law judiciary. 
3.4  BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
The burden and standard of proof are often discussed in general handbooks on evidence. 
There, a distinction is often made between evidential requirements in civil proceedings and in 
criminal proceedings, since these are substantially diff erent. The burden and standard of proof 
can thus be found in diff erent areas of law,104 and are coloured by the area of law in which 
they are applied. In criminal law, these can be coloured by the presumption of innocence. In 
England, a distinction is made between two “principal kind of burdens”105 of proof, namely 
the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of proof. These concepts are also used 
to describe the Dutch system, although it should be mentioned, as explained below, that the 
concept of a burden of proof does not fi t well in the Dutch criminal law system. If the legal 
burden of proof rests upon a person, he should adduce enough evidence to reach the requisite 
standard of proof.106 The evidential burden of proof is referred to as the proof needed to 
establish a prima facie case.107 The evidential burden is thus not literally a burden of proof,108
since it only requires a prima facie case to be established. In this paragraph fi rst some, for the 
burden and standard of proof relevant, characteristics are examined (3.4.1). Hereafter both 
the burden (3.4.2) and the standard of proof (3.4.3) shall be discussed in Dutch criminal law. 
104   As is discussed below, there is a discussion whether there is a burden of proof in Dutch criminal law, see e.g. also Borgers & Kristen 
(1999).
105  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80. See also Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 73; Munday (2013), p. 60.
106  Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 73-74; Munday (2013), p. 60; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80-81.
107  Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 74; Munday (2013), p. 60-61; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 82-83.
108  Munday (2013), p. 60-61; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 82-83.
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3.4.1 Characteristics of the Dutch criminal law system
Article 338 of the DCCP provides that a suspect can only be convicted when a judge is, on the 
basis of evidence, fully convinced that a person is guilty. The evidence should comply with 
the minimum requirements set by legislation. A prosecutor should prove the presence of the 
elements of a criminal law off ence, and the criminal law off ence in total should be substantiated 
by suffi  cient evidence.109 In general two pieces of evidence are required before a court may 
convict a person.110 Only fi ve types of evidence may be used in criminal law proceedings, 
namely (i) the observations of the judge, (ii) the statement of the suspect, (iii) statements of 
a witness, (iv) statements of an expert, and (v) documentation.111 The Dutch Criminal Code 
also provides that generally known facts112 or circumstances do not need proof.113 Indirect 
evidence or circumstantial evidence may be used by the Dutch judiciary to complement 
direct evidence.114 Generally speaking, the judiciary will focus on the reliability of evidence.115
Reliability is an issue when a witness guesses, or assumes or presumes certain facts. Such a 
witness statement can, generally speaking, not be used in criminal law proceedings.116
As stated, one piece of evidence is not suffi  cient to prove an off ence. The application of 
the minimum requirement used to be quite lenient. As Corstens and Borgers contend with 
reference to older case law, a confession of theft by a suspect in combination with a statement 
of the victim that the good stolen was indeed his/hers, was in the past suffi  cient to prove 
the off ence.117 This changed since 2009 due to two judgments of the Supreme Court in which 
it ruled that evidence should suffi  ciently support statements of a witness or suspect.118 The 
second piece of evidence could be used to support the conclusions drawn from the statement 
or to test the reliability of the statement. It appears that both types of support are possible in 
Dutch criminal law proceedings.119 Furthermore, the substantiation of a statement by other 
evidence can still be quite scarce, and it is therefore possible that the second evidence only 
substantiates a small point in the statement made by a witness or suspect.120
The Dutch criminal law system is characterised by the conviction raisonnée of the judge and the 
evidential rules which should be complied with before a conviction could be established.121
It is not necessary for a judge to convict a suspect when the minimum rules of evidence are 
met. The Dutch criminal law system does not know the principle of the unfettered evaluation 
109  De Wilde (2008), p. 269.
110  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 757; De Wilde (2008), p. 272.
111  Article 339(1) Dutch Criminal Code.
112   Facts of general knowledge can be divided into unique historical facts and actual situations on the one hand, and rules of experience 
on the other; see Nijboer (2011), p. 209-210.
113   Article 339(2) of the Duth Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Nijboer (2011), p. 208-211; and Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 759-762, for 
examples on rules of experience.
114  See Dreissen (2007), p. 189-192.
115   See for a discussion on the reliability of statements with reference to case law and literature, Stevens (2014), par. 3.1. 
116  Dubelaar (2014), in particular 302-304.
117  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 772.
118   Hoge Raad (30 June 2009) ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3704, par. 2.3;  Hoge Raad (30 June 2009) ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG7446, par. 2.6. See also 
Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 800.
119  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 803-805.
120  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 802.
121  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 757-758; Woensel (1994), par. 5-6.
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of evidence, due to the evidential rules a judge should comply with.122 Nevertheless, as 
mentioned, if the minimum rules of evidence are met, a judge will remain free, and is also 
required, to acquit a suspect if he/she is not convinced by the evidence that the suspect has 
committed the off ence. The evidential rules are merely a prerequisite for a conviction, but do 
not determine whether a judge is convinced that the suspect has committed the crime.123
3.4.2 Burden of proof
Constituent elements
The burden of proof is not a concept intrinsic to the Dutch criminal law system. The Dutch 
criminal law system is an inquisitorial system nor an adversarial system, but can be placed 
in-between these two systems.124 The characterisation of the Dutch criminal law system is 
important for the concept of the burden of proof.125 In an inquisitorial system, there is a 
public prosecutor which bears the burden to prove the guilt of a suspect. Courts are normally 
actively involved in an inquisitorial system. In an adversarial system, the parties are equal 
and courts act as impartial referees. The Dutch criminal law system is not an adversarial 
system. Courts have e.g. the possibility to investigate facts or make sure that an investigation 
is started. This possibility for a court to investigate a criminal law off ence can be regarded as 
a correction mechanism where the prosecution provides not enough evidence to establish the 
truth.126 However, the public prosecutor and the suspect are, during trial, regarded on equal 
footing. This is not a characteristic of an inquisitorial system. It is therefore argued that the 
Dutch criminal law system does not know a burden of proof.127
In practice, however, we can say that the public prosecutor does bear a de facto burden of proof. 
The burden to prove a criminal law off ence rests in Dutch criminal law on the prosecution.128
This means that, in common law terms, the prosecution has the legal and evidential burden of 
proof.129 Therefore, I refer in this study to the concept of burden of proof in the Dutch criminal 
law system. The burden of proof can in principle never rest on a suspect,130 although it might 
be useful for a suspect to raise doubt as to whether he committed a criminal law off ence.131
Furthermore, a suspect can also make use of defences. 
122  Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 757.
123  Cleiren (2010), p. 262.
124  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 10-11.
125   Cf. Bemelmans (2018), p. 86-87, who refers in general to the role of judges in an inquisitorial or adversarial regime and the consequences 
of these systems on the evidential burden of proof. 
126  Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 758.
127  See e.g. the discussion of Bemelmans (2018), p. 345-348.
128   Bemelmans (2018), p. 350; Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 758; Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 4; Borgers & Kristen (1999), p. 872-873. 
Cf. Nijboer (2011), p. 160, who states that there is no burden of proof stricto sensu for the prosecution in criminal law, although the 
prosecution should substantiate its claim.
129  See chapter 4, par. 5.4.
130  Nijboer (2011), p. 164; Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 758; Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 5.
131   One might regard this as an evidential burden of proof, since a suspect is well-advised to back up his arguments with facts in order 
to raise doubt as to his guilt. However, this is not a burden of proof imposed on a suspect by law. Bemelmans (2018), p. 351, argues 
that the judiciary focuses increasingly on the points which are in dispute. Therefore, an active and watchful approach of the defence is 
necessary. 
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Meritorious defences
Defences may try to ensure that a constituent element of a criminal law off ence cannot be 
proven, they can be justifi catory or excusatory defences or they may be aimed at the possibility to 
prosecute.132 Meritorious defences are defences which relate to the substance of the case and can 
be raised to question e.g. the constituent elements of an off ence (bewijsverweren), or they can be 
justifi catory or excusatory defences. Defences e.g. targeted at the possibility for the prosecution to 
start the case (niet-ontvankelijkheidsverweren), are not regarded as meritorious defences, since they 
do not deal with the substance of the case. Only stating a defence is not suffi  cient to raise doubt 
as to the guilt of a person. In Dutch legal doctrine it has, in general, been stated that a suspect 
has a “bewijsvoeringslast”,133 a burden to substantiate the argumentation and thus also to meet a 
certain standard of proof. Nevertheless, a distinction should be made between defences aimed the 
constituent elements of an off ence and exculpatory or justifi catory defences, since there are doubts 
with regard to the latter whether a legal burden of proof could rest on a suspect.
Strictly speaking, a suspect does not have to prove a defence which challenges the constituent 
elements of an off ence to the requisite legal standard,134 although merely stating that a defence 
is applicable could lead to its rejection.135 It appears, as is explained below that the judge 
should be convinced to the requisite legal standard that the defence is applicable. This could
be regarded though as a de facto legal and evidential burden of proof. It seems to be clear that 
some standard of proof exists as to the defences raising doubt to the constituent elements of an 
off ence.136 The Supreme Court has made clear in this regard that having to provide suffi  cient 
evidence to substantiate a defence cannot be regarded as a reversal of the burden of proof.137
Questions have been raised in literature whether the Supreme Court requires an evidential 
and legal burden of proof for justifi catory and exculpatory defences or whether an evidential 
burden of proof is only required.138 It is therefore not quite clear which burden of proof might 
rest on a suspect when raising exculpatory or justifi catory defences.
3.4.3 Standard of proof
Constituent elements of the off ence
The belief of the judge that a person is guilty is of essential importance for the required 
standard of proof. Dutch criminal law does not contain a specifi c provision stating the 
standard of proof. The question therefore is what level of belief of the judge is required. This 
question is closely related to the presumption of innocence. Many authors have pointed out 
132  E.g. Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 5.
133  E.g. Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 759; Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 5.
134   See e.g. Hoge Raad (3 July 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9975, par. 2.4, where the Supreme Court ruled that the burden to prove an 
exculpatory ground cannot rest solely on the suspect.
135  See Reijntjes (2012), par. 4, commentary at Hoge Raad (3 July 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9975.
136  See par. 3.4.3.
137  Hoge Raad (13 July 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM2471, par. 2.3. 
138  See par. 3.4.3.
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that the principle in dubio pro reo applies in Dutch criminal law,139 which entails that a suspect 
should go free when there is any doubt as to his guilt. A judge should be convinced to a high 
degree of probability that a suspect has committed the criminal law off ence.140 This standard 
of proof can be compared with the common law standard of beyond reasonable doubt.141 A 
diff erent standard of proof might exist when not dealing with the question whether a person 
is guilty. A ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of proof might e.g. suffi  ce when determining 
whether the prosecution is admissible.142
Meritorious defences
As mentioned before, a suspect may want to raise doubt as to the constituent elements of an 
off ence, or he may want to prove the plausibility of his defence. A suspect should raise, in 
principle, doubt as to his guilt. If this doubt exists, the principle of in dubio pro reo applies.143
It is questionable what the standard of proof on a suspect would be in cases where he or she 
raises doubt as to the constituent elements of an off ence.144 Multiple phrases are used by 
the Supreme Court though to reject an alternative situation, e.g. the alternative could not be 
plausible, it could be unbelievable, or it could be highly unlikely.145 Obviously, an alternative 
explanation should be plausible. Raising an implausible alternative explanation cannot raise 
doubt. However, as Bemelmans asserts, it appears that the Dutch Supreme Court requires 
a suspect to substantiate its alternative explanation to the ‘plausibility’ standard.146 Merely 
mentioning plausible circumstances implies an evidential burden of proof. Conversely, 
proving circumstances to a ‘plausibility’ standard implies a legal burden of proof. 
If the plausibility of an exculpatory or justifi catory defence is highly unlikely, a court may reject 
it.147 Borgers and Kristen have examined case law of the Dutch judiciary to determine how 
a person may raise such doubt suffi  ciently in practice.148 They come up with fi ve conditions 
for successfully raising a defence. A defence should be brought forward explicitly and in legal 
terms.149 It should be specifi cally aimed at the exculpating circumstances, and meet the legal 
requirements for such a defence.150 A defence should be used in light of the evidence.151 One 
139   Dubelaar (2017), par. 8; Nijboer (2011), p. 164; Cleiren (2010), p. 260; Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 2. See also the opinion of AG Knigge 
at Hoge Raad (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BJ7266, par. 19
140  B emelmans (2018), p. 358-361; Nijboer (2011), p. 73; Cleiren (2010), p. 261. Cleiren, however, refers to the discussion in legal doctrine on 
this issue, but sees a trend in literature where authors use this standard more often.
141  Nijboer (2011), p. 74; Cleiren (2010), p. 261.
142  Nijboer (2011), p. 74-75.
143   E.g. AG Aben in Hoge Raad (11 June 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:CA2549, par. 8.3.5. Bemelmans (2018), p. 361 states that the presumption 
of innocence prevents a conviction when there is reasonable doubt, which also means that any defence which raises that reasonable 
doubt should prevent a conviction. 
144  Bemelmans (2018), p. 361-363.
145   See e.g. Hoge Raad (16 March 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK4459, par. 2.5. The Supreme Court ruled that only in the latter case, no explicit 
refutation has to be mentioned by the judiciary. In other circumstances, the motivation requirement obliges the judiciary to explicitly 
state why it did not fi nd the alternative explanation to be suffi  cient to raise doubt as to the guilt of the suspect. By contrast, in Hoge 
Raad (13 July 2010) ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM2471, par. 2.3, the Supreme Court merely refers to a ‘highly unlikely’ alternative situation.
146  Bemelmans (2018), p. 361-363.
147   See e.g. Hoge Raad (3 July 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9975, par. 2.4, where the Supreme Court refers to exculpatory defences. 
148  Borgers & Kristen (2005).
149  Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 7.
150  Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 8.
151  Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 9.
140
CHAPTER 3 | The Netherlands
needs to take into account the elements of the criminal law off ence.152 Lastly, it should, when 
necessary, discuss rules of experience.153 These requirements seem to require more than merely 
stating a defence, and thus more than merely an evidential burden of proof. Bemelmans, by 
contrast, asserts that case law of the Dutch Supreme Court is still unclear on the question 
whether there is a standard of proof for a suspect when raising exculpatory or justifi catory 
defences.154
3.4.4 Résumé
The burden of proof as a concept does not fi t well in the Dutch criminal law system. However, 
in practice we can observe a burden of proof on the prosecutor in criminal law proceedings. 
The legal and evidential burden of proof rest on the public prosecutor in Dutch criminal law. 
A prosecutor should thus establish a case and prove it to the requisite legal standard. 
In some cases, there might be a de facto burden of proof on a suspect; a suspect may want 
to substantiate, to a certain standard, his defence. These defences could be aimed at the 
constituent elements of an off ence or they could be exculpatory or justifi catory defences. For 
defences aimed at the constituent elements, it seems that a suspect should make the defence 
plausible to a certain standard. Nevertheless, this could be seen as a legal and evidential 
burden of proof in Dutch criminal law. It is not entirely clear whether the same could be said 
about exculpatory or justifi catory defences, although in those cases a suspect should at least 
raise them, which means that there might be an evidential burden of proof. It should be said 
that there is also a role for the public prosecutor and the judiciary to see whether meritorious 
defences might be present. 
The standard of proof in Dutch criminal law appears to be that of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 
If a suspect bears a legal burden to prove certain arguments, then it will in general be suffi  cient 
in Dutch criminal law to make the arguments plausible. A judge can only reject a defence 
when it is for example, highly unlikely. Otherwise a defence should be honoured by a judge. 
3.5 LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
The principle of legality has been called the cornerstone of criminal law in the Netherlands.155
General principles, i.e. the principle of legality, are subject to the Zeitgeist,156 and even though 
nowadays most authors regard this principle as important,157 its development over the last 
152  Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 10.
153   Borgers & Kristen (2005), par. 11. Rules of experience are part of facts of general knowledge, see Nijboer (2011), p. 209-210. Facts of 
general knowledge are dealt with in the next part of this paragraph.
154  Bemelmans (2018), p. 365-370.
155  Kristen (2010), p. 641.
156   de Hullu (2012), p. 5. Rozemond (2009), p. 682, argues that some core principles always existed, however they may be interpreted 
diff erently in diff erent times. 
157   E.g. Cleiren (2017), par. 3; Corstens & Borgers(2014), p. 19; de Hullu (2012), p. 80; Kristen (2010), p. 641; Borgers (2011), p.105.
141
The Netherlands | CHAPTER 3
Ch
ap
te
r 3
century has been quite turbulent.158 The core of the legality principle as we know it today in 
Dutch criminal law can still be traced back to the French Declaration of Human and Citizen 
Rights of 1789 and entails that every act of a government institution by which it exercises 
power against individuals should have a preceding legal basis.159 Only the substantive legality 
principle is discussed in this study. The principle of legal certainty, or lex certa, is closely related 
to the legality principle, and entails that laws should be accessible and foreseeable. Article 1(1) 
of the Dutch Criminal Law act and Article 16 of the Dutch Constitution provide the nulla 
poena, nullum crimen sine praevia lege poenali principle,160 which consists of three principles 
formulated by Von Feuerbach in 1803.161
The substantive legality principle imposes two obligations on the legislator and provides two 
guidelines for the judiciary.162 The legislator163 is, fi rstly, not allowed to create any ex post 
facto laws. Secondly, there is an obligation on the legislator to establish accessible and clear 
norms in criminal law which are foreseeable and in that regard in line with the principle 
of legal certainty. This second obligation is also called the Bestimmtheitsgebot or the lex certa
principle.164 Two guidelines can be distinguished for the judiciary. Firstly, a judge may not 
fi nd a suspect guilty nor penalise a suspect without a (preceding) law.165 This also entails that 
the judiciary may not apply a law retroactively, unless it is more favourable for the suspect.166
Secondly, a judge may not interpret criminal law off ences by analogy. 
Overall, one can thus distinguish, similar to the ECHR and EU criminal law framework discussed 
in the previous chapter, certain main rules. There should fi rst be a clear and accessible rule (lex 
scripta and lex certa).167 Secondly, a rule may not be applied retroactively (lex praevia), unless it is 
more favourable for a suspect (lex mitior).168 In what follows, fi rst the requirement of suffi  ciently 
accessible and precise off ences and penalties is examined (3.5.1), after which the requirement that 
the law may not be applied retrospectively and the lex mitior principle are discussed (3.5.2). 
158   E.g. Schreiber (1976), p.169ff , who refers to criticism from German scholars, who had “scharfe Kritik gegen seine [the principle of 
legality’s] “Tyrannei”” at the end of the 19th century. See also e.g. Van der Donk (1935), who discusses the principle of legality in light 
of the ‘Lex van der Lubbe’, which introduced retroactive provisions in German criminal law. 
159   Kristen (2010), p. 641. This defi nition formulates the substantive legality principle. See also Article 1(1) Wetboek van Strafrecht (1881) 
(Dutch Criminal Law Act of 1881). 
160   No crime, no punishment without a previous penal law. The “nulla poena” principle is not literally mentioned in these articles, although 
it is generally accepted this is part of the legality principle, see Bleichrodt and Vegter (2013), p. 29.
161   PJAv Feuerbach (1803), p.22; nulla poena sine lege: no penalty without law, nulla poena sine crimine: no penalty without crime and nullum 
crimen sine poena legali: no crime without legal punishment. 
162   MS Groenhuijsen (1987), p. 15; see also De Hullu (2012), p. 82; and F. Kristen (2010), p. 642-643. Nijboer (2011), p. 32, refers to four 
aspects in general.
163   Cf. Voermans (2011), p. 42, who asserts four “norms” for the legislator. Firstly, the legislator can only act on a legal basis. Secondly, 
certain forms of governmental acts can only be exercised through the creation of general rules, if there is a competence to create such 
rules. Thirdly, the legislator is bound by already created legislation. Fourthly, rules should be clear, foreseeable and accessible. 
164  E.g. de Hullu (2012), p. 90; Groenhuijsen (1987), p. 15.
165   Groenhuijsen (1987), states specifi cally that a suspect made not be found guilty nor penalised based on customary law. This specifi c 
prohibition is also referred to in case law of the Dutch Supreme Court in: Hoge Raad (18 September 2001) ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1471, 
par. 4.4.1.
166  Article 1(2) Dutch Criminal Code.
167   See also Cleiren (2017), par. 7. The lex scripta principle is less relevant under the ECHR, since there is no prohibition of customary law. 
Under the ECHR, the term “law” includes written norms, but also case law. The term “law” is, obviously, broadly interpreted by the 
ECtHR due to the common law system of some Member States. 
168  See also Cleiren (2017), par. 7.
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3.5.1 Suffi  ciently accessible and precise off ences and penalties
The Dutch legislator should create legislation which is clear, foreseeable and accessible. 
Even though this principle requires clear legislation, it is, according to the Dutch Supreme 
Court, inevitable that vague norms exist.169 A criminal law norm should make clear which 
behaviour will constitute a criminal law off ence, in order to ensure that a suspect can adjust 
his behaviour accordingly.170
The principle of legality protects against arbitrariness, which means that the legislator should 
ensure that criminal law off ences are foreseeable.171 Citizens should be able to know for which 
acts they can be held liable.172 It appears that professional market participants,173 but also 
‘normal’ citizens,174 should seek advice from a person or institute with the authority on which 
a person may reasonably rely in order to know the law.175 Persons should know the law, or 
otherwise, make some eff ort to know it.176 Not only should a person know the law, he should 
also take into account that criminal law norms are interpreted by the judiciary.177 Mistakes of 
law, which can be a justifi cation ground, and which may lead to the absence of any fault, are 
not quickly accepted.178 In order to know a law, it should be accessible to citizens.179 The lex 
certa principle thus ensures that criminal law off ences are clear, foreseeable and accessible. 
However, in general the Dutch judiciary will not quickly fi nd a norm to be too vague.180
An example of a vague norm, which was considered not to be in violation with the legality 
principle, can be found in a case of 1985.181 A woman was being prosecuted for, among others, 
indecent behaviour at a railway station. The question was whether this term was too vague. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the norm was concretised suffi  ciently, since it prohibits specifi cally 
indecent behaviour at railway stations and in trains. Furthermore, it stated, referring to case 
law of the ECtHR, that some norms are “inevitably couched in terms which,… are vague and 
whose interpretation and application are questions of practice”.182
169  Hoge Raad (31 October 2000) ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE1490, par. 3.4.
170  Hoge Raad (28 May 2002) ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA7954, par. 4.6.
171  Buruma (2002), p. 103.
172  Hoge Raad (31 October 2000) ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE1490, par. 3.4.
173  Hoge Raad (31 October 2000) ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE1490, par. 3.5.
174  Hoge Raad (23 May 1978) ECLI:NL:HR:1978:AC6263. 
175  Hoge Raad (4 April 2007) ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU4664, par. 6.4.
176  De Hullu (2018), p. 87.
177  Borgers (2011), p. 150. 
178  Borgers (2011), p. 149.
179  Legislation is suffi  ciently accessible in the Netherlands, see De Hullu (2015), p. 95.
180  De Hullu (2012), p. 95-96.
181  Hoge Raad (2 April 1985) ECLI:NL:HR:1985:AB7967.
182  Hoge Raad (2 April 1985) ECLI:NL:HR:1985:AB7967, par. 6.3.
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Vague norms can be interpreted by the judiciary. Borgers distinguishes in this regard between 
three types of vague norms. The fi rst type consists of vague and open norms, such as indecent 
behaviour at railway stations.183 The second type are norms which appear to be clear, but can 
become vague in a particular case.184 An example given by Borgers is whether the stealing of 
virtual goods in a computer game can fall under the notion of theft.185 The third type of vague 
norms is where the legislator creates norms which are too broad, and can thus encompass 
more than could be foreseen.186 The fi rst type, open and vague norms, will normally not be an 
issue for the Dutch judiciary. The judiciary will (partly) concretise these by interpreting the 
terms.187 Furthermore, in general, a person should have been able to fi nd out whether certain 
behaviour is prohibited.188 Norms which are clear and precise, but which are in particular 
circumstances vague, are also interpreted by the Supreme Court and do not pose many 
problems.189 There can also be norms which are too broad. The Supreme Court takes two 
approaches with regard to these norms; it either fi nds no problems with the legislation,190
or it will narrow down the broad norms.191 The Dutch judiciary thus deals diff erently with 
these three types of vague norms, but overall none has been found problematic in light of the 
legality principle. 
Dutch courts cannot interpret criminal law by analogy. Extensive interpretation is, on the 
other hand, as shown above, allowed. The boundaries of extensive interpretation are scarcely 
discussed by the Supreme Court.192 De Hullu argues that extensive interpretation can take 
place when technological developments, change of societal opinions or technical lacunas 
require this.193 The judiciary might go further than merely interpreting the wording of a 
provision by including other situations as long as a reasonable thinking citizen would take 
into account this extension of the law.194 Foreseeability thus seems to be an important element 
to determine whether an extensive interpretation is allowed. 
Interpretation by the Dutch judiciary can sometimes be very extensive. This could even 
infringe the boundaries the legislator has set,195 arguably leading to a derogation from the 
183  Borgers (2011), p. 121 ff . 
184  Borgers (2011), p. 127 ff .
185   See Hoge Raad (31 January 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BQ9251, in which the Supreme Court ruled that virtual goods are goods and can 
therefore be stolen. See also the case note of Keijzer (2012a), par. 8. Furthermore, see Fokkens (2016), par. 5.
186  Borgers (2011), p. 138 ff .
187   Borgers (2011), p. 122-127, has some criticism on the approach of the Supreme Court. According to him, the Supreme Court does not 
give too much attention to making certain vague norms concrete or operational.
188  Borgers (2011), p. 122-127.
189   Borgers (2011), p. 129-137. Borgers raises two main points with regard to the interpretation of these norms. Firstly, the Supreme Court 
interprets these norms in a very decisive manner. Secondly, the Supreme Court does not explain how to concretise the legal norm in 
light of the facts of the specifi c case. 
190  Borgers (2011), p. 142-145.
191  Borgers (2011), p. 145-147.
192  Borgers (2011), p. 114.
193  De Hullu (2018), p. 109-111.
194  Fokkens (2016), par. 5.
195   See e.g. Nan (2011), p. 54-61, who discusses, with reference to other authors, the so-called mensenroof (abduction) case, where the Supreme 
Court interprets the elements of abduction in a very extensive manner. See also Hoge Raad (12 March 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ2653, 
par. 2.7, where the Supreme Court reversed its ruling Hoge Raad (21 April 1998) ECLI:NL:HR:ZD1026, the so-called ‘French kissing’-
case (tongzoenarrest). In the French kissing case, the Supreme Court ruled that rape includes entering someone’s mouth with a tongue. 
This extensive interpretation did not infringe the legal certainty principle, according to the Supreme Court in this case. In the 
aforementioned case of March 2013, the Supreme Court reversed its highly criticised French kissing judgment. 
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legality and legal certainty principle. In a couple of cases, the Supreme Court therefore found 
it appropriate to exercise restraint in its interpretation and leave the matter to the legislator.196
3.5.2 Retrospective application of the criminal law and lex mitior
The prohibition of creating retroactive laws ensures that criminal acts are only those rendered 
criminal by the legislator. All other acts cannot be regarded as criminal. The legislator should 
thus, according to De Hullu, regard the development of adequate and updated criminal 
legislation as its permanent assignment.197 The prohibition of retroactivity is applicable to 
the criminalisation of certain acts, but also to rules relating to the penalty imposed.198 It 
appears though that the substantive legality principle cannot help a suspect when the public 
prosecution service decides to change its guidelines.199
The Dutch judiciary is not allowed to apply rules retroactively, although this prohibition of 
retroactivity is not applicable when the Dutch judiciary merely interprets certain criminal 
law off ences extensively.200 As contended above, a person should take into consideration 
that norms are interpreted by the judiciary.201 Courts may take into account changed societal 
opinions when determining the penalty for a crime, and thus increase the penalty for a crime 
insofar as this remains within the maximum set by the Dutch legislator.202
The prohibition of retroactivity applies, unless there is a more lenient rule created by the 
legislator which came into force after the (criminal) off ence was committed by a suspect.203
The lex mitior rule is codifi ed in Article 1(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code. It appears, though, 
that the Supreme Court does not regard a change in legislation per se as a change in legislation 
in light of Article 1(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code.204 For this to occur, there should be a 
change of insight on punishability of the criminal behaviour by the legislator.205 This change of 
insight could become clear from the parliamentary records,206 although it is mentioned that 
the legislator often does not explain whether there is a change of insight on the punishability 
of the behaviour.207
196  E.g. Hoge Raad (7 January 1997) ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZD0608, par. 4.3.2.
197  De Hullu (2018), p. 88.
198  De Hullu (2018), p. 89. 
199  Hoge Raad (2 July 2013) ECLI:NL:HR:2013:144, par. 2.3.
200  De Hullu (2015), p. 109.
201  Borgers (2011), p. 150.
202   Hoge Raad (13 May 1986) ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC3058, par. 7.2. In this case, the appeals court increased the penalty substantially and 
used for this increase the legislation providing higher penalties, which came into force after the crime was committed. The Supreme 
Court ruled that the appeals court could raise the penalty, since this could refl ect societal beliefs, if the court remained within the 
maximum penalty of the old legislation, since that maximum was the lowest of the two.
203   Article 1(2) Dutch Criminal Code. Cleiren (2017), par. 12.b. Kooijmans (2006), discusses case law based on a distinction made by Knigge 
between four categories in which the legislator changed criminal legislation. These categories are (i) where the legislator limited 
the scope of legislation, (ii) technical changes, (iii) the change of punishability of certain behaviour, and (iv) (de)criminalisation of 
behaviour, including the change of conditions to establish a criminal off ence. 
204  Kooijmans (2006), par. 5-6.
205   Kooijmans (2006), par. 5-6. For a criticism of this criterion used to apply the prohibition of retroactivity see e.g. Keijzer (2012b), par. 8.
206  Fokkens (2016), par. 11 ; Kooijmans (2006), par. 5-6.
207  See e.g. Altena (2016), p. 343. For a further discussion see also De Hullu (2015), p. 135-137.
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This approach was taken for both criminal law off ences and penalties up till 2011. With the 
Scoppola judgment of the ECtHR, the Supreme Court decided to change its approach towards 
penalties. For changes with regard to penalties, a change of insight is no longer required.208 This 
criterion is, however, still applicable when criminal law off ence is adapted.209 This diff ering 
approach for penalties and off ences has been subject to criticism in Dutch legal literature.210
It has indeed been argued in foreign legal literature that the lex mitior rule under Article 7(1) 
ECHR applies to criminal law off ences as well, and not only to criminal law penalties.211
3.5.3 Résumé
The legality and legal certainty principles require a suffi  ciently accessible and clear criminal 
rule. Citizens should be able to foresee the consequences of their actions. Some vigilance is 
required from citizens, since they are expected to seek advice in order to know the law. This 
is particularly true for professional market participants. Vague norms can exist in law. This 
does not necessarily lead to any problems in light of the legality and legal certainty principle. 
Furthermore, the Dutch judiciary does interpret vague norms, although an interpretation by 
analogy is not allowed. Nevertheless, extensive interpretation could go quite far as long as a 
reasonably thinking citizen can foresee the consequences. 
The prohibition of retroactivity is applicable to amendments in criminal law off ences and to 
changes of criminal law penalties. An exception to this prohibition can be found in Article 
1(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code, which contains the lex mitior rule. If new rules are created 
after the off ence took place, those rules should be applied when they lead to a more lenient 
application. For criminal law off ences, the Supreme Court maintains the criterion that there 
should be a change of insight of the legislator of the punishability of the behaviour. This 
criterion is under the infl uence of the ECtHR, since 2011 no longer applicable to criminal law 
penalties. 
3.6 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
In the Netherlands, not only courts can impose criminal law sanctions on a person. It is also 
possible for the public prosecutor to issue a penalty order.212 A suspect can lodge objections against 
this penalty order. This in turn leads to a ‘normal’ criminal trial with a fresh assessment of the facts 
where a court will in the end decide on the penalty. The Dutch legislator is of the view that these 
proceedings diff er from administrative law proceedings where courts review a decision taken by 
an administrative authority.213 This is thus also diff erent from competition law proceedings where 
the judiciary will examine the decision itself and will not conduct a fresh assessment of the case.
208  Hoge Raad (12 July 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011BP6878, par. 3.6.1.
209  Hoge Raad (12 July 2011) ECLI:NL:HR:2011BP6878, par. 3.6.2.
210  Altena (2016), p. 345; Keijzer (2012b), par. 8.
211  See Bohlander (2011), p. 635; see also Harris et al. (2014), p. 494.
212  Article 257a Dutch Criminal Code of Procedure. This is the so-called “strafbeschikking”. 
213  Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum) at the Wet OM-afdoening, p. 3.
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In the present section, the focus is on the proportionality of sanctions as applied by the Dutch 
judiciary. This principle may limit the freedom of Dutch judges to determine a sanction. In 
what follows, the proportionality of sanctions is discussed fi rst (3.6.1). Second, the principle of 
proportionality is discussed in light of one particular sanction, the fi ne (3.6.2).
3.6.1 Proportionality of sanctions in general
Dutch criminal law leaves a great discretion to judges to determine a specifi c sanction. The 
legislator has chosen to prescribe the diff erent types of sanctions, the type of sanction per 
criminal law off ence and the maximum sanction per off ence.214 Article 9 of the Dutch Criminal 
Code contains the diff erent sanctions which can be imposed on a person after conviction.215
These sanctions are structured by the weight of the punishment. Imprisonment is the most 
severe of the main sanctions, whilst a fi ne is the least severe. The requirement for a sanction 
to be proportionate can already be seen in the choice of the legislator for a certain type of 
sanction for a criminal law off ence.216 The same can be said about the choice of maximum 
of a sanction for a criminal law off ence.217 By introducing a specifi c punishment and a 
maximum for a criminal law off ence, the legislator has thus tried to ensure that sanctions 
are proportionate. This means that in general, the principle of proportionality only plays 
a role in Dutch criminal law in the weighing of the diff erent factors in order to determine 
the individualised sanction.218 The Association for Criminal Law Courts in the Netherlands 
has published a document which provides some general orientation points for sanctions for 
specifi c off ences.219 These are general guidelines which could be used by courts to determine 
a sanction in a specifi c case. The document suggests certain general sanctions, and also 
mentions aggravating or mitigating circumstances for some of the off ences.220
Three diff erent sanction-aggravating factors are included in the Dutch Criminal Code,221
namely (i) factors to increase the maximum of a sanction in general,222 (ii) factors to increase the 
maximum of a sanction specifi cally for a criminal law off ence, and (iii) qualifi ed criminal law 
off ences, which provide a higher sanction than the basic criminal law off ence.223 Next to these 
factors, a judge can take into consideration the seriousness of the off ence, the circumstances 
214  Mevis (2013), p. 925.
215  Articles 36a till 38ij DCC provide the diff erent measures which can be taken by a court.
216  Mevis (2013), p. 922.
217  Mevis (2013), p. 924.
218   The principle of proportionality can play a role when a criminal law off ence allows for multiple sanctions and when a court should choose 
the most appropriate sanction. However, the principle of proportionality shall in those cases play a role when weighing all the factors 
in order to determine the individual sanction. See e.g. Gerechtshof ‘s-Hertogenbosch (13 April 2011) ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2011:BQ1093, 
where the court of appeal determined that in general the most severe penalty should be taken with regard to Article 247 DCC (which 
provides liability for sexual abuses of dependent and vulnerable person).
219   See the “Oriëntatiepunten voor straftoemeting en overige LOVS-afspraken”.
220   For example: for a conviction of Article 266 DCC (insulting a person), these guidelines suggest a fi ne of €150,- which can be raised with 
33-100% if certain professions are insulted (e.g. police offi  cers). It is also mentioned that the level of the fi ne is strongly infl uenced by 
the nature of the insult and the grievance it caused. An aggravating circumstance mentioned is the presence of multiple bystanders. 
See “Oriëntatiepunten voor straftoemeting en overige LOVS-afspraken”, p. 7.
221  Kelk & De Jong (2016), p. 553.
222  This is only stipulated for two sanctions, namely the imprisonment and the detention, see Articles 10(3) and 18(2) DCC. For a discussion 
of the sensibility of the general maximum-increasing factors, see Mevis (2003).
223  E.g. theft by breaking and entering, see Article 311(1)(5) DCC. 
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at the time of the off ence, and the behaviour and personal circumstances of the perpetrator.224
These factors are often referred to in general. The Supreme Court has accepted in multiple 
cases this general phrasing without the need to elaborate upon those factors.225 The decision 
for a certain sanction is, according to Kelk and De Jong, made on the basis of, among others, 
the personal feeling of a judge towards the aforementioned factors, but also whether (s)he 
feels that the sanction is proportionate and adequate.226
Judges should consider the diff erent sanctions and measures which can be imposed on a 
perpetrator to prevent a disproportionate piling of sanctions.227 The determination of a 
sanction is thus custom-made. There is no legal provision which provides that a sanction 
should be based on the proportionality between off ence and the amount of guilt.228 Even 
though the adage “straf naar mate van schuld”229 is not an accepted underlying principle of 
sanctioning in Dutch criminal law, it can be one of the factors which a judge can take into 
consideration.230
Proportionality of a sanction is a requirement of Dutch criminal law, but the proportionality 
of sanctions will be determined on an individual basis by individual judges who enjoy a 
great discretion.231 Therefore, the principle of proportionality of sanctions does not raise 
many hurdles or limits for criminal law judges in the Netherlands.232 It has been mentioned 
that Dutch criminal law focuses mainly on the criminal liability of the facts and the off ender, 
and not on the determination of the sanction.233 In this light, it seems logical that not much 
emphasis is put on the proportionality of sanctions. 
Motivation requirements, however, do form some limitation for criminal law courts when 
imposing fi nes. A court should substantiate the reasons why it deviated from an expressly 
224   Bleichrodt and Vegter (2013), p. 43; Kelk & De Jong (2016), p. 558; Schoep (2008), p. 119-122. Bröring et al. (2012), chapter 5, p. 5, insists 
that the fi ve most important factors specifi cally for fi nes are, (i) the nature and seriousness of the off ence, (ii) the behaviour and personal 
circumstances of the perpetrator, (iii) the gain of the perpetrator, (iv) recidivism, and (v) recovery of the consequences.
225  Schoep (2008), p. 168, refers to multiple cases of the Supreme Court. 
226  Kelk & De Jong (2016), p. 533.
227  Mevis (2013), p. 988.
228   Mevis (2013), p. 990-991. See also Schoep (2008), p. 97, for a discussion on the adage “straf naar mate van schuld” (the more guilt, the 
heavier the sanction). 
229  The more guilt, the heavier the sanction.
230   See Hoge Raad (15 July 1985,) ECLI:NL:HR:1985:AC4252, par. 52, where the Supreme Court refers to the degree of guilt as one 
factor. Other factors include factual circumstances, such as the impact of the crime on society, and general and specifi c deterrence. 
See also Kelk & De Jong (2016), p. 558-559; and Mevis (2013), p. 991, who states that in practice judges take this principle into 
account when determining the amount of a sanction. Furthermore, see the refl ections of AG Jörg in Hoge Raad (22 March 2005) 
ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AS5881, par. 22, who refers to other authors as well. He held in his opinion that the adage of the more guilt, the 
heavier the sanction, may allow for a reduction of a sanction (par. 25). Furthermore, Dutch society, as a ‘reasonably civilized society’, 
should, according to AG Jörg, draw conclusions from the principles on which Dutch criminal law is based (par. 26). Therefore, in his 
view, the court of appeal should have aligned guilt and punishment (par. 27). 
231   Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 874, assert that judges are in general free to choose the factors which they fi nd relevant in a particular 
case. See also Schoep (2008), p. 119.
232   Boone & Kurtovic (2016), p. 1626, contend that the principle of proportionality of sanctions does not set clear boundaries for the 
content or gravity of a sanction. Bleichrodt and Vegter (2013), p. 44, argue that the determination of a sanction is in practice merely a 
pragmatic decision. The determination of a penalty is characterised by the tension between consistency in multiple judgments and 
individualisation in a particular case. See also Schuyt (2009), p. 10-13.
233  Schoep (2008), p. 182.
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substantiated point of view of the public prosecutor234 or the defence.235 Furthermore, the 
reasons which led to a particular sanction should be clear from the judgment.236 In case 
law, the Supreme Court also developed the so-called “verbazingscriterium” (bemusement 
criterion),237 which means that a court is required to motivate the level of the sanction when 
it causes bemusement in a particular case.238 According to Schoep, this criterion does contain 
a proportionality test.239 This criterion does indeed prevent excessive sanctions leading to 
bemusement. 
3.6.2 Fines and proportionality
The principle of proportionality has been included specifi cally in the Dutch Criminal Code 
when a judge wants to impose a fi ne on a person. Article 24 DCC provides for the “ability-
to-pay” principle, and provides that a person may not be disproportionately aff ected in 
his/her income or property. The proportionality requirement of Article 24 DCC is twofold. 
The level of the fi ne should be proportionate to the criminal off ence, and the fi ne should be 
proportionate to the ability to pay of a person, and thus his/her fi nancial capacity.240 This 
codifi ed proportionality principle may not prevent the imposition of a suitable sanction when 
the ability to pay of a person is limited,241 although it may require a reduction of a fi ne.242 In 
practice, it appears that the “ability-to-pay” principle does not play an important role, since a 
court is not required to investigate the actual ability of a person to pay a fi ne.243 Furthermore, 
in many cases the fi nes are determined on the basis of the aforementioned orientation points 
or on the basis of a straightforward and almost standardised calculation.244
The possibility is available to apply a higher category for a fi ne when it concerns legal persons, 
to ensure a suitable sanction. The maximum of the fi ne for legal persons is currently 10% of 
the total turnover of the legal person concerned.245 This maximum has been introduced in the 
Dutch Criminal Code to ensure an eff ective, proportionate and deterrent sanction.246
234   The Supreme Court has made clear that the demand by the public prosecutor in light of Article 311 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure is not an expressly substantiated point of view of the prosecution. Therefore, the requirement of Article 359(2) of 
the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure only applies in extraordinary cases to the demand. See  Hoge Raad (3 October 2006) 
ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AX5479, par. 3.5.4.
235  Article 359(2) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. 
236   Article 359(5) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. There are also other specifi c motivation requirements, e.g. Article 359(4) of the 
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure which requires motivation of the reasons which led to the decision not to impose a sanction on a 
person convicted for a crime. 
237  See e.g. Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 877-878. See for examples also Schoep (2017), par. 8.c. 
238   This criterion is nowadays partly covered by the motivation requirement of Article 359(2) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. It 
is nevertheless still a relevant criterion, see Corstens & Borgers (2014), p. 877-878.
239  Schoep (2017), par. 8.b. See also Schoep (2008), p. 99 and 170.
240  Bleichrodt and Vegter (2013), p. 281.
241   E.g. AG Machielse in Hoge Raad (7 February 2012) ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU6786, par. 3.5. The explanatory memorandum of Article 
24 mainly deals with the possibility to increase a fi ne in light of the fi nancial capacity of a person, see Memorie van Toelichting 
(explanatory memorandum) at the Wet vermogenssancties, p. 42-43. 
242  E.g. Bröring et al. (2012), chapter 2, p. 19.
243  Schuyt (2009), p. 113.
244  Schuyt (2009), p. 113.
245   Article 23(7) Dutch Criminal Code. The 10% norm is inspired by the maximum sanction in Dutch competition law, see Memorie van 
Toelichting (explanatory memorandum( at the Wet verruiming mogelijkheden bestrijding fi nancieel-economische criminaliteit, p. 13. 
246   See Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum( at the Wet verruiming mogelijkheden bestrijding fi nancieel-economische 
criminaliteit, p. 10.
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3.6.3 Résumé
The principle of proportionality of sanctions plays a role when judges have to determine the 
amount of a fi ne. Nevertheless, Dutch criminal law focuses more on establishing criminal 
liability instead of determining the proper sanction. This could explain the lack of references 
to the proportionality of sanctions. In general, there is quite some discretion to judges to 
determine the sanction and the level of that sanction. The legislator imposed some limitations 
on this discretion, notably the “ability-to-pay” principle in Article 24 DCC. Furthermore, 
motivation requirements may also limit judges, since they should be able to explain why 
and how they came a certain punishment. The ‘bemusement criterion’ contains, arguably, a 
proportionality test, since disproportionate fi nes will obviously lead to bemusement. Overall 
though, judges are free to determine which factors they will use and the weight they will 
accord to them in order to set a certain criminal law penalty. 
3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter I briefl y examined the fi ve principles which form the basis of this study in 
Dutch criminal law. The diff erent paragraphs followed a diff erent structure based on the 
characteristics of each principle. This was not an exhaustive discussion of each principle as 
such, although the aspects relevant for this research were examined. However, their general 
application, insofar as relevant for this study, has been analysed. This chapter should therefore 
be seen as an important stepping stone for examining the main question of this research, 
namely whether criminal law principles are creeping into the (administrative) competition 
law domain. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
The English legal system is a dualist system, which means that international law needs to be 
transposed into national law to have eff ect. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but also general principles of 
EU law, are of importance to English criminal law. The British Parliament has accepted that 
Union legislation has immediate eff ect in the British legal order.1 This means that the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights is also applicable in England.2 An Act of Parliament was necessary 
in order for the UK to comply with the obligations under EU law, such as direct eff ect and 
supremacy of Union law. With the Treaty of Lisbon the Charter became offi  cially legally 
binding. The Charter has the same legal value as the Union Treaties,3 which means that it is 
part of primary law. General principles of EU law are also part of primary law. As stated in 
the previous chapter, the Union institutions should respect the rights and principles in the 
Charter and the general principles of EU law, whilst Member States should abide by them 
when acting within the scope of Union law.4 It is therefore possible that the Charter and 
general principles of EU law have an infl uence on the English criminal law system when 
there is a certain connection with Union law.5 This research is concluded in January 2018, and 
therefore Union law was still relevant for this chapter. Some of the possible consequences for 
UK competition law due to the upcoming withdrawel of the UK from the EU are discussed 
in chapter 9. 
The ECHR also has an infl uence on safeguards for the accused in English criminal law. An Act 
of Parliament was created in order for this Convention to be directly applicable in the UK. The 
ECHR, and the case law of the ECtHR, is therefore directly applicable in the UK by authority 
of the Human Rights Act of 1998.
This chapter examines, in subsequent order, the freedom from self-incrimination (4.2), the 
principle of non bis in idem (4.3), rules relating to the burden and standard of proof (par. 4.4), 
the principle of legality and the principle of legal certainty (4.5), and the proportionality of 
sanctions in criminal law (4.6). In the diff erent paragraphs attention is paid to the scope of 
each principle in English criminal law.
1  Section 2(1) European Communities Act 1972.
2  See chapter 2, par. 2.1 for a discussion on the scope of this Charter.
3  Article 6(1) TEU. 
4   ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), par 20-22; ECJ, C-206/13 (Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni 
Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo), par. 21. See also A Ward (2014), p. 1449-1454.
5   ECJ, C-299/95 (Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich), par. 16; and ECJ, C-206/13 (Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza 
Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo), par. 24. For more information, see chapter 3, par. 3.1.
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4.2 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
In England, the freedom from self-incrimination has been referred to by the judiciary as 
“perhaps the most fundamental rule of the English criminal law”6 and as “[deeply] rooted in 
English law”.7 Furthermore, Judge Walsh of the ECtHR has stated in its concurring opinion 
in the Saunders case that “[t]he seeds of this privilege were planted in the thirteenth century 
in English common law”.8 The freedom from self-incrimination is, as a general principle, 
codifi ed in some laws in England.9 Parliament may, nevertheless, by statutory law “expressly 
or by necessary implication”10 derogate from this privilege.11 Even though the freedom from 
self-incrimination is intrinsic to English law,12 the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has had a major 
infl uence on the application of this principle and the inquisitorial powers of investigators in 
England. 13
In what follows, some general aspects of the freedom from self-incrimination are examined 
fi rst (4.2.1). Hereafter, in subsequent order, I discuss the right not to answer questions 
(4.2.2), the right not to provide materials and in particular documents (4.2.3), the duty of 
confi dentiality14 (4.2.4) and the consequences of a possible violation (4.2.5). 
4.2.1 General aspects of the freedom from self-incrimination
The freedom from self-incrimination is, as asserted above, a principle which is intrinsic to 
English criminal law. Nevertheless, the ECtHR, and in particular the Saunders judgment,15
has had quite some impact on this principle in England. Many statutes which allowed for a 
derogation from the freedom from self-incrimination were changed to safeguard the freedom 
from self-incrimination by not requiring any answers or cooperation in the investigation.16
However, there are still statutory provisions which require cooperation of a person. This 
derogation from the freedom from self-incrimination is, in general, used in regulatory 
proceedings and not in criminal law proceedings, although there are exceptions to this rule. 
Section 172(2) of the Road Traffi  c Act 1998 e.g. requires the owner of a car to reveal the identity 
of the driver where the latt er is prosecuted for certain off ences. This applies even when the 
6  Privy Council, Hong Kong, (27 March 1991) [1991] 2 WLR 1082.
7   Privy Council, Hong Kong, (27 March 1991) [1991] 2 WLR 1082. This is referred to as well by e.g. Lord Bingham in: Privy Council, 
Scotland (5 December 2000) [2001] 2 WLR 817; and by Lord Walker in: Supreme Court (4 July 2012) [2012] 3 WLR 312, par. 13. See also 
Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 60.
8  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom).
9  E.g. section 114(4) of the Medicines Act 1968 and section 47(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
10   See e.g. Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 61; or England and Wales High Court (19 June 2008) [2008] EWHC 1362 
(Admin), par. 73.
11  Glover (2017), p. 688-689. 
12   Bridge LJ, for example, holds that the privilege against self-incrimination is “fi rmly entrenched in [UK] law”; House of Lords (8 April 
1981) [1981] 2 WLR 668, p. 441.
13   It appears though that the judiciary in England does not fi nd itself obliged to follow the case law of the ECtHR strictly insofar as that 
case law is still somewhat inconsistent. See: Thanki et al. (2011), p. 341-343.
14   The duty and right to refuse to disclose is also referred to as professional secrecy, legal professional privilege or the attorney/lawyer-
client privilege, see Van Gerven (2013), p. 2.
15  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom).
16  Glover (2017), p. 690-691.
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owner was the driver, and when he is thus obliged to incriminate him-/herself.17 This Act thus 
allows for an obligation in criminal law proceedings to cooperate with the investigation.
The dividing line between obligations to cooperate in (administrative) regulatory proceedings 
or criminal law proceedings is sometimes diffi  cult to make. Section 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the 
Terrorism Act 2000 e.g. allows offi  cers at the UK border to ask questions to a person in order to 
determine whether that person is a terrorist as defi ned in Section 40(1)(a) of that Act. In Beghal 
v DPP18 the Supreme Court examined whether a person can rely, amongst others, on the 
freedom from self-incrimination. Lord Hughes ruled in the majority judgment that this power 
in the Terrorism Act of 2000 “would be rendered very largely nugatory if privilege applied”. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that, “by necessary implication”, the freedom from self-
incrimination would not apply.19 According to the Supreme Court, the powers in Schedule 
7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 “are patently not aimed at the obtaining of information 
for the purpose of prosecuting either the person questioned or his spouse”.20 This 
statement was criticised in the dissenting opinion of Lord Kerr:
It is suggested that Schedule 7 powers are not aimed at obtaining information for the 
purpose of prosecuting the person questioned or her spouse. I do not understand 
why this should be so. The purpose of questioning under the schedule is to determine 
whether the person questioned appears to be a terrorist within the wide defi nition 
contained in section 40(1)(b) of the 2000 Act. If answers to the questions posed suggest 
that the person questioned is indeed someone who has committed an off ence under 
one of the sections specifi ed in section 40 or who is or has been concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, why should those answers 
not form the basis of a prosecution? It seems to me inescapable that there is a real and 
appreciable risk of prosecution if the answers to the questions posed prove to be self-
incriminating. The fact that, in this case, it was not suspected that the appellant was a 
terrorist is nothing to the point. If, as she should have been, she was asked questions 
designed to establish whether she appeared to be a terrorist, the potential of her 
answers to incriminate her if they were of an inculpatory character, is indisputable.21
Nonetheless, the majority ruling thus held, as mentioned, that there was no abrogation from 
the freedom from self-incrimination by statute in criminal law proceedings. The focus in 
this chapter will, however, be mainly on criminal law proceedings, since competition law 
principles are, in this research, compared with their criminal law counterparts. It should 
be mentioned though that the English judiciary does not appear to fi nd the distinction
17  Privy Council, Scotland (5 December 2000) [2001] 2 WLR 817.
18  Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49.
19   Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 64.
20  Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 64.
21  Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 115.
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between civil (administrative or private law) and criminal law proceedings to be of value 
for the freedom from self-incrimination. Longmore LJ held e.g. the following in the majority 
judgement of the Court of Appeal:
As to the fi rst submission, I would only say that it would be most surprising that a 
privilege designed to protect a defendant in circumstances where he might be facing 
criminal proceedings should vary in its content depending on whether the privilege 
were invoked in civil proceedings or in the criminal proceedings themselves. If anything 
one would expect the privilege to be less extensive rather than more extensive if it is 
invoked in civil proceedings. But there is, in truth, no warrant for suggesting that the 
rule is any diff erent in civil proceedings from criminal proceedings.22
In order to comply with the requirements from the ECtHR, domestic courts have to apply, 
according to Glover, a threefold test to statutes which require implicitly or explicitly 
cooperation from a person.23 First, they should examine whether there is a derogation from 
the freedom from self-incrimination. Furthermore, additional safeguards such as protection 
against the use of the evidence in subsequent criminal law proceedings should be examined.24
Access to a lawyer is, although not referred to by Glover, according to the UK judiciary also 
an important safeguard to protect the freedom from self-incrimination.25
Second, the domestic court must examine the statutory provisions in light of Article 6 ECHR 
to determine whether the application of those provisions lead to unfairness for the person 
obliged to cooperate. Third, the domestic court must balance the public interest served by 
the abrogation from the freedom from self-incrimination with the unfairness caused by that 
abrogation. 
For this study it is relevant to determine whether the freedom from self-incrimination can 
be invoked by legal persons as well. Administrative competition law proceedings, central to 
this research, deal with undertakings and thus, generally speaking,26 with legal persons. In 
England, legal persons can always invoke this principle.27
22   EWCA (22 May 2007) [2007] EWCA Civ 493, par. 33.
23  Glover (2017), p. 691.
24  Glover (2017), p. 693, criticises on this aspect the Beghal v DPP judgment of the Supreme Court, since evidence will be used to determine 
whether a person is a terrorist and will be admissible in the criminal law proceedings. 
25   See e.g. Supreme Court (26 October 2010) [2010] UKSC 43, par. 30-55. This is, as stated in chapter 2, par. 2.2.2.1, an important safeguard 
for the ECtHR to determine whether compulsion is improper in light of the freedom from self-incrimination. The Supreme Court 
referred in its ruling to ample cases of the ECtHR, notably the Salduz judgment. The Supreme Court also referred to other Member 
States, such as the Netherlands, who recognised that their “legal systems are [in relation to the right to legal representation at interview] 
inadequate”. Reference was also made to e.g. the post-Salduz judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. 
26   Natural persons can, in light of the functional approach taken in competition law proceedings with regard to the concept of an 
‘undertaking’ be regarded as undertakings as well when they pursue economic activities. 
27  See e.g. House of Lords (1 January 1977) [1978] AC 547.
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4.2.2 The right not to answer questions
A suspect has the right not to answer questions during a questioning on the streets, at the 
police station and at court.28 In general, an interview by the police should take place at the 
police station.29 Before being interrogated, a suspect should be administered the caution.30
A couple of exceptions to this rule are foreseen by the legislator.31 The caution, and the right 
not to answer questions, only relate to questions posed to a suspect. Code C to the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that a suspect is a person against whom there are 
“reasonable, objective grounds for suspicion, based on known facts or information”.32 The 
facts and information should be related to the off ence and the person who is suspected to 
have committed it. Obligations to provide answers imposed on a suspect will fall foul of the 
freedom from self-incrimination.33 However, certain exceptions exist to this main rule.34 These 
exceptions are inserted in diff erent Acts of Parliament.35 The judiciary in England has made 
clear that “[c]lear language (express or by necessary implication) would be required to show 
that Parliament intended to abrogate such a fundamental principle of the common law”.36
It appears that factual answers do not fall foul of the freedom from self-incrimination in certain 
criminal law proceedings in England. An obligation for an owner of a car to reveal the identity 
of a driver of a car who committed a criminal off ence, even if the owner is the driver, does e.g. 
not lead to an infringement of this principle in England.37 This approach is also extended to 
other criminal law areas than car traffi  c regulations. In R. v Kearns, which was an extrajudicial 
bankruptcy procedure, the court held that “even if, as we would be prepared to accept, 
section 354(3(a) [of the Insolvency Act 1986] does infringe an ‘absolute’ concept of the right to 
silence and/or the right not to incriminate oneself, criminal proceedings brought for a failure 
to provide the offi  cial receiver with information do not infringe [Article 6 ECHR]”.38 Even if 
the request for information was made during criminal law proceedings it could be justifi ed as 
being in the general interest.39 The judiciary in England also allows for a derogation from the 
freedom from self-incrimination in case of the fi ght against terrorism.40 It appears thus that in 
criminal law, obligations to provide answers in criminal law proceedings might be justifi ed in 
28   Sanders & Young (2007), p. 223; Ashworth & Redmayne (2005), p. 130, argue that “[i]n English law, the most fundamental application 
of the privilege occurs at trial, in the form of the rule that the defendant is not a compellable witness at his own trial”.
29  Ashworth & Redmayne (2010), p. 95.
30   PACE Code C, par. 10.1. The caution should also be given before each interview at a police station, see par. 11.4.
31  PACE Code C, par. 10.1.
32  PACE Code C, par. 10A. 
33  A suspect may not be “oppressed” to give answers, see Article 76(2). For a defi nition of this term, see EWCA (17 February 1987) [1987] 
2 WLR 923.
34   E.g. Privy Council, Scotland (5 December 2000) [2001] 2 WLR 817; EWCA (22 March 2002) [2002] 1 WLR 2815; and England and Wales 
High Court (28 August 2013) [2014] 2 WLR 150.
35   As stated above in par. 5.2.1, this can be in regulatory proceedings, but in some cases also in criminal law proceedings. In this 
paragraph, the focus is on limitations of the freedom from self-incrimination in criminal law proceedings only. 
36   England and Wales High Court (19 June 2008) [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin), par. 73.
37  Privy Council, Scotland (5 December 2000) [2001] 2 WLR 817.
38  EWCA (22 March 2002) [2002] 1 WLR 2815, par. 54.
39  EWCA (22 March 2002) [2002] 1 WLR 2815, par. 55-56.
40  EWCA (9 October 2008) [2009] 1 WLR 1489, par. 25. 
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the general interest.41 Furthermore, adverse inferences may also be drawn from the silence of 
the accused without infringing the freedom from self-incrimination.42
4.2.3 The right not to provide materials
The judiciary in England has adopted a so-called “materials based approach”.43 This approach 
is based on the Saunders case44 of the ECtHR. Materials which are independent of the will 
of a suspect are not covered by the freedom from self-incrimination, and an obligation to 
provide those materials may thus exist. The freedom from self-incrimination does not extend 
to materials which exist independent of an order or request.45 An obligation to provide 
documents which exist independent of an order or request therefore does not fall foul of the 
freedom from self-incrimination, since it is not covered by this principle. English criminal 
law thus categorically excludes certain documents from the scope of the freedom from self-
incrimination.
4.2.4 The duty of confi dentiality 
The duty of confi dentiality for lawyers is closely related to the freedom from self-
incrimination of a suspect. This duty of confi dentiality is linked to the principle of legal 
professional privilege. “[A]ll members of [a law] fi rm or in-house practice, including support 
staff , consultants and locums, owe a duty of confi dentiality to [...] clients.”46 The duty of 
confi dentiality can be deviated from when legislation requires this, or when a client gives its 
consent.47 Legal professional privilege covers all communications between lawyer and client 
in which a lawyer gives professional advice.48 This may cover advice given during litigation, 
but also advice given in other circumstances. Documents created by a lawyer may fall under 
the principle of legal professional privilege, if they are made “(1) for the specifi c purpose 
of pending or contemplated litigation; (2) and with either the sole or dominant purpose of 
using it for obtaining advice about actual or anticipated litigation”.49 Questions, however, 
have been raised regarding the scope of this principle when advice is given without legal 
proceedings having been initiated. Advice given in the relevant legal context falls under the 
legal professional privilege. Lord Scott stated in a House of Lords case the following:
In cases of doubt [as to whether advice relates to the relevant legal context] the judge called 
upon to make the decision should ask whether the advice relates to the rights, liabilities, 
41   See also Ashworth (2008) and Redmayne (2007) who discuss the rationale underlying general interest justifi cation grounds for an 
infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination.
42   Sanders & Young (2007), p. 224; Ashworth & Redmayne (2005), p. 93. A jury should be given certain specifi c instructions with regard 
to the use of adverse inferences: see Sanders & Young (2007), p. 225-226; Ashworth & Redmayne (2005), p. 95-96.
43  See EWCA (9 October 2008) [2009] 1 WLR 1489, par. 18 and par. 20, and the case law there cited.
44  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom).
45   EWCA (22 May 2007) [2007] 3 WLR 437, par. 36. Even though this was not a criminal procedure, Longmore LJ contended that “there 
is, in truth, no warrant for suggesting that the [application of the freedom from self-incrimination] is any diff erent in civil proceedings 
from criminal proceedings”, par. 33; see also e.g. Zuckermann (2007), p. 400.
46  See chapter 4 of the Handbook of the Solicitors Regulation Authority.
47  See chapter 4 of the Handbook of the Solicitors Regulation Authority.
48  Glover (2017), p. 702.
49  Glover (2017), p. 707.
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obligations or remedies of the client either under private law or under public law. If it does 
not, then, in my opinion, legal advice privilege would not apply. If it does so relate then, in 
my opinion, the judge should ask himself whether the communication falls within the policy 
underlying the justifi cation for legal advice privilege in our law. Is the occasion on which 
the communication takes place and is the purpose for which it takes place such as to make it 
reasonable to expect the privilege to apply? The criterion must, in my opinion, be an objective 
one.50
If the information merely relates to the business policy of a company, the principle of legal 
professional privilege will not apply, since such information is not given in a relevant legal 
context. In other words, advice which does not relate to rights, liabilities, obligations or 
remedies in public or private law does not trigger the principle of legal professional privilege. 
Legal professional privilege does not extend to advice given to assist a client with dishonest 
or fraudulent practices.51
4.2.5 Consequences of a possible violation
Evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from self-incrimination should in general be 
excluded as evidence in criminal proceedings.52 A failure to issue the caution may lead to 
an unreliable confession, and thus exclusion of that confession as evidence is mandatory.53
Exclusion of evidence follows a general rule which was e.g. referred to by Diplock LJ in a 
House of Lords judgment:
Outside this limited fi eld in which for historical reasons the function of the trial judge 
extended to imposing sanctions for improper conduct on the part of the prosecution 
before the commencement of the proceedings in inducing the accused by threats, 
favour or trickery to provide evidence against himself, your Lordships should, I think, 
make it clear that the function of the judge at a criminal trial as respects the admission 
of evidence is to ensure that the accused has a fair trial according to law. It is no part 
of a judge’s function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution 
as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If 
it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it was obtained legally 
but in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the appropriate 
disciplinary authority to deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not 
how the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution has been obtained, but 
with how it is used by the prosecution at the trial.54
50  House of Lords (11 November 2004) [2004] 3 WLR 1274, par. 38.
51   This is the so-called iniquity exception, see Glover (2017), p. 699; see also: House of Lords (6 July 1995) [1995] 1 WLR 1238.
52   This is as stated above, a safeguard, to protect against an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination, see also Glover (2017), 
p. 691. See also section 76(2) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).
53  Knapmann (1988), pp 747-748; see also section 76(2) PACE.
54   House of Lords (25 July 1979) [1980] A.C. 402, p. 436. This statement was also confi rmed in House of Lords (2 July 1996) [1997] AC 558, 
p. 577-578.
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Exclusion of evidence thus seems to be the most viable option for a derogation from the 
freedom from self-incrimination.
4.2.6 Résumé
English criminal law does not accept an absolute freedom from self-incrimination. Legal 
persons may rely on the protection of this principle. A distinction should be made between 
obligations to provide answers and obligations to provide materials, since they are dealt 
with in a diff erent manner under the freedom from self-incrimination. The English judiciary 
allows certain limitations to the freedom from self-incrimination in Acts of Parliament. 
These limitations are accepted for reasons in the general interest. A suspect should always 
be administered the caution in English law. Moreover, the judiciary examines whether there 
might be some safeguards which can protect a suspect when he/she has an obligation to 
cooperate. Obligations to provide materials are in certain cases allowed. A so-called ‘materials 
based approach’ is followed by the English judiciary. This means that a suspect can be obliged 
to provide materials the existence of which is independent of the will of a suspect. This 
includes documents existing before a warrant is issued. 
The duty of confi dentiality exists for communication between (in-house) lawyers and clients. 
This duty also provides the right to legal professional privilege, which means that information 
exchanged between lawyer and client is protected. All professional advice falls under this privilege. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that a violation of the freedom from self-incrimination will lead 
to the exclusion of the obtained evidence. 
4.3 NON BIS IN IDEM
Th e protection against double jeopardy is the most important limb of the non bis in idem 
principle in England. As is discussed below, the double jeopardy principle provides two 
pleas in bar,55 namely the plea of autrefois acquit and the plea of autrefois convict. It has been 
mentioned though that the latter prevents “double punishment rather than merely the hardship 
of a second trial”.56 The non bis in idem principle as a whole, which prevents against double 
jeopardy and against double liability, can thus be found as an underlying concept of these 
pleas in bar. It has even been argued that the rule against double jeopardy was originally 
merely a procedural rule.57 There is up to 1 January 2018, the date the research was concluded, 
no case law on the non bis in idem principle in UK competition law proceedings. Therefore, 
the discussion on the non bis in idem principle in English criminal law can be kept to a bare 
minimum. 
55   Pleas in bar are “pleas in trials on indictment setting out some special ground for not proceeding with the indictment”. See Gooch & 
Williams (2015).
56  De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 627.
57  Hunter (1984), p. 15.
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In what follows, I fi rst highlight some general aspects of the non bis in idem principle in English 
criminal law (4.3.1). After that I discuss the condition(s) for the non bis in idem principle to 
apply (4.3.2). 
4.3.1 General aspects in criminal law
The prevention of double jeopardy and punishment can present a plea in bar, since a suspect 
can argue that there was an autrefois acquit or an autrefois convict.58 When these pleas are 
not available, one may still argue that the principle of double jeopardy is infringed by a 
prosecution. The courts in England and Wales appear to regard a plea based on the principle 
of double jeopardy, not being the legal bars of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict, not as a 
plea of bar, but as part of the abuse of process doctrine.59 The diff erence between a plea of 
bar and the abuse of process is one of discretion of the judge concerned. As Lord Devlin 
ruled in Connelly a plea of bar “gives the defendant an absolute right to relief and the [abuse 
of process doctrine] only a qualifi ed right”.60 Only the two most important limbs of the 
double jeopardy principle are discussed here, namely the legal bars of autrefois acquit and 
autrefois convict.61 Both pleas prevent a second prosecution for the same off ence, when there 
is respectively a fi nal acquittal or conviction.62 There should thus be a decision on the merits 
of the case. A conviction entails that a person is found to be guilty, but also that a sentence 
has been handed down.63 Merely using evidence from a previous conviction in a case does 
not violate the double jeopardy principle.64 A second prosecution for an off ence for which 
a person was convicted or acquitted, or for which he could have been convicted, prevents a 
second prosecution.65 If a person could have been convicted for an alternative off ence in the 
fi rst case, a second prosecution for this alternative off ence will be prohibited. This means that 
a public prosecutor might have to indict a person for a lower off ence, but possibly also the 
most serious off ence, to prevent an acquittal for an alternative off ence and subsequently a bar 
on a second prosecution.66 There are, however, certain exceptions to the autrefois acquit and 
autrefois convict pleas.67 Two important ones are the exception of a tainted acquittal,68 and the 
exception of a retrial for certain serious off ences after an acquittal.69 A tainted acquittal exists 
when “an administration of justice off ence involving interference with or intimidation of a 
58  Choo (2008), p. 24.
59  Choo (2008), p. 55-56.
60  House of Lords (1 January 1964) [1964] 2 AC 1254.
61   For an extensive case-by-case discussion on the abuse of process doctrine and double jeopardy, see Choo (2008), p. 40-52.
62   See also De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 627-628, who argue that both pleas are normally referred to in one breath, although they do have 
diff erent underlying rationales.
63  De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 627.
64   Similar fact evidence is not banned according to the House of Lords, see House of Lords (22 June 2000) [2000] 3 WLR 117.
65  This is the so-called “in peril-test”, see Choo (2008), p. 26-27; De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 635.
66  De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 629.
67  De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 625-626.
68  See section 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
69   See section 75 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Schedule 5 to this act contains the list of off ences for which a person may be tried for 
a second time. For more information on (and criticism of) this second exception see Choo (2008), p. 35-36; Taylor (2005); Fitzpatrick 
(2003). See also the commentaries of Gale (2007) and Molloy (2011) at respectively EWCA (16 June 2006) [2007] 1 WLR 1657, and EWCA 
(18 May 2011) [2011] 1 WLR 3230. Moreover, see Dennis (2014), who discusses case law on the second exception. For more information 
on both exceptions, see e.g. Ashworth & Redmayne (2010), p. 397-398; and Choo (2008), p. 34-36.
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juror or a witness (or potential witness)”70 has taken place. The second exception, which is a 
“fresh evidence” exception, can be invoked when there is new71 and compelling72 evidence 
and when the interest of justice73 requires a retrial.74 This exception is only applicable to 
certain off ences, such as murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, rape, importation of certain 
drugs, and genocide.75
4.3.2 Conditions
In England, a second prosecution will be prevented if a person is convicted or acquitted for the 
same off ence, or for an off ence for which he could have been convicted. Not only should there 
be a conviction or acquittal, the off ence the accused is indicted for in the second prosecution 
should be substantially the same as the off ence charged with in the fi rst prosecution. The 
interpretation of the requirement of the same off ence has been quite dynamic,76 although it 
appears that, as the law stands, off ences should be substantially the same.77 It is uncertain 
how this condition should be interpreted. Choo contends for example that a prosecution 
for a lesser (included) off ence could be allowed when there was a prior acquittal, but not 
when there was a prior conviction.78 An example of a prosecution which might be allowed 
is where a person is acquitted for aggravated assault, and prosecuted again for the same 
facts, but indicted for common assault. A prosecution for a greater encompassing off ence will 
be barred when there was a previous acquittal, according to Choo, but when there was a 
previous conviction this prosecution might again be allowed.79 The rationale behind this is 
that certain results could occur after a conviction. An example is where a person got convicted 
of a non-fatal off ence, but the victim dies. A second prosecution for murder or manslaughter 
is not necessarily barred. In the Connelly case,80 Lord Reading ruled that the identity of the 
off ence, and not the facts relied upon, determines whether a second prosecution is prohibited. 
In conclusion, the autrefois convict and autrefois acquit pleas impede a second prosecution when 
the off ence charged is proven or could have been proven in the fi rst indictment, and when the 
off ence charged is substantially the same as the off ence charged in the fi rst indictment. 
4.3.3 Résumé
The  non bis in idem principle ensures that a person is not prosecuted, nor criminal liable, for a 
second time for the same facts. There are two court accepted pleas in bar in England. A fi nal 
70  Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
71  For the defi nition of “new” evidence, see Section 78(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
72  For the defi nition of “compelling” evidence, see section 78(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
73   All circumstances of the case should be taken into consideration to determine whether the interest of justice requires a retrial, see 
section 79(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 79(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 refers to circumstances which should in 
particular be taken into consideration, such as, for example, whether a fair trial would be unlikely under the existing circumstances.
74  Section 75 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
75  For the extensive list, see Schedule 5 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
76  De Than & Shorts (2000).
77   Choo (2008), p. 27; De Than & Shorts (2000), p. 630-631; see also Lord Morris in House of Lords (1 January 1964) [1964] 2 AC 1254.
78  Choo (2008), p. 27-28.
79   Choo (2008), p. 29-30. Choo mentions that the English courts have in general, however, taken a “path of mercy” to prevent a conviction 
for a greater compassing off ence after a person was convicted for a lesser off ence. 
80  House of Lords (1 January 1964) [1964] 2 AC 1254.
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decision should be taken on the facts by a criminal court. For a fi nal conviction specifi cally, 
this also entails that a sentence is handed down after the conviction. Furthermore, in order to 
protect a person, the requirement of the fi nal acquittal or conviction in English criminal law 
is also met when a person could have been convicted for another criminal law off ence. This 
might entail that a public prosecutor should charge a person with all possible off ences. 
A person should have been convicted, or could have been convicted, for the same criminal 
off ence before pleas based on the on the non bis in idem will be triggered. The off ence a person 
is indicted for should be substantially the same as the off ence for which a person is convicted, 
acquitted or could have been convicted.
4.4  BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
The burden and standard of proof are neutral principles which can be found in both civil 
proceedings and criminal proceedings. In England, civil law proceedings can be administrative 
law or private law proceedings. As was also mentioned in the previous two chapters, in 
England a distinction is made between two “principal kind of burdens”81 of proof, namely 
the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of proof. If the legal burden of proof rests 
upon a person, he should adduce enough evidence to meet the requisite standard of proof.82
The evidential burden of proof is referred to as the proof needed to establish a case prima 
facie.83 In criminal law, this means that suffi  cient evidence should be given before the case will 
be dealt with, either by the judge or by trial jury.84 Therefore, it has been contended that the 
evidential burden is not literally a burden of proof,85 since the evidential burden of proof only 
requires a prima facie case to be established. In this paragraph, both the burden (4.4.1) and the 
standard of proof (4.4.2) are discussed. 
4.4.1 Burden of proof
In England, the legal burden of proof in criminal law cases lies in general on the prosecution.86
This means that the prosecution should in principle prove all constituent elements of an 
off ence to the requisite legal standard. Most authors refer to the famous words of Viscount 
Sankey in the Woolmington case:
81  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80. See also Glover & Murphy (2013), p. 73; Munday (2013), p. 60.
82  Glover (2017), p. 91-93; Munday (2013), p. 60; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 80-81.
83  Glover (2017), p. 92; Munday (2013), p. 60-61; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 82-83.
84   Three types of off ences exist, namely summary off ences, indictable off ences and off ences triable only on indictment. The fi rst is tried 
in magistrates’ court, whilst the latter is tried in Crown Court. Indictable off ences can be tried in magistrates’ court or in Crown Court. 
In magistrates’ court off ences are tried by lay magistrate or judge only. In Crown Court off ences are tried by jury and judge. See e.g. 
Ashworth & Redmayne (2010), p. 321-325.
85   Munday (2013), p. 60-61; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 82-83. See e.g. also  House of Lords (14 October 2004) [2004] UKHL 43, par. 1, per 
Lord Bingham: “An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence in the case, an issue as to the 
matter in question fi t for consideration by the tribunal of fact.”
86  E.g. Glover (2017), p. 100; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 84.
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Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to 
be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to 
what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory 
exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, 
created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether 
the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not 
made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the 
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the 
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can 
be entertained.87
There are three exceptions to the “golden thread” in criminal law that the legal burden of 
proof is on the prosecution.88 Firstly, the accused bears the legal burden of proof when raising 
an insanity defence. Secondly, criminal law off ences may contain elements for which the legal 
burden of proof rests on the accused. Lastly, it may be that a legal burden of proof on the 
accused will be implied. In the Woolmington case, the fi rst and second exception were already 
accepted, whilst the third exception was subject to discussion (and accepted) in the Hunt 
case.89
The applicability of the ECHR due to the Human Rights Act of 199890 and the Lambert case91 of 
the House of Lords have changed the aforementioned system quite substantially. According 
to the House of Lords in the Lambert case, the legal burden of proof on a suspect may be 
contrary to the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2) ECHR.92 In some cases, the statutory 
legal burden of proof born by an accused, has been read down to an evidential burden of 
proof, although there are also multiple cases in which this has not happened.93 Keane and 
McKeown state, after some discussion on this issue in general, that the legal burden of proof 
is in general more accepted “in the case of off ences which are concerned to regulate the 
conduct of particular action taken in the public interest and which are not regarded as ‘truly 
criminal’”.94
87  House of Lords (5 April 1935) [1935] UKHL 1, p. 7.
88  Munday (2013), p. 65-70; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 84.
89   House of Lords (4 December 1986) [1986] 3 WLR 1115, see e.g. Lord Griffi  ths who ruled: “I would summarise the position thus far by 
saying that Woolmington [1935] A.C. 462 did not lay down a rule that the burden of proving a statutory defence only lay upon the 
defendant if the statute specifi cally so provided: that a statute can, on its true construction, place a burden of proof on the defendant 
although it does not do so expressly.”
90  Human Rights Act of 1998.
91  House of Lords (5 July 2001) [2001] 3 WLR 206.
92   House of Lords (5 July 2001) [2001] 3 WLR 206, par. 17. This case dealt with the possession of a controlled drug. The prosecution had 
proved that “the accused had a bag with something in it in his custody or control; and that the something in the bag was a controlled 
drug”. The suspect then had to discharge “a legal, rather than an evidential, burden of proof to the eff ect that he neither believed nor 
suspected nor had reason to suspect that the substance in question was a controlled drug”. There was thus a statutory presumption in 
this case. 
 93   See for an extensive discussion on this matter Glover (2017), p. 115-123. See also Munday (2013), p. 77-89; Keane & McKeown (2012), 
p. 90-99. 
94  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 97.
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The evidential burden of proof is in general on the party who bears the legal burden of proof.95
This means that the prosecution bears the evidential burden of proof in general, subject to the 
aforementioned exceptions where a suspect may bear a legal burden of proof. 
It is not always the case that a suspect bears the legal burden of proof as well as the evidential 
burden of proof. A suspect may bear solely the evidential burden of proof when raising certain 
issues.96 Some evidence, for example, needs to be provided by a suspect, when trying to prove 
that a constituent element is not met, or when trying to prove he had an alibi. Furthermore, 
a suspect may also raise defences, other than insanity,97 for which the evidential burden also 
lies on the suspect.98
Moreover, when the prosecution has discharged its evidential burden of proof, it might be 
wise for a suspect to provide counterevidence to prevent the discharge of the legal burden of 
proof of the prosecution. A suspect could thus try to raise doubt as to the case presented by 
the prosecution. If a suspect does not raise such doubt, the case might be found to be proven. 
In those cases, a suspect may acquire this evidential burden of proof, “because, if he does not 
now adduce some evidence in opposition to the claimant’s case, he runs the clear risk that the 
prosecution/claimant’s uncontradicted case will succeed”.99
4.4.2 Standard of proof
Criminal law in England requires proof beyond reasonable doubt100 before the legal burden 
of proof is met, and thus before a suspect can be found guilty. Since many criminal law cases 
in England are dealt with by jury, diff erent terms have been used by judges to explain the 
concept of “beyond reasonable doubt” to a jury.101 The classical formulations are, according to 
Glover, “beyond reasonable doubt” and “satisfi ed so that you feel sure”.102 It does not mean 
though that this is a standard which is set in stone. As Denning LJ explained in 1950, there can 
be diff erent degrees in this standard:
The diff erence of opinion which has been evoked about the standard of proof in recent 
cases may well turn out to be more a matter of words than anything else. It is of course 
true that by our law a higher standard of proof is required in criminal cases than in 
civil cases. But this is subject to the qualifi cation that there is no absolute standard in 
either case. In the criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. As Best CJ and many other 
great judges have said, ‘In proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to 
be clear.’103
95  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 101.
96  Glover (2017), p. 105-107.
97  E.g. self-defence, drunkenness or duress.
98  Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 102-103.
99  Glover (2017), p. 93.
100  Allen (2017), p. 25; Munday (2013), p. 70; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 105.
101  Glover (2017), p. 126-129; Munday (2013), p. 70-72; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 108.
102  Glover (2017), p. 126.
103  EWCA (1951) [1950] 2 ALL ER 458.
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After a discussion on the standard of proof in civil cases, Denning LJ further elaborates on 
the standard of proof in both civil and criminal law cases. According to Denning LJ, beyond 
reasonable doubt means that a reasonable and just man should come to a certain conclusion in 
a case. In criminal cases, this means that a reasonable and just man should conclude whether 
or not a suspect can be convicted for a crime he allegedly committed. The diff erence between 
civil and criminal cases “is that, because of our high regard for the liberty of the individual, 
a doubt may be regarded as reasonable in the criminal courts which would not be so in the 
civil courts”.104
The legal burden of proof for the suspect is met when he provides proof on the “balance of 
probabilities”,105 which means that the evidence is more likely true than not.106
In general, almost all evidence may be used in criminal law proceedings. As stated in the 
Blackstone’s Criminal Practice of 2018: “The cardinal rule of the law of evidence is that, 
subject to the exclusionary rules, all evidence which is suffi  ciently relevant to the facts in issue 
is admissible, and all evidence which is irrelevant or insuffi  ciently relevant to the facts in 
issue should be excluded.”107 This also means that the prosecution may rely on circumstantial 
evidence to bring a case to court. Circumstantial evidence requires a judge or a jury “not only 
to accept the evidence tendered, but also to draw an inference from it”.108 A case could rest 
solely on circumstantial evidence.109 As Pollock CB held in R v Exall: 
It has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered as a chain, and each 
piece of evidence as a link in the chain, but that is not so, for then, if any one link 
broke, the chain would fall. It is more like the case of a rope composed of several cords. 
One strand of the cord might be insuffi  cient to sustain the weight, but three stranded 
together may be quite of suffi  cient strength.
Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence—there may be a combination of 
circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction, or more than a 
mere suspicion; but the whole, taken together, may create a strong conclusion of guilt, 
that is, with as much certainty as human aff airs can require or admit of.110
104  EWCA (1951) [1950] 2 ALL ER 458.
105   Allen (2017), p. 26; Glover (2017), p. 129; Munday (2013), p. 70-71; Keane & McKeown (2012), p. 105-107.
106  Munday (2013), p. 71.
107  Ormerod & Perry (2017), par. F 1.11 (emphasis added).
108  Glover (2017), p. 16.
109   See e.g.  EWCA (5 November 2014) [2014] EWCA Crim 2465, where the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction which was based solely 
on circumstantial evidence. See in particular par. 36: “This was a circumstantial case, like many others of its type, upon which the jury 
reached a verdict to which, in our judgment, they were entitled on the evidence to reach. It is not for this court to second-guess that 
verdict.” 
110   Court of assize (1 January 1866) (1866) 4 F. & F. 922, p. 929. 
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Relying only on circumstantial evidence could, however, also lead to ‘no case to answer’.111 In 
such a case, the judge may decide to withdraw a case from a jury since it would be unsafe for 
the jury to conclude on the basis of all the evidence that the suspect is guilty.112 In AB v Crown 
Prosecution Service it was explained how such a situation could be assessed:
[W]e must not examine each strand of the circumstantial evidence minutely, but 
instead we must look at the combination of circumstances ‘in the round’ and we must 
ask ourselves, taking the overview: is there a case on which a jury properly directed 
could convict? […] Our answer, based on [the] two remaining strands of circumstantial 
evidence is no: taking the prosecution case at its highest, the prosecution case was 
insuffi  cient to permit any reasonable and properly directed jury to convict the appellant 
of the robbery. Specifi cally, there remained a realistic possibility that someone else had 
committed the robbery […].113
In other cases, however, it was left to the jury to determine whether there was a realistic 
possibility that the suspect is innocent. These statements, even though dealing with the 
question whether there is a case to answer, seem to indicate that presenting a realistic 
possibility, or a plausible alternative, could be suffi  cient to raise doubt as to the guilt of a 
person when it concerns rebutting circumstantial evidence. It depends, however, on the facts 
of the case whether an alternative may raise suffi  cient doubt. As Roberts contended: “Some 
alternative explanation might, for various reasons, give rise to doubt that does not reach 
[the reasonable doubt] threshold.”114 Any doubt should, in light of the criminal law standard 
of proof, benefi t the accused. It appears that an alternative explanation may already rebut 
circumstantial evidence. For direct evidence it might be more complicated to raise doubt. This 
comes back in the question whether there is a ‘case to answer’. The presence of direct evidence 
cannot lead to the verdict that there is no case to answer,115 which means that it is not “unsafe” 
for a jury to convict a suspect.116 It will then be for the jury to determine whether there is any 
reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the possible 
counterevidence or alternative explanations by the suspect. 
111   Ormerod & Perry (2017), par. D16.65: “There has been a degree of debate as to the proper approach to a submission of no case where 
the prosecution content that guilt is proved, in whole or in part, by the drawing of certain inferences from circumstantial evidence. In 
the past, it was argued on the basis of Moore […] that a case to answer would only be made out where the prosecution could exclude 
any alternative inference being drawn from that circumstantial evidence. It is now clear that this is not the case.”
112  See e.g. Roberts (2011).
113   England and Wales High Court (24 November 2017) [2017] EWHC 2963 (admin), par. 39. For more information see also McKeown 
(2018).
114  Roberts (2015), p. 531.
115   See e.g. EWCA (13 January 2011) [2011] EWCA Crim 2, par. 35, where reference is made to a case of the Supreme Court of South 
Australia. 
116   The question for a case to answer would thus be whether a jury would be entitled on the basis of the circumstantial evidence to reject 
all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence. If so, the trial can continue, if not, there is no case to answer. Direct evidence would 
lead to a case to answer. See e.g. EWCA (13 January 2011) [2011] EWCA Crim 2, par. 34-37, and the case law there cited.
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4.4.4 Résumé
In England, a distinction is made between a legal burden of proof and an evidential burden 
of proof. The legal burden of proof requires a party to provide enough evidence to meet a 
certain standard of proof. The evidential burden of proof requires merely providing suffi  cient 
evidence to establish a case, or, in other words, to raise an issue before court. The legal and 
evidential burden of proof rest on the public prosecutor. A prosecutor should thus establish a 
case and prove it to the requisite legal standard. However, in some cases there might be a de 
facto burden of proof on a suspect; a suspect may want to substantiate, to a certain standard, 
his counterevidence. 
In England, most defences only require an evidential burden of proof. However, there are also 
three circumstances under which there is a legal and evidential burden of proof on a suspect. 
The legal burden of proof is in multiple cases read down by the English judiciary to merely an 
evidential burden of proof. 
The standard of proof is the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. If a suspect bears a legal 
burden to prove certain arguments than it will be suffi  ciently to prove this on the balance 
of probabilities, which means that the argumentation should be more likely true than not. 
Presenting counterevidence does not lead to a legal burden of proof, although there is 
obviously an evidential burden of proof. It appears that circumstantial evidence might be 
rebutted by a plausible alternative or a realistic possibility, whereas this is more diffi  cult for 
direct evidence. 
4.5 LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
In England the legality principle has a longstanding tradition,117 although its importance 
has fl uctuated. English law knew diff erent exceptions to the legality principle; it was e.g. 
not always prohibited for parliament to create ex post facto criminal laws.118 Three diff erent 
principles can be discerned in English criminal law from the legality principle, namely (i) the 
principle of non-retroactivity, (ii) the principle of maximum certainty, and (iii) the principle 
of strict construction of penal statutes.119 The principle of non-retroactivity is aimed at the 
“lawmaking activities of [p]arliament and the courts”.120 The principle of maximum certainty 
and the principle of strict construction of penal statutes can be seen as two sides of the same 
coin. The fi rst principle obliges the legislator, or courts engaged in law-making activities,121 to 
ensure that criminal law norms are clear, whilst the second principle obliges the judiciary to 
interpret open norms strictly. In the following, fi rst the requirement of suffi  ciently accessible 
117  Hall (1937), p. 167-168.
118  Hall (1937), p. 170. 
119   Horder (2016), p. 82. Cf. Wilson (2008), p. 19, who refers only to two aspects, namely (i) the principle of non-retroactivity, and (ii) 
off ence defi nitions should not be too vague; Hallevy (2010), p. 12-13, asserts that “English common law applies the principle of 
legality in criminal law through four secondary principles: (a) non-retroactivity, (b) maximum certainty, (c) strict construction, and (d) the 
presumption of innocence”. (emphasis added) 
120  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 67.
121   This sub-principle of the principle of legality is only discussed here under the heading of “The legislator”. All comments there made 
apply mutatis mutandis to the law making activities of the judiciary.
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and precise off ences and penalties is examined (4.5.1), after which the requirement that the 
law may not be applied retrospectively and the lex mitior principle are discussed (4.5.2).
4.5.1 Suffi  ciently accessible and precise off ences
The legislator should formulate clear norms to ensure clarity for citizens. Many criminal law 
off ences were creations of common law, although nowadays most off ences have found their 
way into statutes.122 The interpretation of the principle of maximum certainty in England 
is strongly infl uenced by the case law of the ECtHR.123 Absolute certainty is not required, 
which means that vagueness and a certain discretion for the person enacting a law is not 
prohibited.124 On the other hand, “[a] citizen is not given fair warning of the criminality 
of his action if, using standard procedures for discovering the law, a reasonably intelligent 
person would be left unsure as to whether the relevant conduct was proscribed or not”.125 A 
balance should thus be struck between clear criminal law off ences, and the eff ectiveness of 
criminal law. Furthermore, criminal law off ences which are too clear might become very long 
and unreadable. Following Lord Bingham in Rimmington and Goldstein, a person may not be 
punished unless a law “is suffi  ciently clear and certain to enable him to know what conduct is 
forbidden before he does it; and no one should be punished for any act which was not clearly 
and ascertainably punishable when the act was done”.126 It is, however, at this point unclear 
where the balance between vague and clear norms should be struck in England, and whether 
off ences may be successfully challenged on this notion.127 Foreseeability for a ‘reasonably 
intelligent person’ seems to be the legal concept used to examine whether a law is suffi  ciently 
clear.
Closely related to the issue of maximum certainty is the principle of strict construction. When 
there is doubt as to the meaning of a statutory off ence, it should be resolved in favour of the 
accused.128 This entails a strict interpretation of the judiciary. It has been argued that reference 
to this principle has been “fi tful”,129 and that it is “increasingly disregarded”.130 The House 
of Lords has ruled in the past that on the basis of this principle the judiciary should examine 
the purpose of a statute, and thus the intention of parliament, when a norm is vague and/
or ambiguous.131 If the intention of Parliament is clear, the judiciary should rule accordingly. 
Otherwise a restrictive approach seems to preferable.132
122  Wilson (2008), p. 18.
123   Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 62-64. See also the opinion of Lord Bingham in House of Lords (27 October 2005) [2005] 3 WLR 982, par. 
36, where he refers to cases brought against the UK before the ECtHR. 
124  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 65.
125   Wilson (2008), p. 19. Cf. Raz (2009), p. 214, states that the law “must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects”.
126  House of Lords (27 October 2005) [2005] 3 WLR 982, par. 33.
127  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 64.
128  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 67; Wilson (2008), p. 20.
129  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 68.
130  Wilson (2008), p. 20.
131  See the opinion of Lord Lowry in House of Lords (13 April 1989) [1989] 2 WLR 729.
132   Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 49. The restrictive approach, which is prescribed by the principle of strict construction, is closely linked 
to the principle of non-retroactivity and the principle of maximum certainty. The latter two principles may oblige a court to rule in 
favour of a suspect e.g. when an extensive interpretation of a (perhaps clear) norm prohibits conduct retroactively, or when a norm is 
too vague for a suspect to understand. 
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4.5.2 Retrospective application of the criminal law and lex mitior
The legality principle may prevent the legislator from making retroactive criminal laws,133
although the English criminal law system does allow for the retroactive application of criminal 
law Acts of Parliament. In 2002, the position of the UK government on the principle of non-
retroactivity was explained on questions of the House of Commons. The Solicitor-General stated 
that “[t]he Government’s policy before introducing a legislative provision having retrospective 
eff ect is to balance the confl icting public interests and to consider whether the general public 
interest in the law not being changed retrospectively may be outweighed by any competing 
public interest”.134 The retroactive criminalisation by legislation of certain behaviour is however 
scarce.135 Applying criminal law penalties retroactively seems to be, as is explained below when 
discussing the lex mitior principle, a general approach by the English judiciary. This means that 
the judiciary will apply the penalties in force at the time of the criminal law proceedings and not 
the penalties which were in force at the time of co mmitting the off ence.
The principle of non-retroactivity can also have an infl uence on the English judiciary. This 
principle can be of an infl uence in three distinct ways. Firstly, it may oblige the judiciary not to 
apply legislation created by the legislator. Secondly, it may prevent the judiciary from creating 
retroactive rules or, thirdly, adapting rules retroactively.136 Bentham has stated with regard to 
second aspect:
It is the judges (as we have seen) that make the common law. Do you know how they 
make it? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you 
want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way 
you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me. 
They won’t tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do—they won’t so much as 
allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which they say he should 
not have done, and then they hang him for it.137
In the past, the English judiciary did create criminal law off ences through case law. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the judiciary does not create new criminal law off ences anymore. 
The creation of legislation is left to the legislator.138 The adaption of legislation might still 
take place though.139 In general, however, the adaption of legislation will be a task for the 
legislator, and not for the judiciary.140
133  See Juratowitch (2008), p. 5-26, for three types of temporal eff ects of statutory rules.
134  House of Commons, written answers to questions of 6 March 2002, Column 410W. 
135  An example is the War Crimes Act 1991.
136  See also Juratowitch (2008), p. 35-42.
137  J Bentham (1843), p. 235.
138   Horder (2016), p. 83; see also Lord Bingham in House of Lords (29 March 2006) [2006] 2 WLR 772, par. 29, who ruled that it “has become 
an important democratic principle in this country: that it is for those representing the people of the country in Parliament, not the 
executive and not the judges, to decide what conduct should be treated as lying so far outside the bounds of what is acceptable in our 
society as to attract criminal penalties. One would need very compelling reasons for departing from that principle”.
139  Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 59-61.
140   Cf. Ashworth & Horder (2013), p. 62, who provide that extension is for the legislator and interpretation for the judiciary. 
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The lex mitior rule was, for a long time, not a rule in English criminal law.141 Up till today 
Section 16(1)(d)-(e) of the Interpretation Act 1978142 e.g. excludes the application of lex mitior 
rule by the judiciary in case of a statutory repeal, unless this is explicitly provided for in the 
new act. However, it has been mentioned that some form of the lex mitior rule does apply in 
English law. Bohlander has summarised the approach to the lex mitior rule as follows:
In eff ect, the current state of English law would appear to be that:
• changes in the common law and in the interpretation of existing statute law can be taken 
intoaccount, regardless of when they happen:
--  if they happen during the trial or an appeal fi led in time, they will be considered 
as a matter of course;
--  in cases of appeals out-of-time and CCRC referrals, they may be considered if 
there is a substantial injustice.
• Changes to the substance of the law by subsequent statute are never taken into account.143
This approach did not seem to adhere to the application of the lex mitior rule by the ECtHR in 
Scoppola.144 Bohlander has therefore asserted that not much attention was given to the Scoppola 
judgment in the UK and that he “hoped that [his] short comment will encourage the judiciary 
and legislators in the United Kingdom to tackle the issue head-on sooner rather than later”.145
This tackling fi nally occurred by the Court of Appeal in 2014, and was confi rmed on appeal 
by the Supreme Court in 2016 in the case of R v Docherty.146 After thorough discussion of the 
Scoppola case and the English legal system, the Supreme Court held:
English practice recognises lex mitior in its ordinary form, namely the principle that an 
off ender should be sentenced according to the law and practice prevailing at the time 
of his sentence, subject to not exceeding the limits (ie in England normally the maximum) 
provided for at the time the off ence was committed. If it were necessary to investigate the 
second diffi  culty, and the possibility that a defendant is entitled to insist on being 
sentenced according to any more favourable law or practice which has at any time 
obtained between the commission of the off ence and the passing of sentence, that 
extended rule is not clearly adopted by the Grand Chamber, appears not to be within 
141   See e.g. Supreme Court (14 December 2016) [2016] UKSC 62, par. 17, where the Supreme Court held the following: “The general rule of 
English law, not confi ned to the criminal law, is that a statute is prospective rather than retrospective in eff ect unless it distinctly says 
otherwise”. 
142   This provision provides: 
   “(1) Without prejudice to section 15, where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears,—
  […]
   (d) aff ect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any off ence committed against that enactment;
   (e) aff ect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or 
punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, 
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed.”
143  Bohlander (2011), p. 630.
144  ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)). See Bohlander (2011), p. 635-636 and 641.
145  Bohlander (2011), p. 641.
146   EWCA (18 June 2014) [2014] EWCA Crim 1197; Supreme Court (14 December 2016) [2016] UKSC 62.
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the stated rationale for the principle of lex mitior, and would entail unwarranted 
consequences. Such an extended concept of the principle should, with great respect, 
not be applied.147
The English judiciary will thus only ensure that the penalty imposed on a person is not higher 
than the penalty available at the time the behaviour occurred. 
Two comments can be made with regard to this ruling of the Supreme Court. First of all, the 
English judiciary will apply a criminal law retroactively insofar as it concerns the sanction, 
although the maximum sentence to be imposed upon a person may not exceed the maximum 
which could be imposed upon that person at the time of committing the off ence. This is an 
accepted approach in England. The Law Commission148 e.g. also referred to this approach in 
its consultation on a Sentencing Guide.149
Secondly, the second statement by the Supreme Court where it held that the ECtHR does not 
prescribe a rule where any favourable law or practice should be applied does not fi t well at 
fi rst sight with the Scoppola judgment. The ECtHR held, in that case, that “the Convention 
guarantees not only the principle of non-retrospectiveness of more stringent criminal laws but 
also, and implicitly, the principle of retrospectiveness of the more lenient criminal law. That 
principle is embodied in the rule that where there are diff erences between the criminal law 
in force at the time of the commission of the off ence and subsequent criminal laws enacted 
before a fi nal judgment is rendered, the courts must apply the law whose provisions are most 
favourable to the defendant”.150 However, the focus of the Supreme Court in the quote above 
seems to rest on the “any time”. This would mean that the English judiciary is not obliged 
to examine all the changes made by the legislator between committing the off ence and the 
sentencing in order to fi nd the most lenient.151 Indeed, it does not appear from Scoppola that all 
the changes made by the legislator between off ence and sentence should be compared. There 
cannot be a logical reason to do so. Overall, only two penalties have to be compared, namely 
the penalty which could be imposed at the time of committing the off ence and the penalty at 
the time of sentencing. 
147  Supreme Court (14 December 2016) [2016] UKSC 62, par. 55 (emphasis added). 
148   The Law Commission reviews legislation in England and Wales and recommends reform where needed.
149   See Consultation on Sentencing Guide), par. 3.10, where the Law Commission provided: “Our starting point was that after the 
introduction of the Sentencing Code, all off enders convicted after its commencement would be sentenced by applying the sentencing 
law and procedure in the Sentencing Code, regardless of when their off ence was committed. To this starting point we added important 
but limited exceptions in the interests of fairness and to protect the rights of the off ender. The exceptions were: (1) cases where the 
penalty under the Sentencing Code would be more severe than the maximum which could have been imposed at the time of the 
off ence, and (2) cases where new laws on prescribed minimum sentencing and recidivist premiums86 have come into force after the 
commission of the off ence for which the off ender is being sentenced.” 
150  ECtHR, no. 10249/03 (Scoppola v Italy (No 2)), par. 109. (emphasis added)
151  See also Supreme Court (14 December 2016) [2016] UKSC 62, par. 46.
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4.5.3 Résumé
The legality principle in English criminal law can be divided into three subprinciples, namely 
(i) the principle of non-retroactivity, (ii) the principle of maximum certainty, and (iii) the 
principle of strict construction of penal statutes. The principle of maximum certainty requires 
that a law should be suffi  ciently accessible and foreseeable. The interpretation of Article 7 
ECHR by the ECtHR is an important source for the English judiciary on the application of 
the principle of maximum certainty. The judiciary will, in general, examine the intention of 
the legislator in order to determine the manner in which a vague norm should be interpreted. 
However, if this intention is unclear, the principle of strict construction will be applicable. 
Criminal law statutes may criminalise behaviour retroactively, although this does not happen 
very often anymore. The judiciary used to create criminal law norms as well, although 
nowadays this task is left to the legislator. The general rule is that criminal law penalties will be 
applied retroactively, i.e. penalties at the time of sentencing will be applied. In order to adhere 
to the principle of lex mitior, the English judiciary will compare the maximum penalty at the 
time of the commitment of the off ence and the maximum penalty at the time of sentencing. 
The penalty, which can be imposed on the basis of the law in force at time of sentencing, may 
not exceed the maximum which was applicable at the time of committing the off ence.
4.6 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
Sentencing in English criminal law is characterised by the application of sentencing guidelines 
for particular off ences. These guidelines fi nd their origin in the 1980s, by virtue of the creation 
of guidelines for some off ences by the Magistrate’s Association and the guidelines created 
by the England and Wales Court of Appeal.152 Nevertheless, sentencing up to the adoption 
of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act was subject to quite some criticism. As Koff man argues: 
“Critics of the pre-1991 sentencing system pointed out that unfettered discretion could lead 
to indefensible disparities in sentencing practice, as sentencers were (largely) free to choose 
from a number of diff erent sentencing objectives.”153 The 1991 Act made proportionality a 
guiding principle in sentencing.154 The principle of proportionality also “appears as a framing 
principle in the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s statement of the general principles to be 
followed by sentencing judges”.155 Proportionality is thus a principle which seems to lie at the 
basis of the current sentencing policy in England. 
In what follows, fi rst the principle of proportionality is discussed in general (4.6.1), after 
which the emphasis is placed on the sentencing guidelines (4.6.2.)
152  Wasik (2008), p. 253.
153  Koff man (2006), p. 285.
154   Koff man (2006), p. 285. The Bill of Rights of 1689 already recognised a principle of proportionality of a sanction by providing that “[t]
hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fi nes imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments infl icted”. Two underlying 
sources of this prohibition of gross disproportionality in sentencing can be pinpointed, namely the prohibition of “cruel, unusual, 
inhuman or degrading treatments” and the prohibition of arbitrariness in criminal proceedings. For more information see Smit and 
Ashworth (2004), p. 543.
155   Lovegrove (2010), p. 331. This principle is not as such referred to in the “Overarching Principles: Seriousness” Guideline. 
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4.6.1 Proportionality in legislation 
The proportionality principle cannot explicitly be found in legislation. The 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act seemed to focus extensively on the proportionality principle. It has however been 
mentioned that the 2003 Criminal Justice Act moved away from this principle as a guiding 
principle. As Koff man argues: “Recent legislation suggests that proportionality has not only 
lost its status as the primary rationale of sentencing, but also that other criminal justice 
policies actually militate against this principle.”156 Other authors do however fi nd traces of 
the proportionality principle in specifi c provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Ashworth 
for instance refers to two provisions in the Criminal Justice Act which should ensure that the 
type of penalty relates to the seriousness of the off ence.157 Nevertheless, the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act does not explicitly codify the proportionality principle.
Section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003158 requires courts to consider fi ve purposes of 
sentencing, namely “(a) the punishment of off enders, (b) the reduction of crime (including its 
reduction by deterrence), (c) the reform and rehabilitation of off enders, (d) the protection of 
the public, and (e) the making of reparation by off enders to persons aff ected by their off ences.” 
The proportionality of a sanction is not referred to. Moreover, Section 143 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 mentions certain factors159 which should be taken into account to determine 
the seriousness of an off ence for the purpose of the sentence. Whereas culpability and the 
(potential) harm caused by the illegal behaviour are framed as neutral factors, the other 
two factors in Section 143 are referred to as aggravating factors. Furthermore, Section 144 
refers to a mitigating circumstance, namely the guilty plea. Sections 145 and 146 refer again 
to aggravating circumstances, respectively religious or racial aggravation and aggravation 
related to disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. A general mitigating clause has 
also been included in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 166(1) provides that “[n]othing 
in [certain provisions of this act] prevents a court from mitigating an off ender’s sentence by 
taking into account any such matters as, in the opinion of the court, are relevant in mitigation 
of sentence”. Some aggravating and mitigating facts have thus found their way in Acts of 
Parliament,160 even though the proportionality principle has not. 
4.6.2 Sentencing guidelines 
The process of creating sentencing guidelines “has [over time] widened and deepened, so 
that the latest set of sophisticated guidelines […] covers all the main off ences likely to be 
156   Koff man (2006), p. 297. Similarly, see also Von Hirsch & Roberts (2004), who argue that the Criminal Justice Act 2003 gives some mixed 
signals with relation to the status of the proportionality principle. The sentencing guidelines should therefore elaborate more upon the 
factors mentioned in the Criminal Justice Act. Von Hirsch and Roberts therefore seem to hope that the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
is willing to “issue guidelines of suffi  cient specifi city to off er meaningful guidance, and to address adequately the respective roles of 
proportionality and ulterior, crime-preventive ends” (p. 646).
157  See e.g. Ashworth (2015), p. 113.
158  For minors Section 142A was created. 
159   Namely the culpability and (potential) harm (par. 1), previous convictions (par. 2), and committing an off ence while the off ender was 
on bail (par. 3).
160   For more information on the aggravating and mitigating factors in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (and sentencing guidelines), see 
Ashworth (2015), p. 163-205.
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encountered in those courts”.161 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 required courts to take these 
guidelines into account.162 This duty to take the guidelines into account has been changed to a 
duty to “follow” the guidelines, “unless the court is satisfi ed that it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice to do so”.163 A judge will in general fi rst have to determine which guideline 
is applicable. Secondly, that judge will be obliged to follow the method in a specifi c sentencing 
guideline to determine the penalty which should be imposed in a case. As mentioned, the 
principle of proportionality appears to be a “framing principle” in the sentencing guidelines,164
which means that in general penalties based on a guideline will be proportionate. 
4.6.3 Résumé
The proportionality principle is currently not codifi ed in Acts of Parliament nor in the 
sentencing guidelines. Even though, the 2003 Criminal Justice Act departed a bit from 
the notion of proportionate sanctions, the Sentencing Guidelines Council does regard this 
principle as a framing principle for its sentencing guidelines. These guidelines incorporate 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
although other factors are, per off ence, also taken into account. Judges should in general 
follow these sentencing guidelines. This would ensure that fi nes are proportionate. However, 
if the interest of justice requires so, judges may depart from the sentencing guidelines. This 
can occur by raising the sanction or by lowering the sanction.165
4.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter examined the fi ve principles central to this study in English criminal law. In 
English competition law proceedings, the fi ve principles are not that extensively elaborated 
upon. This also means that the comparison of these principles with their criminal law 
counterparts is more diffi  cult, due to the lack of guidance from the competition law judiciary 
on the application of these principles. The discussion of some of the principles in English 
criminal law is meant to provide the benchmark for the comparision in chapter 8. Even 
though the discussion in this chapter is far from exhaustive, it is a representative discussion 
for the present research. The framework against which the principles in English competition 
law proceedings can be compared is therefore suffi  ciently examined. 
161  Wasik (2008), p. 253.
162  Section 172 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (old). 
163   Section 125(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. See for more information Roberts & Raff erty (2011), p. 686-687 and Thomas (2010). 
See also Ashworth (2012) for a discussion of, amongst others, jurisprudence in which it was or was not allowed to deviate from specifi c 
sentencing guidelines. 
164   Lovegrove (2010), p. 331. This principle is not as such mentioned in the “Overarching Principles: Seriousness” Guideline. See also 
Ashworth (2015), p. 113.
165  See e.g. Ashworth (2012). 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous part of this study a discussion took place on the scope and content of fi ve 
principles in criminal law. Four jurisdictions formed the subject of this overview, namely the 
EU, the ECHR system, the Netherlands and England. This chapter focuses on the scope and 
content of the fi ve principles in EU competition law. 
In this chapter the focus is therefore on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination (5.3), 
the non bis in idem principle (5.4), the burden and standard of proof (5.5), the principle of 
legality and legal certainty (5.6), and the proportionality of sanctions (5.7). Before a substantive 
a discussion on these principles takes, the enforcement framework for EU competition law by 
the Commission is discussed (5.2). 
5.2 ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW
The current enforcement regime of EU competition law is laid down in Regulation 1/2003. 
This Regulation also provides for the decentralisation of the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. National competition authorities are competent, and, when there is an eff ect on 
trade between Member States, obliged to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in parallel to 
their own competition rules.1 This chapter deals only with the Commission’s enforcement 
of the cartel prohibition and the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position. The diff erent 
competences of the Commission are hereby discussed in so far as relevant for this study. The 
Court of Justice and the Commission have accepted that certain criminal law principles may 
play a role in EU competition law, and may therefore limit the powers of the Commission. It is 
thus relevant to determine the scope of the competences the Commission enjoys on the basis 
of Regulation 1/2003. However, relevant case law discussed in this chapter also deals with 
the old enforcement Regulation. A side-step should thus also be made to consider Regulation 
17/62, which contained the enforcement regime from before 1 May 2004. 
5.2.1 The old (pre-2004) enforcement regime
Regulation 17/62 was the fi rst Regulation which laid down specifi c rules for the enforcement 
of the cartel prohibition and the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position. Kerse sums 
up the main features: 
[Regulation 17/62] provides the basis for the Commission’s procedures in relation 
to the giving of negative clearance, the taking of decisions requiring the termination 
of infringements and the granting of exemptions under Article 85(3) [EC]. It makes 
provisions for the notifi cation of agreements, for the relationship between the 
Commission and the authorities of the Member States, for the obtaining of information
1  Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003.
182
CHAPTER 5 | EU Competition Law
and the investigation of cases by the Commission, for the hearing of parties, for the 
imposition of fi nes and periodic penalty payments, for the publication of decisions and 
for the maintenance of professional secrecy.2
Two stages could be distinguished when the Commission enforced EU competition law: the 
preparatory fact-fi nding stage and the formal procedure. The formal procedure was offi  cially 
opened by a statement of objections sent to the undertaking(s) concerned. 
This statement of objections provided an opportunity for the undertaking to reply to the 
allegations of the Commission. The Commission might initiate the fact-fi nding stage on the 
basis of a notifi cation of an undertaking or undertakings,3 on the basis of an application, or 
on its own motion.4 The application could only be submitted by Member States or by persons 
having a legitimate interest.5
In the fact-fi nding stage, the Commission had extensive powers. It could request information 
from undertakings,6 it could oblige undertakings to provide information,7 and it could carry 
out a dawn raid.8 The procedure for requesting information consisted of two phases: fi rst 
the Commission should send a simple request, whilst it might issue a decision only when an 
undertaking “does not supply the information requested within the time limit fi xed by the 
Commission, or supplies incomplete information”.9 Providing incorrect information when a 
request was made could lead to the imposition of a fi ne.10 Conversely, when a decision was 
issued, undertakings might also be fi ned for non-cooperation.11 Even though the Commission 
could not impose a fi ne when an undertaking failed to provide information after it received 
a simple request for information, there would still be an obligation to actively cooperate.12
The Court of First Instance stated in 1994 the following with regard to a simple request for 
information: 
As regards the ways in which the Commission should ‘try’ the fi rst stage of the 
preliminary investigation procedure, the Court of Justice has held that Regulation 
No 17 confers on the Commission wide powers of investigation and imposes on 
the individuals concerned the obligation to cooperate actively in the investigative 
measures, which means that they must make available to the Commission all 
information  relating to the subject-matter of the investigation (Case 374/87 
Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, paragraphs 22 and 27). Consequently, the
2  Kerse (1994), p. 29.
3  Article 2 Regulation 17/62.
4  Article 3(1) Regulation 17/62.
5  Article 3(2) Regulation 17/62; see also Kerse (1994), p. 75. 
6  Article 11(2) and (3) Regulation 17/62.
7  Article 11(5) Regulation 17/62.
8  Article 14(1) Regulation 17/62.
9  Article 11(5) Regulation 17/62.
10  Article 15(1)(b) Regulation 17/62.
11  Article 15(1)(b) and 16(1)(c) Regulation 17/62. 
12  CFI, T-46/92 (Scottish Football Association v Commission), par. 31-32.
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applicant’s argument that the contested decision could only have been justifi ed 
if it had manifestly obstructed the Commission in carrying out its task must be 
rejected. Given that the individuals concerned have such an obligation to cooperate 
actively in the initial investigation procedure, a passive reaction may in itself 
justify the adoption of a formal decision under Article 11(5) of Regulation No 17.13
A “passive reaction”, or no active cooperation, might thus be a suffi  cient ground to issue a 
decision under Article 11(5) in order to force the undertaking to cooperate under the threat of a 
fi ne and/or penalty payment.14 The regime for the requests and decisions for information was 
partly applied in a similar manner to the dawn raid, although the Commission could issue a 
decision for a dawn raid immediately, without the need to issue a written authorisation fi rst. 
The diff erence between a dawn raid issued by authorisation and a dawn raid issued 
by decision lay, for the purpose of this study, in the possibility to impose a fi ne when an 
undertaking refused to cooperate. Non-cooperation was not punishable for a dawn raid 
issued by authorisation. In contrast, the Commission could impose fi nes and/or penalty 
payments when an undertaking did not submit to an inspection ordered by decision.15
During a dawn raid, the Commission could examine books and other records, take copies 
of those documents, enter any premises of the undertaking, and ask for oral explanations 
“on specifi c questions arising from the books and business records which [the Commission 
offi  cials] examine”.16 The Commission might only search business premises when the 
undertaking concerned opposed to an inspection. In all other situations, it was not allowed 
for the Commission to search premises.17 Kreis, who used to be a principal administrator at 
the Commission, mentioned that the Commission offi  cials, in cases in which they could not 
search the premises, did not have to stand idly by:
[T]he fact that the Commission does not have a right of search cannot mean that the 
Commission offi  cials must sit waiting in some conference room in the business to see 
whether any of the documents requested are going to be produced to them and, if so, 
which ones.18
Commission offi  cials might enter all parts of a business where records were (actually 
or usually) kept to see for themselves whether the records were available. Overall, 
the Commission had to observe the rights of defence, during the complete fact-
fi nding stage.19 In 1982, the offi  ce of Hearing Offi  cer was created, partly to ensure
13  CFI, T-46/92 (Scottish Football Association v Commission), par. 31.
14  CFI, T-46/92 (Scottish Football Association v Commission), par. 31-32.
15  Article 15(1)(c) and 16(1)(d) Regulation 17/62.
16  ECJ, 136/79 (National Panasonic v Commission), par. 15. See also Article 14(1) Regulation 17/62.
17  ECJ, 46/87 and 277/88 (Hoechst AG v Commission), par. 31-32.
18  Kreis (1983), p. 44.
19   E.g. ECJ, 46/87 and 277/88 (Hoechst AG v Commission), par. 15; ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem SA v Commission), par. 33.
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the Commission’s observance of the rights of the defence of an undertaking.20
The penalties imposed for procedural infringements could range from 100 to 5000 “units”.21
For substantive infringements, the Commission could impose a fi ne from 1000 to 1,000,000 
units or more, but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of the 
undertaking concerned.22 These fi nes could be imposed when an undertaking acted by intent 
or when it acted negligently. This left considerable discretion to the Commission, although 
the Regulation provided that, for substantive infringements, it had to take into account 
the gravity and the duration of the infringement. The discretion to determine the amount 
of the fi ne for substantive infringements raised quite some criticism,23 especially when the 
Commission raised the stakes unexpectedly in the Pioneer case of 1989.24
Following the criticism on its approach, the Commission adopted its fi rst Fining Guidelines in 
1998.25 These Fining Guidelines focused on fi nes imposed for substantive infringements and 
not on procedural infringements. The Commission “did not thereby surrender its discretion”, 
it rather “set out a methodology which it would henceforth follow”.26 The discretion of the 
Commission to determine the amount of a fi ne remained, although the guidelines could create 
legitimate expectations.27 The Guidelines thus created more certainty for undertakings. In 
order to catch cartelists, the Commission also adopted a Leniency Notice in 1996,28 which was 
replaced by a new Notice in 2002.29 The adoption of the fi rst Notice was meant to codify and 
to systematise the already existing practice of reducing fi nes on the basis of the cooperation 
of the undertaking concerned. It provided an incentive for undertakings to actively assist the 
Commission in fi nding infringements of the cartel prohibition. 
5.2.2 The new (post-2004) enforcement regime
In 2004, a new regulation was adopted to modernise competition law enforcement throughout 
the EU. This new regulation, Regulation 1/2003, introduced a decentralised enforcement 
system. Ever since this Regulation entered into force, national authorities are obliged to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU parallel to national competition law when there is an eff ect on 
trade between Member States.30
Another major change was the abolishment of the negative clearance regime. This regime, 
which existed under Regulation 17/62, allowed for an ex ante enforcement of the competition 
20   For more information see: 
  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/hearing_offi  cers/index_en.html, visited 30/07/2015. 
21   Article 15(1) Regulation 17/62. “Units” should be read from 1 January 1999 onwards as Euros, see Article 2(1) and 2(3) Regulation 
1103/97.
22  Article 15(2) Regulation 17/62. 
23  Jones & Sufrin (2001), p. 907-911.
24   The ECJ allowed this change in fi ning policy, see ECJ, 100 to 103/80 (SA Musique Diff usion française and others v Commission), par. 106-
109.
25   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty, 
[2006] OJ C 9/3. 
26  Jones & Sufrin (2001), p. 911.
27   See ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 209-211.
28   Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fi nes in cartel cases, [1996] OJ C 207/4.
29  Commission notice on immunity from fi nes and reduction of fi nes in cartel cases, [2002] OJ 45/3.
30  Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
185
EU Competition Law | CHAPTER 5
Ch
ap
te
r 5
law rules. Nowadays, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced completely through an ex post 
enforcement system. The Commission explained this change with the following statement: 
Undertakings are generally well placed to assess the legality of their actions in such a 
way as to enable them to take an informed decision on whether to go ahead with an 
agreement or practice and in what form. They are close to the facts and have at their 
disposal the framework of block exemption regulations, case law and case practice as 
well as extensive guidance in Commission guidelines and notices.31
However, even though there is only an ex post enforcement system, informal guidance can still 
be given when novel questions relating to the application of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU arise.32
A third major change introduced by Regulation 1/2003 is the strengthening of certain 
enforcement powers of the Commission. Under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission e.g. 
also has the power to investigate other locations than business premises, such as the private 
homes of directors of an undertaking.33 Regulation 1/2003 deals overall with two matters, “[f]
irst, it renders Article 101(3) directly applicable and lays down the basic framework for the 
Commission, the NCAs, and the national courts to cooperate in the decentralised system; [s]
econdly it provides for the powers and procedures of the Commission in the investigation of 
competition matters”.34
The investigation powers of the Commission can be found in Articles 17 to 21 of Regulation 
1/2003. The Commission has the power to initiate a sector inquiry,35 to request information 
from undertakings,36 to take statements on a voluntary basis,37 to initiate a dawn raid at 
business premises,38 and to start an inspection at other premises.39 A request for information 
can be issued in two forms, namely by simple request or by decision. In contrast to Regulation 
17/62 it is no longer necessary for the Commission to send a simple request for information 
before adopting a decision. The Commission is thus free to determine the form of the 
information request and can therefore skip the informal stage. 
Non-cooperation with a decision may lead to a fi ne, whereas it is not possible to impose a fi ne on 
an undertaking for non-cooperation with a simple request. Providing incomplete information 
is also non-cooperation and can thus only be fi ned when a decision has been issued.40
31   Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in 
individual cases (guidance letters), [2004] OJ C 101/78, par. 3. 
32   Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in 
individual cases (guidance letters), [2004] OJ C 101/78, par. 5. In practice this is not done very often. 
33  Article 21 Regulation 1/2003.
34  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 891.
35  Article 17 Regulation 1/2003.
36  Article 18 Regulation 1/2003.
37   Article 19 Regulation 1/2003. The Court of Justice corrected the General Court in ECJ, C-413/14 P (Intel Corporation v Commission), par. 
86-91, by ruling that this article does not make a distinction between formal and informal interviews. This means that interviews on 
the basis of this article are always of a formal nature and should be recorded by the Commission.
38  Article 20 Regulation 1/2003.
39  Article 21 Regulation 1/2003.
40  Article 23(1)(b) Regulation 1/2003.
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A fi ne can be imposed on an undertaking when it provides incorrect or misleading information 
regardless of the form of the request for information.41 A dawn raid can be issued by written 
authorisation or by decision. During a dawn raid, the Commission has the competence to 
enter any premises, to examine documents, to take copies or extracts of those documents, 
to seal any room at the business premises, and to interrogate representatives and members 
of staff .42 Under Regulation 17/62 the interrogation of employees was limited to questions 
related to a particular document. This competence of the Commission is broadened with 
Regulation 1/2003: the Commission offi  cials may ask employees for “explanations of facts or 
documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection”.43
An undertaking cannot be fi ned for refusing to submit to an inspection when the inspection is 
issued by written authorisation. In such circumstances, penalties may only be imposed upon 
an undertaking when the dawn raid is issued by decision.44 In case of a dawn raid issued 
by decision, but also by written authorisation, fi nes may be imposed when an undertaking 
provides incomplete documents or when the undertaking provides incorrect or misleading 
answers. However, it is only possible to fi ne undertakings for failing or refusing to provide 
complete answers when an inspection is ordered by decision.45
Furthermore, the Commission may also impose fi nes upon an undertaking when seals are 
broken.46 Fines may thus be imposed upon undertakings when they do not cooperate or provide 
misleading or incorrect answers. However, it should be mentioned that incorrect, misleading 
and incomplete answers made by a member of staff  not being a representative can be rectifi ed 
by the undertaking concerned.47 The Commission can therefore only impose a fi ne directly 
on an undertaking when a legal representative provides incorrect, incomplete or misleading 
answers. 48 If the undertaking does not rectify the answer given by a member of staff , not being 
the representative of the undertaking, then a fi ne may be imposed upon that undertaking.49
As mentioned before, the powers of the Commission are not unlimited, since the Commission 
should observe the rights of the defence of an undertaking. Over the years the powers of the 
Hearing Offi  cer also have been broadened to strengthen the objectivity and impartiality of 
competition law proceedings.50
Regulation 1/2003 fi xes the amount of fi nes purely to a percentage of the overall turnover of 
the undertaking in one business year. Fines for procedural infringements are under Regulation
41  Article 23(1)(a) and (b) Regulation 1/2003.
42  Article 20(2) Regulation 1/2003. 
43  Article 20(2)(e) Regulation 1/2003.
44  Article 23(1)(c) Regulation 1/2003.
45  Article 23(1)(d) Regulation 1/2003.
46  Article 23(1)(e) Regulation 1/2003.
47  Article 23(1)(d) Regulation 1/2003 and Article 4(3) Regulation 773/2004.
48   Legal persons cannot speak and therefore natural persons have to provide answers. For the purpose of the dawn raid provision in 
Regulation 1/2003 natural persons are divided into employees or legal representatives.
49  Article 23(1)(d) Regulation 1/2003 and Article 4(3) Regulation 773/2004.
50  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/hearing_offi  cers/index_en.html, visited 30/07/2015. 
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1/2003 also limited by this percentage. Article 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that 
procedural infringements may be fi ned by a maximum of 1% of the turnover in the preceding 
business year. The maximum fi ne for substantive infringements is fi xed at 10%.51 Periodic 
penalty payments are fi xed at “5% of the average daily turnover in the preceding business 
year per day”.52 These fi nes may be imposed when an undertaking acts by intent or when 
it acts negligently. These thresholds again leave considerable discretion to the Commission. 
In 2006, the Commission issued new Fining Guidelines. There are, just as in the old 
Guidelines, no rules in these Guidelines as to the methodology of setting fi nes for procedural 
infringements. These Guidelines were adopted in order to increase the deterrent eff ect of the 
substantive competition law fi nes, but also “to refi ne the rules in the light of experience”.53
Not only the Fining Guidelines were updated after 2004. The Leniency Notice of 2002 was 
also changed in 2004 in order “to provide more guidance to applicants and to increase the 
transparency of the procedure”.54 In 2008, the Commission also introduced a Notice on 
settlements in cartel cases. Furthermore, the Commission amended Regulation 773/2004 in 
2008 as well to introduce rules on settlements.55 These measures were taken in order to speed 
up the procedure. In exchange for an admission of guilt, a 10% reduction of the fi ne is off ered 
by the Commission. 
5.3 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
5.3.1 Introduction
Having clarifi ed the enforcement system of EU competition law, it is time to now turn to 
the application of the fi ve principles central to this study in competition law proceedings. 
The fi rst of these principles is the freedom from self-incrimination. In 1989, this principle 
was for the fi rst time accepted as a principle which could be invoked in EU competition 
law procedures,56 although the Court of Justice did not accept a full criminal law version of 
this principle. Nowadays, this “approach is being increasingly questioned by legal scholars 
and practitioners in the light of the relevant ECtHR case law”.57 For that time though, it was 
perhaps a bold move of the Court to accept the freedom from self-incrimination for legal 
persons. A criminal law principle thus found its way into the administrative law enforcement 
of EU competition law. The Court stated in the Orkem case that this principle was not present 
in Regulation 17/62,58 nor in the ECHR,59 whilst this principle was present in the laws of 
the Member States, although it was only accepted for natural persons.60 Furthermore, the 
51  Article 23(2). 
52  Article 24(1) Regulation 1/2003.
53  See Press Release IP/06/857 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-857_en.htm?locale=en). 
54   See Press Release IP/06/1705 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1705_en.htm?locale=en). 
55  S ee Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of 
settlement procedures in cartel cases.
56  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission).
57  Nehl (2014), p. 1294.
58  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 27-28.
59  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 30.
60  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 29.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only respects this principle in criminal 
law procedures.61 Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the rights of the defence, also during the 
fact-fi nding phase, the Court of Justice did accept the freedom from self-incrimination to be 
applicable in EU competition law proceedings. However, the Court of Justice did not accept 
a complete freedom from self-incrimination “in order to preserve the useful eff ect”62 of the 
powers of the Commission. The Commission is therefore allowed to compel an undertaking 
to provide already existing documents and to compel an undertaking to provide factual 
answers. Conversely, the Commission is not allowed to compel an undertaking to admit its 
admission in an infringement.63 This Orkem reasoning has been confi rmed by the Union Courts 
on multiple occasions,64 although it has been subject to a lively debate amongst academics and 
practitioners, especially in light of the compatibility of the reasoning of the Union Courts with 
case law of the ECtHR.65
Obviously, the freedom from self-incrimination will only be triggered when there is some 
form of compulsion on an undertaking. The Court of Justice created a twofold test in order 
to determine whether there is an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination. In 
Limburgse Vinyl, a case from 2002, the Court stated that “both the Orkem judgment and the recent 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights require, fi rst [for the nemo tenetur principle 
to be applicable], the exercise of coercion against the suspect in order to obtain information 
from him and, second, establishment of the existence of an actual interference with the right 
which they defi ne”.66 The Union Courts thus “made the privilege against self-incrimination 
dependent on an element of compulsion or coercion”.67 This evolution of the freedom from 
self-incrimination took place in light of the developments in case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. In order to determine whether there is an actual interference, the Court of 
Justice made a distinction in the Orkem case between obligations to provide documents and 
obligations to provide answers. As is elaborated upon below, documents should always be 
handed over to the Commission, whilst answers - whether in writing or not - should only be
61  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 31.
62  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 34.
63  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 34-35.
64   CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v 
Commission), appeal: ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgese 
Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission); CFI, T-112/98 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission); ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox 
v Commission); ECJ, C-65/02 and C-73/02 P (ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission); CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 
251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), appeal: ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon); CFI, T-50/00 (Dalmine 
SpA v Commission), appeal: ECJ, C-407/04 P (Dalmine SpA v Commission); CFI, T-259/02, T-264/02, T-271/02 (Raiff eisen Zentralbank 
Österreich AG and others v Commission), appeal: ECJ, C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P (Erste Group Bank and others 
v Commission); GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission); GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission); GC, 
T-458/09 and T-171/10 (Slovak Telekom v Commission); GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission); GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del 
Monte v Commission); GC, T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission); GC, T-462/07 (Galp Energia España 
and others v Commission); GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux Corp v Commission); GC, T-456/10 (Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission).
65   See e.g. Veenbrink (2015a); Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 143-151; and Van Bael (2011), p. 101 and p. 158-161; Andreangeli, p. 129-149; 
Aslam & Ramsden (2008), p. 67-74; Redmayne (2007), p. 210, argues that ‘[t]he European Court of Justice [...] recognizes a narrower 
privilege than Strasbourg; Macculloch (2006), p. 235; Wils (2003). See also H Nehl (2014), p. 1294, fn. 85, who refers to diff erent authors.
66   ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV and 
others v Commission), par. 275.
67  Vesterdorf (2005), p. 1197.
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given to the Commission when they do not entail an admission of guilt. In what follows, the 
element of coercion is examined (5.3.2), after which the actual interference is discussed (5.3.3). 
Access to a lawyer, and the duty of confi dentiality, is discussed as well in so far as relevant for 
the freedom from self-incrimination (5.3.4). Lastly, the consequences of an infringement of the 
freedom from self-incrimination are discussed (5.3.4).
5.3.2 Coercion
An undertaking claiming an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination should 
fi rst claim that there is some form of coercion. In this regard, the Union Courts have held that 
requests for information under Article 11(2) of Regulation 17/6268 and under 18(2) Regulation of 
1/200369 will not amount to coercion, since no fi nes can be imposed upon an undertaking for non-
cooperation.70 This does not mean though, as the Union courts also have held, that there is no duty 
to actively cooperate with an investigation and thus also with a simple request for information.71
A simple request will therefore not amount to coercion due to the absence of penalties, but an 
undertaking will still be obliged to cooperate actively. The rationale of this, perhaps at fi rst sight 
confl icting reasoning, appears to be the prevention of claims from undertakings that they provided 
information after a simple request was sent on a voluntary basis and that therefore a reduction of a 
possible fi ne of the substantive competition rules is in order. It should be noted that the distinction 
between coercion and a duty to actively cooperate is not always that clear. In the InnoLux case, the 
General Court blurred this distinction by ruling as follows:
It should however be borne in mind that, in order to ensure the eff ectiveness of Article 
18(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission is entitled to compel undertakings 
to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to them 
and to disclose to the Commission, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are 
in their possession, on condition only that an undertaking is not compelled to provide 
the Commission with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the 
existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove (Case 
374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, paragraphs 34 and 35). An undertaking 
to which the Commission addresses a request for information pursuant to Article 18 of 
68   CFI, T-25-26/95, T-30-32/95, T-34-39/95, T-42-46/95,T-48/95, T-50-65/95, T-68-71/95, T-87-88/95 and T-103-104/95 (Cimentries CBR 
and others v Commission), par. 734; CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgese Vinyl 
Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 455-457; ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P 
and C-254/99 P (Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 279; CFI, T-50/00 (Dalmine SpA v Commission), par. 46.
69   GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 838-839; ECJ, C-293/13 P and C-294/13 P (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 195. 
The General Court also held in the Fresh Del Monte case that “[t]he case-law relating to [Article 11 of Regulation 17/62] and clarifying 
the Commission’s powers to make such requests is applicable by analogy in the interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 1/2003”.
70   E.g. ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV 
and others v Commission), par. 279.
71   See ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), where the ECJ insisted that undertakings have a duty to cooperate actively with both 
simple requests and decisions for information under Regulation 17/62. In GC, T-458/09 and T-171/10 (Slovak Telekom v Commission), 
par. 44, a case dealing with Regulation 1/2003, the General Court held: “Finally, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has stated, 
on numerous occasions, in relation to the application of Regulation No 17, that an undertaking which is being investigated is subject 
to an obligation to cooperate actively, which implies that it must make available to the Commission all information relating to the 
subject-matter of the investigation [...]”. See also T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), par. 82, 
where reference is made to a general duty to cooperate under Regulation 1/2003, and more specifi cally under Article 20(4) of that 
Regulation which gives the competence to the Commission to issue a decision for a dawn raid. 
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Regulation No 1/2003 is therefore bound by an obligation to cooperate actively and may 
be punished by a specifi c fi ne, as laid down in Article 23(1) of that regulation, which may 
represent up to 1% of total turnover if it provides, intentionally or negligently, incorrect 
or misleading information (Shell Petroleum and others v Commission, paragraph 118).72
The reference to the compulsion exerted by the Commission even in case it issues a simple 
request for information and the reference to the possibility to impose a fi ne for providing 
incorrect and misleading answers, seems to imply that the freedom from self-incrimination also 
applies to simple requests. Strangely enough, the Court of Justice also used this terminology 
in SGL Carbon by stating that, for requests and decisions for information, “the Commission is 
entitled to compel an undertaking, if necessary by adopting a decision, to provide all necessary 
information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, 
such documents relating thereto as are in that undertaking’s possession”.73
The diff erence between SGL Carbon and Innolux is that the Court of Justice did not refer 
to the coercion by penalties in SGL Carbon. It appears that the reference to compelling an 
undertaking in SGL Carbon merely refers to the obligation to cooperate, since there was no 
reference to coercion which can only be exerted by the Commission by imposing a fi ne for 
non-cooperation on an undertaking. Unfortunately, the diff erence between coercion and the 
obligation to cooperate was not raised by the parties, nor addressed by the Court of Justice, in 
the Innolux appeal procedure. One may assume though, on the basis of settled case law, that 
this was merely a slip of the pen. Moreover, even if this was a deliberate choice of wording 
of the General Court, it is not unfamiliar for the European Court of Justice to strike down a 
ruling of the General Court which broadens the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination 
when such a ruling weakens the enforcement powers of the Commission.74
In legal doctrine, the distinction between the active duty to cooperate and the coercion 
exercised by the Commission is also not always that clearly stated. Van Bael e.g. asserts that the 
Orkem principle “constitutes an exception to the otherwise absolute obligation of cooperation 
with the Commission in the course of competition investigations”.75 This statement negates 
the fact that the freedom from self-incrimination is only triggered when the Commission 
can coerce an undertaking to cooperate and not when there is merely an obligation to 
cooperate. Coercion, as asserted above, always exists when fi nes for non-cooperation 
can be imposed on an undertaking. When there is no possibility to impose a fi ne for non-
cooperation on an undertaking, there will not be coercion on the part of that undertaking. 
A dawn raid can be initiated on the basis of a written authorisation or a decision. An 
undertaking cannot be obliged on pain of a fi ne to allow a dawn raid by written authorisation.
72  GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux Corp v Commission), par. 167.
73  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 41 (emphasis added).
74  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 47.
75   Van Bael (2011), p. 160. Van Bael refers here also to the Opinion of AG Gulmann in ECJ, C-60/92 (Otto v Postbank). 
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This in contrast to a dawn raid on the basis of a decision. The General Court has therefore 
stated that Commission inspectors may not compel an undertaking to provide an admission 
of guilt during an inspection ordered by decision.76 The freedom from self-incrimination is 
therefore also applicable during a dawn raid issued by decision, because such a dawn raid 
may amount to coercion on part of the undertaking. As is explained below, it remains to be 
seen whether coercion exists when employees are being interrogated during a dawn raid.
The Commission can by request ask an undertaking not only to provide factual information 
and documents,77 but also to provide an admission of guilt. In such a case an undertaking 
does not have to admit its participation. In Ahmann and Söhne, the General Court ruled that if 
an undertaking nonetheless does admit its guilt when this was requested by the Commission, 
it will be regarded as spontaneous cooperation and therefore the undertaking cannot claim to 
be coerced.78 It is doubtful whether the same reasoning will be used by the Union Courts for 
decisions requesting information under Article 18(3) Regulation 1/2003 or for interrogations 
of legal representatives under Article 20(2)(e) and 20(4) Regulation 1/2003, since non-
compliance might in both circumstances directly lead to a fi ne.79 The reasoning might thus be 
based on the distinction between requests / written authorisation on one the hand and decisions
on the other, since an element of coercion is only present when a decision has been issued. 
Undertakings may also decide to cooperate with the Commission when the Commission 
has not (yet) requested information. Any admission of guilt by an undertaking will in those 
circumstances be seen as a voluntary admission, since an undertaking cannot be coerced 
into providing an admission of guilt.80 In the Acerinox case, the Court explicitly referred to a 
paragraph in the Opinion of AG Léger. As the latter stated in that paragraph: 
Indeed, like the disclosure of matters of fact or evidence, admission of the infringement 
is a matter entirely within the will of the undertaking. It is not in any way coerced 
to admit the existence of the cartel or to provide information capable of proving its 
existence. The degree of cooperation which the undertaking wishes to off er in the 
administrative procedure is therefore governed entirely by the undertakings’ freedom 
of choice and is not in any circumstances imposed by the Commission.81
76  T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), par. 82.
77   Providing pre-existing documents can never amount to an admission of guilt, see ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 
44-48. This in contrast to documents specifi cally created to answer questions of the Commission. 
78  GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 329 and 332. 
79   If, during a dawn raid, an employee provides incomplete answers, and thus only partly cooperates, these answers may be rectifi ed by 
the undertaking after the dawn raid has ended. Only when an undertaking does not rectify those answers, fi nes may be imposed, supra
par. 5.2.2. One might therefore argue that there is only coercion on part of the undertaking when a legal representative is interrogated. 
See also Vesterdorf (2005), p. 1212-1214.
80   ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox v Commission), par. 89; ECJ, C-65/02 and C-73/02 P (ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission), par. 52. It 
appears that undertakings, by voluntarily cooperating, waived their freedom from self-incrimination. This participation may be taken 
into account as a mitigating circumstance, see  Acerinox v Commission, par. 87.
81   Opinion AG Léger, C-57/02, C-65/02 and C-73/02 (Acerinox, ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 140.
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In a similar line of reasoning, the Union Courts have made clear that the leniency programme 
does not amount to coercion to admit participation in a cartel. In Acerinox and ThyssenKrupp, 
the Court of Justice merely stated that the “construction” which applies to voluntarily 
providing an admission of guilt is “to be placed on the Leniency Notice”.82 This reasoning has 
been affi  rmed in stronger terms by the General Court from 2011 onwards.83 Participation in the 
leniency programme is considered to be a “matter entirely within the will of the undertaking 
concerned”,84 and therefore there is no form of coercion. The leniency programme only 
encourages undertakings to admit participation in a cartel. The fact that an undertaking might 
benefi t less from the leniency programme when it does not cooperate fully cannot be regarded 
as coercion.85 As the General Court has stated, “the same logic applies to the settlement 
procedure”.86 The 1996 Leniency Notice allowed a reduction of the fi ne when an undertaking 
did not contest the facts. In the Schindler case, the undertaking argued that, in order to be 
granted a reduction under the leniency regime, it could not contest untrue facts put forward 
by other undertakings. In its obiter dictum the General Court ruled interestingly enough that 
“the allegation that an undertaking is under an obligation not to dispute facts of which it is 
not the author is based on the purely theoretical hypothesis of an undertaking’s accusing itself 
of an infringement which it has not committed in the hope of receiving a reduction in the fi ne 
which it fears will nevertheless be imposed on it. Such an assumption cannot serve as a basis 
for an argument alleging breach of the nemo tenetur principle”.87 The General Court is thus of 
the opinion that, even if the incentive amounted to coercion, an undertaking will never admit 
an infringement when it is not guilty of that infringement. This is a strange statement in light 
of one of the rationales behind the nemo tenetur principle, since this principle can be regarded 
as a mechanism to protect the truth-fi nding process and thus to avoid miscarriages of justice.88
The protection off ered by the freedom from self-incrimination can protect a suspect, or in 
competition law proceedings undertakings, against pressure which would lead them to lie 
in order to obtain a reduction of a fi ne. According to the General Court, an undertaking will 
never lie in order to obtain a reduction of a competition law fi ne. This does not appear to be 
in conformity with the rationale of the freedom from self-incrimination.
In conclusion, requests for authorisation, and probably also dawn raids by written authorisation, 
the leniency programme and the settlement procedure all do not amount to coercion. The 
freedom from self-incrimination is in those cases not triggered. Furthermore, after voluntarily 
providing an admission of guilt, the undertaking concerned cannot rely on the freedom from 
self-incrimination. Voluntarily providing information, however, probably only occurs when 
82   ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox v Commission), par. 91; ECJ, C-65/02 and C-73/02 P (ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission), par. 54. 
83   GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 153; GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 110; GC, 
T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 115; GC, T-456/10 (Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission), par. 120.
84  GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 153.
85  GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 115.
86  GC, T-456/10 (Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission), par. 120.
87  GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 157.
88  See e.g. Harris et al. (2014), p. 422.
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there is no coercion, and thus when the Commission cannot impose a fi ne for non-cooperation. 
Only decisions for information and dawn raids by decision thus amount to coercion. 
During a dawn raid, the Commission has the competence to interrogate representatives 
and members of staff . Legal representatives can probably rely on the freedom from self-
incrimination of the undertaking when interrogated during a dawn raid, since fi nes can 
immediately be imposed upon the undertaking when they refuse to answer or provide incorrect 
or misleading answers. When an employee provides incomplete, incorrect or misleading 
answers, the Commission cannot immediately impose a fi ne on the undertaking, since it 
should fi rst give the undertaking the opportunity to rectify the answers. It could therefore be 
argued that there is no coercion when an employee, not being a legal representative, is being 
interrogated by Commission offi  cials.89 This means that only legal representatives could rely 
on the freedom from self-incrimination derived from the undertaking. On the other hand, 
the Court has in the past ruled, in light of the concept of undertaking, that workers “are, 
for the duration of [their employment] relationship, incorporated into the undertakings 
concerned and thus form an economic unit with each of them”.90 All employees are thus part 
of the undertaking. This could imply that all employees may rely on the freedom from self-
incrimination, because they form a part of the undertaking. Furthermore, in Deutsche Bahn, 
the General Court did hold that Commission offi  cials may not require an admission of guilt 
during an interrogation which takes place at the time of a dawn raid issued by decision.91
No distinction is made by the General Court between interrogations of legal representatives 
and employees. This is, again, an indication that all employees may rely on the freedom 
from self-incrimination and not only legal representatives. Nevertheless, there is no case 
law explicitly endorsing this approach. In light of the element of coercion, which should be 
present before an undertaking can rely on the freedom from self-incrimination, it is not likely 
that this right of the undertaking is extended to all employees though.92 An undertaking 
cannot be fi ned when a normal employee refuses to answer questions. Coercion thus exists 
only when a legal representative is interrogated, but not when an employee is interrogated. 
It is thus more plausible that only legal representatives have a derived freedom from self-
incrimination, because coercion to answer exists only for legal representative. Only a refusal 
by legal representatives to answer questions may lead directly to a fi ne for the undertaking. 
5.3.3 Actual interference
After it is established that coercion existed, there should be an actual interference with the 
freedom from self-incrimination. The Orkem ruling is still relevant here. In the Orkem case the 
Court of Justice made a distinction between obligations to provide documents and obligations 
89  See also Vesterdorf (2005), p. 1212-1214. 
90   ECJ, C-22/98 (Criminal proceedings against Jean Claude Becu and others), par. 26. See also: ECJ, C-542/14 (SIA “VM Remonts” (anciennement 
SIA “DIV un KO”) and others v Konkurences padome), par. 23.
91  GC, T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), par. 82.
92  Veenbrink (2015a), p. 134-135.
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to provide answers. Documents should always be handed over to the Commission,93 whilst 
answers - whether in writing or not - should only be given to the Commission when they 
do not entail an admission of guilt.94 An absolute right to silence was not accepted by the 
Court, since this would be to the detriment of the eff ective enforcement of the EU competition 
law rules. Furthermore, an undertaking is always in the position, as the ECJ ruled in SGL 
Carbon, to dispute the interpretation of documents by the Commission.95 This same reasoning 
could be extended to factual answers. The rights of the defence would thus not be irreparably 
damaged by these limitations to the freedom from self-incrimination.96
In 2004, the Court of First Instance adapted the Orkem reasoning by ruling that the request 
for certain pre-existing documents would infringe the freedom from self-incrimination.97
However, the European Court of Justice re-affi  rmed, on appeal, its Orkem reasoning and ruled 
that “[t]he obligation to cooperate means that the undertaking may not evade requests for 
production of documents on the ground that by complying with them it would be required to 
give evidence”.98 Documents should thus always be handed over.
An undertaking may not be coerced into providing admissions of guilt. Admissions of 
guilt should be distinguished from factual answers. When the Commission asks whether 
representatives of an undertaking were present at a certain meeting, this will only require a 
factual answer. In contrast, the Commission may not ask about the nature of the discussion at 
that meeting, where it leads to the admission that a prohibited agreement was made.
93   ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 34; CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgese 
Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 447 and 449; CFI, T-112/98 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission), par. 65-
67; CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 406; ECJ, C-301/04 P 
(Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 41-42; CFI, T-259/02, T-264/02, T-271/02 (Raiff eisen Zentralbank Österreich AG and others v Commission), 
par. 539; ECJ, C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P (Erste Group Bank and others v Commission), par. 271; GC, T-446/05 
(Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 325-327; GC, T-458/09 and T-171/10 (Slovak Telekom v Commission), par. 41; GC, T-587/08 
(Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 836; GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux Corp v Commission), par. 167.
94   ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission), par. 34-35; CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 
(Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 447 and 449; ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 
P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgese Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 273; CFI, T-112/98 
(Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission), par. 65-67; ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox v Commission), par. 86; ECJ, C-65/02 and C-73/02 P 
(ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission), par. 49; CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and 
others v Commission), par. 406; ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 41-42; CFI, T-50/00 (Dalmine SpA v Commission), par. 45; 
ECJ, C-407/04 P (Dalmine SpA v Commission), par. 34; CFI, T-259/02, T-264/02, T-271/02 (Raiff eisen Zentralbank Österreich AG and others 
v Commission), par. 539; E ECJ, C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P (Erste Group Bank and others v Commission), par. 271; 
GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 325-327; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 
150; GC, T-458/09 and T-171/10 (Slovak Telekom v Commission), par. 41; GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 112; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 836; GC, T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), 
par. 82; GC, T-462/07 (Galp Energia España and others v Commission), par. 114; GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux Corp v Commission), par. 167; GC, 
T-456/10 (Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission), par. 120.
95  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 49.
96   Cf. Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 146, who argues that “[r]equiring the undertaking to characterise certain facts in a particular way entails 
the danger that, although this characterisation may not be the true one, it may have the consequence of prejudicing, once applied to 
the facts in question, any attempt by the undertaking to off er an alternative explanation”.
97   CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 409. See also Advocate General 
Geelhoed in ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 56, who stated: “[The Court of First Instance appeared] to have drawn 
a distinction between ‘admissible’ and ‘non-admissible’ documents. In other words, because the Commission could not compel 
the [undertaking concerned] to answer the questions on the object and results/outcome of those meetings, it could not ask for the 
documents relating to them either.”
98  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 48.
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The obligation to provide factual answers to questions of the Commission does not allow 
questions which require from an undertaking “a subjective appreciation of what information 
falls within the request [of the Commission]”.99 So-called fi shing expeditions are therefore 
not allowed, since they require such a subjective appreciation by the undertaking concerned 
about the information that should be handed over.100
There is a fi ne line between requiring factual answers and requiring an admission of guilt. 
Lasok for example argues that the Commission is prevented “from asking questions of the 
‘have you stopped beating your wife?’ sort”, but not from asking questions such as “[d]id 
one of your employees (and, if so, who) attend such-and-such a meeting?”.101 In order to 
distinguish between those types of questions a distinction is made in legal doctrine between 
primary facts and qualifi ed facts,102 or sometimes between purely factual questions and 
leading questions.103
A qualifi ed fact would require “the undertaking to assess its position as regards the 
application of the competition rules”.104 Purely factual questions do not require answers 
which would lead the undertaking to interpret facts or give its opinion on matt ers. One 
could argue that factual questions can be “equally damning”105 as leading questions. As 
Riley has stated, the Commission cannot ask questions such as “when did you stop beating 
your wife”, but the Orkem-rule “does permit the Commission to ask for a close examination 
of her bruises and the instruments by which they were infl icted”.106 Or, in competition law 
terms, “this means that although the Commission cannot ask a company ‘how many meetings 
have you had with your competitors at which the fi xing of prices was discussed?’, it can 
ask ‘How many meetings have you had with your competitors and what was discussed 
at each meeting?’ and the company will be obliged to answer and fi ned if it does not”.107
There is thus a thin line between leading questions and factual questions, which might, 
according to some authors, not be justifi ed either due to their equally damning nature. The 
consequences of this distinction are however tremendous, since leading questions do not 
have to be answered by an undertaking, whereas factual questions should be answered. 
The protection of the freedom from self-incrimination in EU competition law proceedings 
does not only apply to admissions of an infringement of the competition law rules, but also 
to admissions of actions the Commission may take into account as aggravating factors when 
determining a fi ne. In SGL Carbon, the ECJ ruled that the eponymous fi rm was not obliged to
99  Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 145; Lasok (1990), p. 91. 
100   This is also apparent from the Deutsche Bahn case, although the argumentation was not based on the freedom from self-incrimination, 
but on the motivation requirement and the rights of defence in general. See ECJ, C-583/13 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), 
par. 63. See also see GC, T-135/09 (Nexans France v Commission), par. 43, where the General Court referred to the obligation on the 
Commission to formulate its inspection decisions as precise as possible to prevent arbitrary inspections.
101  Lasok (1990), p. 91.
102  Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 145; Lasok (1990), p. 91.
103   See e.g. Van Bael (2011), p. 160; Andreangeli (2008), p. 132. Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 146 also refers to leading incriminating questions. 
104  Giannakopoulos (2011), p. 145.
105  Andreangeli (2008), p. 132.
106  Riley (2000), p. 269.
107  Smith (2001), p. 2.
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 provide the names of the undertakings which it had warned when the Commission started its 
investigation into the cartel.108 This concise statement of the Court was based on the Opinion 
of AG Geelhoed.109 The warning could be used by the Commission as an aggravating factor, 
although it does not necessarily have to be used by the Commission as an aggravating factor. 
The discretion of the Commission does not change the fact that answering the question could 
lead to a higher fi ne. Requiring an answer to such questions means requiring a “response of a 
self-incriminating character”.110
5.3.4 Access to a lawyer and the duty of confi dentiality (legal professional 
privilege)
Access to a lawyer is regarded by the ECtHR as an important safeguard to ensure compliance 
with the freedom from self-incrimination.111 Access to a lawyer and the principle of legal 
professional privilege are closely related principles. The rationale for accepting legal 
professional privilege in EU competition law proceedings appears to lie in the protection of 
the rights of the defence,112 although there are authors who insist that the approach of the 
Court of Justice corresponds with the rationale of the right to privacy.113 The acceptance in EU 
competition law of the principle of legal professional privilege protects undertakings from 
the dilemma whether or not to seek legal advice.114 The freedom from self-incrimination does 
not protect an undertaking against requests for pre-existing documents or requests for factual 
answers. Documents could include in particular correspondence between an undertaking 
and a lawyer. It is therefore necessary to protect the lawyer-client confi dentiality in order for 
an undertaking to eff ectively enjoy the right to legal counsel. Legal professional privilege 
protects an undertaking where the limits to the freedom from self-incrimination are reached. 
Access to a lawyer and the principle of legal professional privilege are briefl y discussed 
in this paragraph insofar as they are relevant for the freedom from self-incrimination. 
Access to a lawyer is particularly important during an inspection, since employees and legal 
representatives can be asked questions on the spot by Commission offi  cials. The Commission 
shall, in general, wait with exercising its inspections powers, until a lawyer of the undertaking 
is present.115
108  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 69.
109  AG Geelhoed in ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 75-78.
110  AG Geelhoed in ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 76.
111  See chapter 2, par. 2.2.2.1.
112  Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 1005.
113   Frese (2011b), p. 200, states that “[t]he approach of the Court in AM & S, and indeed in Akzo Nobel, dealing with the principle of LPP, 
is very similar to the approach in the fi eld of the principle of the inviolability of one’s home”. Cf. Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 991, who 
states that “[p]rivacy rights can [...] not be the rationale for a privilege altogether disconnected from legal proceedings, for the simple 
reason that legal privilege has not existence or meaning outside legal proceedings”. In contrast to both, AG Maduro in ECJ, C-305/05 
(Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones e.a. v Commission), par. 44, contends that aspects are drawn from both the right to a fair 
trial and the right to privacy for determining the scope of the principle of legal professional privilege.
114  E.g. Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 1002.
115   The delay, while waiting for a lawyer, should be kept to the strict minimum, see Explanatory note to an authorisation to conduct an 
inspection in execution of a Commission decision under Article 20(4) of Council Regulation No 1/2003, par. 6. 
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The Commission will also respect lawyer-client privilege. This means that documentation 
relating to the rights of the defence which emanates116 from an independent lawyer will be 
protected.117
Correspondence between lawyer and client should fi rstly relate to the rights of the defence. This 
condition does not appear to lead to any problems in practice,118 since it is interpreted broadly. 
All documentation relating to the subject-matter of the investigation, whether exchanged 
before or after the initiation of the proceedings by the Commission, can be covered by this 
privilege.119 Three categories of documents may be distinguished:120 (i) documents emanating 
from the lawyer which relate to the rights of the defence, (ii) preparatory documents drawn 
up by the undertaking “for the sole aim of seeking legal advice from a lawyer”,121 and (iii) 
“internal notes which are confi ned to reporting the text or the content of [the written lawyer-
client] communications”.122 These three categories of documents are only protected by legal 
professional privilege when they are confi dential.123 Furthermore, an undertaking may waive 
this principle by disclosing the documents.124 In this regard, Christoforou refers to diff erent 
types of disclosure from which, according to him, only express, deliberate or, in some cases, 
implied waivers should be accepted.125
The fi rst criterion, which relates to the nature of the communication exchanged between 
lawyer and client, is thus a broad criterion, but not an unlimited one. In the Perindopril (Servier) 
decision,126 certain documents emanating from a lawyer were excluded from the principle 
of legal professional privilege, since they did not relate to the rights of the defence. The 
Perindopril documents were letters by an (external) lawyer of a competitor of Servier. These 
letters were sent to the (external) lawyer of the fi rm concerned and contained a complaint 
about the its behaviour. A violation of the EU competition law rules was described in the 
letters. Furthermore, the lawyer of the competitor requested Servier to stop its behaviour, 
otherwise a complaint would be fi led to the Commission. The lawyer of Servier sent these 
documents to Servier with a view to discussing these. The documents represented a goldmine 
for the Commission, since they contained information on an alleged breach of the competition 
law rules. The Commission rejected the claim on the privileged nature of the documents on 
four grounds:
116   The AM&S and AKZO rulings refer to communication emanating from a lawyer. Communication which is to be sent from the 
undertaking to the lawyer could also fall under this principle. Therefore, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of communications 
between an independent lawyer and an undertaking. 
117   ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 21-22; CFI, T-30/89 (Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v Commission), par. 13; CFI, T-125/03 
and T-253/03 (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 117; ECJ, C-550/07 P (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 41.
118  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 925.
119  ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 23.
120  See e.g. Frese (2011b), p. 198.
121  CFI, T-125/03 and T-253/03 (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 124.
122  CFI, T-30/89 (Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v Commission), par. 18.
123   See Christoforou (1985), p. 7-8, who also argues that fi ling documents in general fi les is not suffi  cient to regard the documents as non-
confi dential. 
124  ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 28.
125  Christoforou (1985), p. 44-45.
126  C(2010)5044. 
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(i) [W]hilst the document originates from an independent lawyer within the 
meaning of AM&S, that lawyer is not the lawyer acting on behalf of Servier, but 
the lawyer of an opposing party; it thereby follows that the communication was 
not made with a view to defending Servier’s rights and interests;
(ii) the fact that Document No 1 is attached to the communication between an 
external lawyer and his client (Servier), does not change the nature of Document 
No l, which was not prepared for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s 
rights of defence; the Akzo judgment clarifi es in this respect that “the mere /act that 
a document has been discussed with a lawyer is n ot suffi  cient to give it such protection” 
(paragraph 123);
(iii) Document No 1 does not summarise legal advice given by an external lawyer
working for Servier in the sense of the Hilti order;
(iv) Document No 1 was not prepared within Servier for the purpose of 
seeking legal advice from an independent lawyer.127
This decision of the Commission has been criticised in literature, since “it will require outside 
counsel and their clients to use unnecessary and artifi cial techniques in their communication, 
as well as in the communications with opposing counsel, in order to avoid certain information 
potentially being reviewed by the Commission following an inspection”.128 Furthermore, 
“it may also prejudice undertakings entering into a settlement, rather than launching court 
proceedings and/or lodging a complaint”.129
The Commission applied existing case law in an adequate matter to this new situation. It is 
doubtful that the rights of the defence will be infringed by this decision. The rationale of legal 
professional privilege in EU competition law is mainly to ensure that undertakings are able to 
obtain advice on the applicable EU rules. The Commission would probably not have inspected 
the documentation, if the lawyer of Servier would have sent the letters of the competitor to 
Servier together with advice on how to deal with it. The letter of a third party lawyer, which 
was merely forwarded by Servier’s lawyer does not fall under the protection of the principle 
of legal professional privilege. Extending this protection to such documentation would restrict 
the Commission in a disproportionate way. Furthermore, the Commission itself stated that 
the “need to protect [the] communication as a corollary of the rights of the defence, is normally
not applicable in the case of communications between lawyers acting for opposing parties, 
which were submitted to the respective clients and found on the clients’ premises during 
inspections”.130 This statement leaves room for exceptions on a case-by-case basis. The decision 
127  Perindopril (Servier) decision, C(2010)5044, par. 15.
128  Buyle, Brophy & McInnes (2012), p. 210.
129  Buyle, Brophy & McInnes (2012), p. 210.
130  Perindopril (Servier) decision, C(2010)5044, par. 17 (emphasis added). 
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was however not appealed, nor were arguments raised in the substantive procedure. It is 
therefore not completely certain that the CJEU would formulate its ruling in a similar manner. 
The second criterion, which was already mentioned above, requires communication to be 
exchanged between an undertaking and an independent lawyer. This criterion is composed of 
two elements; (i) only communications with independent, or in other words, external lawyers 
are covered by this principle,131 and (ii) that an independent lawyer should be competent to 
practice in the EU,132 or in other words, should be a member of a bar or law society in one of 
the Member States. 
The fi rst element, the element of independence, has att racted much criticism in legal 
literature.133 The ECJ established in AM&S, and reaffi  rmed in 2010 in AKZO,134 that the 
term ‘independent’ relates not only to the positive aspect, namely the professional ethical 
obligations of lawyers, but also relates to a negative aspect, which is the external/internal 
dichotomy. In-house counsel who did or did not join a bar or law society are by defi nition not 
independent, whereas external lawyers will be regarded as independent for the application 
of the principle of legal professional privilege. In light of the functional interpretation of 
the term ‘undertaking’ this is an understandable point of view, since all employees “are, 
for the duration of [their employment] relationship, incorporated into the undertakings 
concerned and thus form an economic unit with [the undertaking]”.135 It would be strange 
to let the undertaking withhold communications which it found to be privileged, but 
which it had writt en for itself. Conversely, the Court of Justice did not use this functional 
approach in its reasoning, but rather ruled that the “economic dependence and the close 
ties with his employer”136 do not allow an in-house lawyer to have the same independence 
as an external lawyer. An in-house lawyer cannot ignore the commercial strategies of the 
undertaking.137 Members of European Parliament have, in the past, unsuccessfully advocated 
extending the principle of legal professional privilege to in-house lawyers as well.138
The second element of the second criterion entails that a lawyer can legally practice in the EU. 
This element can be found in the AM&S case, but is not repeated in later case law. There are, 
131   ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 21-22; CFI, T-30/89 (Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v Commission), par. 13; CFI, T-125/03 
and T-253/03 (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 117; ECJ, C-550/07 P (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 41.
132  ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 25-26.
133   See e.g. Frese (2011b), p. 197 and Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 969, who both refer to diff erent authors. See also Nehl (2014), p. 1297.
134   The President of the Court of First Instance has indicated that the issue of excluding in-house counsel, even though that counsel was 
a member of a bar, raised “delicate question of principle, which requires a complex legal assessment”. See the Order of the President 
of the CFI, T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R (AKZO v Commission), par. 130. This order raised hope for the proponents of extending legal 
professional privilege to in-house counsel. See also Vesterdorf (2005), p. 1187-1188. The order was, however, quashed on appeal by the 
President of the ECJ. Furthermore, the Court of First Instance reaffi  rmed the AM&S ruling in the judgment on the merits. 
135   ECJ, C-22/98 (Criminal proceedings against Jean Claude Becu and others), par. 26. See also ECJ, C-542/14 (SIA “VM Remonts” (anciennement 
SIA “DIV un KO”) and others v Konkurences padome), par. 23
136  ECJ, C-550/07 P (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 49.
137  ECJ, C-550/07 P (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 47.
138   In the process of the creation of the successor of Regulation 17/62 this was raised twice, namely in 1999 and in 2001. In 1999 it was 
raised during a Parliamentary meeting, see EP minutes of 15 April 1999, Doc. A4-0137/1999. In 2001 the Evans report proposed 
an amendment by which legal professional privilege was extended to in-house counsel. This amendment was not accepted by the 
European Parliament. See the Report of 21 June 2001 on the proposal for a Council regulation on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 
4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87, Com(2000)582. 
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however, no indications that this element has been abolished.139 Obviously, this is “overtly 
discriminatory”,140 although it could be justifi able. As the Court notes in AM&S the limits on 
this privilege “are determined by the scope of the common rules on the exercise of the legal 
profession as laid down in Council Directive 77/249/EEC [...] which is based on its turn on 
the mutual recognition by all the Member States of the national legal concepts of each of them 
on this subject”.141 There are thus common standards for lawyers in the EU. These standards 
might ensure the independence of lawyers. 
The approach taken by the Court is understandable, but might raise barriers for undertakings 
from third countries to enter the EU market. A third country undertaking should request advice 
not from a lawyer in that country, but from an EU lawyer before the communication will be 
regarded as privileged. The Commission has expressed its interest to create bilateral agreements 
with certain third countries by which the principle of legal professional privilege is extended to 
third country lawyers. These bilateral treaties would, however, only be created with countries 
the legal systems of which “aff ord professional protection in a non-discriminatory way to all 
lawyers, including [Union] lawyers”.142 No specifi c bilateral treaties on this matter have been 
concluded,143 although bilateral competition law enforcement treaties may include articles on 
confi dentiality which could prevent documents from being transferred to the Commission when 
those documents are privileged, and thus confi dential, under the laws of that third country.144
The principle of legal professional privilege thus only applies when the documents relate 
to the rights of the defence of the undertaking and when they are exchanged between the 
undertaking and an independent lawyer. An undertaking should provide the offi  cials of the 
Commission with suffi  cient information in order for them to establish whether particular 
documents are privileged. The undertaking is, however, not “bound to reveal the contents 
of the communications in question”.145 A mere cursory look “at the general layout, heading, 
title or other superfi cial features of the document”146 might be allowed, although there are 
situations where this might reveal the contents of the communications. In such a circumstance, 
the undertaking may refuse this cursory look “provided that the undertaking considers that 
such a cursory look is impossible without revealing the content of those documents and that 
it gives the Commission offi  cials appropriate reasons for its view”.147 In case of a dispute 
between the undertaking and the Commission on this matter, the document should be placed 
in a sealed envelope. A decision by the Commission rejecting the privileged nature of a
139   See e.g. Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 1007-1008, who states that “there is consensus that these qualifi cations exclude third-country 
attorneys from the benefi t of legal privilege”.
140  Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 280.
141  ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 26 (emphasis added).
142  Thirteenth report on competition policy, [1984], par. 78. 
143  Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 280, state that this idea was dropped by the Commission.
144   See e.g. Article 7(7) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the 
application of their competition laws, [2014] OJ L347/3.
145  ECJ, 155/79 (AM&S Europe Limited v Commission), par. 29.
146  CFI, T-125/03 and T-253/03 (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 81.
147  CFI, T-125/03 and T-253/03 (AKZO Nobel Chemicals v Commission), par. 82.
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document can be reviewed by the General Court, and, on appeal, by the Court of Justice.148
The Union Courts can take interim measures in order for the Commission not to examine the 
potentially privileged documents.
5.3.5 Consequences of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination
The consequences for an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination is not that clear. 
In Tokai Carbon, the Court of First Instance wrongly assumed that the undertaking concerned 
could not be forced to cooperate. The undertaking’s voluntary cooperation should therefore 
be rewarded by a reduction of a fi ne.149 It is doubtful whether a reduction of a fi ne is a suffi  cient 
to redress an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination. Guidance by the Union 
Courts on the consequences of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination is thus 
needed to provide more clarity and certainty to undertakings. 
In general, the Commission will wait for a lawyer to be present during an inspection, but this 
is not a requirement for the validity of an inspection.150 It is therefore not possible to speak of 
a right for the undertaking, since it is merely a service given to undertakings. There are thus 
no consequences for derogating from this principle. 
The Union Courts are clear about the consequences of an infringement of the principle of 
legal professional privilege. The procedure on how to deal with a dispute on the principle 
of legal professional privilege is unambiguous. The Commission cannot examine documents 
which are under dispute but should put them in a sealed envelope, and after it has taken a 
decision, it should wait until the appeal period has passed or until the request for interim 
measures has been rejected. If in this process the Commission did examine the privileged 
documents, or if the Commission examined the documents which later on in the procedure 
were to be regarded as privileged, exclusion of the evidence will be the consequence. As the 
President of the Court of Justice stated in the appeal procedure for interim measures in AKZO, 
the “Commission is prevented from using the information [...] obtained”151 in violation of the 
principle of legal professional privilege. Exclusion of evidence is thus a likely consequence 
when evidence is obtained in violation of the principle of legal professional privilege.152
5.3.6 Résumé
The Court of Justice accepted already in 1989 that undertakings are not required to provide 
evidence against themselves. This freedom from self-incrimination is subject to a twofold 
test. First, the Court will determine whether there is a form of coercion. In general, the Court 
148   The procedure which the Commission follows in case of legal professional privilege claims can be found in Commission notice on best 
practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, [2011] OJ C308/6, par. 51-58. For more information, see 
e.g. also Nehl (2014), p. 1298-1301.
149   CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 410.
150   see Explanatory note to an authorisation to conduct an inspection in execution of a Commission decision under Article 20(4) of Council 
Regulation No 1/2003, par. 6. 
151  Order of the President of the ECJ, C-7/04 P(R) (AKZO v Commission), par. 43.
152  See also Gippini-Fournier (2004), p. 991 and 1023-1024.
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has ruled that only penalties amount to coercion. Positive incentives, such as reductions of a 
fi ne, cannot amount to coercion. This means that the freedom from self-incrimination is only 
triggered when the Commission requests information by decision, or when the Commission 
exercises its powers during a dawn raid on the basis of a decision. Requests for information, 
written authorisations, the leniency programme and the settlement programme, all do not 
coerce an undertaking into providing information. 
The second step will be for the Court to determine whether there is an actual interference 
with the freedom from self-incrimination. Here, the Court has made a distinction between 
the obligation to provide answers and the obligation to provide documents. Undertakings 
can only rely on the freedom from self-incrimination when they are requested to provide an 
admission of guilt or when they have to admit to facts which are regarded as aggravating 
factors for the determination of a fi ne. Factual answers should always be given and documents 
should always be handed over. According to the ECJ, this would not infringe the rights of the 
defence, since undertakings still have the possibility to dispute the interpretation of factual 
answers and documents. This line of reasoning of the Court is subject to much criticism in 
literature. A dividing line between factual answers and admissions is not always easily made. 
Furthermore, various authors have argued that the reasoning of the Court of Justice is not in 
conformity with the ECHR system and case law of the ECtHR. The Court of First Instance 
tried to adapt the Orkem reasoning in 2004, but this was not accepted by the Court of Justice. 
Access to a lawyer is not a principle protected by the Court of Justice in EU competition law 
proceedings, but merely a “service” to undertakings which are subject to an inspection. By 
contrast, legal professional privilege is a principle accepted by the Court of Justice subject to 
two conditions. Communication exchanged between a lawyer and an undertaking should 
relate (i) to the rights of the defence and (ii) should emanate from an independent lawyer. 
This principle protects undertakings where the limits of the freedom from self-incrimination 
are reached. 
The consequences of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination are not clear. There 
are no negative consequences for the Commission when it decides not to stay an inspection 
until a lawyer is present. An infringement of the principle of legal professional privilege will, 
however, lead to exclusion of the evidence obtained in violation of that principle. 
5.4 NON BIS IN IDEM
5.4.1 Introduction
The fi rst case in which the Court of Justice has had to render a judgment concerning the non bis 
in idem principle in competition law proceedings was Walt Wilhelm. It should be said though 
that the Court did not refer to this principle as such. Nevertheless, Walt Wilhelm can be seen 
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as a landmark decision on the non bis in idem principle in competition law proceedings. The 
German competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, initiated a competition law procedure for 
the same facts after the Commission had already started a procedure. Unsure whether it was 
possible for the Bundeskartellamt to start proceedings and to impose a penalty for the same 
cartel, the national court referred questions to the Court of Justice. According to the Court of 
Justice, it was not against the system of Regulation 17/62 to allow parallel proceedings.153 The 
diff erent “point of view” of the competition law prohibitions in Union law and national law 
do not prevent proceedings by both the national competition authorities and the Commission. 
Van Bockel contends that the reasoning of the Court follows from the system of Regulation 
17/62, and not from the non bis in idem principle as such.154 With regard to the possibility of 
being sanctioned twice, the Court ruled that it is not contrary to Union law for the Commission 
and national competition authorities to impose penalties for the same cartel, although there 
is a “general requirement of natural justice”155 that previous penalties should be taken into 
account. A principle that originates from criminal law has thus been accepted to a certain 
extent in EU competition law proceedings. In the following subparagraphs, an examination 
takes place of the non bis in idem principle in EU competition law proceedings. The non bis in 
idem principle might play a role when there are dual proceedings by the Commission, by the 
Commission and NCAs,156 and by the Commission and third country NCAs. In what follows, 
it is fi rst examined what the non bis in idem principle tries to prevent in EU competition 
law (5.4.2). After that, the so-called accounting principle is discussed (5.4.3). The condition 
sine qua non, namely the fi nality of a fi rst decision, is then reviewed (5.4.4). Thereafter, the 
three conditions for application of the non bis in idem principle are examined (5.4.6-5.4.8). 
5.4.2 Prohibition of double prosecutions and/or double sanctions
Whereas no explicit reference to the non bis in idem principle was made in the Walt Wilhelm 
case,157 later rulings of the Union Courts refer explicitly to this principle. It is, however, not 
always that clear whether this principle prohibits a second prosecution or a second penalty 
for the same off ence. The Union Courts refer in some cases merely to the prohibition of double 
punishment/sanctions,158 but in other cases to both the prohibition of double punishment 
153  ECJ, 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt), par. 3.
154  Van Bockel (2010), p. 124.
155  ECJ, 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt), par. 11.
156  Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 prevents parallel proceedings by the Commission and an NCA, but it does not prevent subsequent proceedings. 
157   The same can be said about the Boehringer case in which the Court discusses the alleged obligation on the Commission to take into 
account penalties already imposed for a cartel by third country authorities; see ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), in 
particular par. 3. 
158   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 
338; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 61; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 285; CFI, T-322/01 
(Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 278; CFI, T-13/03 (Nintendo v Commission), par. 82; CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 149; 
GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 205; GC, T-122/07 and T-124/07 (Siemens and others v Commission), par. 
151; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 186.
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and the prohibition of double prosecution.159 Strangely enough, the Court sometimes uses 
a diff erent terminology. In the Limburgse Vinyl case, the Court refers to the prohibition of 
being found guilty for a second time, while also referring, more explicitly, to the prohibition 
of double prosecution.160 Van Bockel concludes, after a discussion of case law of the Union 
Courts in particular in competition law proceedings, that the non bis in idem principle in Union 
law contains the prohibition of double prosecutions.161
Van Bockel bases one of his arguments, that the prohibition of double sanctions does not 
constitute the non bis in idem principle, on the 2006 Archer Daniels Midland case.162 In that 
case, the undertakings argued that the Commission is obliged to take into account fi nes 
already imposed for the same cartel by third country competition authorities. This follows, 
according to the undertakings, not directly from the non bis in idem principle, but from “a 
corollary of the principle of non bis in idem”.163 According to Van Bockel “[i]t appears from the 
judgment that the ECJ agreed with the applicants that the prohibition of double punishment, 
which they relied on in this instance, is a corollary of the [non] bis in idem principle as such”.164
Nevertheless, the ECJ did not explicitly rule that an obligation to take into account a previous 
imposed fi ne when determining the amount of a second fi ne is merely a corollary of the non 
bis in idem principle. Furthermore, the accounting principle could be the corollary of the 
prohibition of double punishments. This principle requires competition authorities to take 
into account previously imposed penalties, and thus to set off  fi nes. The accounting principle 
does not necessarily encompass the complete prohibition against double punishments, since 
this prohibition may prevent in a broader sense the imposition of a second fi ne. An obligation 
to merely take into account a previously imposed fi ne does not prohibit double sanctions as 
such.
The 2014 Orange case of the General Court seems to confi rm the statement that the non bis in 
idem principle in EU competition law is confi ned to the prohibition of double punishments. 
In this case, the General Court referred to both the prohibition of double prosecution and 
double sanctions,165 although it mainly dealt with the possibility of the Commission to 
initiate a procedure after national authorities had accepted commitments or took decisions
159   CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v 
Commission), par. 95, on appeal the Court of Justice refers to the prohibition of double prosecution and held that an undertaking 
cannot be found guilty for a second time on the same grounds, see ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P 
to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 59; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co 
v Commission), par. 97; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 86; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, 
T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 131; CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 
185; CFI, T-217/03 and T-245/03 (Fédération nationale de la cooperation bétail et viande and others v Commission), par. 340; CFI, T-24/07 
(ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 178; GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 292; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and 
T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 159; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 254; ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and 
others), par. 94; GC, T-128/11 (LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission), par. 241; GC, T-402/13 (Orange v Commission), par. 29.
160   ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others 
v Commission), par. 59. 
161  Van Bockel (2010), p. 129.
162  ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission).
163   ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 39. 
164  Van Bockel (2010), p. 129. (original emphasis)
165  GC, T-402/13 (Orange v Commission), par. 29.
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stating there was no ground for further action.166 In other cases where an explicit reference to 
only the prohibition of double sanctions is made, the Union Courts seem to refer implicitly 
to the prohibition of double prosecutions.167 The statement that the prohibition of double 
prosecutions is the main aspect of the non bis in idem principle in EU competition law 
proceedings is thus not that strange. Nevertheless, the focus of the Union Courts appears in 
many cases to lie mainly on the prohibition of double sanctions even in cases where reference 
is made to both prohibitions.168
By contrast, the LG Display case creates at fi rst glance confusion about the premise that the 
prohibition of double sanctions is the ‘true’ non bis in idem principle in EU competition law 
proceedings. It seems to provide for a bigger role of the prohibition of double prosecutions. 
In this case, the applicants argued that the Commission should have taken a decision not 
only on the so-called “Crystal Meetings”, but also on other meetings of Japanese suppliers. 
The applicants were afraid that the Commission would take a decision in the future on the 
meetings of the Japanese suppliers. According to LG Display, the Commission was obliged to 
take immediately a decision on the meetings of the Japanese suppliers, since it investigated 
that behaviour as well. Furthermore, the meetings of the Japanese suppliers, although distinct 
from the “Crystal Meetings”, formed part of the same cartel. Not taking into account the other 
meetings would infringe the non bis in idem principle and the principle of legal certainty. The 
General Court fi rst referred to both the prohibition of double prosecution and the prohibition 
of double sanctions. Obviously, the General Court ruled that there was no fi nal decision yet on 
“Crystal Meetings”, as this appeal was still pending. Furthermore, according to the General 
Court, the non bis in idem principle “cannot play any role in relation to the contested decision, 
the existence of which is a condition sine qua non if that principle is to be relied on with regard 
to the second procedure”.169 There thus needs to be a fi nal decision before an undertaking can rely 
on the non bis in idem principle. The aforementioned quote seems to imply that the prohibition 
of double prosecutions might be relevant when the Commission starts a new procedure. 
Strangely enough, the General Court also ruled in the same paragraph that the non bis in idem 
principle “may, in fact, be relied on only against a decision closing a second procedure that 
might be initiated in respect of the same infringement”.170 Even though reference was made 
to both prohibitions, the closing of a second procedure against LG Display and LG Display 
Taiwan on the same facts seems to be prohibited by the non bis in idem principle. 
166  GC, T-402/13 (Orange v Commission), par. 31.
167   This occurs mainly with reference to the Walt Wilhelm case, see e.g. CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 62; CFI, 
T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 286.
168   See e.g. CFI, T-217/03 and T-245/03 (Fédération nationale de la cooperation bétail et viande and others v Commission); GC, T-144/07, T-147-
150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission). See also Vervaele (2013), p. 218, who contends that “the ECJ seems to 
limit the [non] bis in idem principle to double punishment”. AG Colomer, ECJ, C-297/07 (Bourquain), par. 33, also seems of the opinion 
that the prohibition of double punishments is the main prohibition of the non bis in idem principle in EU competition law proceedings. 
This in contrast to other areas of EU law where the non bis in idem principle is relevant.
169  GC, T-128/11 (LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission), par. 242. (emphasis added)
170  GC, T-128/11 (LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission), par. 242. (emphasis added)
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The Grand Chamber judgment in the Toshiba case dealt with the possibility for a national 
competition authority to apply national competition law after the Commission has already 
reached a fi nal decision on a certain cartel.171 This case is further discussed under par. 5.4.8. In 
this case the prohibition of double prosecutions seemed to be the main issue.
In the author’s view, both prohibitions remain relevant for EU competition law proceedings, 
even though the focus in some cases is merely on one prohibition. However, as is seen below, 
an appeal to the non bis in idem principle by undertakings arguing that the prosecution by the 
Commission or a national competition authority (NCA) after the respective other already 
issued a fi nal decision on the matter172 is normally not very successful due to the condition of 
‘unity of the legal interest protected’.173 Furthermore, an appeal to the prohibition of double 
sanctions is, in those cases, not that often honoured either. There are also no cases brought 
before the Union Courts in which the facts where the same and where the Commission 
initiated procedures or imposed a fi ne for a second time. On the basis of the prohibition of 
double sanctions, the Union Courts do, however, oblige the Commission to take into account 
a previous imposed fi ne by NCAs,174 although this obligation does not exist with regard to 
penalties of competition authorities of third countries.175 The question therefore remains 
whether this accounting principle is part of the non bis in idem principle, or merely a corollary 
of that principle. Overall though, the (un)successfulness176 of certain pleas of undertakings 
might explain why the prohibition of double sanctions, and more specifi cally the accounting 
principle, as a (possible) limb of the non bis in idem principle, can predominantly be found in 
case law of the Union Courts.
171   See ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 93, where the Court of Justice held that “[t]he second part of the second question concerns 
the issue whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the [non] bis in idem principle precludes the application
of national competition law by the national competition authority” (emphasis added).
172   NCAs have an obligation to apply EU competition law in parallel to their national competition rules when there is an eff ect on 
trade between Member States, see Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003. It should be mentioned that NCAs may initiate competition law 
proceedings after the Commission has already imposed a fi ne; however, when they apply Article 101 or 102 TFEU, they are prohibited 
from issuing a decision which runs counter to the decision of the Commission, see Article 16(1) Regulation 1/2003. When an NCA has 
started an investigation in a competition law off ence, after which the Commission also decides to investigate the same issue, the NCA 
will be prohibited during the investigation of the Commission, to continue its own investigation, see Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003 
and ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), in particular par. 78-80. This rule prevents the parallel application of EU competition law by 
NCAs and the Commission. 
173   This condition is one of the three the Court has created for the application of the non bis in idem principle in EU competition law 
enforcement. For a further discussion, see below. 
174   See ECJ, 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt), par. 11; ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), in particular par. 3; 
CFI, T-141/89 (Tréfi leurope v Commission), par. 191; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 98; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer 
Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 87, on appeal, ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients
v Commission), par. 50; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v 
Commission), par. 132; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 290; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 279. In its 
Telekomunikacja Polska decision of 22 June 2011 (COMP/39.525) the Commission also set off  penalties imposed upon the undertaking by 
the national telecommunications authority insofar as the penalties of that national authority overlapped, although the Commission stated 
that it “is not under any legal obligation to do so”, see par. 142.
175   CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 101; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 100, on appeal 
ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 51-52; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, 
T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 142, on appeal ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa 
Denko KK v Commission), par. 57-59, and ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 33-35; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v 
Commission), par. 288; ECJ, C-231/14 P (Innolux v Commission), par. 75.
176   As Tomkin (2014), p. 1403, states “the Court’s [non] bis in idem case law in [the EU competition law] fi eld provides greater insight into 
what the principle permits rather than what it serves to prohibit”. 
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5.4.3 Accounting principle and the prohibition of double sanctions
In the Walt Wilhelm case, the Court of Justice ruled that setting off  a penalty was a “general 
requirement of natural justice”.177 The accounting principle requires that competition authorities 
take into account a previous penalty, and thus set off  the fi nes. It can be said that the Union 
Courts accept the “accounting principle instead of barring the second prosecution”.178 The 
accounting principle thus appears to be part of the non bis in idem principle in EU competition 
law proceedings. Frese however argues that this accounting principle is “essentially a 
proportionality requirement”.179 Van Bockel and Jones and Sufrin assert that the accounting 
principle is “technically” a corollary of the non bis in idem principle.180 Rose and Baily, by 
contrast, assert, in light of an examination of the non bis in idem principle, that “[w]here fi nes are 
imposed under the law of a Member State in respect of conduct which is also an infringement 
of the Treaty, the Commission is obliged, in accordance with the requirements of natural justice, 
to take account of the fi nes already imposed by the Member State”.181 The Court of Justice 
also makes a distinction between the Walt Wilhelm obligation to take into account previous 
imposed fi nes, and the possibility for the Commission to do so under the proportionality 
principle in cases where the accounting principle, or in general the non bis in idem principle, is 
not applicable.182 Furthermore, the Court of First Instance held the following in Jungbunzlauer:
With regard to the principle of natural justice, it must be observed that the possibility of 
concurrent sanctions, one Community, the other national, resulting from two parallel 
procedures pursuing diff erent ends, the acceptability thereof deriving from the special 
system of sharing jurisdiction between the Community and the Member States with 
regard to cartels, is subject to the principle of natural justice. This means that, when 
setting fi nes, the Commission must take account of penalties which have already been 
borne by the same undertaking for the same conduct, where they have been imposed 
for infringements of the cartel law of a Member State and, consequently, have been 
committed on Community territory.183
This obligation to take into account previously imposed penalties indicates that the Union 
Courts regard the accounting principle as part of the prohibition against double sanctions, 
and thus as part of the non bis in idem principle. 
177  ECJ, 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt), par. 11.
178  Vervaele (2013), p. 218.
179   Frese (2011a), p. 33. See also ECJ, C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P (Coop de France bétail et viande and others), par. 130, where the Court of 
Justice discussed the accounting principle and mentioned the non bis in idem principle and the proportionality principle both as not 
infringed since there was no unity of the off ender. The concept of “unity of the off ender” is further elaborated upon below. 
180  Van Bockel (2010), p. 129; and Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 981.
181  Rose & Bailey (2013), p. 1449-1450. (emphasis added)
182   See e.g. ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 60; ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 36; ECJ, C-328/05 
P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 30-32.
183  CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 290. (emphasis added)
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5.4.4 Final decision
The non bis in idem principle is only applicable when there is already a fi nal decision of a 
competition authority.184 A previous fi nal decision is thus a “condition sine qua non”185 in 
order to rely on the non bis in idem principle. This fi nal decision should have led to a conviction 
or an acquittal and should thus be taken on the merits.186 In the Bavaria case, the General 
Court ruled that a reference to the behaviour of Bavaria in a decision addressed to other 
undertakings was not a fi nal decision against Bavaria.187 Mere procedural annulments of 
decisions of competition authorities will not trigger the non bis in idem principle, since there 
was no fi nal decision in the fi rst proceedings.188 As Wils and Federico state, an annulment 
on the basis of lack of evidence will probably be regarded as an acquittal and thus as a fi nal 
decision.189 However, the Union Courts have not yet ruled on this issue. 
5.4.5 Conditions
A second prosecution or a second penalty can only be prevented when three conditions are 
met. Even though the non bis in idem principle could already be found in case law of the Union 
Courts since 1969, it took until 2004 before the Court of Justice formulated three conditions 
in a clear manner. In Aalborg Portland it ruled that “the application of [the non bis in idem] 
principle is subject to the threefold condition of identity of the facts, unity of off ender and 
unity of the legal interest protected”.190 The Court applied this trinity of unities to the ruling 
of the General Court and held that the General Court did not fi nd “identity in the facts”,191
due to which the non bis in idem principle was not violated. It thus appears that the threefold 
condition was already present in case law before 2004, even though it was not explicitly stated 
in that manner. 
5.4.6 Unity of off ender
In order for the non bis in idem principle to apply there needs to be, fi rst of all, unity of the 
off ender. The Court adopts a similar functional approach as it did towards the concept of an 
184   ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others 
v Commission), par. 61; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 160; GC, T-128/11 (LG 
Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission), par. 242.
185  See GC, T-128/11 (LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission), par. 242.
186   GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 164. This case dealt with provisional leniency 
decisions taken by NCAs. The General Court also ruled on the argument of the applicants that Article 54 CISA was relevant here. It 
held in par. 167 that: “Even supposing that Article 54 of the CISA, to the extent that it constitutes the expression of a general principle 
of EU law, namely the principle non bis in idem, could be relied upon in the fi eld of EU competition law, it should be observed that a 
provisional amnesty decision taken by a national competition authority cannot, in any event, be regarded as falling within the scope 
of that provision. Indeed, the provisional grant of leniency does not have the fi nality of a defi nitive bar on further prosecution, as is 
required by Article 54 of the CISA.” (emphasis added) The General Court then examined the provisional nature of the three leniency 
decisions and concluded that there was no fi nal decision on the merits by these leniency decisions (par. 168-175).
187  GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 187-188.
188   CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v 
Commission), par. 98; ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 62; CFI, T-24/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 190.
189  Wils (2003), p. 141-142; and Federico (2011), p. 252.
190   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 338.
191   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 340.
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undertaking in EU competition law.192 An example of this functional approach can be found in 
the Siemens case, where the undertakings argued that joint and several liability infringed the 
non bis in idem principle.193 According to the General Court this is not the case, since this joint 
and several liability “covers only the period of the infringement during which [the parent and 
subsidiary] formed an economic unit and thus constituted an undertaking for the purposes 
of competition law”.194 A penalty on undertakings and on associations of undertakings 
(federations) does not lead to an infringement of the non bis in idem principle, even when those 
undertakings are members to the associations. The Court of First Instance has confi rmed this 
in the past by ruling that, in that case, the association of undertakings (federations in this 
case) had “independent legal personality and separate budgets and [that the] objects [of 
the undertakings and federations] do not always coincide”.195 A similar approach has been 
taken by the General Court in the Transcatab case when dealing with the parallel liability of 
undertakings and associations of undertakings. The General Court ruled that the association 
of undertakings had “its own legal personality, object and objectives, independent of and 
distinct from Transcatab’s”.196 It thus appears that identity of the off ender only exists when 
the entities concerned can be regarded as one undertaking.
5.4.7 Unity of the legal interest protected
Not only unity of the off ender is required before the non bis in idem principle applies. There 
should also be unity of the legal interest protected and identity of the facts. The requirement of 
unity of the legal interest has been questioned by e.g. Advocate General Kokott in the Toshiba 
case. AG Kokott suggested to remove the requirement of unity of the legal interest.197 This 
criterion does not play a role in other areas of Union law.198 As Kokott stated: “To interpret 
and apply the ne bis in idem principle so diff erently depending on the area of law concerned is 
detrimental to the unity of the EU legal order.”199 The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice 
decided, however, to confi rm its preceding case law.200 The case law on both the unity of the 
legal interest and the identity of the facts can be characterised as somewhat confusing.201 In 
some cases, the dividing line between the condition of identity of the facts and the condition 
of unity of the legal interest protected seems to be rather vague. 
The unity of the legal interest protected will be used by the Union Courts when there might be 
overlap between a prosecution and punishment of the Commission and a fi nal decision of an
192   See ECJ, C-41/90 (Höfner and Elser v Macrotron), par 21: “[A]n undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is fi nanced.”
193  GC, T-122/07 and T-124/07 (Siemens and others v Commission).
194  GC, T-122/07 and T-124/07 (Siemens and others v Commission), par. 152, see also par. 203.
195   CFI, T-217/03 and T-245/03 (Fédération nationale de la cooperation bétail et viande and others v Commission), par. 342. This was confi rmed 
on appeal by the Court of Justice, see ECJ, C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P (Coop de France bétail et viande and others), par. 130.
196  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 258.
197   AG Kokott in ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 123-124.
198   See e.g. Sarmiento (2016), p. 126; Nazzini (2016b), p. 141-145; Tzouma (2014), p. 266-267; Tomkin (2014), p. 1411; Van Bockel (2010), p. 
171.
199  AG Kokott in ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 117.
200  ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 97
201   As Monti (2014), p. 268, asserts, “the Court’s case law has not always been very clear as to how it applies the notion of identity of the 
facts”.
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NCA or a competition authority of a third country. Parallel prosecutions by the Commission 
and an NCA are not contrary to the non bis in idem principle, since Union competition law 
and national competition law “pursue diff erent interests/ends”.202 The rationale behind this 
appears to be that the Commission tries to protect the internal market, whilst NCAs focus 
on the eff ects in their own state.203 Interestingly, AG Colomer, who proposed the trinity of 
unities as condition for the application of the non bis in idem principle in the Aalborg Portland 
case, argued that the unity of the legal interest protected by Union competition law and 
national competition law of EU Member States is “beyond doubt”. He stated the following:
The rules which guarantee free competition within the European Union do not allow a 
distinction to be drawn between separate areas, the [Union] area and the national areas, 
as though there were watertight compartments. Both sectors are concerned with the 
supervision of free and open competition in the common market, one contemplating it 
in its entirety and the other from its separate components, but the essence is the same. 
On this point, the national legislation must properly transpose the provisions set out in 
Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] and, in order to implement them, by secondary legislation.204
The modernisation of EU competition law, which included the obligation for NCAs to apply 
EU competition law in parallel to national competition law, could be an incentive for the 
Union Courts to revisit their case law on this point. In 2011 the fi rst case came before the 
General Court which dealt with this point after the entering into force of Regulation 1/2003. 
Three NCAs had adopted provisional leniency decisions for a cartel. These decisions could 
not be regarded as fi nal decision and taken on the merits. However, before examining the 
fi nality of the decisions, the General Court ruled the following:
As for the question whether a decision of a national competition authority can prevent 
the Commission from penalising the same undertaking a second time or making it the 
defendant to proceedings a second time, it must be recalled that the application of the 
principle non bis in idem is subject to the threefold condition of identity of the facts, 
unity of off ender and unity of the legal interest protected. That principle therefore 
precludes a penalty being imposed on the same person more than once for the same 
unlawful conduct for the purpose of protecting the same legal asset (Joined Cases 
C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paragraph 338; FNCBV and others v 
202   CFI, T-141/89 (Tréfi leurope v Commission), par. 19; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 100; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer 
Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 89; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co 
Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 132; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 62; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v 
Commission), par. 286; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 280. The Court refers in ECJ, 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and others v 
Bundeskartellamt), par. 3, to “diff erent points of view”.
203  See also Wils (2003), p. 146, who criticises this approach in light of Article 50 of the Charter.
204   See the opinion of AG Colomer in C-217/00 P, par. 173, one of the cases joined in ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, 
C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission).
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Commission, paragraph 69 above, paragraph 340; and Hoechst v Commission, paragraph 
158 above, paragraph 600).
Given that the action of the Member States’ competition authorities on the one 
hand and of the Commission on the other when bringing proceedings against 
undertakings or penalising them for infringements of Articles [101 and 102 
TFEU], under the powers conferred upon them by Articles 5 and 14 of Regulation 
No 1/2003 respectively, is intended to protect the same legal asset, namely the free 
competition within the common market which constitutes a fundamental objective 
of the Community under Article 3(1)(g) EC (see, to that eff ect, SGL Carbon v 
Commission, paragraph 158 above, paragraph 31), it must be held that the principle 
non bis in idem precludes an undertaking from being penalised a second time or 
made the defendant to proceedings brought by the Commission a second time for 
an infringement of Article 81 EC or 82 EC for which it has already been penalised, 
or of which it has been exonerated, by a previous decision of a national competition 
authority adopted under Article 5 of Regulation No 1/2003 which has become fi nal.205
It appears that the General Court tried to revise the Walt Wilhelm case law. After all, NCAs have 
to apply, since 2004, Union competition law in parallel to their own competition rules when 
there is an eff ect on trade between Member States. Therefore, it might not be tenable anymore 
to argue that the unity of the legal interest protected by EU NCAs and the Commission is 
diff erent.206 By contrast, in Toshiba, delivered roughly fi ve months later by the Grand Chamber 
of the Court of Justice, the Court held: 
In accordance with settled case-law, EU law and national law on competition apply 
in parallel (Wilhelm and others, paragraph 3; Case C-137/00 Milk Marque and National 
Farmers’ Union [2003] ECR I-7975, paragraph 61; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 
Manfredi and others [2006] ECR I-6619, paragraph 38). Competition rules at European 
and at national level view restrictions on competition from diff erent angles (Wilhelm, 
paragraph 3; Manfredi and others, paragraph 38; Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [2010] ECR I-8301, paragraph 103) and their areas 
of application do not coincide (Case C-505/07 Compañía Española de Comercialización de 
Aceite [2009] ECR I-8963, paragraph 52).207
A diff erence in insight thus exists between the General Court and the Court of Justice. Whereas 
the General Court might have tried to adapt the interpretation of the unity of the legal interest 
protected, the Court of Justice held that EU and national competition law may still be applied 
205   GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 161-162.
206   See e.g. Federico (2011), p. 252-254, who argues that the Commission or NCAs “should” lose their competence to act when the other 
has taken a fi nal decision on the same ant-competitive behaviour. 
207  ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 81.
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in parallel. A second prosecution or punishment by the Commission, after an NCA has issued 
a decision on the same anti-competitive behaviour, is thus still allowed. Nevertheless, the non 
bis in idem principle does play a (limited) role in these types of cases. The Union Courts have, 
as contended above, accepted the accounting principle208 under the non bis in idem principle 
as a requirement of natural justice. 
Strangely enough, the accounting principle has not been accepted in cases where the fi rst fi nal 
decision concerned a decision by an authority in a non-Member State. The General Court has 
over and over stated that the competition rules of third countries “clearly pursue diff erent 
ends”209 than Union competition law, whilst the Court of Justice has held, in a similar vein, that 
“the exercise of powers by the authorities of [third countries] responsible for protecting free 
competition under their territorial jurisdiction meets requirements specifi c to those States”.210
There is no unity of the legal interest when a third country NCA has previously imposed a fi ne 
and an EU NCA initiates subsequently proceedings. Nevertheless, this unity is also lacking 
in cases where an EU NCA has imposed a fi ne already on an undertaking for the same anti-
competitive behaviour investigated by another EU NCA. Another reason should thus exist 
why the Union Courts have not accepted the accounting principle in cases where an authority 
of a third country has imposed a fi ne for breach of its competition rules. According to the 
Union Courts, there is currently no international rule which obliges the Commission to set off  
fi nes imposed upon an undertaking for the same acts in a jurisdiction outside the EU.211 The 
diff erence in approach on the accounting principle when it concerns a fi ne of an NCA or a fi ne 
of a third country authority is explained in multiple cases by the General Court with reference 
to the “close interdependence of the national markets of the Member States of the common 
market and [to] the special system of the sharing of jurisdiction between the [Union] and the 
Member States with regard to cartels in the same territory”.212
208   Previous imposed penalties by NCAs should be set off  when the Commission determines the fi ne for the same anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
209   CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 101; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 90; CFI, 
T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 134; CFI, T-59/02 
(Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 63; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 287. The Court of First Instance held in 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 280, that competition law proceedings by the Commission and by an authority of 
a third country “clearly do not pursue the same objectives”. The word “clearly” is only used when it concerns fi nes of third country 
authorities, but not when it concerns fi nes of EU NCAs.
210   ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 53; ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 29; ECJ, C-328/05 P (SGL 
Carbon AG v Commission), par. 26.
211  E.g. ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 58.
212   CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 291. See also CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 110; CFI, 
T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai 
Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 141; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 287. The Court of Justice refers in 
ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 50, to this reasoning by the Court of 
First Instance, although it does not explicitly confi rm this reasoning, since the problem in this case was the lack of the identical nature 
of the facts. 
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This reasoning could indicate the existence of a fourth criterion that should be fulfi lled before 
the accounting principle can play a role in EU competition law proceedings.213 However, there 
are no clear indications that a fourth criterion has been created by the Union Courts. Moreover, 
the Union Courts still refer to the trinity of unities. Another explanation could then be that 
the criterion of ‘unity of the legal interest protected’ is explained diff erently when it concerns 
a fi ne of an NCA due to the special system of shared jurisdiction in the EU. This explanation 
is not tenable either. The criterion of ‘unity of the legal interest protected’ is in general used 
as a protection of the powers of the Commission and thus as a jurisdictional214 rule. It ensures 
that the Commission can still start proceedings after an NCA or a third country NCA has 
adopted a fi nal decision on the same facts. Adapting the ‘unity of the legal interest’ criterion 
to a rule which aff ects the substance of the scope of non bis in idem does not seem to be logical. 
In most cases where the Union Courts refer to the special system of shared jurisdiction 
and the interdependence of the markets in the EU, reference is also made to the Boehringer 
case.215 In the Boehringer case, the Court made the acceptance of the accounting principle 
when a competition authority of a non-Member State has imposed a fi ne dependent on the 
pre-condition of the identity of the facts.216 The Union Courts therefore also examined the 
identity of the facts, even after they referred to the special system in the Union, and concluded 
that the facts were diff erent, since, in short, the fi nes imposed by the authorities of the non-
Member States217 only related to the behaviour on those non-EU markets.218 The unity of 
the legal interest protected, prevents the competences of the Commission to be aff ected by 
acts of authorities of third countries or EU NCAs, whilst the identity of the facts prevent 
the application of the accounting principle only in cases where a third country authority has 
imposed a fi ne.219 It is therefore relevant to examine the manner in which the Union Courts 
interpret the condition of identity of the facts. 
5.4.8 Identity of the facts
In light of the discussion above, a distinction is made in this study between cases dealing with 
a previously imposed fi ne by a third country competition authority or previously imposed 
fi nes by NCAs or the Commission. 
213   At least, insofar as the premise that the accounting principle is part of the non bis in idem principle is correct. This reasoning is less 
controversial if the accounting principle is merely a manifestation of the proportionality requirement.
214  See also Federico (2011), p. 251.
215   ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission); ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 60; ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon 
AG v Commission), par. 36; ECJ, C-328/05 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 30-32.
216  ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), par. 3.
217  The USA and Canada were discussed in these cases.
218   CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 112-113; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 102-103; 
CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 143; CFI, 
T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 294-296; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 289-290; ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer 
Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 52-58.
219   Cf. ECJ, C-231/14 P (Innolux v Commission), par. 75, where the Court of Justice merely stated that “as the Court has held, neither the 
principle non bis in idem nor any other principle of law obliges the Commission to take account of proceedings and penalties to which 
the undertaking has been subject in non-Member States”. This seems to be a bit of a blunt remark, although it is true that the accounting 
principle, as a limb of the non bis in idem principle, has never been successfully invoked in cases where it concerned fi nes imposed by 
competition authorities from outside the EU. 
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The fi rst case in which the ECJ had to rule on the identity of the facts was the Boehringer case. 
In this case, the US competition authority and the Commission imposed a fi ne for the same 
prohibited agreements. However, according to the Court, the object and the geographical 
scope of the cartel fi ned by the US authorities was diff erent from the cartel fi ned by the 
Commission.220 The facts concerning the US decision were broader than the facts for which 
the Commission imposed a fi ne. Moreover, the Commission focused, among others, on the 
partitioning of the EU and UK markets.221 The Court also stated that “the applicant has put 
forward nothing capable of confi rming the argument that the conviction in the United States 
was directed against the application or eff ects of the cartel other than those occurring in that 
country”.222 Not taking into account the eff ects on the EU market was used in later case law of 
the CJEU as a decisive criterion to rule that there is no identity of facts when a third country 
has previously imposed a fi ne. 
In the 2002 Archer Daniels Midland case, the Court focused on the product market, which was in 
the Commission decision narrower than in the decision of the US and Canadian authorities.223
Furthermore, it also focused on the point that the penalties by the third country authorities 
were based on the turnover in those jurisdictions, and thus also focused on the application 
and eff ects of the anti-competitive behaviour in those jurisdictions.224 One of the points which 
the Union Courts take into account is the penalty imposed by competition authorities in 
non-Member States. The penalty should thus relate to the eff ects and application of the anti-
competitive behaviour in the EU as well, otherwise there cannot be an identity of facts. In such 
a case, the uniformity in the object and geographical scope of the set of agreements for which a 
fi ne was imposed by non-Member State authorities and the Commission seems to be lacking.225
Interestingly, this might lead to a circular reasoning. The Court of First Instance provided in 
Archer Daniels Midland, after stating that the Canadian and US authorities did not take into 
consideration the eff ects of the cartel on the EU market when determining the fi ne, that this 
“moreover, would have clearly encroached on the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission”.226
The identity of the facts was lacking since the authorities in the USA and in Canada did not 
take into account the eff ects on the EU market, but taking these eff ects into account would in 
its turn have encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Commission. This reasoning may ensure 
that there can never be identity of the facts when it concerns behaviour already fi ned by an 
220  ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), par. 4.
221  ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), par. 5.
222  ECJ, 7/72 (Boehringer Mannheim v Commission), par. 6.
223   The Commission only focused on agreements in the lysine market, whilst the US and Canadian decisions saw on the lysine and citric 
acids markets.
224   CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 102-103. This approach was confi rmed on appeal, see ECJ, C-397/03 P 
(Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 55-57. See also CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 
to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 143; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v 
Commission), par. 66-69; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 294-296; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 289-
290 ; ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 101.
225   See CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 112-115, where the Court of First Instance 
referred to the Boehringer formulation, after which reference was made to CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and 
T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), in which the Court of First Instance held that the penalty imposed by the USA 
authority should relate to behaviour in the EU as well.
226   CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 103. See also CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 295.
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authority outside the EU. It leads to a circular and somewhat presumptuous statement that 
third country competition authorities cannot take the eff ect on the EU market into account. 
There are also multiple cases dealing with the identity of facts when an EU NCA or the 
Commission itself has previously imposed a fi ne. In Aalborg Portland the Court of Justice 
considered that the agreements fi ned by the Italian competition authority and the Commission 
pursued a diff erent object. Whereas the Italian decision focused on supply contracts and 
cooperation agreements between four undertakings, the decision of the Commission focused 
on the agreement by which three of the same undertakings tried to prevent the fourth 
undertaking to import cement from Greece.227 Thus only the object of the agreement diff ered, 
the participants in the cartel were diff erent as well. 
This could be labelled, as Monti argues, as a formalistic approach since “both [kinds of 
conduct] appear designed to strengthen the market power the three undertakings have in the 
Italian market, and to allow for higher prices”.228 The object of the agreement and the members 
of the cartel were nevertheless also factors taken into account in the 2005 Tokai Carbon case.229
The Commission imposed separate fi nes for, among others, the behaviour on the graphite 
electrodes market and the speciality graphite market. The undertakings argued that this 
infringed the non bis in idem principle since there was a single, continuous infringement.230
The distinction in those two markets was artifi cial,231 according to the undertakings, and 
therefore they were in their view fi ned twice for the same conduct. 
Conversely, the Court of First Instance held that the non bis in idem principle was not 
infringed, because the two graphite electrodes markets were separate markets. In considering 
this, the Court of First Instance provided that “the properties, price and applications of 
isostatic graphite and extruded graphite are very diff erent”.232 The Court of First Instance 
also considered that the members for both agreements were diff erent.233 Furthermore, the 
speciality graphite agreement had no specifi c market sharing clause, which was, by contrast, 
included in the graphite electrodes agreement.234 The object of both agreements was thus also 
diff erent. 
In the 2009 Hoechst case, the Court of First Instance considered that the object of the two cartels 
fi ned by the Commission was diff erent, since the fi rst decision related to “an infringement on 
a separate product market”.235 This meant that there was no identity of the facts between the 
two Commission decisions.236
227   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 339.
228  Monti (2014), p. 272.
229  CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission).
230  CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 109.
231  CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 108.
232  CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 119.
233  CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 120.
234  C FI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 122-123.
235  CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 150.
236  CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 151.
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The content of two agreements fi ned by the Commission was at issue in Transcatab.237 This 
case, discussed above as well under the ‘unity of off ender’, concerned an agreement between 
tobacco companies and a decision of an association of undertakings. The tobacco companies 
“fi xed the trading conditions for the purchase of raw tobacco in Italy in respect of both direct 
purchases from producers and purchases from ‘third packers’, in particular by price fi xing and 
market sharing”.238 Whereas, the association of undertakings for tobacco processors, APTI, 
was concerned with the negotiation of prices with Unitab, an association of undertakings for 
tobacco growers. The General Court provided that there was no identity of facts. It ruled that:
[E]ven on the assumption that there was a certain overlap between a part of the various 
types of anti-competitive behaviour of which the processors are accused, in particular 
coordination in order to determine APTI’s conduct [...] and the conduct of which APTI 
is accused, namely the determination of the position which it would adopt in the 
negotiations on prices for the purposes of concluding interprofessional agreements 
with Unitab [...] it must be held that they were two diff erent types of conduct. In eff ect, 
coordination preceding the adoption of a decision is diff erent from the adoption of the 
decision properly so-called.239
As mentioned above, a distinction is made in this paragraph between cases dealing with 
a previously imposed fi ne of a third country competition authority or previously imposed 
fi nes by NCAs or the Commission. The Toshiba case does not fi t well, at fi rst sight, in either of 
these categories. In Toshiba the question was raised whether the Czech competition authority 
could impose a fi ne on the same cartel as the Commission did. The problem was that the 
cartel was in eff ect before the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. In order to determine 
whether the non bis in idem principle could preclude a prosecution by the Czech competition 
authority, the Court of Justice had to determine whether the criterion of “identity of the 
facts” was fulfi lled. The Court ruled that two factors should be taken into account, namely 
the geographical scope, or territory on which the behaviour took place, and the temporal 
dimension of the behaviour.240 According to the Court, neither the geographical scope nor 
the temporal scope was the same in the decision of the Commission and the proceedings by 
the Czech competition authority. The Czech competition authority fi ned the cartel for the 
behaviour on the Czech territory before the country acceded to the EU in 2004, whilst the 
Commission only penalised the behaviour in the EU Member States.241 The Commission thus 
237  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission).
238  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 12.
239  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 255.
240  ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 98-99.
241  ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 101-102.
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did not penalise the behaviour of the undertakings on the Czech market before accession.242
This case therefore dealt with a fi ne imposed by the Commission and proceedings of a third 
country competition authority. 
Nevertheless, the Court did apply the EU non bis in idem principle, and ruled that this 
principle “does not preclude penalties which the national competition authority of the 
Member State concerned imposes on undertakings participating in a cartel on account of the 
anti-competitive eff ects to which the cartel gave rise in the territory of that Member State 
prior to its accession to the European Union, where the fi nes imposed on the same cartel 
members by a Commission decision taken before the decision of the said national competition 
authority was adopted were not designed to penalise the said eff ects.”243 Interestingly, the 
Court refers to the turnover used by the Commission to set the fi ne. The turnover in the Czech 
Republic before 2004 was not taken into account by the Commission. As discussed above, 
this thus seems to be the decisive criterion when the Court has to determine whether there is 
‘identity of the facts’ when there is consecutive enforcement of the EU competition rules by 
the Commission and national competition rules by third country competition authorities.244
5.4.9 Résumé
To summarise, the legal interest is always diff erent when the non-Member State NCA has 
fi ned an undertaking for behaviour which the Commission investigates as well. This means 
that the Commission is not barred from imposing a fi ne in such a case. The accounting 
principle is not applicable either. This is excluded on the condition of the identity of the facts. 
The Union Courts have used multiple factors in order to determine whether the facts are 
the same when the Commission imposes a fi ne for allegedly the same behaviour which was 
already fi ned by an authority in a non-Member State. The object and geographical scope of 
the anti-competitive behaviour are examined to determine whether the facts are the same. 
The decisive criterion in this regard seems to be whether a foreign authority took into account 
the turnover in the EU when determining the fi ne. A third country authority will only be 
regarded as taking into account the application and eff ects of the anti-competitive behaviour 
on the EU market when it takes the turnover in the EU into account.245 Undertakings are in 
all other situations not yet fi ned for their behaviour on the EU market, which means that the
242   The cartel lasted until 11 May 2004. It was therefore possible for the Commission to penalise the cartel for ten days also for the eff ect 
on the Czech market. Monti (2014), p. 268, notes: “Paradoxically, the undertakings received a tiny discount of sorts as a result of this 
arrangement between the authorities because the Commission could well have decided that since the cartel had lasted until 11 May 
2004, it was entitled to penalise the undertakings for the eff ects on the Czech Republic starting from 1 May 2004, leaving the Czech 
NCA to proceed against the cartel for the period prior to that.”
243  ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 103.
244   The non-Member State is in this case, prior to 2004, the Czech Republic. Cf. Monti (2014), p. 276-277, who applies the ruling in Toshiba 
also to situations where it concerns current Member States. There are, in my opinion suffi  cient indications however that a distinction 
should be made between cases involving fi nes of authorities of third countries and fi nes of NCAs or the Commission. The Courts 
appear to use a diff erent reasoning for both types of cases. 
245   As mentioned above, the CJEU did provide that third country NCAs do not have the competence to take the eff ects on the EU market 
into account, since this would encroach on the powers of the Commission. This would lead to a circular reasoning where fi nes of third 
country NCAs are only taken into account when the eff ects on the EU market are taken into account, which is, according to the Court 
of Justice, not possible. 
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 Commission will still be able to impose fi nes on those undertakings for their behaviour in the 
EU without taking into account the previously imposed fi ne. 
A more nuanced approach seems to be taken when the Commission itself or an NCA has imposed 
a fi ne for allegedly the same behaviour, which is then fi ned (again) by the Commission. Here 
again, the legal interest protects the jurisdiction of the Commission. However, the accounting 
principle does apply in these cases due to the approach taken towards the identity of the 
facts. The Union Courts will examine whether the object of the anti-competitive behaviour is 
the same for both decisions to determine whether the facts are the same. In order to examine 
this, the Courts will take into account whether the product market is the same,246 whether the 
members of the cartel are the same, whether the content of the agreements is the same, and 
whether the type of anti-competitive behaviour is the same. One could say, as Van Bockel 
states, that that this is a “piecemeal approach”.247 On the other hand, it seems to boil down 
to one point: is the object of the anti-competitive behaviour the same. This is easily denied 
when it concerns a previously imposed fi ne by a competition authority of a non-Member 
State. In contrast the Union Courts have never ruled that a decision of the Commission or of 
an NCA did not take into account the eff ects on the EU market, in particular by not taking 
into account the turnover of the undertakings on the EU market. This seems to be a logical 
reasoning, since the Commission fi nes anti-competitive behaviour on the EU market, whilst 
NCAs fi ne competitive behaviour on part of the EU market. Therefore, other factors are taken 
into consideration, and this indeed, is done on a case-by-case basis. Overall, the non bis in idem 
principle is only applicable in highly exceptional circumstances. 
 5.5 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
5.5.1 Introduction
The burden and standard of proof can be found in multiple legal areas. Whether it is civil law, 
criminal law or administrative law, each area of law has rules regarding the burden and standard 
of proof. In 1999, the Court of Justice accepted in the Hüls case the presumption of innocence as a 
general principle of EU law, which is as such also applicable in EU competition law.248 The burden 
of proof and the obligation to prove certain aspects to the requisite legal standard are notions 
which were also present in case law of the Court of Justice after Hüls was delivered, but which 
have only been tied together explicitly with the presumption of innocence in later case law.249 In 
the following subparagraphs, the burden (5.5.2) and standard of proof (5.5.3) are discussed. 
246   Van Bockel (2010), p. 171, argues that the Union Courts “do not appear to take into account which markets are aff ected by anticompetitive 
behaviour”. (original emphasis) The product market is however taken into account when it concerns a previous imposed fi ne by the 
Commission or an NCA, whilst the eff ect on the EU market is only taken into consideration when it concerns a previous imposed fi ne 
by a third country competition authority. 
247  Van Bockel (2010), p. 161.
248  ECJ, C-199/92 P (Hüls v Commission), par.149-150.
249   See e.g. GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 173-178; ECJ, C-89/11 P (E.ON Energie v 
Commission), par. 71-76.
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5.5.2 Burden of proof
Regulation 1/2003 provides that the Commission should prove an infringement of Article 
101(1) or Article 102 TFEU.250 Before 2004, there was no provision in Regulation 17/62 dealing 
with the burden of proof. Nevertheless, Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 affi  rmed existing case 
law.251 The Commission thus bears, in common law terms, a legal and evidential burden of 
proof, although the evidential burden of proof may shift.252 The legal burden of proof may 
also shift to the undertaking, as is explained below. 
An important example of a shift of the burden of proof can be given. As is also explained below, 
an undertaking might be called upon to provide suffi  cient evidence that an infringement did 
not take place. The Commission and Union Courts may fi nd an infringement to be proven, 
unless an undertaking provides counterevidence. The Commission may rely on direct evidence 
or indirect evidence in order to prove an infringement of Article 101(1) or 102 TFEU. As is 
explained in par. 5.5.3, an undertaking only has to provide a plausible alternative explanation 
when the Commission relies on indirect evidence, whereas the rebuttal of direct evidence is 
more diffi  cult. In common law terms one might say that the evidential burden of proof rests 
on an undertaking to substantiate the counterevidence when the Commission uses indirect 
evidence. In cases where the Commission uses direct evidence, it will be more diffi  cult to rebut 
the evidence of the Commission. As the Union Courts have held, the undertaking should then 
provide more evidence than merely an alternative plausible explanation. The undertaking 
concerned should prove that the evidence of the Commission is insuffi  cient. This seems to 
imply an evidential and legal burden of proof on the undertaking.253 In the 2016 Telefónica case, 
the General Court held e.g. the following:
Although […] the burden of proof is borne either by the Commission or by the 
undertaking or association concerned, the factual evidence on which a party relies 
may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an explanation or 
justifi cation, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of proof has 
been discharged.
250   Article 2 Regulation 1/2003. See e.g. also: GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 105; GC, T-471/13 (Xellia Pharmaceuticals v 
Commission), par. 66; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 88; GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), par. 76; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow 
Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 69; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 65; 
GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 124; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 35; GC, T-47/10 (Akzo 
nobel v Commission), par. 132; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 215; GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas 
Petróleo v Commission), par. 182; GC, T-321/05 (AstraZeneca v Commission), par. 474; GC, T-361/06 (Ballast Nedam v Commission), par. 
30; GC, T-348/06 (Total Nederland v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 38; GC, T-214/06 (ICI v 
Commission), par. 53; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 178; ECJ, C-413/08 P (Lafarge 
SA v Commission), par. 29 ; ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others 
v Commission), par. 79.
251  See e.g. ECJ, C-185/95 P (Baustahlgewebe v Commission), par. 58.
252   See e.g. Nehl (2014), p. 1285; Bailey (2010), p. 20; Hellström (2011), p. 147; Ó Caoimh (2011), p. 276. See also: GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington 
Group and others v Commission), par. 81; GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 67; GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v 
Commission), par. 184; ECJ, C-89/11 P (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 74-75; GC, T-361/06 (Ballast Nedam v Commission), par. 30; GC, 
T-348/06 (Total Nederland v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 39; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo 
Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 178; ECJ, C-413/08 P (Lafarge SA v Commission), par. 30 ; ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, 
C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 79.
253   See e.g. GC, T-47/10 (Akzo nobel v Commission), par. 141, where the General Court ruled that the undertaking concerned should “prove 
to the requisite legal standard, fi rst, the existence of the circumstance relied on by it and, second, that that circumstance calls into 
question the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Commission”. This statement has been repeated on multiple occasions. 
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It should also be pointed out that an undertaking cannot transfer the burden of 
proof to the Commission by relying on circumstances which it is not in a position 
to establish. In other words, when the Commission relies on evidence which is in 
principle suffi  cient to demonstrate the existence of the infringement, it is not suffi  cient 
for the undertaking concerned to raise the possibility that a circumstance arose which 
might aff ect the probative value of that evidence in order for the Commission to bear 
the burden of proving that that circumstance was not capable of aff ecting the probative 
value of the evidence. On the contrary, except in cases where such proof could not be 
provided by the undertaking concerned on account of the conduct of the Commission 
itself, it is for the undertaking concerned to prove to the requisite legal standard, fi rst, 
the existence of the circumstance relied on by it and, second, that that circumstance 
calls into question the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Commission.254
There is thus a burden of proof on an undertaking to discharge evidence adduced by the 
Commission. Otherwise, the Union Courts might be convinced that the infringement took 
place. It should be mentioned though that the Union Courts have made clear that the onus of 
proof has not been reversed in these cases.255
The undertaking bears a burden of proof when it invokes Article 101(3) TFEU.256 Article 101(3) 
provides an exemption ground for infringements of the cartel prohibition. In common law 
terms, this burden of proof on an undertaking is a legal and evidential burden of proof. The 
justifi cation grounds for Article 102 TFEU have not been included in the Treaties, but have, 
in contrast to the exemptions from Article 101(3) TFEU, been developed in practice.257 There 
is therefore no explicit rule on the burden of proof in Regulation 1/2003. Jones & Sufrin state, 
with reference to the Microsoft case and the Post Danmark case, that it still unclear whether there 
is a legal and/or evidential burden of proof on an undertaking to prove that a justifi cation 
is applicable in an Article 102 TFEU-case.258 Indeed in the Microsoft case, the Court of First 
Instance discussed the justifi cation ground under the assessment of whether there is an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU.259 Since the Commission should prove, following Article 2 
Regulation 1/2003, the infringement of Article 102 TFEU, it will also be up to the Commission 
to prove that there is no applicable justifi cation ground when an undertaking invokes that 
254   GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 129-130. The judgment of the General Court was confi rmed on appeal. The Court of Justice 
did not expressly refer to these considerations of the General Court though. See ECJ, C-487/16 P (Telefónica v Commission).
255   E.g. ECJ, C-89/11 P (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 75; GC, T-361/06 (Ballast Nedam v Commission), par. 30; GC, T-348/06 (Total 
Nederland v Commission), par. 100; ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland 
and others v Commission), par. 132; ECJ, C-235/92 P (Montecatini v Commission), par. 181.
256   Article 2 Regulation 1/2003. See e.g. also: GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 183; GC, T-357/06 
(Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 122; ECJ, C-413/08 P (Lafarge SA v Commission), par. 29 ; ECJ, C-125/05 (Vulcan 
Silkeborg), par. 42; ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v 
Commission), par. 79. For a case before Regulation 1/2003 entered into force, see: ECJ, 43/82 and 63/82 (VBVB and VBBB v Commission), 
par. 52. 
257  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 369.
258  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 374.
259   CFI, T-201/04 (Microsoft v Commission), par. 688; see also: CFI, T-301/04 (Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v 
Commission), par. 185.
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justifi cation ground. Conversely, in the Post Danmark case, the Court of Justice mentions that 
it is up to the undertaking to show that the effi  ciencies260 were likely to result from the anti-
competitive conduct.261 Jones and Sufrin contend in 2014 that the Post Danmark case seems to 
“produce congruence with Article 101” by “placing the legal as well as the evidential burden 
in respect of effi  ciencies on the undertaking under article 102 too”.262 Nevertheless, in 2016 
Jones and Sufrin assert on the basis of the same case that only the evidential burden is placed 
on an undertaking.263 The matter of the burden of proof is thus still open to discussion.
5.5.3 Standard of proof
In legal doctrine, a lively discussion takes place on the standard of proof in EU competition 
law proceedings. Nehl argues, with reference to EU competition law cases, that “there seems 
to be common ground that the prosecuting authority needs to match the so-called ‘beyond any 
reasonable doubt’ test as it is generally recognised in criminal law”.264 Venit also states that 
there are compelling arguments to use this criminal law standard competition law cases.265
By contrast, Lowe argues that the standard of beyond reasonable doubt is not a standard 
specifi cally endorsed by the Union Courts.266 Ó Caoimh, former Irish judge of the Court of 
Justice, was not convinced either. He stated: 
I am not at all convinced that the standard applied by the Court amounts to such a 
standard [beyond reasonable doubt], but it is clear that the language used in certain 
cases might be seen by a practitioner coming from the common law tradition as 
suggesting such a standard.267
Jones and Sufrin asserted in 2014 that the Union Courts use a lower standard than that of 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, namely the civil law standard of the balance of probabilities.268
Conversely, Hellström argued that the Union Courts do not seem to use a probabilistic 
standard of proof at all,269 although, if one needs to formulate such a standard, it would 
probably be “some (stricter) version of the ‘balance of probabilities’ test”.270 It thus appears 
quite diffi  cult to fi nd a common standard of proof in EU competition law cases. Gippini-
Fournier argues, just like Hellström, that the Union Courts do not use a probabilistic standard
260   The effi  ciency defence is one of the defences available for undertakings when accused of infringing Article 102 TFEU. When invoked, it 
has to be determined whether anti-competitive eff ects outweigh the advantages on the basis of effi  ciency considerations. Overall, this 
could mean that the benefi ts for consumers are greater than the negative consequences of the anti-competitive behaviour. For more 
information on this, and other defences under Article 102 TFEU, see Jones & Sufrin (2016), p.369-377.
261  ECJ, C-209/10 (Post Danmark), par. 41-42.
262  Jones & Sufrin (2014), p. 389.
263  See Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 374.
264  Nehl (2014), p. 1283.
265  Venit (2011), p. 243.
266  Lowe (2011), p. 166-167.
267  Ó Caoimh (2011), p. 279.
268   Jones & Sufrin (2014), p. 126. This statement cannot be found in the 2016 edition of their book, see Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 115.
269  Hellström (2011), p. 152.
270  Hellström (2011), p. 153.
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 of proof; the focus of the Union Courts appears to lay on the inner conviction (the conviction 
intime). As Gippini-Fournier eloquently phrases:
By and large, the quest for a ‘standard of proof’ by reading fi ne distinctions in or 
between the lines of hundreds of judgments is a delusional one. The EU courts’ 
message regarding the standard of proof is a simple one: the level of proof required is 
the one that is convincing to the court and is not amenable to prior standardization. 
The qualitative and quantitative level of the evidence necessary does not fi t into pre-
established moulds, because it varies from case to case and from issue to issue.271
Perhaps a delusion, but nevertheless, I will try to determine whether the “ambiguity”272 in 
this area, as Ó Caoimh stated in 2011, has become less over the years. 
In 2008, the Court of First Instance refuted the claim of the undertaking concerned that a 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt should apply in EU competition law proceedings.273
Strangely enough, in 2006, the Court of First Instance had ruled diff erently. In the Dresdner 
Bank case, the Court of First Instance ruled that “the direct evidence relating to the meeting of 
15 October 1997 is not suffi  cient for it to be considered, without any reasonable doubt remaining 
on that point, that the banks present concluded such an agreement”.274 It thus appeared that 
the Court of First Instance did not fi nd this statement to be relevant anymore in 2008. To 
make matters more confusing, the General Court explicitly reaffi  rmed the standard of proof 
as provided for in the Dresdner Bank case in the ONP case of 2014.275 In another 2014 case, 
the General Court ruled in an obiter dictum, that the Commission should provide proof of a 
competition law infringement beyond reasonable doubt. The General Court held:
[I]t must be noted that in order to justify inspections, it is not necessary for the 
documents seized by the Commission to be of such a kind as to establish beyond 
reasonable doubt the existence of the infringement found in the contested 
decision. That standard o f proof is required for Commission decisions in which it 
fi nds the existence of an infringement and imposes fi nes. On the other hand, 
in order to adopt an inspection decision within the meaning of Article 20(4) 
of Regulation No 1/2003, it is suffi  cient that it is in possession of information 
and evidence providing reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement.276
None of these cases have, however, been appealed, which means that the Court of Justice has 
not had the opportunity to make a decisive statement on this matter in these cases. 
271 Gippini-Fournier (2010), p. 195.
272  Ó Caoimh (2011), p. 283.
273  CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 64.
274   CFI T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP (Dresdner Bank and others v Commission), par. 144.
275  GC, T-90/11 (Ordre national des pharmaciens and others v Commission), par. 54.
276  GC, T-521/09 (Alstom Grid v Commission), par. 53 (emphasis added).
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In multiple cases, both the General Court and the Court of Justice have ruled that any doubt 
should benefi t the undertaking concerned.277 It is not clear though, whether this would 
mean that a standard of beyond reasonable doubt should be applied.278 The Union Courts 
may be convinced that an undertaking has infringed the competition rules even when the 
Commission “reconstitute[d] certain details by deduction”.279 As the Union Courts have 
ruled, proof of an infringement of the competition rules “must be inferred from a number 
of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible 
explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules”.280 This does not 
seem to constitute proof without reasonable doubt, although the requirements for proof may, 
as mentioned above, have become (at least in wording) more strict. 
The standard of proof in a specifi c case will be determined on the basis of the conviction 
of the Court.281 An undertaking will not be found to have committed an infringement of 
the competition rules when the Court is not convinced by the evidence provided for by 
the Commission. In other words, an undertaking cannot be fi ned for an infringement of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU when there is still doubt on whether the undertaking infringed 
those rules. The Union Courts will analyse the whole body of evidence on a case-by-case 
basis.282 Overall, it is thus quite formalistic to speak of a specifi c standard of proof in EU 
competition law proceedings, since the Union Courts do not have to reach a certain 
standard, but should be convinced that the anti-competitive behaviour occurred. It 
remains therefore the question, at which point the Union Courts, or the Commission 
for that matter, can be said to have reached that inner conviction (the conviction intime).
277   GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 106; GC, T-471/13 (Xellia Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 67; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v 
Commission), par. 89; GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), par. 77; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), 
par. 70; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 66; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 
126; GC, T-82/13 (Panasonic and MT Picture Display v Commission), par. 70; GC, T-104/13 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 50; GC, T-389/10 
and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 216; GC, T-393/10 (Westfälische Drahtindustrie and others v Commission), par. 172; GC, T-398/10 
(Fapricela v Commission), par. 92 and 124; GC, T-418/10, par. 195; GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 62; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 
(Saint-Gobain Glass v Commission), par. 101; GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 188; GC, T-566/08 
(Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 37; ECJ, C-89/11 P (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 72; GC, T-321/05 (AstraZeneca v 
Commission), par. 475, on appeal: ECJ, C-457/10 P (AstraZeneca v Commission), par. 199; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and 
Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 56; ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal 
Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 52.
278  See e.g. Ó Caoimh (2011), p. 279.
279   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 56. See 
also: GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 83; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals 
v Commission), par. 54; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 58; CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 63; ECJ, 
C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 51.
280   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 57. 
See also: ECJ, C-626/13 P (Villeroy and Boch Austria v Commission), par. 47; ECJ, C-625/13 P (Villeroy and Boch v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 94; ECJ, C-74/14 (Eturas and others v Commission), par. 36; GC, T-47/10 (Akzo 
nobel v Commission), par. 138; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 218; GC, T-418/10, par. 117; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie 
Meridionali v Commission), par. 89; GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 83; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo 
Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 54; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 58; CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v 
Commission), par. 63; ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 51.
281   In GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 109; GC, T-471/13 (Xellia Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 70; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v 
Commission), par. 92; GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), par. 80; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 
73; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 69; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 124; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 35; GC, T-82/13 (Panasonic and MT Picture Display v Commission), par. 71; 
GC, T-104/13 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 51; GC, T-47/10 (Akzo nobel v Commission), par. 133; GC, T-418/10, par. 116; GC, T-422/10 
(Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 88; and GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain Glass v Commission), par. 100, the General 
Court/Court of First Instance even refers to the “fi rm conviction”. 
282  See ECJ, C-260/09 P (Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission), par. 72.
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In general, all evidence will, in line with the principle of the unfettered evaluation, be 
admissible provided that it has been obtained lawfully.283 This means that all evidence can 
be used to convince the Union Courts that an infringement of the EU competition rules has 
taken place. Evidence should be suffi  ciently precise and consistent so that the Union Courts 
will obtain this conviction.284 As mentioned, judges will look at the whole body of evidence,285
which means that not each piece of evidence needs to fulfi l this requirement. One piece of 
evidence may be vague, as long as the whole body of evidence is suffi  ciently precise and 
consistent.
A couple of examples of situations where evidence was not suffi  ciently precise and consistent 
can indicate the level of scrutiny exercised by the Union Courts, which may help to determine 
the lowest threshold where the Union Courts did not reach the inner conviction (the conviction 
intime). Evidence will e.g. not be regarded as suffi  ciently precise and consistent when the 
evidence originates from one undertaking and is not substantiated by other pieces of 
evidence.286 In a similar vein, an admission of an undertaking under the leniency programme 
will not be regarded as adequate proof when other undertakings dispute the accuracy of that 
statement and when it is not supported by other consistent evidence.287 Only one piece of 
evidence, regardless of its elaborateness, is never suffi  cient to prove an infringement of the 
EU competition rules. 
Remarkably, these thresholds appear to be quite low. A few examples may demonstrate 
this. Evidence corroborating statements or documents originating from one undertaking 
or evidence obtained under the leniency programme does not necessarily have to be very 
clear; it may be evidence of a “relatively vague nature”.288 Similarly, documentary evidence, 
which credibility is “reduced by the fact that the context in which it was drawn up is 
283   GC, T-758/14 (Infi neon Technologies v Commission), par. 179; GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 42; GC, T-264/12 (UTi 
Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 38; ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), 
par. 128.
284   GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 69; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 124; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 35; GC, T-82/13 (Panasonic and MT Picture Display v Commission), par. 
71; GC, T-104/13 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 51; GC, T-47/10 (Akzo nobel v Commission), par. 133; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM 
v Commission), par. 216; GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 117; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie 
Meridionali v Commission), par. 88; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain Glass v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-90/11 (Ordre national 
des pharmaciens and others v Commission), par. 54; ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v 
Commission), par. 217; GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 182; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing 
v Commission), par. 39; GC, T-321/05 (AstraZeneca v Commission), par. 477; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 38; GC, 
T-214/06 (ICI v Commission), par. 53; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 173; GC, 
T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 56; ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), 
par. 42; CFI, T-62/98 (Volkswagen v Commission), par. 43.
285   GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 70; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), 
par. 217; GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 82; GC, T-90/11 (Ordre national des pharmaciens and others v 
Commission), par. 56; ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 217; GC, T-482/07 
(Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 185; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 39; GC, T-321/05 
(AstraZeneca v Commission), par. 477; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 41; GC, T-214/06 (ICI v Commission), par. 54-55; 
GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 57; 
ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 42.
286   See e.g. GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 203.
287   See e.g. GC, T-214/06 (ICI v Commission), par. 61-62; and ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v 
Commission), par. 135.
288   ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 193.
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largely unknown”,289 due to which “the Commission’s statement in that regard cannot be 
verifi ed”,290 can still be suffi  cient evidence when it is reinforced by other evidence.291 Even 
though undertakings have argued that evidence provided for by leniency applicants should 
be approached with some prudence, the Union Courts do regard this type of evidence as 
of a high probative value.292 Undertakings participating in a leniency programme have an 
incentive to provide as much incriminating information as possible, in order to benefi t fully 
from the leniency programme. There are, nevertheless, suffi  cient safeguards to ensure the 
accuracy of those statements. Providing inaccurate information may lead to a loss of the 
benefi ts of the leniency programme.293 Furthermore, all evidence provided for by a leniency 
applicant can also be used against that undertaking.294 Moreover, “admitting the existence of 
an infringement by [a leniency applicant] entails considerable legal and economic risks”.295
These considerable legal and economic risks mean, according to Tew, amongst others that 
private damages actions may be started.296 Ultimately, for all types of evidence the Union 
Courts will thus examine whether that particular type of evidence is credible.297
It thus appears that the thresholds for the Union Courts to achieve the inner conviction (the 
conviction intime) are not that high. This is even more so when there are certain presumptions 
applicable. As Bailey states, there are diff erent types of presumptions.298 For Article 101 and 
102 TFEU proceedings, the evidential and substantive presumptions appear to be the most 
important.299 An example of an evidential presumption300 is the parent-subsidiary liability, 
which means that a parent company will be liable for its wholly owned subsidiary.301
Substantive presumptions are e.g. the presumption that object restrictions are per defi nition 
prohibited, since they do not require any market analysis302 and they aff ect by defi nition 
competition in an appreciable manner.303
289  CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 274.
290  CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 274.
291   CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 275. See also: GC, T-90/11 (Ordre national des 
pharmaciens and others v Commission), par. 56.
292   See e.g. Tew (2014), p. 274, who insists in her case note at case ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and 
Toshiba v Commission), that “[t]his judgment highlights the up-hill struggle faced by addressees of Commission cartel decisions in 
challenging evidence submitted by leniency applicants”.
293   See e.g. ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 138.
294   See e.g. ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 139.
295   See e.g. ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 103; and ECJ, C-239/11 P, 
C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 140.
296   Tew (2014), p. 274.  is risk has been mitigated for immunity recipients by the adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU, since they are only 
jointly and severally liable for damages towards their direct or indirect purchasers, unless the damages for other injured parties cannot be 
claimed from the other cartelists (see Article 11(4) Directive 2014/104/EU).
297   See e.g. ECJ, C-469/15 P (FSL Holdings and others v Commission), par. 38; GC, T-758/14 (Infi neon Technologies v Commission), par. 179-180; 
GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 42 and 95; and GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 191. 
298  Bailey (2010).
299  Bailey (2010), p. 24, also argues procedural presumptions in the merger control area
300  See also Nehl (2014), p. 1285-1286, who refers to fi ve evidential presumptions.
301   See e.g. ECJ, C-279/98 P (Cascades v Commission); ECJ, C-196/99 P (Aristrain v Commission); ECJ, C-97/08 P (Akzo Nobel and others v 
Commission); ECJ, C-90/09 P (General Química and others v Commission); ECJ, C-520/09 P (Arkema v Commission); ECJ, C-521/09 P (Elf 
Aquitaine v Commission); ECJ, C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P (Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission); ECJ, 
C-289/11 P (Legris Industries v Commission).
302   See e.g. ECJ, C-185/95 P (Baustahlgewebe v Commission); ECJ, C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P (Coop de France bétail et viande and others); ECJ, 
C-8/08 (T-Mobile Netherlands and others).
303   See ECJ, C-226/11 (Expedia v Commission), par. 37. The wording of the Expedia case is open to ambiguity on this point, but the 
Commission has codifi ed it in part by stating that object restrictions are per se appreciable, see: De Minimis Notice, OJ 2014 C291/01, 
par. 2.
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Evidence may quickly be suffi  cient to prove an infringement of the EU competition rules. 
There is however an important task for the undertakings concerned, since the Commission 
is not obliged to prove the innocence of an undertaking.304 A distinction should be made 
between direct evidence or indirect, or circumstantial, evidence produced by the Commission. 
Direct evidence shows that the abuse of a dominant position or a cartel took place. However, 
in many cases, direct evidence will not be available, which means that the Commission has 
to resort to deduction.305 The behaviour of undertakings on the market may e.g. be suffi  cient 
to prove an infringement of the competition rules. Certain elements of the competition law 
rules can even only be proven with assumptions, and thus by resorting to indirect evidence.306
This distinction between direct evidence and indirect evidence is decisive for determining 
whether an undertaking provided suffi  cient counterevidence to prevent the Union Courts 
from acquiring the conviction that an infringement of Article 101(1) or 102 TFEU took place.307
As the Court of Justice has held:
Admittedly, if the Commission fi nds that there has been an infringement of the 
competition rules on the basis that the established facts cannot be explained other 
than by the existence of anti-competitive behaviour, the Courts of the European Union 
will fi nd it necessary to annul the decision in question where those undertakings put 
forward arguments which cast the facts established by the Commission in a diff erent 
light and thus allow another plausible explanation of the facts to be substituted for 
the one adopted by the Commission in concluding that an infringement occurred. 
In such a case, it cannot be considered that the Commission has adduced proof of 
an infringement of competitio n law (see, to that eff ect, Joined Cases 29/83 and 
30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 16 and Joined 
Cases C-89/95, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 
Ahlström and others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paragraphs 126 and 127).
However, the Court has also held that, where the Commission has been able to establish 
that an undertaking had taken part in meetings between undertakings of a manifestly 
anti-competitive nature, the General Court was entitled to consider that it was for 
that undertaking to provide another explanation of the tenor of those meetings. In 
304   Lowe (2011), p. 164. The Commission does have to give access to documents in its case fi le, which could include incriminating and 
exculpatory evidence, see e.g. GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 293.
305   See e.g. ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), 
par. 56.
306   This is e.g. the case with a prospective market analysis. The Commission might have to determine the eff ect on the market for an eff ect 
restriction under Article 101 TFEU or, as was the case in KME I, the Commission might have to determine the potential evolution of the 
prices without the anti-competitive behaviour in order to determine an appropriate fi ne (see ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others 
v Commission), par. 39-40). 
307   It does not happen that often that an undertaking has provided suffi  cient counterevidence, see: ECJ, C-185/95 P (Baustahlgewebe 
v Commission); ECJ, C-286/98 P (Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission); ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, 
C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission); ECJ, C-338/00 P (Volkswagen v Commission); ECJ, C-57/02 P 
(Acerinox v Commission); ECJ, C-65/02 P and C-73/02 P (ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission); ECJ, C-74/04 P (Commission 
v Volkswagen); ECJ, C-105/04 P (Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission); ECJ, 
C-113/04 P (Technische Unie v Commission); ECJ, C-549/10 P (Tomra Systems and others v Commission); ECJ, C-264/11 P (Kaimer and others 
v Commission); ECJ, C-411/11 P (Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens).
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so doing, the General Court had neither unduly reversed the burden of proof nor set 
aside the presumption of innocence (Montecatini v Commission, paragraph 181).308
When the Commission produces direct evidence, an undertaking will need to show that the 
direct evidence is insuffi  cient to prove the infringement.309 A mere denial or an alternative 
explanation is not suffi  cient to rebut direct evidence.310 However, when the Commission relies 
on indirect or circumstantial evidence, and infers an infringement of the competition rules 
by coincidences and indicia, it will be suffi  cient for an undertaking to provide a plausible 
alternative explanation that may shed a diff erent light on the facts.311 An undertaking may 
thus ensure that an infringement cannot be proven by proving that direct evidence used by 
the Commission is insuffi  cient. Furthermore, undertakings only have to provide a plausible 
alternative explanation312 when the infringement is proven on the basis of indirect evidence. 
This may thus prevent the Union Courts to achieve the inner conviction (the conviction intime). 
Whilst in general the Commission will be free to prove an infringement of the competition 
rules on the basis of direct or indirect evidence, the Union Courts did, in some cases, require 
explicitly direct evidence.313
In the Toshiba case, the Union Courts appeared to create some confusion on the nature of the 
evidence which an undertaking should produce in order to prevent a conviction. The General 
Court ruled that: 
Moreover, where the Commission bases its decision solely on the conduct of the 
undertakings at issue on the market to conclude that there was an infringement, it is 
suffi  cient for those undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances which cast 
the facts established by the Commission in a diff erent light and thus allow another 
plausible explanation of those facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the 
Commission in concluding that the Community competition rules had been infringed 
(see, to that eff ect, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering 
and others v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, paragraph 186, and the case-law cited). 
As the applicant submits, that rule also applies where the evidence which the 
Commission relies on is insuffi  cient. In that case, the evidence does not enable the 
308  ECJ, C-89/11 P (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 74-75.
309   GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 83; GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 67; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage 
Marketing v Commission), par. 46; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 39.
310  GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 110-111.
311   GC, T-47/10 (Akzo nobel v Commission), par. 134; GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 82; GC, T-286/09 (Intel v 
Commission), par. 66; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 45; GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 42; 
GC, T-214/06 (ICI v Commission), par. 56; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 177; GC, 
T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 58; CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 63; ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 
P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 57.
312   See e.g. GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 194-195, where the explanation put forward by 
the undertaking, “without being proved”, was just as plausible as that of the Commission. Nonetheless, since the Commission relied 
on indicia, the alternative explanation was suffi  cient to raise doubt. This explanation was not suffi  cient to rebut direct evidence of 
another part of the cartel though, see par. 196. 
313   See e.g. ECJ, C-457/10 P (AstraZeneca v Commission), par. 202, where the Court of Justice required “tangible evidence”, without which 
the Commission could not “presume” that the infringement took place.
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existence of the infringement to be established unequivocally and without the need for 
interpretation (see, to that eff ect, the judgment of 12 September 2007 in Case T-36/05 
Coats Holdings and Coats v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 74). 
By contrast, contrary to what the applicant claims, that rule does not apply to all cases 
in which the infringement is established by deduction from other facts, by indirect 
or non-documentary evidence. As regards the evidence which may be relied on to 
establish an infringement of Article 81 EC, the prevailing principle of Community law 
is the unfettered evaluation of evidence (Case T-50/00 Dalmine v Commission [2004] 
ECR II-2395, paragraph 72). That case-law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53 of the 
EEA Agreement.314
The Court of Justice explicitly endorsed this ruling of the General Court by ruling: 
In such circumstances, as the General Court rightly held in paragraphs 81 and 82 of 
the judgment in Mitsubishi Electric v Commission and in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the 
judgment in Toshiba v Commission, it would be contrary to the prevailing principle of 
European Union law of the unfettered evaluation of evidence to require the General 
Court to examine a possible alternative explanation of the facts put forward by an 
undertaking in order to call the Commission’s claims into question. 
In that context, the General Court was also right to reject the more specifi c arguments raised 
by Mitsubishi and Toshiba, by which they claimed that the General Court is required to 
examine an alternative explanation each time an infringement seems to be established by 
deduction from other facts, indirect evidence or non-documentary evidence.315
It thus appears that providing a possible alternative explanation is not suffi  cient in order to 
prevent the Commission from proving an infringement on the basis of indirect evidence to 
the requisite legal standard. Nevertheless, both the General Court and the Court of Justice 
mention that the Commission did not prove the infringement merely by reference to the 
behaviour of the undertaking on the market.316 There was thus also direct evidence on which 
the Commission relied. In the author’s view, the statement of the Union Courts should 
therefore not be read too strictly. A plausible alternative explanation is not suffi  cient when 
the Commission uses direct evidence. The statement of the Union Courts seems to presume 
that there was indirect and direct evidence, even though reference is only made to indirect 
evidence. Therefore, it remains the case that indirect evidence can be challenged by presenting 
a plausible alternative explanation. It is not necessary to provide more evidence. 
314  GC, T-113/07 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 85-87.
315   ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 221-222.
316   ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 224; GC, T-113/07 (Toshiba v 
Commission), par. 209.
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From 2016, the General Court explicitly refers to the rule that indirect evidence can be rebutted 
with a plausible alternative explanation, whereas an undertaking should “show” that the 
direct evidence used is “insuffi  cient” to prove the infringement.317 This indeed shows that 
direct evidence should be rebutted by other direct evidence and not merely by an alternative 
explanation.318 In some cases, the General Court strangely refers to “documentary evidence” 
instead of direct evidence.319 It appears, in light of the foregoing discussion and other case law 
of the General Court, that this should be read as direct evidence. Documentary evidence does 
not necessarily contain direct evidence. 
An undertaking may rely on an exemption or justifi cation ground when an infringement of the 
competition rules is proven. There are not that many cases where the Union Courts have dealt 
with the standard of proof when an undertaking bears the burden of proof. These cases concern 
the exemption grounds for an infringement of the cartel prohibition and do not examined 
defences under Article 102 TFEU. As mentioned in par. 5.5.2, it is unclear whether there is even 
a (legal) burden of proof on an undertaking when invoking a defence under Article 102 TFEU. 
In GlaxoSmithKline, the Court of Justice has ruled that it should be more likely than not 
that the objective advantages, relied on by an undertaking to justify their behaviour under 
Article 101 TFEU, occur.320 The undertaking concerned should show with a “suffi  cient degree 
of probability” that the advantage would off set the disadvantages of the anti-competitive 
behaviour.321 Similar to the standard of proof for the Commission, an undertaking should 
convince the Union Courts that the conditions for an exemption or justifi cation ground 
are met.322 An undertaking should provide documentary evidence that the exemption or 
justifi cation ground is met.323
5.5.4 Résumé
To summarise, even though the Union Courts sometimes refer to the standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt, it is not likely that this standard applies in EU competition law proceedings. 
The term standard of proof is diffi  cult to apply in those procedures, since the question whether
317   GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 91 and 114-115; GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 111-112; GC, T-471/13 
(Xellia Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 72-73; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 94-95; GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), 
par. 82-83; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 75-76; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and 
Rambaxy v Commission), par. 72; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 125; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), 
par. 37 and 83.
318   This direct evidence should be “credible”. See e.g. GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 149-150 in which the General 
Court ruled that a non-contemporaneous affi  davit was not credible, since the statement was of a person who had a direct interest in 
the case. See e.g. also T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 136.
319   GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 91; GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 111-112; GC, T-471/13 (Xellia 
Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 72-73; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 94-95; GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), par. 82-
83; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 75-76; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy 
v Commission), par. 72; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 125; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 37 
and 83.
320   ECJ, C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P (GlaxoSmithKline and others v Commission), par. 93-94.
321   ECJ, C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P (GlaxoSmithKline and others v Commission), par. 95.
322   The Court of Justice refers to “convincing arguments and evidence”, see e.g. ECJ, C-68/12 (Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v 
Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s.), par. 32; and ECJ, C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P (GlaxoSmithKline and others v Commission), 
par. 82.
323  GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 122.
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an infringement is proven depends on the conviction of the Commission, or on appeal, the 
Union Courts. Evidence will be reviewed as a whole to see whether it is suffi  ciently coherent 
and precise. In general, the Union Courts do not appear to apply a very high threshold before 
they acquire the inner conviction (conviction intime). Nevertheless, there is an important role 
for the undertaking concerned to rebut the evidence of the Commission. 
When the burden of proof rests on an undertaking to prove to the requisite legal standard 
that an objective justifi cation ground is applicable, the Union Courts require an undertaking 
to provide evidence with a suffi  cient degree of probability. 
5.6 LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
5.6.1 Introduction
The principle of legality is a general principle of EU law and should also be complied with 
in EU competition law proceedings, since these proceedings are administrative proceedings 
which lead to a fi ne.324 Undertakings have argued on multiple occasions that the Commission 
breached the substantive legality principle or the principle of legal certainty. Nevertheless, 
the Union Courts rarely acknowledge that the principle of legality is indeed violated by 
actions of the Commission. No clear distinction is made between the legality principle and 
the principle of legal certainty in EU competition law cases. Legality, sometimes referred 
to by the Union Courts as the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle, is sometimes 
mentioned as a corollary of the principle of legal certainty.325 The principle that penalties 
should have a proper legal basis is mentioned as a corollary to the legality principle.326
Conversely, Ortiz Blanco et al. argue that the “requirement of legal certainty is a corollary 
of the principle of legality”.327 On the other hand, Van Bael is of the opinion that the Union 
Courts seem to apply the legality principle “through the intermediary of a more fl exible 
principle, namely the principle of legal certainty”.328 He continues by stating that this 
approach “has had adverse consequences on the two main corollaries of the principle of 
legality, namely the principle of strict interpretation and the principle of non-retroactivity”.329
Sometimes the Union Courts discuss the principle of legality and legal certainty interchangeably, 
without mentioning whether one is part of the other overarching principle.330 Arguably it is 
arbitrary to make a distinction between the legality principle and the legal certainty principle 
in EU competition law proceedings. Both principles are examined in this paragraph as two 
324   See e.g. GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 97; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 29; CFI, T-99/04 (AC 
Treuhand v Commission), par. 139; ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 38; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to 
C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 202.
325   CFI, T-24/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 167; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 71.
326   GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 60; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 33-35; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne 
and others v Commission, par. 124; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 95; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), 
par. 28; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 66.
327  Ortiz Blanco (ed.) (2013), p. 35.
328  Van Bael (2011), p. 220.
329  Van Bael (2011), p. 220.
330  GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 248.
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sides of the same coin. First of all, the content of the legality principle in EU competition law 
proceedings is explained (5.6.2). The Union Courts sometimes explicitly refer to the criminal 
law counterpart of the principle of legality and legal certainty. This approach is discussed 
in the second subparagraph (5.6.3). Thirdly, an examination takes place of cases in which 
undertakings have argued that the legality principle is infringed (5.6.4-5.6.7). 
5.6.2 Legality & legal certainty principle – content
The principle of legal certainty ensures foreseeability.331 Sometimes the Union Courts hold 
that the “the principle of legal certainty requires that [punitive] rules enable those concerned 
to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them, and that those 
persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and 
take steps accordingly”.332 Rules should be clear and precise so that a person may know 
which omissions or acts would make him liable.333 Furthermore, penalties should also be 
clearly defi ned by the law.334 Conversely, this does not mean that vague terms cannot 
exist. As the Union Courts have held, the law may leave discretion for the Commission, 
and vague terms may exist.335 With regard to the discretion for the Commission, the ECJ 
has ruled in e.g. the Schindler case that “discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the 
requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner 
of its exercise are indicated with suffi  cient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in 
question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference”.336
By their interpretation of the legality and legal certainty principle, the Union Courts have 
taken notice of the case law of the ECtHR.337 The Union Courts refer to case law of the ECtHR 
to interpret the Union legality and legal certainty principle. The term ‘law’ is e.g. interpreted 
in line with case law of the Strasbourg Court and includes for that purpose statutory rules, 
but also rules with judicial origins.338 Case law can thus make legislation suffi  ciently clear 
331  See e.g. CFI, T-22/02 and T-23/02 (Sumitomo and Sumila v Commission), par. 80.
332   ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 81. See e.g. also GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 454. 
333   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 202; GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 61; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v 
Commission), par. 33-35; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 95 and 97, on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler 
Holding and others v Commission), par. 57; ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 80-81; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & 
Söhne and others v Commission), par. 124; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 28; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 71; 
CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 66, on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 39. 
334   GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 61; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 33-35; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler 
Holding and others v Commission), par. 95 and 97, on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 57; GC, 
T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 124; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 28; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v 
Commission), par. 66, on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 39.
335   GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 61; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 99, on appeal: 
ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 57; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 
129; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 33; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 79-80; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v 
Commission), par. 71-72; confi rmed on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 42. 
336  ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 57.
337   See e.g. GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 99, on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v 
Commission), par. 57; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 41; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 69-72; 
on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 38-40; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and 
C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 215-220.
338   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par, 205; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 36. 
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and precise to pass the test of the principle of legal certainty.339 Furthermore, the Union 
Courts seem to rely on the concept of a ‘prudent trader’, who should be more careful in its 
actions than e.g. the average consumer.340 A ‘prudent trader’ should more easily foresee the 
consequences of its behaviour, if need be with legal advice.341 Ignorance of the law due to 
vague terms and discretion for the Commission is thus not a good defence342 for undertakings 
in EU competition law proceedings. 
The legality principle in EU competition law proceedings is, as just mentioned, closely related 
to the application of this principle by the ECtHR in criminal law cases. As the Court of First 
Instance has moreover ruled:
With regard to the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, there is 
nothing which would justify the Court of First Instance giving a diff erent interpretation 
of the principle of legality, which is a general principle of Community law, from that 
resulting from the considerations [which are mainly based on case law of the ECtHR] 
set out above.343
The legality principle in EU competition law proceedings seems to be infl uenced by the case 
law of the ECtHR. It should be mentioned though that, after an elaboration on the scope of the 
legality and legal certainty principle, the Union Courts mostly explain what these principles 
do not protect in EU competition law proceedings.344
5.6.3 Legality & legal certainty principle – criminal law light or administrative 
law plus?
The principle of legality is thus a principle which is applicable in EU competition law 
proceedings. The chance of success of defences raised on the basis of this principle is not that 
high though. Undertakings receive some protection on the basis of the legality principle, but 
the scope of protection in the administrative law enforcement of EU competition law is not 
339   GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 63; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 96, on appeal: 
ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 57; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 79, on appeal: ECJ, 
C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 40; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk 
Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 216. 
340   GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 108, on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v 
Commission), par. 58; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 139 and 147; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), 
par. 45; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 83. Sometimes the Union Courts do not mention the concept of a prudent trader, 
but refer to “persons carrying on a professional activity”: see: GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 463 and 511; GC, T-380/10 
(Wabco and others v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 323; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 
P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 219. Furthermore, sometimes reference is made to 
the “well-informed business undertaking”: CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 90, to the “diligent undertaking”: ECJ, 
C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 86, or to the “diligent/prudent economic operator”: GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v 
Commission), par. 323-324.
341   GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 463; ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 58; GC, T-380/10 (Wabco 
and others v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 323; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 
90; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 83; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk 
Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 219.
342   More in general the GC, T-413/10 and T-414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 304, held with reference to an Opinion of AG Kokott that 
there is a “general maxim that ignorance of the law is no defence”.
343  CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 34.
344   See below under the headings “legality and fi nes – legal basis” and “legality and fi nes – Fining Guidelines”.
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the same as in criminal law cases. As the General Court held in the Sasol case of 2014, when 
discussing the principle of legality:
[I]t should be noted that while competition law is indeed similar to criminal law, it is 
not at the ‘heart’ of criminal law. Outside the ‘hard core’ of criminal law, the guarantees 
in matters of criminal law laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR will not necessarily apply 
with their full stringency (see European Court of Human Rights, Jussila v. Finland [GC], 
no. 73053/01, § 43, ECHR 2006-XIV).
It must also be noted in that context that, in the area of competition law, unlike 
criminal law, both the benefi ts and the penalties for unlawful activities are purely 
pecuniary, as is the motivation of the off enders whose actions are in line with an 
economic logic. Consequently, were the fi ne to be imposed for participation in an 
unlawful cartel to be more or less predictable, this would have highly damaging 
consequences for European Union competition policy, since the undertakings 
committing the infringements could directly compare the costs and benefi ts of their 
unlawful activities, and also take into account the chances of being discovered, and 
thus attempt to ensure that those activities are profi table (see, to that eff ect, Degussa v 
Commission, cited in paragraph 203 above, paragraph 83; Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff -
Technik v Commission, cited in paragraph 203 above, paragraph 45; and Ecka Granulate 
and non ferrum Metallpulver v Commission, cited in paragraph 203 above, paragraph 32).
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that Article 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 constitutes both a means of enabling the Commission to 
implement European Union competition policy with the necessary effi  ciency and a 
suffi  ciently clear and precise legal basis for the adoption of decisions imposing fi nes 
on the participants in cartels. Consequently the applicants’ complaint in that regard 
must be rejected.345
In the Sasol case, the General Court thus seems to accept that competition law is an area of 
law which could be of a criminal law nature, although not all safeguards are applicable since 
it does not belong to the “heart” of criminal law.
Conversely, in other cases the General Court seems to take a more established path, by stating 
that the legality principle is a criminal law principle which is nevertheless applicable in the 
administrative law enforcement of EU competition law.346 These are two diff erent roads, a 
345  GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 206-208. 
346   See e.g. GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 97; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 29; and CFI, 
T-99/04 (AC Treuhand v Commission), par. 113. Some cases in which the ECJ took this approach are: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v 
Commission), par. 38; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), 
par. 202.
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‘criminal law light’ road and an ‘administrative law plus’ road,347 which both lead to the 
same result as regards the application of the legality principle. In later cases, the reference to 
the application of a criminal law principle in administrative law proceedings (administrative 
law plus), or the reference to the application of a criminal law principle but not in its full 
stringency (criminal law light), seems to be forgotten. In the 2017 Icap case, the General Court 
explained the scope of the legal certainty principle in ‘criminal law’ and applied this principle 
to the case at hand.348 The General Court did refer to older case law of the Court of Justice, 
although that case law does not explicitly seem to advocate such a strong adherence to the 
criminal law legal certainty principle. 
Overall, it can thus be said that the Commission receives some leeway from the Union Courts 
in establishing an infringement of the Union competition rules and in imposing fi nes for those 
infringements, since competition law does not belong to the criminal law domain. This leeway 
for the Commission causes some dismay to some authors. Van Bael e.g. refers to the approach 
taken by the Union Courts as “unfortunate”.349 Ortiz Blanco, held in a speech: 
The basic problem is that fi nes are undetermined and – what is worse – purposefully 
undeterminable with the excuse that otherwise undertakings would “factor them 
in” and deterrence would not be obtained. This is contrary to the principle of lex 
certa and surprising for many national judges.350
The approach taken by the Union Courts in relation to the principle of legal certainty and 
legality is not that surprising though. A fair balance has to be struck between eff ective 
enforcement and the adherence to these principles. As becomes clear from, amongst others, 
the Sasol case, eff ective enforcement of EU competition law, and thus also the deterrent eff ect 
of fi nes requires some form of unpredictability. In e.g. the Jungbunzlauer case, the Court of 
First Instance ruled: 
[T]o avoid excessive prescriptive rigidity and to enable a rule of law to be adapted 
to the circumstances, a certain degree of unforeseeability as to the penalty which 
may be imposed for a given off ence must be permitted. A fi ne subject to suffi  ciently 
circumscribed variation between the minimum and the maximum amounts which 
may be imposed for a given off ence may therefore render the penalty more eff ective 
both from the viewpoint of its application and its deterrent eff ect.351
347  The Court of Justice has also ruled in other cases that penalties of a non-criminal nature can also only be imposed when they “[rest] on 
a clear an unambiguous legal basis”, see ECJ, C-670/11 (Établissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer v Vinifrance), par. 
50. The legality principle and legal certainty principle thus also play a role in administrative law proceedings. 
348  GC, T-180/15 (Icap v Commission), par. 194.
349  Van Bael (2011), p. 220. 
350  Ortiz Blanco, speech of 19 November 2015. 
351  CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 84.
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A similar reasoning can be found in other cases as well, which is discussed below. 
5.6.4 Legality & legal certainty principle – application in case law
Many cases which are brought before the Union Courts deal with the legality of 
the fi ning guidelines of the Commission.352 However, there are also cases dealing 
with limitation periods,353 with the question whether it was foreseeable that certain 
behaviour is prohibited by the EU competition rules,354 with the market defi nition 
and the concept of a dominant position,355 the single and continuous infringement 
defi nition,356 and parent-subsidiary liability.357 Fining cases are discussed fi rst (5.6.5-
5.6.6), after which the other cases dealing with the legality principle are examined (5.6.7). 
5.6.5 Legality & legal certainty and fi nes – legal basis
In multiple cases undertakings have argued that Article 23(2) of Reg. 1/2003, or Article 
15(2) of Reg. 17, which form the legal basis for the imposition of fi nes for infringements of 
the substantive EU competition law rules, are imprecise. According to the undertakings 
concerned, this imprecision infringes the legality principle. The Union Courts never accepted 
this argument. The Commission’s discretion provided for in the Procedural Regulation is, 
according to the Union Courts, limited by a “quantifi able and absolute ceiling”,358 by the 
objective359 requirements that the Commission should determine the fi ne on the gravity 
and duration of the infringement,360 and by the “Commission’s well-known and accessible
352   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission); GC, T-380/10 (Wabco and others v Commission); GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v 
Commission); GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission); GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission); GC, T-299/08 
(Elf Aquitaine v Commission); GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding 
and others v Commission); GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission); CFI, T-24/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), on appeal: 
ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission); CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission); CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission); 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), on appeal ECJ, C-501/06 P (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission); CFI, T-279/02 
(Degussa v Commission), on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission); ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission); 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), on appeal: ECJ, C-3/06 P (Groupe Danone v Commission); ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, 
C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission); ECJ, C-298/98 P (Finnboard v Commission).
353   CFI, T-22/02 and T-23/02 (Sumitomo and Sumila v Commission), par. 80-82; ECJ, 51/69 (Bayer v Commission), par. 20. These two cases 
are not dealt with here, since the Union Courts left it up to the legislator to decide to include limitation periods in legislation and to 
determine the specifi c limitation periods. The absence of a limitation period does not mean that the Commission is not barred from 
imposing a fi ne after a certain period. This bar exists when the Commission delays the process for an unduly long period, but not when 
it was merely unaware of the infringement. 
354   GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1604 and 1639-1641; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 226.
355   GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 322-325; GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 537-538.
356  GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 133-139.
357  ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission); GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 132-
139 and 213-216; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 31-50.
358   ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 58. See also: GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 203; 
GC, T-380/10 (Wabco and others v Commission), par. 177; GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 75 and 77; GC, T-138/07 
(Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 102 and 104; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 141-142; CFI, 
T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 36; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 85; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 
74-75, on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 50.
359  In GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 142, the General Court refers to “the objective yardstick of the upper 
limit for the fi ne and the subjective criteria of the gravity and the duration of the infringement” (emphasis added; the German version, 
which is the language of the case, also refers to “das objektive Kriterium der Obergrenze der Geldbuße und die subjektiven Kriterien 
der Schwere und Dauer“). This seems to be a slip of the pen, since all other cases refer to the objective criteria of gravity and duration. 
360   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 204; GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 71 and 77; GC, T-138/07 
(Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 102; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 142; CFI, T-69/04 
(Schunk v Commission), par. 36-37; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 74-75.
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practice361 [which] is subject to unlimited review by the European Union judicature, whose settled 
case-law362 has enabled the concepts that Article 23(2) might contain to be defi ned”.363 The General 
Court and the Court of Justice sometimes only refer to some of these elements though. 
In Groupe Danone, the Court of Justice ruled that “even in the absence of the [Fining] Guidelines 
[the undertaking was] still able to foresee the legal consequences of its conduct”.364 The fi rst 
Fining Guidelines were not adopted yet when the undertaking infringed the EU competition 
law rules. The objective criteria from the Procedural Regulation and the interpretation of those 
criteria by the Union Courts were, according to the Groupe Danone case, suffi  cient to ensure 
foreseeability. This emphasis on the Procedural Regulation and established case law of the 
Union Courts without mentioning the administrative practice has not been not repeated in later 
judgments. By contrast, in later cases, the well-known administrative practice of the Commission, 
which can partly be found in the Fining Guidelines,365 is explicitly referred to as an important 
element in order for an undertaking to be able to foresee the consequences of its conduct.366
Undertakings have also more specifi cally argued that the terms ‘gravity’ and ‘duration’ 
are too broad and that they therefore do not comply with the legality principle. The Union 
Courts have nevertheless not been convinced by this reasoning and confi rmed that these 
perhaps somewhat vague terms do not necessarily infringe “the principles that penalties 
must have a proper legal basis and the principle of legal certainty”.367 These terms were also 
explained by the Union Courts and further developed by the Commission’s “well-known and 
accessible” practice.368 Furthermore, the 10% limit created by the Union legislator cannot be 
regarded as excessive.369 Arbitrary interferences, due to vague terms and discretion for the 
Commission, are thus prevented, since the legislator has still provided the benchmarks which 
the Commission should comply with. Moreover, the Union Courts and the Commission itself 
have further developed the objective criteria from the Procedural Regulation. This, again, 
off ers protection against arbitrary interferences. 
361   Namely the application of the Fining Guidelines and the Leniency Notice, see e.g. ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 
52. 
362   See in particular, for the role of case law in clarifying the concepts in Regulation 17/62/Regulation 1/2003, ECJ, C-266/06 P 
(Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 61, where the Court ruled that case law has allowed the Commission to develop its well-known 
administrative practice and the Fining Guidelines: “De même, il ne saurait être contesté que la jurisprudence bien établie de la Cour 
et du Tribunal a contribué à clarifi er les critères et la méthode de calcul que la Commission doit appliquer dans le cadre de la fi xation 
du montant des amendes. À cet égard, les critères dégagés par cette jurisprudence ont, notamment, été empruntés par la Commission 
pour la rédaction des lignes directrices et permis à celle-ci de développer une pratique décisionnelle connue et accessible.”
363   ECJ, C-501/11 P (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 58. See also: GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 205; GC, 
T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 106-107; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 144-146; 
CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 42 and 44; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 88-89; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v 
Commission), par. 78-80, on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 52, 54 and 61.
364  ECJ, C-3/06 P (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 28.
365   The General Court referred in GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 145-146, to both the well-known 
administrative practice and the Fining Guidelines. The administrative practice of the Commission can thus be found beyond the 
Fining Guidelines as well. However, this practice is not a legal framework to impose fi nes, but the Commission may be bound by it on 
the basis of the equality principle.
366   The Fining Guidelines ensure legal certainty, see e.g. ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk 
Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 213.
367  See e.g. GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 64. 
368  See e.g. GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 63. 
369  See e.g. CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 86. 
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The application of the wide discretion which the Commission enjoys on the basis of Regulation 
1/2003, and formerly Regulation 17/62, may not infringe other general principles of EU law, 
such as the principle of equal treatment or proportionality.370
5.6.6 Legality & legal certainty and fi nes – Fining Guidelines
In other cases dealing with the fi ning policy of the Commission, undertakings have 
argued that the Fining Guidelines are not compatible with the legality principle. In many 
cases, these arguments are based on the misconception that the Guidelines form the legal 
basis for the Commission to impose fi nes on undertakings.371 Regulation 1/2003, and the 
former Regulation 17/62, contain the legal basis for the Commission to impose fi nes - not 
the Guidelines.372 The Guidelines merely provide more legal certainty.373 Conversely, it has 
also been ruled by the General Court that “the Commission’s previous decision-making 
practice does not in itself serve as a legal framework for the fi nes imposed in competition 
matters, since that framework is defi ned solely in Regulation No 1/2003 and in the applicable 
guidelines”.374 The reference to the Fining Guidelines does not seem to fi t well at fi rst sight 
with other statements that they are not the legal basis for fi nes. Nevertheless, the General 
Court does refer to the legal framework consisting of Regulation 1/2003 and the Fining 
Guidelines, and not to the legal basis. The Fining Guidelines could be regarded as part of the 
legal framework for imposing fi nes, even though they are not the legal basis for those fi nes. 
Other arguments of undertakings deal with the retroactive application of the Fining 
Guidelines. This could relate to the retroactive application of the 2006 version or the 
retroactive application of the 1998 version.375 As the Court of First Instance has made clear, 
the principle of non-retroactivity is a general principle of EU law “which must be observed 
when fi nes are imposed for infringement of the competition rules and [which] requires that 
the penalties imposed correspond with those fi xed at the time when the infringement was 
committed”.376 However, the Commission can apply the Fining Guidelines that are in place 
370   GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 105; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 143; CFI, 
T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 41; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 87; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 
77, on appeal: ECJ, C-266/06 P (Evonik Degussa v Commission), par. 51 and 62.
371   See e.g. GC, T-299/08 (Elf Aquitaine v Commission), par. 258; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 44; ECJ, C-3/06 P (Groupe Danone 
v Commission), par. 23 and 27-28; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 82; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 
P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 212. Similarly, the Union Courts have ruled before the Guidelines 
were adopted that the Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not serve as the legal framework for the imposition of fi nes, 
see e.g. CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 234, and CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 58. 
372   GC, T-299/08 (Elf Aquitaine v Commission), par. 258; CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 44; ECJ, C-3/06 P (Groupe Danone v 
Commission), par. 24 and 27-28.
373   See e.g. GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 200. See also GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 291; and GC, 
T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 159, where the General Court mentioned that the use 
of a particular factor in the Fining Guidelines, the “value of sales”, means that the fi ne of the “Commission is more foreseeable for 
undertakings and enables them to assess the size of the fi ne they are liable to incur when they decide to take part in an unlawful cartel”. 
(emphasis added)
374  GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 312.
375   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission); GC, T-380/10 (Wabco and others v Commission); GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v 
Commission); GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission); GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission); 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), on appeal ECJ, C-501/06 P (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission); CFI, T-279/02 
(Degussa v Commission); ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v 
Commission).
376  CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 38.
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at the time of establishing the infringement and not at the time the infringement took place. 
If the Commission would have been obliged to do so, that would have rendered its rights 
to change the calculation method of fi nes meaningless.377 The principle of non-retroactivity 
does not prevent the Commission from relying on new methods of calculating a fi ne that 
were not used at the time the infringement took place. Under the heading of foreseeability, 
the Union Courts have ruled on multiple occasions that the Commission is entitled to 
change its fi ning policy378 whenever the eff ective enforcement of EU competition law so 
requires.379 This means that a change in the fi ning policy, and the imposition of higher fi nes, 
is completely acceptable in light of the legality principle. The Commission did however 
limit its discretion a bit by adopting Fining Guidelines. This self-imposed limitation ensures 
legal certainty. Therefore, the Commission may not depart from the Fining Guidelines or 
apply new Fining Guidelines when this infringes (other) general principles of EU law, in 
particular the principle of equal treatment, but also e.g. the principle of proportionality.380
There is one exception to the rule that the Commission can always apply new Fining Guidelines 
to a case where the facts occurred before those Guidelines were adopted. In the Solvay 
case,381 the General Court ruled that the Commission could not take newly created Fining 
Guidelines into account when setting a fi ne. The reason for this was that the Commission 
already took a decision before the Guidelines had been adopted. However, this decision 
was quashed on appeal due to a procedural defect. Therefore, the Commission justifi ably 
adopted a new decision without initiating a new administrative procedure.382 The General 
Court held that in these particular circumstances, the Commission could not take into account 
the new Guidelines, since it had to use the rules available at the time of the adoption of the 
initial decision in order to remedy the procedural defect.383 This is even the case when, as the 
undertaking concerned argued, the Guidelines allow for less severe fi nes.384 The lex mitior rule 
thus does not seem to apply in these cases.
377  See e.g. GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 214.
378   An increase in the level of fi nes can take place in individual decisions, but also by application of Guidelines, see e.g. ECJ, C-501/06 P 
(Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 59 and 66; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk 
Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 230. Furthermore, the Commission may depart from the Fining Guidelines in an individual 
case, see e.g. GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 77.
379   GC, T-541/08 (Sasol and others v Commission), par. 209-214; GC, T-380/10 (Wabco and others v Commission), par. 175-182; GC, T-386/10 
(Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 84-90; GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 248; GC, T-138/07 
(Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 123-128; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 41-46; CFI, T-279/02 
(Degussa v Commission), par. 81; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others 
v Commission), par. 224-232. Frese (2014), p. 74, argues, with reference to GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), 
that “the terms and conditions of penalties for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should correspond with those laid down at 
the time when the infringement was committed”. However, this does not seem to follow from the case law of the General Court or the 
European Court of Justice. 
380   GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 120; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 40 and 47, 
on appeal ECJ, C-501/06 P (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 60 and 64; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 82; ECJ, 
C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 211.
381  GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission).
382  GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 492.
383  GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 493-495.
384  GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 484.
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5.6.7 Legality & legal certainty and other cases
While most cases concern the compatibility of the fi ning policy of the Commission with 
the legality and legal certainty principles, there are still other cases in which undertakings 
have argued that the latter have been infringed. In the ThyssenKrupp case, the undertaking 
concerned was fi ned for behaviour prohibited under the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community. This Treaty expired, however, when the Commission started 
an infringement proceeding against ThyssenKrupp. Since the procedural rules of the 
ECSC were no longer in place, the Commission decided to use Regulation 1/2003. Neither 
the Court of First Instance nor the Court of Justice found this to be an infringement of the 
legality and legal certainty principle.385 As the Court of Justice ruled: “[the principle of the 
legality of criminal off ences and penalties and the principle of legal certainty386] do not aim 
to guarantee to undertakings that subsequent amendments to the legal bases and procedural 
rules will enable them to escape all penalties relating to their past infringement”.387
In the Telefónica case, the Commission used a diff erent method to establish a dominant 
position on the market than the Spanish authorities. Some uncertainty was thus created by 
the diff erence in application of the concept of “dominant position” by the two competition 
authorities. Nevertheless, Telefónica “could not be unaware that it held a dominant position 
on the relevant markets”.388 The General Court applied existing case law and concluded that 
Telefónica’s belief “that it did not occupy a dominant position on those markets could only 
be the outcome of an inadequate study of the structure of the markets on which it operated 
or a refusal to take those structures into consideration”.389 Was Telefónica a prudent trader, 
then it would have foreseen that it held a dominant position on the relevant markets. Overall, 
undertakings should be aware of the defi nition the Court of Justice gave of the concept of a 
dominant position in Hoff mann-LaRoche.390 This means that “extremely large market shares 
[constitute], save in exceptional circumstances, [...] proof of the existence of a dominant 
position”.391
Sometimes undertakings argue that it was unforeseeable for them to know whether their 
behaviour was unlawful. Undertakings should be very careful in their behaviour, since 
unawareness of the rules, even when the particularities in a case are complex, does not prevent 
them from being found guilty of an infringement of the EU competition rules.392 Behaviour 
of undertakings that is already established by the Commission or in case law of the Union 
Courts to be unlawful, even when that behaviour is not completely similar, will be prohibited. 
This also means that undertakings cannot rely on the argument of legal uncertainty about 
385   CFI, T-24/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 82-83 and 167-168. ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 80-90.
386  ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), respectively par 80 and 81.
387  ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 83 (emphasis added).
388  GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 325.
389  GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 325.
390  See GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 537.
391  See e.g. GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 538.
392  GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1604 and 1641.
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that matter.393 Furthermore, undertakings can never argue that it was not foreseeable for them 
that behaviour will be regarded as anti-competitive when that behaviour is referred to in the 
Treaties.394 The same reasoning can be found in cases dealing with the concept of a single 
and continuous infringement. This concept is already well-explained in case law, and thus an 
appeal on the legality principle will not be successful.395 Furthermore, relying on a common 
practice within the EU to claim that undertakings are unaware that the practice might infringe 
the competition law rules, is not a good defence.396 Undertakings should be aware of the 
competition law rules, and in particular also the application of these rules by the Commission 
and the Union Courts. 
The Union Courts have also held that “the principle that penalties must be clearly defi ned 
by law and the principle of legal certainty cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the gradual 
clarifi cation of the rules of criminal liability but may preclude the retroactive application of 
a new interpretation of a rule establishing an off ence”.397 The competition law rules can be 
further clarifi ed and developed by the interpretation of those rules by the Commission and 
the Union Courts. No infringement of the legal certainty principle will be found as long as 
the gradual development of competition law liability is foreseeable.398 What is foreseeable 
“depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text at issue, the fi eld which it covers 
and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed, and that a law may still satisfy 
the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal 
advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which 
a given action may entail”.399
As mentioned, in most cases an appeal to the legality and legal certainty principle will not be 
successful. An exception to this observation can be found in the Areva case. Two undertakings 
were held jointly and severally liable for the behaviour of a subsidiary. However, the parent 
undertakings were in subsequent order 100% shareholders of the subsidiary, which meant that 
the two parent undertakings were never part of the same economic unit. Both undertakings 
were, for part of the period in which the anti-competitive behaviour took place, parent
393   GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1641; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 226.
394  GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 226.
395  GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 133-139.
396   GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 280; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v 
Commission), par. 268.
397   ECJ, C-295/12 P (Telefónica v Commission), par. 147. See also GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 762; GC, Case T-471/13 (Xellia 
Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 403; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 369; GC, T-460/13 (Sun 
Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 304. See also GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 507. As regards the 
term ‘gradual clarifi cation’ reference is sometimes also made to progressive clarifi cation, see GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 
457. Reference is also made to the “gradual, case-by-case clarifi cation of the rules on criminal liability by judicial interpretation”, see 
GC, T-180/15 (Icap v Commission), par. 195.
398   For the gradual development of the margin squeeze doctrine, see e.g. ECJ, C-295/12 P (Telefónica v Commission), par. 147-149.
399   GC, T-472/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 767; GC, Case T-471/13 (Xellia Pharmaceuticals v Commission), par. 404; GC, T-467/13 (Arrow 
Group and Arrow Generics v Commission), par. 370; GC, T-460/13 (Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries and Rambaxy v Commission), par. 305. See 
also GC, T-180/15 (Icap v Commission), par. 196; GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 511, where the General Court ruled that this 
is in particular true for “persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution 
when pursuing their occupation”.
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undertakings of the subsidiary. According to the undertakings it was unforeseeable that they 
would be held jointly and severally liable for the total period in which the infringement by 
the subsidiary took place. The General Court nonetheless did not see any problems in this.400
Conversely, the Court of Justice quashed the decision of the Commission. The Commission 
has never held undertakings joint and several liable in this way, and, according to the 
Court of Justice, this mechanism of joint and several liability “cannot be used to force one 
company to bear the risk of the insolvency of another company where those companies 
have never formed part of the same undertaking”.401 It was also impossible for the two 
parent undertakings to “ascertain precisely the amount of the fi ne they are required to 
pay in respect of the period during which they were held jointly and severally liable, with 
their parent subsidiary, for the infringement”.402 For undertakings which form a single 
economic unit, by contrast, this would be easier. This uncertainty for the two undertakings 
in the Areva case infringed the principle of legal certainty.403 The Court then continued: 
That uncertainty cannot be dispelled by the rule of liability in equal measure applicable by 
default, such as that referred to by the General Court at paragraph 215 of the judgment 
under appeal, under which, in the absence of any fi nding in the Commission’s decision 
imposing joint and several liability for payment of a fi ne on a number of companies 
that some of the companies in the undertaking have a greater share of responsibility 
than others for the undertaking’s participation in the cartel during a specifi c period, 
it must be presumed that they share equal responsibility and, accordingly, must pay 
an equal share of the fi nes for which they have been held jointly and severally liable. 
European Union law does not lay down any such rule (Commission v Siemens 
Österreich and others and Siemens Transmission & Distribution and others v Commission, 
paragraphs 70 and 71). Moreover, that rule relates, in any event, only to the internal 
allocation of liability for payment of the fi ne among those jointly and severally liable, 
once the fi ne has been paid to the Commission, not to the determination, from the 
external perspective, of joint and several liability, of the respective amounts that 
the Commission may claim from the legal entities that formed part of each of the 
undertakings which succeeded one another during the infringement period.404
The Court of Justice thus seems to accept the possibility to “dispel” uncertainty. It appears that 
a prudent trader cannot foresee the consequences of its acts in the absence of a rule in Union 
law. This rule can be created in case law, by administrative practice of the Commission or in 
400   GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 132-139 and 213-216. See also par. 133, in which the General Court 
ruled that “the rules on attributing liability to legal and natural persons for infringements of competition law correspond with those 
laid down at the time when the infringement was committed”. However, the gradual clarifi cation of rules of liability does not infringe 
the principle of non-retroactivity, as long as that clarifi cation is foreseeable. 
401  ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission), par. 132.
402  ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission), par. 139.
403  ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission), par. 139.
404   ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission), par. 140-141 (emphasis added).
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legislation. Conversely, this means that when there is a Union rule, prudent undertakings 
should be aware of that rule. The Bolloré case provides a good example of the approach of 
the Union Courts.405 According to the undertaking concerned, it could not have foreseen that 
it was to be held liable as a parent undertaking for its fully owned subsidiary. The General 
Court referred to existing case law on the presumption of decisive infl uence over a fully 
owned subsidiary, after which it concludes that there was no uncertainty as to that concept.406
A prudent trader should thus have been aware of this case law.
5.6.8 Résumé
The principles of legality and legal certainty are applicable in EU competition law proceedings. 
This means that off ences and penalties should be suffi  ciently clear for a prudent trader to 
know which acts and/or omissions would make him liable. Overall, it can be said that the 
Union Courts do not quickly accept an appeal to the legality and legal certainty principle. 
The Union legislator has left the Commission with a wide discretion to increase fi nes. This 
discretion has been reaffi  rmed by the Union Courts on multiple occasions. Undertakings 
should therefore always expect that the Commission can raise the level of fi nes in individual 
cases or by a change in the Fining Guidelines. Nevertheless, there are limits to this discretion, 
most notably the 10% maximum for fi nes which the legislator created for competition law 
fi nes, but also general principles of EU law, such as the principle of equal treatment.407
In general, undertakings are obliged to know the law, especially when a matter has been 
dealt with before by the Commission or the Union Courts. The concept of a prudent trader 
is therefore often used to explain that an undertaking could have been aware or could have 
foreseen that its behaviour would infringe the competition rules. 
5.7 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
5.7.1 Introduction
Proportionality of sanctions is a principle which the Commission should comply with 
when imposing a fi ne on an undertaking in competition law proceedings. The principle is 
codifi ed in Article 49(3) of the Charter, although reference to this article in competition law 
proceedings is, upon now, scarce.408 In what follows, fi rstly the current Fining Guidelines, and 
case law of the Union Courts on these Guidelines, are discussed (5.7.2). Secondly, the principle 
of proportionality of sanctions is discussed in general (5.7.3), after which the focus shifts to the 
405  GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission).
406   GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 38-50. In par. 45, the General Court sums up case law on the parent-subsidiary liability.
407   For the acceptance of a plea based on the principle of equal treatment see Van Bael (2011), p. 223, who asserts that “[a]rguably, cases 
are never similar and therefore the application of the principle of equal treatment relates only to the comparison of the situation of 
various parties involved in the same case. Further, the European Courts have systematically confi rmed that the Commission’s earlier 
decision-making practice does not serve as a legal framework for the fi nes imposed in competition matters.”
408   GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 347; GC, T-519/09 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 280; GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v 
Commission), par. 308 and 324; GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 165; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 135; 
GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 408; GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 108; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 244; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 244; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche 
Bahn v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 102.
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factors which should be taken into account when fi nes for EU competition law infringements 
are imposed upon undertakings (5.7.4-5.7.5). Lastly, some factors are mentioned which do not 
necessarily have to be taken into account by the Commission when determining the amount 
for a competition law fi ne (5.7.6).
5.7.2 The 2006 Fining Guidelines
The most recent Fining Guidelines of the Commission date from 2006. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, these Guidelines try to ensure certainty for undertakings. The 
Commission will fi rst determine the basic amount for a fi ne by taking a percentage between 0% 
and 30% of the value of sales of the last preceding business year before the fi ne is imposed.409
Obviously, the value of sales relate to the relevant market in which the anti-competitive 
behaviour took place. This amount is multiplied by the duration of the infringement,410 after 
which the fi ne is raised with a certain percentage between 15% and 25% to ensure deterrence.411
When the basic amount has been determined, the Commission will take into account 
aggravating412 and mitigating circumstances.413 Furthermore, at this stage the Commission 
may increase the fi ne once more to ensure the deterrent eff ect of the fi ne.414 At this point, 
the fi ne will be adapted to the 10% maximum from Regulation 1/2003, after which the 
Commission may adapt the fi ne in accordance with the Leniency Notice415 or reduce the fi ne 
in case the undertaking is not able to pay it.416
Lastly, even when the Commission has set the fi ne, it may still decide to impose a symbolic 
one417 or adjust it by departing from the Fining Guidelines.418
The Union Courts have endorsed the method developed by the Commission for setting fi nes. 
Nevertheless, in later case law, the General Court has tried to streamline the fi ning policy as 
well. In cartel cases, the General Court makes a distinction between three stages, namely: the 
stage of determining the objective gravity; the stage of determining the relative gravity; and, 
lastly, possible adaptations419 that were not taken into account in the two stages before.420 This 
distinction largely corresponds with the 2006 Fining Policy of the Commission.421 The objective 
gravity is thus assessed by taking into account all factors which are common to all cartelists,422
409   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 13.
410   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 19.
411   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 25.
412   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 28.
413   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 29.
414   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 30-31.
415   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 34.
416   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 35.
417   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 36.
418   Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, par. 37.
419   This is similar to the 2006 Fining Guidelines and deals with the possibility to depart from the factors discussed or the possibility to 
impose a symbolic fi ne.
420  See e.g. GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 423.
421  GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 414. 
422   See e.g. GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux v Commission), par. 151, where the General Court ruled that, in the initial stage (assessment of the basic 
amount of the fi ne), the Commission uses multipliers which are “determined in the light of factors which refl ect the characteristics of 
the infringement as a whole, that is to say, inasmuch as it combines all of the anti-competitive conduct of all of the participants”.
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whereas the relative gravity is used for the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.423 This 
is in line with the Fining Guidelines of the Commission.
The concept of relative gravity dates back to the Suiker Unie case of 1975 in which the Court 
of Justice ruled that “in so far as an infringement upheld by the Court has been committ ed 
by several applicants, it is appropriate to consider how seriously each of them participated 
in it”.424 Only from 2013 onwards did the General Court start to use the new terminology of 
objective and relative gravity.425 The specifi c reference to the aforementioned three stages 
is only used since 2015.426 The relative gravity is, although relating to the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, in line with the Suiker Unie case, used to assess the actions of one 
undertaking in relation to the others. This factor is therefore mainly meant to individualise 
the fi ne.427 The minor role of an undertaking in the cartel, or the fact that it did not take part 
in the whole cartel, are for example circumstances which should be taken into account to 
assess the relative gravity.428 In contrast, the material limitation or geographical limitation of 
a cartel are factors which are common to all cartelists, and therefore taken into account when 
determining the objective gravity.429
The distinction made by the General Court thus seems clear: the objective gravity is assessed 
on the basis of all the factors which are common to all cartelists, whereas the relative gravity 
is assessed on the basis of factors which are unique to one undertaking and relate to their 
behaviour towards the other cartelists. Strikingly, the General Court and the Court of Justice 
still leave the Commission discretion to individualise the penalty in the various stages.430
Individualising a fi ne thus does not necessarily have to happen at the stage of determining the 
relative gravity, at least, in so far as the Commission sets the fi ne.431 Furthermore, sometimes 
the General Court accepts that the Commission does not take into account the minor role 
of an undertaking in a cartel when the Commission already took into account the small 
market shares as an objective factor.432 The initial stage in which the Commission assessed 
423   See e.g. ECJ, C-444/11P (Team Relocations and others v Commission), par. 113; GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 
58. 
424  ECJ, 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73 (Suiker Unie and others v Commission), par. 623.
425   GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 384-387. The General Court only referred specifi cally to objective 
factors, but it refers also to the specifi c involvement of the cartelists, which seems to refer to the relative gravity. 
426   GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 143-146; GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), 
par. 414.
427   See GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 86, in which the General Court ruled that “[it is its] practice is to assess individual 
circumstances not in the context of the assessment of the gravity of the infringement, that is, when the basic amount of the fi ne is set, 
but in the context of the adjustment to the basic amount to refl ect mitigating or aggravating circumstances”. This has been endorsed 
by the Court of Justice, see ECJ, C-444/11P (Team Relocations and others v Commission), par. 113.
428   GC, T-409/12 (Mitsubishi Electric v Commission), par. 150; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par 145.
429  GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 144.
430   See e.g. ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 56; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 143; and 
GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 416.
431  GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 92.
432  See GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 384-387.
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the objective gravity is in such case used to individualise the fi ne. The distinction between 
objective gravity and relative gravity therefore seems to fade.
The General Court should, when it sets a fi ne, use the relative gravity stage to individualise the 
fi ne if it wishes to follow its own case law. However, even when the General Court explicitly 
makes a distinction between the objective and relative gravity, it is not clear how it uses this 
distinction itself, since no reference is made to both concepts when adjusting a fi ne.433
A distinction is thus made by the General Court between the objective and relative gravity 
of an infringement. Nevertheless, the Commission is not bound by this distinction, and it 
remains completely unclear how the General Court uses this distinction. One could say that 
the concepts of ‘objective gravity’ and “relative gravity” are merely categorisations used 
without any meaning. Unfortunately, this is not the case, since this confusing line of case law 
could have far-reaching consequences for undertakings. The General Court might use this 
distinction in a formalistic manner to refute arguments of undertakings that the Commission 
did not take into account a certain factor at the fi rst or second stage of determining a fi ne. In 
Novácke chemické závody, the General Court ruled:
[I]it must be borne in mind that the amount referred to in point 25 of the Guidelines 
is part of the basic amount of the fi ne which, as is apparent from point 19 of the 
Guidelines (see paragraph 21 above), must refl ect the gravity of the infringement 
and not the relative gravity of the participation in the infringement of each of 
the undertakings concerned. According to the case-law, the latter issue has to be 
examined in the context of the possible application of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances.434
Undertakings should thus place the arguments under the correct heading. More specifi cally, in 
Socitrel, the General Court refuted an argument of the undertaking concerned in the following 
manner:
It should be borne in mind that the minor role which an undertaking plays in the cartel 
constitutes a mitigating circumstance, which is assessed separately from the objective 
gravity of the infringement as such.
Socitrel’s argument must therefore be rejected on that point and, for the remainder, 
reference should be made to the argument which Socitrel specifi cally puts forward in 
that regard in the context of the sixth plea.435
433  See e.g. GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 450-469.
434  GC, T-352/09 (Novácke chemické závody v Commission), par. 58
435  GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 297-298.
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The General Court did not discuss the argumentation of the undertaking under this plea, 
since the undertaking brought forward a factor under the objective gravity, whereas it 
should have raised this factor under the relative gravity. The undertaking did however also 
use a similar argument under its sixth plea. The alleged “minor role” of the undertaking 
in the cartel was thus still (partly) examined by the General Court. Nevertheless, the 
reasoning of the General Court in this case suggests a rather formalistic approach. In 
other cases, the General Court is more lenient for undertakings. In e.g. SLM it ruled that: 
In the present case, the Commission did not — either at the initial stage of the assessment 
of the gravity of the infringement as such, or at the later stage of the discussion of the 
mitigating circumstances, or at any other stage — take account of the specifi c situation 
alleged by the applicants when it determined the amount of the fi ne.436
In SLM the General Court examined whether a certain factor was taken into account in one 
of the stages. It did not set aside the arguments of the undertaking on the formalistic ground 
that the factor was brought up under an incorrect heading. 
This new distinction between the objective and relative gravity leads to uncertainty as to how 
the General Court will assess the proportionality of a fi ne. As is explained below, the General 
Court, in general, only examines whether the Commission used all the relevant factors in 
a coherent manner. The assessment of the proportionality of a competition law fi ne might 
become problematic if the arguments of undertakings are too easily set aside on the basis of 
formalistic grounds. Furthermore, it is also unclear how the General Court determines the 
level of a fi ne, when it has to set the fi ne itself. Arbitrariness of the Commission and the Union 
Courts when determining the level of a fi ne is a real danger due to the confusing case law 
created by the General Court on the objective and relative gravity. 
The 2006 Fining Guidelines seem to sit at the origin of this confusing distinction. Categorising 
a factor as falling under the initial stage when setting the basic amount of the fi ne, or under the 
stage of assessing the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, may also lead to a substantially 
diff erent outcome, since the basic amount before applying aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances will diff er. Perhaps this distinction in stages should be abolished completely, 
to ensure that all relevant factors are taken into account at one single stage. Another option 
for the Union Courts is to assess a factor on their own motion under the correct heading. 
Abolishing the formalistic approach would then be required. The General Court should then 
discuss the arguments of the undertaking concerned under the correct heading.
436  GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 147.
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5.7.3 Proportionality of sanctions in general
In this subparagraph, the approach of the Union Courts towards the proportionality principle 
in EU competition law proceedings is discussed further. 
The proportionality principle ensures “that measures adopted by the institutions do not 
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives 
legitimately pursued by the legislation in question”.437 This also means that “where there is 
a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, 
and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued”.438 This 
phrasing can be found in many cases ruled upon by the Union Courts,439 although sometimes 
reference is only made to the appropriateness and necessity of the measures.440 This is the 
general proportionality test used by the Union Courts.441
More specifi cally for fi nes, the Union Courts have ruled that fi nes should not be disproportionate 
to the objectives pursued by the competition law rules.442 This is, obviously, further explained 
in light of the legal basis of the Commission to impose fi nes, namely Article 23(2) Regulation 
1/2003, and the former Article 15(2) of Regulation 17/62. In both Procedural Regulations 
can be found that the Commission should fi x the amount of a fi ne in light of the gravity and 
duration of the infringement.443 A fi ne imposed should be proportionate to the infringement 
437  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 188.
438  GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 188.
439   GC, T-762/14 (Koninklijke Philips and Philips France v Commission), par. 310; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 373; 
GC, T-543/08 (RWE v Commission), par. 216; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 315; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v 
Commission), par. 353; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 350; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 431; GC, 
T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 428; GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 286; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), 
par. 188; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 104; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v 
Commission), par. 449; GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 383; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding 
and others v Commission), par. 366; GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 269; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v 
Commission), par. 235.
440   GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 63; GC, T-76/08 (EI du Pont de Nemours and others v Commission), par. 127; GC, T-77/08 
(Dow Chemical v Commission), par. 142; GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 238; GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), 
par. 257; GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 282; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; GC, T-38/07 (Shell 
v Commission), par. 120; GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 264; GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v 
Commission), par. 82; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 171; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 
226. 
441  For more information see, chapter 2, par. 2.6. 
442   GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-267/12 
(Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 103; GC, 
T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 374; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 277; GC, T-543/08 (RWE v 
Commission), par. 217; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 316 and 405; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 
354; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 350; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 432; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria 
v Commission), par. 300; GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 287; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 189; GC, 
T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 105 and 280; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 229; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 
and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 384; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 367; GC, 
T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 120; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 298.
443   Article 15(2) Regulation 17/62 and Article 23(3) Regulation 1/2003. For more information on these regulations, see par. 5.2 of this 
chapter. 
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as a whole.444 Particular attention should be given to the gravity and the factors which should 
be taken into account with regard to this criterion.445 The duration of the fi ne sometimes even 
seems to be inferior to the gravity criterion.446 In the Mitsubishi case, the General Court held:
The amount of the fi ne is set by the Commission according to the gravity of the 
infringement and, where appropriate, to its duration. The gravity of an infringement 
has to be determined by reference to criteria such as the particular circumstances of 
the case, its context and the dissuasive eff ect of the fi nes. Objective factors such as the 
content and duration of the anti-competitive conduct, the number of incidents and their 
intensity, the extent of the market aff ected and the damage to the economic public 
order must be taken into account [...].447
The General Court thus starts by mentioning the two criteria which should be taken into 
account when setting the fi ne. However, the factors that should be taken into account for the 
gravity also include, according to the General Court, the duration of the infringement. This 
seems to be a strange formulation in light of the choice by the Union legislator to mention 
gravity and duration as separate (main) criteria. Furthermore, in Fapricela, the General Court 
was very strict on an undertaking by ruling that “the duration of the infringement must not 
be confused with the gravity of the infringement (Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003)”.448
444   GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche 
Bahn v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 103; GC, T-486/11 (Orange 
Polska v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 374; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), 
par. 277; GC, T-543/08 (RWE v Commission), par. 217; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 316 and 405; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 
(Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 354; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 350; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), 
par. 432; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 300; GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 287; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab 
v Commission), par. 189; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 105 and 280); GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 
229; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 450; GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 
and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 384; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 367; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v 
Commission), par. 120; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 298.
445   GC, T-762/14 (Koninklijke Philips and Philips France v Commission), par. 311; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 
245; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina 
World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 103 and 413; GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-422/10 
(Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 374; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 277; GC, T-543/08 (RWE v Commission), 
par. 217; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 316 and 405; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 354; GC, 
T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 350; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 432; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v 
Commission), par. 300; GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 287; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 189; GC, T-11/06 
(Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 105 and 280); GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 229; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and 
T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 450; GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 
384; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 367; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 120; GC, T-117/07 and 
T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 298.
446   See e.g. GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265, in which the General Court ruled that the duration should be taken into 
account “where appropriate”.
447  GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265 (emphasis added).
448  GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 260.
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Overall, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion when setting a fi ne,449 although 
it should consider the individual conduct and characteristics of an undertaking.450 The 
Union Courts sometimes refer to the arithmetical calculations which the Commission uses to 
determine a fi ne,451 but the Commission does not have to use a mathematical formula.452 This 
perhaps paradoxical statement is merely meant to explain the discretion which the Commission 
has when determining a fi ne. The Commission is not required per se to use a mathematical 
formula, but it has limited its discretion somewhat by taking into account the diff erent factors 
in an arithmetical manner in accordance with the Guidelines. The only requirement which the 
Union Courts set for the Commission on the basis of the proportionality principle, is that fi nes 
are set in a coherent manner,453 and that the choices made454 by the 
449   ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 39; GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 773; GC, T-470/13 (Merck 
v Commission), par. 517; GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 126; GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 233; GC, 
T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 195; ECJ, C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P (Papierfabrik August Koehler and others 
v Commission), par. 112; ECJ, C-308/04 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission), par. 71; ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 
P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 464; GC, T-104/13 (Toshiba v 
Commission), par. 184; GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 256; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 286; GC, T-56/09 
and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 326 and 360; GC, T-392/09 (1. garantovaná v Commission), par. 112; GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v 
Commission), par. 220; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 372 and 430; GC, T-77/08 (Dow Chemical v Commission), par. 139; GC, 
T-76/08 (EI du Pont de Nemours and others v Commission), par. 124; GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 31; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v 
Commission), par. 265 and 270; GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 64 and 100; GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), 
par. 287; GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 195; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp 
and others v Commission), par. 192; GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 264; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v 
Commission), par. 350; GC, T-40/06 (Trioplast Industrier v Commission), par. 141; GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 227; GC, 
T-19/05 (Boliden and others v Commission), par. 98; CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 68; CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v 
Commission), par. 342; CFI, T-101/05 and T-111/05 (BASF v Commission), par. 65; CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, 
T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 467; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 119; CFI, T-52/02 
(SNCZ v Commission), par. 68; CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 134; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, 
T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 216; CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel 
Nederland v Commission), par. 189; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 181; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co 
v Commission), par. 61; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 76; CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 
246-247; CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), par. 105.
450   See e.g. GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 256.
451   GC, T-40/06 (Trioplast Industrier v Commission), par. 141; CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 342; CFI, T-304/02 (Hoek Loos v 
Commission), par. 82; CFI, T-52/02 (SNCZ v Commission), par. 68.
452   GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 126 and 170; ECJ, C-511/11 P (Versalis v Commission), par. 103; ECJ, C-322/07 P, 
C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P (Papierfabrik August Koehler and others v Commission), par. 114; ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, 
C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 464; GC, T-151/07 
(Kone v Commission), par. 55; GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), 
par. 363; GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-40/06 (Trioplast Industrier v Commission), 
par. 141; CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 114-115; CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 471; CFI, T-15/02 
(BASF v Commission), par. 119; CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), par. 105.
453   GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 55.
  GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 176; GC, T-40/06 (Trioplast Industrier v Commission), par. 141; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 114-115; CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 471; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v 
Commission), par. 119; CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), par. 105.
454  The choice to attach certain weight to the diff erent factors. 
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Commission when setting a fi ne are consistent and objectively justifi ed.455 The Union Courts 
will adjust a fi ne when the Commission makes an error of assessment by not applying the 
method for calculating a fi ne in a coherent manner.456
In general, the Court will therefore examine whether the Commission took into account 
all relevant factors, and thus, “whether the amount of the fi ne imposed is proportionate 
in relation to the gravity and duration of the infringement and to weigh the gravity of 
the infringement and the circumstances invoked by the [undertaking concerned]”.457
In older case law, the Court of First Instance was quite concise in its formulation and 
merely stated that it would verify whether the fi ne was reasonable.458 This review was 
thus quite limited. Vesterdorf once referred to the unlimited jurisdiction of the Union 
Courts when examining a fi ne imposed on an undertaking by the Commission. He stated:
To what extent, then, is this unlimited jurisdiction exercised by the ECJ or the CFI in 
practice? The answer is, formally speaking, that it is used every time the Court has to 
rule on a demand for annulment or reduction of a fi ne. However, the reality is that, 
almost without exception, the Court limits itself to performing a control of the legality 
of the fi ne or, rather, to verifying whether the Commission has applied the Guidelines 
for the calculation of fi nes correctly. In doing so, it will normally apply the manifest 
error test, as can be seen in the recent judgment in the Wieland‐Werke case, paragraph 
32.459
The proportionality of competition law fi nes is thus assessed by examining whether all relevant 
factors are taken into account. Strangely enough, the Union Courts sometimes assert that the 
455   GC, T-762/14 (Koninklijke Philips and Philips France v Commission), par. 311; GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 811; ECJ, 
C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 300; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others 
v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 176; GC, 
T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 103; GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 109; 
GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 374; GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 282; GC, T-398/10 
(Fapricela v Commission), par. 257; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 277; GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 166; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 309 and 325; GC, T-543/08 (RWE v Commission), par. 217; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v 
Commission), par. 316 and 405; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 354; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v 
Commission), par. 432; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 428; GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 63 and 187; GC, 
T-208/06 (Quinn Barlo and Quinn Plastics v Commission), par. 211; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 189; GC, T-11/06 (Romana 
Tabacchi v Commission), par. 105 and 181; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 229; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 120; GC, 
T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 264; GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 82; GC, T-446/05 
(Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 171; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 228). In cases dealing with the 
categorisation of undertakings into diff erent groups in order to set the starting amount of a fi ne, the Union Courts refer to a coherent 
and objective method instead of consistent and objective: see CFI, T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 184; CFI, T-68/04 (SGL Carbon 
v Commission), par. 69; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 157 and 166; CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 157; CFI, 
T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 228-233.
456   See e.g. GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 257, where the Commission did not take a factor into account for one undertaking, 
whereas it had done so for others in the same cartel.
457   GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 195. See also: CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 136; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, 
British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), par. 106.
458   CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 85; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 100.
459  Vesterdorf (2009), p. 2-3.
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10% limit in Regulation 1/2003 and in Regulation 17/62 ensure that fi nes are neither excessive 
nor disproportionate.460 As the Court of First Instance stated in e.g. the Union Pigments case:
It must be pointed out, for the sake of completeness, that, in the circumstances of the 
present case, suffi  cient account was taken of the applicant’s total turnover when the 
upper limit of 10% provided for by Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 was applied. 
As indicated in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, the amount of the applicant’s fi ne 
was reduced to EUR 700 000 in order to comply with that upper limit, before being 
further reduced to EUR 350 000 for cooperation. The purpose of the upper limit 
of 10% is to prevent fi nes from being disproportionate in relation to the size of the 
undertaking (Musique diff usion française and others v Commission, cited in paragraph 
146 above, paragraph 119). The application of that maximum limit in this case ensured 
that the fi ne imposed on the applicant was proportionate to its size. In view of the 
very serious nature of the infringement and the fact that it lasted for more than four 
years, the amount of the fi ne could have been much higher if the applicant had not 
been a small undertaking and if it had not benefi ted from the upper limit of 10%.461
The 10% maximum thus ensures that fi nes are not disproportionate. This appears to be in 
contrast to the review by the Union Courts of the fi ne in light of the proportionality principle. 
If the 10% limit ensures that fi nes are not disproportionate, it is strange that the Union Courts 
still assess the proportionality of fi nes with reference to the gravity and duration of an 
infringement. This 10% limit should be seen as a general safeguard against excessive fi nes, but 
not as a carte blanche for the Commission to impose fi nes in an arbitrary manner. This seems 
to be affi  rmed by the General Court in e.g. Almamet, where it stated that the capping ceiling 
of 10% “does not preclude an undertaking from being able to argue [...] that the fi ne imposed 
on it for infringement of the competition rules is excessive, even though it does not exceed the 
limit set in [Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003]”.462
460   ECJ, C-644/13 P (Villeroy and Boch SAS v Commission), par. 81; ECJ, C-642/13 P(Villeroy and Boch Belgium v Commission), par. 88; ECJ, 
C-625/13 P (Villeroy and Boch v Commission), par. 192; ECJ C-626/13 P (Villeroy and Boch Austria v Commission), par. 94; ECJ, C-619/13 P 
(Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 84; ECJ, C-58/12 (Groupe Gascogne v Commission), par. 48; GC, T-92/13 (Philips v Commission), 
par. 215; GC, T-91/13 (LG Electronics v Commission), par. 100; GC, T-436/10 (Hit Groep BV v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-413/10 and 
414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 260; GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 280; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), 
par. 444; GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 266; GC, T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 449; GC, 
T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 218-219; GC, T-410/09 (Almamet v Commission), par. 212; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi 
v Commission), par. 257; GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 453; GC, T-138/07 
(Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 370; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 349; GC, T-40/06 
(Trioplast Industrier v Commission), par. 144; GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 78; CFI, T-68/04 
(SGL Carbon v Commission, par. 127; T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 158; CFI, T-52/02 (SNCZ v Commission), par. 70; CFI, 
T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 200; CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v 
Commission), par. 533.
461  CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 158.
462  GC, T-410/09 (Almamet v Commission), par. 228.
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The Commission is not obliged to ensure that an increase in a fi ne is in absolute terms 
proportionate.463 Conversely, the percentage increase of the fi ne should be proportionate.464
However, in the end the Commission should determine the fi ne it is going to impose on an 
undertaking in a coherent, consistent and objective manner. The question remains though 
which factors the Commission should take into account when assessing the appropriate fi ne in 
a particular case. 
It appears that the Union Courts mainly focus on the gravity of an infringement. The duration 
of the infringement is in general465 only used as a circumstance on the basis of which the basic 
amount of the fi ne is increased with a certain percentage. These percentages can be found in 
the Fining Guidelines.466 The Union Courts have, in principle, unequivocally endorsed the 
method of the Commission in this regard.467 Some factors which can be taken into account for 
assessing the gravity of an infringement are merely mentioned by the Union Courts, whilst 
others are elaborated upon more. Lastly, there are also factors as regards which the Union 
Courts specifi cally ruled that they do not have to be taken into account. In what follows, the 
factors which the Commission can or cannot take into account are discussed.
5.7.4 Factors which can be taken into account
The gravity of the infringement is determined with reference to numerous factors.468 The 
importance of the factors diff ers per type of infringement and circumstances of the case,469
which means that the Commission and the Union Courts will assess on a case-by-case basis 
whether the fi ne is proportionate. This also gives the Commission and the Union Courts 
much leeway to determine whether a fi ne will be proportionate. However, the Union Courts 
did rule that the Commission should not attach disproportionate importance to one or the
463  CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 401.
464  CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 401.
465   As illustrated above, the General Court did use this condition once as a factor to assess the gravity of the infringement.
466  See par. 5.2 of this chapter.
467   GC, T-25/05 (KME v Commission), par. 111-116; GC, T-19/05 (Boliden and others v Commission), par. 98-99; CFI, T-127/04 (KME v 
Commission), par. 104; CFI, T-116/04 (Wieland-Werke v Commission), par. 111; CFI, T-12/03 (Itochu v Commission), par. 119-120; CFI, 
T-68/04 (SGL Carbon v Commission), par. 112-113; CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 363; CFI, T-368/00 (General 
Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 201; CFI, T-65/99 (Strintzis Line Shipping v Commission), par. 192-194.
468   An annex contains an overview of all references, to prevent pages full of footnotes. See the annex, EU competition law, point 1.
469   ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 58; ECJ, C-272/09 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 
49; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 246; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 177; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina 
World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 104; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 246; GC, 
T-370/09 (GDF Suez v Commission), par. 416; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 101; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa 
v Commission), par. 95; CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 532; CFI, T-44/00 
(Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 229.
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other factor and that factors do not have the same weight in the overall assessment.470 This 
phrasing is often used when undertakings argue that the fi ne has been disproportionate in 
light of one factor. It is in general not successful to argue that one factor is disproportionally 
taken into account, although mistakes made by the Commission in its assessment do lead 
the Union Courts to adjust the fi ne.471 This assessment can be performed quite quickly. If 
for example the Commission based the fi ne on two agreements, whereas the undertakings 
concerned only participated in one, the Union Courts might follow the arithmetical formula 
of the Commission and adjust the fi ne accordingly.472 It is however not uncommon for the 
Union Courts to conduct a whole new assessment in light of the proportionality principle.473
This new assessment appears to take place whenever the Commission has made multiple 
errors that are diffi  cult to rectify with reference to the formula used by the Commission.
In some cases the Union Courts conduct a more extensive review of the proportionality of the 
factors taken into account,474 although sometimes the conclusion is still drawn quickly.475 In 
other cases however, the Union Courts merely state that a fi ne is not disproportionate, or that 
a comparison shows that the fi ne is not excessive.476 In a couple of cases the Commission e.g. 
used a percentage between 15% and 17% of the value of sales to set the basic amount of the fi ne. 
Normally, the Commission will take a percentage between 15%-30% of the value of sales to set 
the basic amount for object restrictions. Undertakings cannot argue, according to the General 
470   ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 59-60; ECJ, C-272/09 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 
51; ECJ, C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P (Papierfabrik August Koehler and others v Commission), par. 114; ECJ, C-189/02 P, 
C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission), par. 257; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker 
v Commission), par. 286; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 234; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and 
others v Commission), par. 160; GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 282; GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 
257; GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 326; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage 
Marketing v Commission), par. 477; GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 63; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 
191 and 197); GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 222 and 233; GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 316; GC, T-456/05 and 
T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 264 and 267; GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 82; GC, T-446/05 
(Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 171 and 175; CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; CFI, T-69/04 
(Schunk v Commission), par. 175; CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 
(Bolloré v Commission), par. 468 and 481; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v 
Commission), par. 214 and 227; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 79; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 
146; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 201; CFI, 
T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 188; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 98; CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v 
Commission), par. 280 and 303.
471  See e.g. CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 298-300.
472  See e.g. CFI, T-61/99 (Adriatica v Commission), par. 190-191.
473  See e.g. GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 265-286.
474   GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 170-187; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 432-452; GC, T-418/10 
(Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 450-467; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 394-407; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 179-186 and 228; CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 345 and 347; GC, 
T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 544; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 80-89; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v 
Commission), par. 93-103.
475   GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 183; GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 447; GC, T-418/10 
(Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 467; GC, T-422/10 (Trafi lerie Meridionali v Commission), par. 406.
476   GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 281; GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 168-170; GC, T-551/08 (H&R 
ChemPharm v Commission), par. 312-315; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 317-319; GC, T-46/10 (Faci v Commission), par. 210; 
GC, T-482/07 (Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Petróleo v Commission), par. 418; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), 
par. 433; GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 777; GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 94; GC, T-38/05 
(Agroexpansión v Commission), par. 219; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 107; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 
176-180; CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 41; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 143; CFI, T-64/02 
(Heubach v Commission), par. 183; CFI, T-52/02 (SNCZ v Commission), par. 60; CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, 
T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission), par. 1219.
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Court, that a percentage at the lower end of the scale for an object restriction is disproportionate.477
The General Court is very brief in its reasoning in these cases. In FSL Holdings, the Court of 
Justice corrected the General Court in the statement that no other factors have to be taken into 
account when a lower percentage is taken for object restrictions. As the Court of Justice held: 
Although the General Court’s statement, in paragraph 532 of the judgment under 
appeal, that where the Commission simply applies a rate equal or almost equal to the 
minimum rate of 15% of the value of sales laid down for the most harmful restrictions, 
it is not necessary to take into account additional factors, is prima facie erroneous, that 
statement does not, however, refl ect the assessment actually undertaken by the General 
Court in that judgment: the Court examined the relevance of the circumstances relied 
on by the appellants in their application with regard to the analysis of the gravity of 
the infringement, in particular in paragraph 533 of the judgment under appeal (see, 
by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C-429/11 P, not 
published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraph 129). The point must also be made that since 
the General Court rightly found, in the judgment under appeal, that the infringement 
at issue fell within the category of the most harmful infringements, the individual 
conduct of the undertakings was certainly taken into account.478
Whether other factors are taken into account in the review by the Union Courts depends, 
as is explained below, on the arguments of the undertakings. Another example of a concise 
form of reasoning can be found in the 2006 Archer Daniels Midland case, where the Court of 
First Instance merely stated the following, after elaborating on the fact that fi nes should be 
deterrent: 
Furthermore, as the Commission stated without being contradicted by ADM, 
the fi ne set for ADM after the multiplier of 2.5 had been applied represents only a 
tiny proportion, i.e. 0.0538% of its total annual turnover and cannot be regarded as 
disproportionate from that point of view either.479
It does not become clear why the Court uses a more extensive reasoning in certain cases in 
contrast to cases where it merely states that a fi ne is not disproportionate. However, it is 
not implausible that this is due to the elaborateness of the arguments of the undertakings 
concerned. In multiple cases, the Union Courts have referred to the lack of specifi c arguments 
477   GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 281; GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 168-170; GC, T-551/08 (H&R 
ChemPharm v Commission), par. 312-315; GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 317-319; GC, T-46/10 (Faci v Commission), par. 210; GC, 
T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 94. Sometimes the General Court (merely) mentions other factors to substantiate this 
conclusion: see e.g. GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 319; and GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 170.
478  ECJ, C-469/15 P (FSL Holdings v Commission), par. 83.
479   CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 143. See e.g. also CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 380-384 in which 
the Commission did not reveal the data which it used to increase a fi ne based on the deterrence factor. The Court of First Instance did 
not fi nd this to be a problem, since the worldwide turnover of Hoechst was the highest in the relevant sector.
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on the proportionality of the sanction by the undertaking concerned.480 The Union Courts do 
not, as a general rule, conduct a proprio motu review.
As mentioned, the Commission can take a great number of factors into account when 
assessing the gravity of an infringement. The Union Courts sometimes base their reasoning 
on the Fining Guidelines of the Commission.481 In most cases however, reference is made to 
factors independent of the Fining Guidelines. There is nevertheless no binding or exhaustive 
list of factors which should be taken into account.482 Older case law in general refers to very 
specifi c circumstances which are taken into account,483 whereas in later case law, a long list of 
more general factors has gradually been created. Nevertheless, the Union Courts still refer in 
later case law to the “particular circumstances of the case”484 as one factor which should be 
taken into account. Obviously, this factor might in itself comprise multiple diff erent factors, 
but the Union Courts rarely elaborate upon these. 
Factors which should be taken into account to assess the gravity of an infringement are 
the context of the case; the deterrent eff ect of fi nes; the size of the relevant market; the 
relative importance and market share of an undertaking, or of all undertakings involved; 
repeated infringements; the volume and value of goods; the size and economic power of 
undertakings; the turnover on the relevant product market; the overall turnover; the nature 
of an infringement and the content of the anti-competitive conduct; the (actual) impact on the 
market, and whether the cartel is implemented; the geographical size of the aff ected market; 
the number and intensity of incidents on the market; the conduct of the undertakings; the 
role the undertakings played in the cartel; the size of an undertaking; whether there was a 
deliberate and coherent strategy for the anti-competitive behaviour; the profi ts derived 
from the cartel; the bargaining power of the buyers from the cartelists; the threat the 
infringement poses to the objectives of the Union; the damage to the economic public order; 
the legislative background; and the economic context; the conduct of the undertaking during 
the administrative procedure.485
480   See e.g. ECJ, C-644/13 P (Villeroy and Boch SAS v Commission), par. 81; ECJ, C-642/13 P (Villeroy and Boch Belgium v Commission), par. 
88; ECJ, C-625/13 P (Villeroy and Boch v Commission), par. 192; ECJ C-626/13 P (Villeroy and Boch Austria v Commission), par. 94. See 
also CFI, T-305-307/94, T-313-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328-329/94 and T-335/94 (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v 
Commission), par. 1219, where the reasoning of the Court of First Instance was extremely concise on the proportionality. The arguments 
of the party were also quite concise and merely stated that the fi ne was disproportionate on the basis of the short duration (par. 
1211-1212) and in light of the current currency (par 1213). See also GC, T-469/13 (Generics v Commission), where the General Court 
discussed the arguments of the undertaking and concluded in paragraph 415 that the fi ne “appears to be suffi  cient and fair in view of 
the circumstances of the present case”. 
481   See e.g. GC, T-386/10 (Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission), par. 245-246; GC, T-379/10 (Keramag Keramische Werke and others v Commission), 
par. 332; GC, T-370/09 (GDF Suez v Commission), par. 416; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 378-382; GC, T-151/07 (Kone v 
Commission), par. 45; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 271; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 220; GC, T-456/05 and 
T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 265; CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 59; CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe 
Danone v Commission), par. 139; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 183-184; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo 
Co v Commission), par. 64; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 79; CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 
232.
482  See the annex, EU competition law, point 2 for case law.
483  CFI, T-176/95 (Accinauto v Commission), par. 247.
484  See the annex, EU competition law, point 3 for case law.
485  For an overview of case law per factor, see the annex, EU competition law, point 4-30.
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5.7.5 Factors taken into account - further elaborated upon by the Union Courts
Deterrence is an important factor in order to determine a fi ne. As Jones and Sufrin state: “[t]
he major theme of the Commission fi ning policy, in accordance with the duty identifi ed back 
in 1983 in Musique Diff ussion, is deterrence”.486 Specifi c and general deterrence can be pursued 
by the Commission.487 Deterrence is often used to justify a higher fi ne. Furthermore, the 
Union Courts have ruled on occasion that taking into account the fi nancial resources of an 
undertaking,488 a repeated infringement,489 or the turnover on the relevant market490 might be 
part of the deterrence factor. This means that multiple factors might fall under the deterrence 
factor.491 As the Union Courts have ruled: 
[In general a fi ne should] have a suffi  cient deterrent eff ect [which] may entail [that] 
the amount of the fi ne [is] adjusted in order to take account of the desired impact on 
the undertaking on which it is imposed, so that the fi ne is not rendered negligible, 
or on the other hand, excessive, notably in the light of the fi nancial capacity of the 
undertaking in question, in accordance with the requirements arising from, fi rst, the 
need to ensure that the fi ne is eff ective and, second, compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.492
Moreover, a fi ne which only negates the negative eff ects of an infringement of the competition 
rules is not suffi  ciently deterrent.493
486  Jones & Sufrin (2016), p. 978. (reference omitted)
487  See e.g. GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 822-823.
488   ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v Commission), par. 298; ECJ, C-58/12 (Groupe Gascogne 
v Commission), par. 49-50; GC, T-91/10 (Lucchini v Commission), par. 314; GC, T-53/06 (UPM-Kymmene Oyi v Commission), par. 76; 
GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 
213; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 186); CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 379; CFI, T-59/02 
(Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 131; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 142; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v 
Commission), par. 283 and 285; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 254-260; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 
and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v Commission), par. 239.
489   GC, T-53/06 (UPM-Kymmene Oyi v Commission), par. 135-140; CFI, T-101/05 and T-111/05 (BASF v Commission), par. 66; GC, T-57/01 
(Solvay v Commission), par. 507-512 and 522.
490   GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 86.
491   See e.g. CFI, T-12/03 (Itochu v Commission), par. 93, in which the Court of First Instance stated that “the deterrence factor is assessed by 
taking into account a large number of factors and not merely the particular situation of the undertaking concerned”.
492   GC, T-53/06 (UPM-Kymmene Oyi v Commission), par. 76. See also ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and 
Toshiba v Commission), par. 298; ECJ, C-58/12 (Groupe Gascogne v Commission), par. 50; ECJ, C-511/11 P (Versalis v Commission), par. 102; 
GC, T-541/08 (Sasol v Commission), par. 404; GC, T-392/09 (1. garantovaná v Commission), par. 114 and 115; GC, T-370/09 (GDF Suez v 
Commission), par. 382; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 217; GC, T-25/06 (Alliance One International v Commission), par. 235; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 285; GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, 
T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 239; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 120; GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v 
Commission), par. 213 and 258; GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 78; CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and 
others v Commission), par. 154; CFI, T-116/04 (Wieland-Werke v Commission), par. 93; CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 379; CFI, 
T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 283.
493   GC, T-471/13 (Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v Commission), par. 429; GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 285; GC, 
T-56/09 and T-73/09 (Saint-Gobain v Commission), par. 390; GC, T-410/09 (Almamet v Commission), par. 271; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels 
Midland v Commission), par. 130; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 141.
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Closely related to deterrence is the factor that the Commission may take into account that an 
undertaking has a high worldwide turnover,494 or that an undertaking is of a large size and 
has many global resources.495 Large undertakings have the legal and economic knowledge 
which enables them to determine what behaviour might constitute an infringement and the 
consequences of that behaviour.496
Turnover, worldwide or on the product market, can be used to determine whether a fi ne needs 
to be increased in order to ensure deterrence. The total turnover, even though it is an imperfect 
picture,497 shows the size of an undertaking and the economic capacity to do damage,498
whilst the turnover on the relevant market indicates the scale of the infringement,499 and in 
particular the harm done to competition.500
As mentioned above, the Commission may take into account the size of the relevant product 
market and the relevant geographical market. This is however not obligatory. It is the only 
factor with regard to which the Union Courts have ruled on multiple occasions that the 
Commission has a discretion to decide whether to take this factor into account, even when
494   GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 304; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 477; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v 
Commission), par. 235 GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 326; GC, T-53/06 (UPM-Kymmene Oyi v Commission), par. 76; 
GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 245; GC, T-38/07 (Shell v Commission), par. 120; GC, T-217/06 
(Arkema and others v Commission), par. 213; CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 154; CFI, T-116/04 (Wieland-Werke 
v Commission), par. 92.
495   See e.g. ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 18; CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 232.
496   GC, T-53/06 (UPM-Kymmene Oyi v Commission), par. 77; GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 261 and 264; CFI, T-116/04 
(Wieland-Werke v Commission), par. 91; CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 114-118; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v 
Commission), par. 185-186; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 65; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 
80; CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 154 and 169.
497   ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 83; GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 232; GC, T-446/05 
(Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 186 and 192; CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 152; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer 
Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 193; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 73; CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v 
Commission), par. 88.
498   GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 232; ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba 
v Commission), par. 299; ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 59; ECJ, C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 
P (Papierfabrik August Koehler and others v Commission), par. 114; ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland 
Ingredients v Commission), par. 100; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 243; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 304; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), 
par. 477; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235; GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 326GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v 
Commission), par. 197; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 239; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 
350; CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, 
T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; CFI, 
T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 214; CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 77.
499   GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 261; GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 232; GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v 
Commission), par. 248; GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 179; GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others 
v Commission), par. 106; GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 248; GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), 
par. 326; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235; GC, T-83/08 (Denki Kagaku Kogyo and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 134; 
GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 477; GC, T-448/07 (YKK v Commission), par. 148; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v 
Commission), par. 197; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 239; GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 
350; CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, 
T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; CFI, 
T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 188; CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 76.
500  GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 261.
258
CHAPTER 5 | EU Competition Law
it appears to be relevant.501 In light of other case law this seems strange, since the General 
Court has adjusted fi nes on the basis that the Commission did not take certain other factors 
into account. It nevertheless underlines the wide discretion which the Commission enjoys 
when setting fi nes.
Lastly, being the leader in a cartel could be taken into account as an aggravating factor. There 
can be more than one leader per cartel.502 The General Court also explained in 2016, with 
reference to older case law, how to determine whether an undertaking acted as a leader in a 
cartel:
In order to be classifi ed as a leader in a cartel, an undertaking must have been a 
signifi cant driving force for the cartel and have borne individual and specifi c liability 
for the operation of the cartel. That factor may, inter alia, be inferred from the fact that 
the undertaking, through specifi c initiatives, voluntarily gave a fundamental boost 
to the cartel, or from a combination of indicia which reveal the determination of the 
undertaking to ensure the stability and success of the cartel (judgments of 15 March 
2006 in BASF v Commission, T-15/02, EU:T:2006:74, paragraphs 299, 300, 351, 370 to 375 
and 427, and of 27 September 2012 in Shell Petroleum and others v Commission, T-343/06, 
EU:T:2012:478, paragraph 198).
That is the case where the undertaking participated in cartel meetings on behalf of 
another undertaking which did not attend them and notifi ed that other undertaking 
of the results of those meetings (judgment of 15 March 2006 in BASF v Commission, 
T-15/02, EU:T:2006:74, paragraph 439). The same applies where it is shown that that 
undertaking played a central role in the actual operation of the cartel, for example 
by organising various meetings, collecting and distributing information within 
the cartel, and by most often suggesting proposals relating to the operation of the 
cartel (judgment of 27 September 2012 in Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, 
T-357/06, EU:T:2012:488, paragraph 284).503
An undertaking should have been a signifi cant driving force behind it, in order for it to be 
classifi ed as a leader of a cartel. 
501   GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 88; GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 46; GC, T-208/06 (Quinn Barlo and Quinn 
Plastics v Commission), par. 212; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 190; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 232 and 234; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 209-210 and 277; GC, T-141/07, 
T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 169, 174 and 202; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), 
par. 258; GC, T-18/05 (IMI v Commission), par. 180; GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 266; CFI, 
T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 133; CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 193; CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 
and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 532; CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 229.
502  GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 102.
503  GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 100-101.
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5.7.6 Factors which do not have to be taken into account
In contrast to the factors which should be taken into account, it is also clear that a poor fi nancial 
situation does not have to be taken into account by the Commission.504 As the General Court 
stated “even if a measure taken by a Community authority were to lead to the liquidation of 
an undertaking, such a liquidation of the undertaking in its existing legal form – although it 
may adversely aff ect the fi nancial interests of the owners, investors or shareholders – does 
not mean that the personal, tangible and intangible elements represented by the undertaking 
would also lose their value”.505 In highly exceptional cases, the Commission should take this 
principle into account though, in order to avoid infringing the proportionality principle.506
Neither the fi nancial health of a sector507 nor the lack of benefi ts are factors the Commission 
needs to take into account.508 However, the consequences the disappearance of an undertaking 
might have on the economy or a particular sector could, in an extraordinary case, be taken 
into account as a “specifi c interpretation of the principle of proportionality”.509 This is not 
often accepted, since an undertaking should, in general, disappear from the market. This 
would mean that it is not re-capitalised, nor that the assets of the undertaking are taken over. 
Furthermore, it should lead to an “increase in unemployment or deterioration in the economic 
sectors upstream and downstream of the undertaking concerned”.510 The tough stance of 
the Union Courts as regard the poor fi nancial situation could perhaps be explained by the 
reasoning that a 10% limit “seeks to prevent fi nes being imposed which it is foreseeable that 
the undertakings, owing to their size, as determined, albeit approximately and imperfectly, by 
their total turnover, will not be able to pay”.511
It should be mentioned that the Commission is not obliged to ensure that a fi ne is proportionate 
in relation to the turnover on the relevant market512 or the market share.513 Furthermore, it
504   GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 134-139 and 151-158; GC, T-410/09 (Almamet v Commission), par. 266-269; GC, 
T-392/09 (1. garantovaná v Commission), par. 117-119 and 132-133; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 222; GC, T-11/06 (Romana 
Tabacchi v Commission), par. 258; GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 260-261; CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 
v Commission), par. 308.
505  GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 261.
506   See GC, T-392/09 (1. garantovaná v Commission), par. 117. In GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), the General Court took into 
account the poor fi nancial situation of the undertaking concerned, since the fi ne was twice the amount of the value of the shares, the 
shares were held by two natural persons who had to sell a factory in order to pay the reserve for the fi ne and these persons could not 
obtain a bank guarantee anymore. Furthermore, under Italian law a fi ne exceeding twice the amount of the shares would lead, when 
added to the accounts, to the recapitalisation or winding up of a company. This led the General Court to conclude that the fi ne was 
excessive (par. 280-285). See also: Guidelines on the method of setting fi nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003, par. 35.
507  GC, T-92/13 (Philips v Commission), par. 275.
508  GC, T-92/13 (Philips v Commission), par. 278; GC, T-91/10 (Lucchini v Commission), par. 309.
509  GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 141-142.
510  GC, T-54/14 (Goldfi sh and Heiploeg v Commission), par. 141.
511  See e.g.  ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 83.
512   ECJ, C-397/03 P (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission), par. 101; GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm
v Commission), par. 327; GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 264; GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 
478; GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 196; GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 238; GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding 
and others v Commission), par. 263; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 110; GC, T-110/07 (Siemens v Commission), par. 289; GC, 
T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 277; CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 109; CFI, T-53/03 
(British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 339.
513   GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 88.
  CFI, T-18/03 (CD-Contact Data v Commission), par. 108; CFI, T-12/03 (Itochu v Commission), par. 77.
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is not necessary that the fi nal amount of a fi ne514 refl ects any diff erence in turnover between 
undertakings in a cartel even if a fi ne on a small undertaking is in percentage of turnover 
much bigger than the fi ne in percentage of a large undertaking.515 There is moreover no 
obligation on the Commission to ensure a proportionate relationship between the size of the 
undertaking and the fi ne.516
5.7.7 Résumé
In sum, the assessment of the fi ne has become increasingly complicated over the years. 
Confusing case law of the General Court on the concept of objective and relative gravity has 
not contributed to legal certainty, but may instead lead to legal uncertainty and arbitrariness. 
When setting a fi ne, the Commission enjoys quite some discretion. The maximum limit of 
10% ensures that fi nes are, in general, proportionate. Furthermore, it is not necessary that 
an increase of a fi ne in absolute terms is proportionate, although the increase in percentage 
should be proportionate. The Union Courts will verify whether the Commission sets the 
amount in a coherent, objective and consistent manner. This review is sometimes very limited, 
although the Union Courts have exercised it more strictly in some cases. 
Gravity and duration are the main criteria used to set a fi ne. Multiple factors should be taken 
into account to determine the gravity of an infringement. All relevant factors should be taken 
into account, although it appears that the Commission still enjoys some discretion to attach 
importance to each factor. The Union Courts will only step in when the Commission made a 
manifest error, or when certain relevant factors have not been taken into account. 
5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out the approach of the Union Court on the fi ve principles central to this research. 
Some principles have slowly developed over time, such as the non bis in idem principle, whereas 
others, such as the freedom from self-incrimination, are applied rigidly from their fi rst introduction 
in competition law proceedings. It also appears that for some principles, the approach taken is only 
explicitly mentioned in later case law, even though it was already apparent in earlier case law. This 
is e.g. the case with some evidential rules which were discussed in this chapter under the standard 
of proof. Case law of the Union Courts on the fi ve principles is in general well-developed. Two
514   Or any other amount at any stage in the process of determining the fi ne, see CFI, T-116/04 (Wieland-Werke v Commission), par. 85-87.
515   GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 397-398 and 438; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 299; GC, T-30/10 (Reagens 
v Commission), par. 196; GC, T-46/10 (Faci v Commission), par. 196; GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 259 and 260; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v Commission), par. 456; CFI, T-53/03 (British 
Plasterboard v Commission), par. 338 and 340; CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 
and T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 484; CFI, T-304/02 (Hoek Loos v Commission), par. 84; CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), 
par. 145; CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 159; CFI, T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 (Tokai Carbon and others 
v Commission), par. 399; CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd. and others v 
Commission), par. 217. In contrast with other cases, the Court of First Instance stated in CFI, T-52/02 (SNCZ v Commission), par. 71-
75, that the Commission does not have to ensure that the fi nes refl ect any diff erence if the undertakings concerned are in diff erent 
circumstances. This seems to water down the absolute statement in other cases, although it has not repeated elsewhere.
516   CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 534; CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke
v Commission), par. 244.
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observations can be made though. The approach of some principles can be criticised, whereas for 
other principles there is no case law on some aspects of those principles.
The fi rst observation concerns the criticism on case law of the CJEU. The distinction between 
factual and leading questions in light of the freedom from self-incrimination has been highly 
criticised, since it is diffi  cult to distinguish between both. The consequences of this distinction 
are, nevertheless, enormous. Factual answers should always be answered, whereas the 
undertaking concerned does not have to respond to leading questions. The principle of legal 
professional privilege was also discussed in light of the freedom from self-incrimination. Here 
as well, there is much discussion on the application of this principle, since it is not extended 
by the Union Courts to in-house lawyers. 
For the non bis in idem principle there is much criticism on the application of the condition 
of the unity of the legal interest. This condition is unique for the competition law domain, 
and cannot be found in other areas of EU law. It is, however, not explained by the Union 
Courts why this criterion is in particular necessary for EU competition law, but not for other 
areas of law. It is also asserted in this chapter, that the application of the identity of the facts 
to a decision of third country NCAs leads to a circular reasoning. The General Court held 
that third country NCAs do not consider the eff ects on the EU market. Therefore, there is no 
identity of the facts when the Commission imposes a fi ne, after a third country NCA already 
imposed a fi ne for the same anti-competitive behaviour. This statement is complemented by 
the General Court by providing that third country NCAs cannot even take the eff ects on the 
EU market into account, since that would encroach upon the powers of the Commission. This 
observation is quite presumptuous, since the Union Courts do not have any infl uence over the 
decision-making processes in third countries. 
Lastly, the approach of the General Court when discussing the absolute or relative gravity to 
determine the level of a fi ne can lead to quite some formalistic judgments. This distinction 
should be borne in mind by an undertaking when raising a plea. There are some cases where 
the General Court rather formalistically rejected the argument, since it was raised under the 
incorrect heading. Abolishing the distinction of the objective and relative gravity, or adjusting 
the argumentation of an undertaking by discussing its plea under the correct heading would 
lead to a more suitable approach. 
In other cases, it is not always clear how certain aspects will be dealt with in the future. It is 
not entirely clear whether legal representative and/or employees can rely on the freedom 
from self-incrimination during a dawn raid. 
It is also not clear whether there is a burden of proof on an undertaking when invoking a 
defence under Article 102 TFEU. The Court of Justice could produce congruence with Article 
101(3) by placing a legal and evidential burden of proof on undertakings. This would, 
however, depend on the outcome of the discussion whether a defence under Article 102 TFEU 
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challenges a constituent element of the abuse of a dominant position, or whether it should be 
regarded as an exemption ground similarly to Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Overall though, the case law of the CJEU is well-developed and provides a rich source of 
information on the application of the fi ve principles central to this research. In the next two 
chapters, the approach of the fi ve principles subject to this research is examined in respectively 
Dutch and English competition law. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
An examination takes place in this chapter of the scope of the fi ve principles in Dutch 
competition law. In chapter 8, a comparison takes place with the counterparts of those 
principles in Dutch criminal law, EU criminal law and the ECHR. It is thus examined 
whether the administrative law enforcement of Dutch competition law transforms to a 
system with criminal law characteristics. As stated, the fi ve principles in Dutch competition 
law are compared with their criminal law counterpart in three jurisdictions. The reason to 
compare the principles with their counterparts in Dutch criminal law is obvious. However, 
the comparisons with the other two jurisdictions is perhaps less obvious, but as is explained 
below, a logical consequence of the impact of the EU and the ECHR on Dutch law. 
By creating the EU, Member States have “limited their sovereign rights [...] and have thus 
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves”.1 National authorities 
should, on the basis of EU law, comply with general principles of EU law when Union law 
is applicable.2 This means that Member States are bound by the general principles of EU 
law when they implement or execute EU law,3 when they derogate from EU law,4 and when 
they act within the scope of Union law.5 This approach has been extended to the rights and 
principles in the Charter.6 More specifi cally, this means that the Dutch Competition Authority, 
the Authority for Consumers and Markets (Autoriteit Consument & Markt), is obliged to 
comply with general principles of EU law when it enforces EU competition law in parallel to 
Dutch competition law. When a cartel has an eff ect on trade between Member States, or when 
behaviour of an undertaking is also caught by the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, 
the national authorities should also apply Article 101, respectively 102 TFEU in parallel to 
their national rules.7 This obviously triggers the obligation to comply with general principles 
of EU law.
The obligation for national authorities to comply with general principles of EU law thus 
stems from EU law. Nevertheless, as asserted in chapter 3, Dutch law has always been quite 
favourable to obligations that fl ow from international treaties. International treaties can have 
direct eff ect in the national legal order pursuant to Article 93 of the Constitution, insofar 
as they are created in accordance with national law.8 Furthermore, competences may be 
transferred to international organisations.9 The obligation for national authorities to comply 
1  ECJ, 6/64 (Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.).
2  ECJ, C-260/89 (ERT), par. 42.
3  ECJ, 5/88 (Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft).
4   ECJ, C-112/00 (Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich).
5  ECJ, C-555/07 (Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG).
6   Article 51(1) of the Charter. See for the interpretation of this article: ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson); and ECJ, 
C-198/13 (Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno de España en Alicante) and others).
7  Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
8  See for this requirement Article 91(1) Dutch Constitution.
9  Article 92 Dutch Constitution.
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with (general principles of) EU law nevertheless follows from EU law itself, according to the 
Dutch Supreme Court, and not from Article 93 of the Constitution.10
The ECHR obviously includes a duty to ‘respect’ the rights in the Convention.11 As Harris, 
O’Boyle and Warbrick contend: “[...] a party may satisfy Article 1 [...] by ensuring, in whatever 
manner it chooses, that its law and practice is such that Convention rights are guaranteed.”12
The consequence of this obligation is less clear nonetheless than under EU law, since there 
is much room for “[l]ocal factors [to] infl uence how a state incorporates the Convention in 
its law”.13 In the Netherlands, this does not lead to any problems, since the Dutch state has 
acceded to the ECHR in a manner in conformity with the Dutch Constitution. Therefore, the 
Convention is directly applicable in the Dutch legal order.14 The ECHR is thus, as contended 
in chapter 3, directly applicable in the Netherlands, which means that the ACM and the Dutch 
judiciary should adhere to the rights following from this Convention and the interpretation 
by the Strasbourg Court. 
Before examining the fi ve principles in Dutch competition law (6.3-6.7), an examination takes 
place of the enforcement regime in the Netherlands (6.2). 
6.2 ENFORCEMENT OF DUTCH COMPETITION LAW
Until 1998, the Netherlands had a substantially diff erent competition law enforcement regime 
than the current one. In 1991, the Secretary of State for Economic Aff airs sent a letter to the 
House of Representatives with suggestions for improvements of the competition climate in 
the Netherlands.15 The aim was to create a ‘European competition policy’.16 Undertakings 
from other Member States were entering the market in the Netherlands, due to which there 
was a need for Dutch undertakings to compete more fi ercely with foreign and national 
undertakings. The enforcement regime that was in place until 1998 allowed undertakings to 
make anti-competitive agreements, unless the Minister prohibited them on grounds that they 
were contrary to the general interest.17 There was even a cartel register for notifi ed agreements. 
Only the agreements which were prohibited were published, but all others were kept secret. 
In the 1970s, a discussion took place as regards to making the cartel register public. Cartel 
organisations, however, were opposed to this idea, since “pressure groups and the public 
opinion” could try to infl uence competition policy on the basis of “superfi cial opinions”.18
The cartel register was ultimately never made available to the public.19
10  Hoge Raad (2 November 2004) ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AR1797, par. 3.6.
11  Article 1 ECHR.
12  Harris et al. (2014), p. 26.
13  Harris et al. (2014), p. 27.
14  See Article 91(1) Dutch Constitution and Article 93 Dutch Constitution.
15   Letter of the Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (Secretary of State of Economic Aff airs) of 1990-1991.
16   See Letter of the Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (Secretary of State of Economic Aff airs) of 1990-1991, p. 1. The Secretary of State 
refers to a Europees concurrentiebeleid.
17  Article 19(1) Wet Economische Mededinging.
18  SER Advies, nr. 1973, p. 8.
19   Mok (2004), p. 34. In the 1990s a resolution was adopted by the Dutch Second Chamber to make the cartel register public. The Secretary 
of State for Economic Aff airs decided not to implement this resolution, see Letter of the Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (Secretary 
of State of Economic Aff airs) of 1990-1991, p. 13. 
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Even though, as explained above, the climate in the Netherlands was quite favourable to anti-
competitive agreements, from 1994 onwards some general rules were created which declared 
particular types of agreements void.20 Enforcement of the Wet Economische Mededinging was 
done through criminal law means, which meant that the public prosecutor could prosecute 
undertakings which engaged in an anti-competitive agreement prohibited by the Minister of 
Economic Aff airs.21 Furthermore, not notifying an anti-competitive agreement also constituted 
an economic off ence which could be enforced by the public prosecutor.22 Usually no criminal 
enforcement was initiated, even when an agreement declared non-binding was executed by 
the parties involved in the agreement.23
The enforcement regime on the basis of the Wet Economische Mededinging was changed in 
1998, when the current competition law act was introduced (Mededingingswet). Furthermore, 
the criminal law enforcement regime was replaced with an administrative law regime.24 The 
Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) was created to enforce the national competition law 
rules and the EU competition law rules.25 The Dutch Competition Law Act also provided, 
in combination with the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht; 
Awb), for the procedures and powers of the NMa. On the fi rst of April 2013, the NMa was 
merged with the Netherlands Consumer Authority and the Netherlands Independent Post 
and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA).26 Moreover, the main powers of the new Dutch 
Competition Authority, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), can, since August 
2014, be found predominantly in the General Administrative Law Act and the Act establishing 
the ACM (Instellingswet). Reference is here only made to the NMa when a specifi c case is 
discussed in which it was still the authority which was part of the proceedings. In general, 
reference is made to the ACM though. 
The enforcement of Dutch competition law is discussed in the following paragraph. The fi rst 
subparagraph examines the enforcement regime between 1998 and 2014 (6.2.1), whereas the 
second subparagraph discusses briefl y the changes from the pre-2014 enforcement regime to 
the current regime (6.2.2).
6.2.1 The old (pre-2014) enforcement regime
The Dutch Competition Act (Mw) used to make a distinction between the surveillance 
phase and the investigative phase.27 The powers for the surveillance phase could be found 
20   See also Korsten & Van Wanroij (2008), p. 1-2. These rules were created on the basis of Article 10 Wet Economische Mededinging.
21   Agreements could be prohibited by means of one of the generic rules or by an individual decision, see De Bree (2006), p. 206.
22   De Bree (2006), p. 206.
23   De Bree (2006), p. 206. See also Mok (2004), p. 35, who argues that criminal law enforcement was secondary to the orders declaring 
agreements non-binding.
24   De Bree (2006), p. 205, mentions that the criminal law enforcement was replaced with an administrative law regime, due to the lack of 
success of the criminal law enforcement regime.
25   Article 88 of the Mededingingswet (Mw) (old) already provided the power to apply the competition law rules of the European 
Community. 
26  For more information on this merger see: Schäfers & Houdijk (2012). 
27   Articles 50-51 Mededingingswet (Mw) referred to the powers in the surveillance phase. Conversely, Articles 52-55c Mw dealt with the 
investigative phase.
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in the Dutch Competition Act and in the General Administrative Law Act. By contrast, the 
powers in the investigative phase could only be found in the Dutch Competition Act, since 
the General Administrative Law Act did not make a distinction between surveillance and 
investigation. The distinction between the surveillance phase and the investigative phase was 
important in light of the powers the NMa had and the safeguards for undertakings. However, 
during both phases the NMa was bound by the proportionality principle in Article 5:13 of the 
General Administrative Law Act.28 This principle limited the use and exercise of the powers 
of the NMA fl owing from the General Administrative Law Act, but also from the Competition 
Act.29
The surveillance phase shifted to the investigative phase when the NMa started investigating 
whether an infringement of the competition rules took place.30 In practice, the surveillance 
phase would easily shift to the investigative phase. At this point, the NMa had more 
enforcement powers. There was some discussion in legal literature whether the change from 
surveillance to investigation meant that there was a suspicion that the competition rules were 
infringed. 
Slot and Swaak argued that this shift from investigation to surveillance occurred when the NMa 
had a reasonable suspicion that the competition rules were infringed.31 Conversely, Korsten 
and Van Wanroij insisted that a suspicion of infringement of the competition rules was not 
necessary to determine whether the investigation phase would start, since the investigation 
was aimed at determining whether there was an infringement of the competition rules.32 This 
also seemed to be in line with Article 59 Mw, which stated that a statement of objections33
should be made after the investigation when there was a reasonable suspicion that the competition 
rules were infringed. The NMa thus had the opportunity to make a statement of objections 
when there was a reasonable suspicion that the competition rules had been infringed and 
when it was willing to impose a fi ne for the infringement. A reasonable suspicion thus existed 
after the investigation, which meant, as Korsten and Van Wanroij argued, that the investigation 
was aimed to determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion that the competition rules 
had been infringed. 
By contrast, Korsten and Van Wanroij also asserted that the change from surveillance to 
investigation occurred in practice when the NMa administered the caution in line with 
Article 53 Mw.34 The Dutch legislator also held in the explanatory memorandum to the Dutch 
Competition Act that the freedom from self-incrimination in Article 53 Mw would only apply 
in the investigative phase. This statement confl icted however with a literal reading of Article 
28   Korsten & Van Wanroij (2008), p. 229. The more general proportionality principle can be found in Article 3:4 Awb.
29  Van de Gronden & Jansen (2014a), p. 431.
30  See pre-January 2012 Article 1(k) Mw and from January 2012-August 2014 1(j) Mw.
31  Slot & Swaak (2012), p. 175.
32  Korsten & Van Wanroij (2008), p. 226.
33   The report which should be made on the basis of Article 59 Mw had a similar function as the statement of objections of the Commission, 
see e.g. Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.5.4.
34  Korsten & Van Wanroij (2008), p. 227.
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59 Mw, since the caution would only be administered when there was a reasonable suspicion 
that the competition rules had been infringed. Normally the caution was administered before 
the report was made and thus before the end of the investigation. Perhaps the opportunity 
to create a report in Article 59 Mw should be read as: a report could be made if there was still 
a reasonable suspicion after the investigation ended. This would mean that the investigative 
phase started when there was a reasonable suspicion that the competition rules were infringed. 
At that point, the NMa had more investigative powers, and the caution should be administered. 
During the surveillance phase, the NMa had the competence to enter any premises,35 with the 
exception of a home when there was no permission from the owner;36 to request information;37
and to inspect and copy any documents.38 The powers were extended in the investigative 
phase with the power to seal premises39 and to enter and search other premises, such as the 
home of a director.40 It was not possible to search business premises.41
An undertaking had the obligation to cooperate with the surveillance or the investigation on 
the basis of Article 5:20 Awb. The NMa could fi ne an undertaking for non-cooperation42 or 
might impose a lump sum to ensure cooperation.43 The maximum amount of the fi ne could 
be €450,000 or, when higher, 1% of the turnover of the undertaking in the preceding business 
year. In the previous chapter, it was explained that an important distinction between decisions 
and requests/written authorisations exists when the Commission enforces EU competition 
law. There is only an element of compulsion when a decision is taken. In Dutch competition 
law, this distinction is irrelevant. The request for information, and the dawn raid itself, will 
be regarded as factual acts and not as decisions. Nonetheless, the obligation to cooperate and 
the element of compulsion does exist, since the NMa (and currently the ACM) might impose 
fi nes for non-cooperation.
The enforcement powers of the NMa did have some limits though. Firstly, the exercise of these 
powers should always comply with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR, since the 
Dutch judiciary held that competition law fi nes are of a criminal law nature.44 It was less clear 
in Dutch competition law proceedings at what point in time the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR 
begin to apply.45 The ECtHR is more clear on this matter. Most cases in which the ECtHR had 
to determine the moment Article 6 ECHR applies, deal with the reasonable time guarantee.46
35   Including vehicles of the company concerned: Article 5:19 Awb. The NMa may, during an inspection, interrogate all employees 
involved in the anti-competitive behaviour on the basis of Article 5:16 Awb; see e.g. Van de Gronden (2017), p. 357-358.
36  Article 5:15 Awb.
37  Article 5:16 Awb. 
38  Article 5:17 Awb.
39  Article 54 Mw.
40  Article 55 Mw.
41  Van de Gronden (2017), p. 355-356.
42  Article 69 Mw.
43  Article 70 Mw.
44  CBb (19 January 2009) ECLI:NL:CBB:2009:BH0436, par. 2.10.
45   See also Beumer (2016), p. 121-122, for an overview of the diff erent moment in time at which a criminal law charge might exist in Dutch 
competition law proceedings. 
46  Harris et al. (2014), p. 376.
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As Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick sum up, in so far as relevant: “[i]n practice a person has been 
found to be subject to a ‘charge’ [...] when notifi ed that he is being charged with an off ence; 
when, in a civil law system, a preliminary investigation has been opened and, although not 
under arrest, the applicant has ‘offi  cially learnt of the investigation or begun to be aff ected by 
it’ [or] from the moment that there is a reasonable suspicion of guilt”.47
There might be two moments in Dutch competition law proceedings when the right to a fair 
trial under Article 6 ECHR starts: (i) when there was a reasonable suspicion of an infringement 
of the competition rules in light of Article 53 Mw, and thus when the freedom from self-
incrimination applied; or (ii) when there was a reasonable suspicion and the NMa made a 
statement of objections under Article 59 Mw.48
It would be logical to argue that all the safeguards from Article 6 ECHR apply when one of 
them, the right to remain silent, applied. Nevertheless, in 1998 the Dutch legislator contended 
that the right to remain silent should apply before Article 6 ECHR is triggered,49 since this was 
also the case in competition law proceedings initiated by the Commission. According to the 
Dutch legislator, Article 6 ECHR would only be triggered at the moment a suspect had been 
made aware of the prosecution. In competition law proceedings, this would be the case when 
a statement of objections was issued under Article 59 Mw.50 The right to remain silent should 
thus be triggered sooner.51 The assertion of the Dutch legislator seemed to imply that the 
second approach (when a statement of objections is made under Article 59 Mw) is the proper 
approach. This second approach was also adhered to by the Dutch judiciary in cases dealing 
with the reasonable time safeguard52 and the right to translation.53 Nevertheless, the Dutch 
judiciary left some room for another approach, since it also held that there might be situations 
where Article 6 ECHR applied before the statement of objections was made.54 In a case dating 
from March 2011, the CBb ruled that the reasonable time limit started not at the moment the 
report was made, but seven months before that time, since the undertaking received a letter 
that the report was being made.55
47  Harris et al. (2014), p. 377.
48   Beumer (2016), p. 122, refers to a third option which follows from the judgment of the CBb in ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.4, where 
the ACM conducted an investigation in a spamming case. In this case, the Appeals Tribunal ruled that Article 6 rights apply also from 
the moment a dawn raid is conducted. This case could indeed be applied by analogy to competition law proceedings; see for more 
information par. 7.3.3.
49  Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum) Mw. 
50  Or as Beumer (2016), p. 122, states from the moment a dawn raid is conducted. 
51   The point in time when the right to remain silent is triggered is not always consistently applied by the Dutch judiciary. For more 
information, see par. 6.3.1. 
52   See e.g. CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6635, par. 7.8.1.; CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.7; CBb (18 
November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5193, par. 3.5.4.1.
53   See Rb Rott erdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.1, where the Rb Rott erdam ruled that the right to translation 
under Article 6 ECHR applies from the moment the NMa takes decisions relating to the imposition of a fi ne. This appears to refer to 
the statement of objections in Article 59 Mw. 
54   See e.g. CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6635, par. 7.8.1.; CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.7; CBb (18 
November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5193, par. 3.5.4.1.
55   An extra indication was given by the fact that the NMa had created fi ning guidelines for this specifi c sector. The undertaking admitt ed 
to have participated in the cartel, which meant that it could have been aware that a fi ne was going to be imposed on it. See CBb (25 
March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BQ5977, par. 3.4.4. See also: Vinken & Van Joolingen (2011), p. 218.
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Unfortunately, there are no other cases dealing with the question that might shed light on the 
question at what point in time the safeguards from Article 6 ECHR apply. This could thus lead 
to uncertainty for undertakings.
The enforcement powers of the NMa were, as mentioned, limited by Article 6 ECHR. This 
was not the only limitation. The duty to cooperate was also limited by the freedom from self-
incrimination,56 the duty of confi dentiality,57 and the proportionality principle.58
Korsten and Van Wanroij suggested that the NMa, in principle, had to request information 
from the (legal representatives of an) undertaking, and not directly from an employee.59
According to these authors, this followed from the proportionality principle. Nevertheless, the 
District Court of Rotterdam, which is the court of fi rst instance in administrative competition 
law cases in the Netherlands, had ruled that the proportionality principle does not prohibit 
the NMa to request information directly from employees.60 Moreover, the NMa was even 
allowed to send a request for information to a third party which did not participate in the 
alleged anti-competitive behaviour.61
6.2.2 The new (post-2014) enforcement regime
As of 2014, three types of legislation are relevant for the enforcement powers of the ACM. 
These are the Instellingswet (Act establishing the ACM; Iw), the General Administrative Law 
Act (Awb), and the Stroomlijningswet (Act streamlining the enforcement powers of the ACM; 
Sw). The latter amends diff erent acts and will therefore become irrelevant in the future. The 
current Competition Law Act has become largely irrelevant with regard to the enforcement 
powers of the ACM,62 since the Stroomlijningswet transferred these powers to the Instellingswet. 
The possibility to seal premises is e.g. transferred from Article 54 Mw to Article 12b Iw. Three 
main substantive changes should be mentioned here. 
First, the power to search a home has been abolished in general in the Instellingswet.63 The 
power to enter a home remains, but the legislator was of the opinion that it is suffi  cient for 
the ACM to look around in a room64 and to request information on the basis of Article 5:17 
Awb. Nevertheless, the ACM does retain the power to search a home for competition law 
investigations specifi cally on the basis of Article 50 Mw. For other regulatory purposes, the 
ACM does not have the right to search a home, but merely the power to enter a home.
56   Article 53 Mw. This principle also follows from Article 6 ECHR. The freedom from self-incrimination is discussed in par. 7.3.
57  Article 5:20(2) Awb. The principle of legal professional privilege is discussed in par. 7.3.4. 
58  Article 5:13 Awb.
59  Korsten & Van Wanroij (2008), p. 230.
60  Rb Rott erdam (11 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY6361, par. 2.3.5.
61  Gerechtshof Den Haag (23 April 2013) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:CA3041, par. 2.3-2.5.
62  The power to search a home can still be found in the Mededingingswet though, see Article 50 Mw.
63   See the Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum) at the Stroomlijningswet, par. 2.2.3.1.
64  In Dutch this is called zoekend rondkijken.
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Secondly, the distinction between surveillance and investigation has been abolished. This 
means that the ACM may always seal premises65 or enter a home66 if this is necessary in 
light of the power to inspect or copy documents in 5:17 Awb. This does not have to lead 
to any problems, since the safeguards in the General Administrative Law Act remain 
unimpaired. The proportionality principle is always applicable to all enforcement powers of 
the ACM. Furthermore, the duty to cooperate is also always limited by the freedom from self-
incrimination and the duty of confi dentiality. Lastly, the safeguards from Article 6 ECHR will 
continue to apply when there is a criminal charge, even though as referred to before, it is still 
a bit unclear when these rights apply.
Thirdly, the Dutch legislator changed the thresholds for competition law fi nes as of 1 July 2016. 
The threshold for procedural fi nes is increased to €900,000 or, when higher, 1% of the total 
turnover of the undertaking concerned.67 For substantive fi nes, the Dutch legislator changed 
the 10% threshold. A fi ne may be imposed on an undertaking of €900,000, or, if higher, 10% 
of the total turnover.68 This 10% threshold may be raised to a maximum of 40% of the total 
turnover in case of a cartel which lasted more than one year.69 The ACM may multiply the 
maximum amount of the fi ne by the number of years in which the cartel was active This 
multiplier is limited to four years. 
6.3 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
6.3.1 Introduction
The right to remain silent can be found in Dutch competition law.70 No broader freedom from 
self-incrimination however can explicitly be found in specifi c provisions in Dutch competition 
law, although the broader freedom from self-incrimination might be applicable in competition 
law proceedings by virtue of Article 6 ECHR.
The right to remain silent in Dutch competition law proceedings can be found in Article 53 
of the Dutch Competition Law Act (Mw). However, the Dutch legislator tried to simplify 
administrative law in the Netherlands. It was thus the intention that the right to remain silent 
in competition law proceedings would have been transferred to the General Administrative 
Law Act with the coming into force of the fourth tranche of this act in 2009.71 Nevertheless, 
65  Article 12b Instellingswet (Iw).
66  Article 12c Iw.
67   Article 12m(1) Iw. The turnover should be calculated on the basis of the preceding business year, see Article 12o Iw. The 1% turnover 
threshold was not changed. 
68   Article 57 Mw. The turnover should, just as with the procedural fi nes, be calculated on the basis of the preceding business year, see 
Article 12o(1) Iw.
69   Article 57 Mw. In the previous chapter it was stated that the Court of Justice regards the 10% threshold as an important means to ensure 
that fi nes are not disproportionate. This change may thus have consequences for the proportionality of sanctions. In par. 7.7 this is 
examined. 
70  See Articles 53 Mw, 5:10a Awb and 12i Instellingswet; and Jansen & Van de Gronden (2014b).
71   The General Administrative Law Act is adopted in diff erent phases. These are called tranches. The fi rst two tranches entered into force 
in 1994, and the third one in 1998. 
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Article 53 Mw continued to exist, next to the general provision in Article 5:10a Awb. Case law 
up to now still refers solely to Article 53 Mw. 
In 2014, the right to remain silent was moved with all other procedural guarantees from the 
Dutch Competition Law Act, to Article 12i of the so-called Act establishing the Authority 
Consumers and Market (Iw). 
It should be mentioned that the right to remain silent also follows from Article 6 ECHR. In two 
cases, the Dutch judiciary has discussed the right to remain silent under this article instead of 
national law.72 In general, however, reference is made to national law.
The right to remain silent under Article 53 Mw is triggered when there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the undertaking concerned committed an infringement of the competition 
rules. This trigger exists, as explained in paragraph 2 of this chapter, before a statement of 
objections under Article 59 Mw is made. 
Contrary to this approach, in 2014 the District Court of Rotterdam applied the right to 
remain silent under Article 6 ECHR instead of 53 Mw. In those two cases, the District Court 
held, with reference to case law of the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, that there is a 
criminal charge when there is an act of the administration from which the person concerned 
can reasonably suspect that he will be fi ned.73 This is normally the case when there is a 
statement of objections, according to the District Court.74 T he District Court also referred to 
a regulatory case in which the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal stated that the criminal 
charge existed when a dawn raid was ordered.75 This is thus before a statement of objections 
is issued. However, the District Court interpreted this judgment in such a way that a criminal 
charge exists when the ACM notifi es the undertaking of its intention to impose a fi ne on an 
undertaking. This is normally the case when there is a statement of objections. The Dutch 
competition authority was, in these two cases ruled upon by the District Court, in the end not 
obliged to administer the caution when it requested some information from the undertaking, 
since there was no criminal charge, even though the competition authority was investigating 
anti-competitive behaviour. Nevertheless, the ACM did refer to the right to remain silent, 
and therefore the District Court also discussed the substance of this right in these cases. 
The approach taken by the District Court seems to run counter to the purpose of the legislator. 
In the explanatory memorandum to Article 53 Mw, the legislator has stated that the right to 
remain silent should exist already before one can speak formally of a criminal charge and thus 
before a statement of objections is issued. The reason for this is to bring the safeguards from 
the right to silence in line with EU competition law proceedings initiated by the Commission. 
72   Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par .9.23; and Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, 
par. 2.6.1.
73   Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 9.22; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, 
par. 9.19.
74   Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 9.22; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, 
par. 9.19.
75  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.4.
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Article 5:10a Awb and Article 12i Instellingswet refer to a diff erent trigger than Article 53 Mw, 
namely the interrogation. In its memorandum of reply to the Stroomlijningswet, the Dutch 
legislator provided that the current trigger, the interrogation, is the same as the reasonable 
suspicion trigger. This means that there will be a reasonable suspicion when an interrogation 
takes place. There appears thus not to be a change in approach with regard to the moment in 
time when a person may invoke the right to remain silent in competition law proceedings.76
When an undertaking is interrogated on a potential infringement of the competition rules, the 
right to remain silent applies.
The broader freedom from self-incrimination, which fl ows from Article 6 ECHR instead of 
national law, is probably also triggered when documents are asked of an undertaking in light 
of an investigation in a potential infringement of the competition rules. There are currently no 
competition law cases dealing with the broader freedom from self-incrimination.
In the following subparagraphs, fi rst the concept of coercion is discussed (6.3.2). Secondly, 
there is a discussion on the actual interference with the freedom from self-incrimination (6.3.3), 
after which the duty of confi dentiality is examined (6.3.4). Lastly, the possible consequences of 
an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination are analysed (6.3.5). 
6.3.2 Coercion
As mentioned in the second paragraph of this chapter, undertakings have a duty to 
cooperate with the Dutch Competition Authority (ACM) on the basis of Article 5:20 Awb. 
Refusing to cooperate may lead to a fi ne.77 This general obligation to provide information is 
limited by the proportionality principle and the right to remain silent.78 Coercion that might 
trigger the freedom from self-incrimination will only exist when there is an obligation to 
provide information on pain of a fi ne. An interrogation at the police offi  ce, which might be 
experienced as uncomfortable, cannot be seen as impermissible pressure.79 Furthermore, it 
has been argued that a layperson may fi nd the statement that there is a duty to cooperate 
combined with the caution confusing.80 The District Court of Rotterdam has not considered 
this to be a convincing argument to rule that the rights of defence are derogated from.81
There are indications that providing information voluntarily does not lead to an infringement 
of the right to remain silent or the freedom from self-incrimination. In the Breda Notary case, 
the NMa did not administer the caution in line with Article 53 Mw. The District Court of 
Rotterdam ruled that the undertaking provided documents voluntarily. The evidence was
76   Cf. De Bree (2012), p. 145 and 147 who contends that this as a change, but does not elaborate further upon this aspect.
77  Pre-2014: Article 69(1) Mw; post-2014: Article 12m(1)(c) Iw.
78  Rb Rotterdam (7 August 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AI1062, 2.3.
79  Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 11.
80  Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par .8.19.
81  Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 8.20.
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thus not illegally obtained.82 Strikingly, the District Court concluded by stating that there 
had been no infringement of Article 8 ECHR,83 instead of Article 6 ECHR. It is, however, 
not entirely clear from the case whether this conclusion was reached because the notaries 
provided documents which do not fall under the freedom from self-incrimination, or whether 
the focus of the District Court was on the voluntary nature of providing the documents.84
In the appeal procedure before the NMa, the discussion focused on the fi rst aspect, namely 
the nature of the evidence and the freedom from self-incrimination and not on the aspect of 
voluntarily providing those documents.85
In 2010, the District Court of Rotterdam concluded that providing information voluntarily 
is only a ground for a reduction of the fi ne when it does not fall under the cooperation 
requirement, and thus only when the undertaking provides incriminating statements, and 
when the statements provide additional value.86 As the District Court rightfully observed, this 
is comparable to the approach taken by the Union Courts.87 The Union Courts have indeed 
held that this type of participation by an undertaking in the investigation may amount to a 
mitigating factor for the determination of the fi ne.88
Coercion will be used against the undertaking, although it will always be a natural person 
responding. In the Netherlands, a discussion has taken place on the scope of the freedom 
from self-incrimination in competition law proceedings, since the duty to cooperate is broadly 
formulated.89 As the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal held, the group of persons that can 
be requested to provide information in Dutch competition law proceedings is broader than 
under EU law.90 In principle this means that everyone who can be interrogated on behalf of 
the undertaking, can also rely on the right to remain silent. 
In 2003, the District Court of Rotterdam ruled that the NMa might interrogate any employee 
of an undertaking regarding the anti-competitive behaviour of that undertaking.91 The court 
ruled that everyone who is part of an undertaking and through whom that undertaking is 
being heard can rely on Article 53 Mw.92 This changes nonetheless when a person is heard as 
an individual and thus not as an employee on the part of the undertaking.93 It thus appears
82  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2. 
83  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2. 
84   Van de Gronden (2017), p. 364, refers also to both aspects, namely the fact that the documents were voluntarily provided and the fact 
that no statements were used to establish the anti-competitive behaviour. It is thus not entirely clear which aspect was decisive for the 
District Court.
85   Decision of the DG of the NMa 952/112 (15 March 2000), par. 17 and par. 26-29.
86  Rb Rotterdam (6 May 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM5246, par. 2.4.
87   See ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox v Commission), par. 89; ECJ, C-65/02 and C-73/02 P (ThyssenKrupp Stainless and others v Commission), par. 
52.
88   ECJ, C-57/02 P (Acerinox v Commission), par. 87.
89   See e.g. Gerechtshof Den Haag (23 April 2013) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:CA3041, par. 2.11-2.12; and Rb Rotterdam (7 August 2003) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AI1062, par. 2.3.
90   CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7026, par. 5.2; CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7031, par. 5.2.
91   Rb Rotterdam (7 August 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AI1062, par. 2.3; Rb Rotterdam (11 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY6361, par. 
2.3.5.
92   Rb Rotterdam (7 August 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AI1062, par. 2.3; Rb Rotterdam (11 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY6361, par. 
2.3.5. 
93  Rb Rotterdam (11 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY6361, par. 2.3.5.
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that natural persons have a right to remain silent derived from the undertaking, but not a 
right on their own. In 2011, two cases came before the District Court of Rotterdam dealing 
with the right to remain silent under Article 53 Mw. The judgments reiterated previous case 
law which saw on this from the undertaking derived right to remain silent for employees.94
Following this established reasoning, the District Court ruled that ex-employees cannot rely 
on Article 53 Mw, since they do not form part of the undertaking anymore.95 Furthermore, 
ex-employees are not interrogated on behalf of the undertaking.96 These two judgments 
were quashed on appeal. Conversely, the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal ruled that 
the legislator did not prescribe any restriction on the persons which might rely on Article 53 
Mw.97 Moreover, limiting the group of persons who can rely on Article 53 Mw will reduce 
the eff ective protection for the undertaking concerned. Lastly, the Appeals Tribunal also 
stated that the broad duty to cooperate cannot be combined with a narrow reading of Article 
53 Mw.98 Therefore, ex-employees can rely on Article 53 Mw. Whereas the District Court 
of Rotterdam regarded the right to remain silent purely as a right of the undertaking, the 
court of appeal appears to view this right more broadly. Article 53 Mw merely protects the 
undertaking. The District Court therefore grants a derived right to certain categories of persons 
which form part of the undertaking. On the other hand, the court of appeal seems to grant 
certain natural persons a right to remain silent on the basis of Article 53 Mw as well. The latter 
approach seems to contradict the wording of Article 53 Mw. Nevertheless, it does provide 
more protection to the undertaking concerned. 
With the entering into force of the Act streamlining the enforcement powers of the ACM, 
the legislator decided to narrow down the judgement of the Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal.99 This much to the dismay of e.g. Doorenbos,100 who was also one of the two lawyers 
representing the former employees in the aforementioned cases. During the legislative 
process, members of the Dutch parliament have posed questions to the responsible minister 
on the basis of a publication by Doorenbos on this topic. The minister responded that the right 
to remain silent is a right of the undertaking under scrutiny by the ACM and not a right of a 
natural person. The extension to employees goes already beyond the protection in the General 
Administrative Law Act. Furthermore, the extension of the right to remain silent to ex-workers 
goes beyond the goals of the right to remain silent and disrupts the balance between the 
eff ective enforcement of the competition rules and the rights of the defence.101 By overruling 
the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, the minister went back to the roots of the right to 
remain silent in competition law proceedings. After all, the freedom from self-incrimination in 
94   Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7633, par. 2.4.2-2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7658, 
par. 2.4.2-2.4.3.
95   Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7633, par. 2.4.4-2.4.6; Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7658, 
par. 2.4.4-2.4.6.
96   Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7633, par. 2.4.4; Rb Rotterdam (9 June 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ7658, par. 
2.4.4.
97   CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7026, par. 5.2; CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7031, par. 5.2.
98   CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7026, par. 5.2; CBb (21 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY7031, par. 5.2.
99   Article 12i Iw provides that the right to remain silent from 5:10a Awb is applicable to employees of the undertaking.
100  Doorenbos (2013).
101  Memorie van Antwoord (memorandum of reply) Stroomlijningswet, p. 19.
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Dutch competition law proceedings is a right of the undertaking itself. Natural persons may 
have a derived right when they are interrogated on behalf of the undertaking, but it would go 
too far to read this right to remain silent as a right of the natural person who is interrogated. 
6.3.3 Interference
As stated above, the broader freedom from self-incrimination might be applicable in Dutch 
competition law proceedings on the basis of Article 6 ECHR. Nevertheless, the Dutch judiciary 
has not explicitly confi rmed this. The right to remain silent is nevertheless applicable in 
Dutch competition law proceedings. The ACM is also obliged to administer the caution to 
undertakings and persons who can benefi t from the right to remain silent.102
The right to remain silent is not absolute. Comparable to the case law of the EU Courts, the 
Dutch judiciary has (implicitly) ruled in competition law proceedings that the right to remain 
silent only extends to providing incriminating answers. An undertaking, or a person being 
interrogated on behalf of the undertaking, does not have to provide incriminating answers,103
although factual answers should be given.104
In the Breda Notary case, the caution was not administered. However, the District Court 
of Rotterdam stated that the undertaking concerned provided voluntarily pre-existing 
documentation.105 Furthermore, only these documents and not the oral statements were used 
to prove the existence of the cartel.106 The District Court did not fi nd this to be a problem. It 
could be argued therefore that undertakings cannot rely on the freedom from self-incrimination 
when the ACM requests documentation which already existed and which is in the possession 
of the undertaking concerned. This approach would be in line with that of the Union Courts. 
The ACM will, however, not engage in fi shing expeditions or ask broad questions in order to 
obtain materials. In 2014, the Trade and Industries Appeals Tribunal ruled in a regulatory case 
dealing with spamming of advertisements that the ACM107 could not request, on pain of a fi ne, 
the person concerned which device he used for the spamming and where this device could be 
found.108 This led the Tribunal to conclude that the person was forced to hand over materials 
dependent on his will which were used ultimately for the substantive fi ne, and would therefore 
infringe the freedom from self-incrimination under Article 6 ECHR.109 This case might be 
applicable in competition law proceedings as well. The District Court of Rotterdam referred in
102  Pre-2014: 53(1) Mw; post-2014: 5:10a(2) Awb.
103   In the foreclosure auction cartel, the District Court referred to both incriminating information and information dependent on the will of 
the undertaking when discussing the freedom from self-incrimination under Article 6 ECHR. This case dealt, however, specifi cally 
with the right to remain silent and not the broader freedom from self-incrimination. See Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 9.23.
104  Rb Rotterdam (6 May 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM5246, par. 2.4.
105  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
106  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
107   This was a case started by the OPTA, a regulatory authority in the area of post-delivery and telecommunication. It could initiate 
regulatory proceedings in these particular sectors. The OPTA was merged in 2013 with the NMa into the ACM.
108  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.7.
109   CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.7 The Tribunal decided to exclude the information on the laptop from this case, see 
par. 5.8.
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two cases to this judgment of the Trade and Industries Appeals Tribunal to determine whether 
a criminal charge existed in light of the application of the freedom from self-incrimination.110
Nevertheless, this particular aspect of broad questions and fi shing expeditions was 
not addressed in these two District Court cases, nor in other competition law cases.
6.3.4 Duty of confi dentiality (legal professional privilege)
Up till now no cases have been brought before the Dutch judiciary dealing with legal 
professional privilege in competition law proceedings. This privilege is however protected 
through Article 5:20(2) Awb. Whereas 5:20(2) Awb only protects documentation at the 
premises of a person with a duty of confi dentiality, the legislator decided to broaden this 
in special legislation. In Article 12g(1) Iw,111 this privilege has been extended to information 
exchanged between a lawyer and the undertaking but which can be found at the premises of 
the undertaking. Legal professional privilege is also applicable to in-house counsels as long 
as they are admitted to the bar.112
The protection of this principle also extends to internal documentation in which the 
correspondence between lawyer and undertaking is mentioned or summarised.113 Furthermore, 
internal documentation created to obtain advice from a lawyer is also privileged.114
Documentation of which the privileged nature is disputed will normally be sealed and 
examined by an independent civil servant of the ACM.115
 6.3.5 Consequences of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination
Since there are not that many cases dealing with the freedom from self-incrimination, the 
consequences of an infringement are not that clear. In the Breda Notary case, the undertakings 
concerned had not been administered the caution.116 However, since the NMa only used the 
voluntarily provided pre-existing documentation and not the oral statements, there was 
no illegally obtained evidence.117 It thus appears that the most likely consequence will be 
exclusion of evidence. In the Breda Notary case, there was still enough evidence available and 
the evidence obtained in violation of the right to remain silent was not used. 
In 2015, the District Court of Rotterdam referred to the so-called Drainpipe (Afvoerpijp)
judgment,118 a criminal law judgment of the Supreme Court, dealing with the consequences 
110   Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 9.22; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, 
par. 9.19.
111  Pre-2014 this could be found in Article 51(1) Mw.
112  Jansen (2018).
113  Brochure werkwijze NMa (2009), p. 13.
114  Brochure werkwijze NMa (2009), p. 13.
115   Article 3(5) ACM Werkwijze Geheimhoudingsprivilege Advocaat (2014); see also Brochure werkwijze NMa (2009), p. 14.
116  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
117  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
118   Hoge Raad (30 March 2004) ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Drainpipe contains guidelines on how to 
deal with a procedural defects in criminal law proceedings. 
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of an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination.119 In this specifi c case, the caution 
was not administered to a person. That person was, however, working for a diff erent 
company than the one under investigation. The undertaking concerned could thus not rely 
on the freedom from self-incrimination, since the infringed principle protected the other 
undertaking.120 From the aforementioned spamming case (par. 6.3.3), it becomes clear that 
exclusion of evidence is the most likely consequence in competition law proceedings.121 It is 
however not entirely clear whether this case could be used in competition law proceedings. 
6.3.6 Résumé
Some controversy exists as to when the freedom from self-incrimination will be triggered, 
although the legislator intended it to be applicable when the ACM has issued a statement 
of objections. The right to remain silent is codifi ed in Dutch competition law, whereas the 
broader freedom from self-incrimination cannot be found there. It is thus unclear whether 
an undertaking e.g. has to hand over documents created before the investigation started. 
However, it appears that documents do not have to be handed over when the request is too 
broadly formulated or when the request amounts to a fi shing expedition.
The right to remain silent is a right of the undertaking. In some controversial cases, the 
Appeals Tribunal seemed to miss this point by stating that individuals have their own right 
to remain silent on the basis of Article 53 Mw. In 2014, the legislator decided to bring the right 
to remain silent back to its intended roots and specifi cally excluded former employees from 
those who are able to rely on the new provision. Only employees interrogated on behalf of the 
undertaking can rely on this right. 
The right to remain silent is not absolute. An undertaking does have to provide factual answers, 
whereas it does not have to provide incriminating answers. The dividing line between both 
can be thin, and might lead to problems.122
A broad legal professional privilege exists in Dutch competition law proceedings. 
Communication between in-house counsel and the undertaking is also privileged when 
that counsel is a member of the bar. Furthermore, it does not matter at what place the 
communication is found. 
The consequences for an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination are not that 
clear, although in one case the District Court of Rotterdam referred to the so-called Drainpipe 
judgment of the Supreme Court. Exclusion of evidence seems, on the basis of the available 
case law on this matter, most likely.
119  Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 10.2.
120  Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 10.2-10.3.
121  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.7-5.8.
122  See chapter 5, par. 5.3.3.
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6.4 NON BIS IN IDEM
6.4 .1 Introduction
Since 1998, thirteen cases of the Dutch judiciary have (explicitly or implicitly) dealt with the 
non bis in idem principle in Dutch competition law proceedings. The Dutch judiciary has been 
substantially infl uenced by the case law of the EU Courts when discussing the elements of 
the non bis in idem principle. There is thus some voluntary adherence to Union law in the 
application of the non bis in idem principle by the Dutch judiciary. 
In the following subparagraphs, the prohibition of double prosecutions and/or double 
sanctions is examined (6.4.2), after which the corollary of the prohibition of sanctions, namely 
the accounting principle, is discussed (6.4.3). In order for the non bis in idem principle to apply, 
there needs to be a fi nal decision (6.4.4). The trinity of conditions used in EU competition law 
is also used in Dutch competition law proceedings (6.4.5). These three conditions, namely the 
unity of the off ender (6.4.6), unity of the legal interest protected (6.4.7) and the identity of the 
facts (6.4.8), are also discussed. 
6.4.2 Prohibition of double prosecutions and/or double sanctions 
In the previous chapter, it was discussed how the Union Courts refer to both the prohibition 
of double prosecutions and the prohibition of double sanctions when discussing the non bis in 
idem principle. The prohibition of double sanctions seems to play the bigger part in case law 
of the Union judiciary. 
This ambiguity can also be found in cases ruled upon by the Dutch judiciary in competition 
law proceedings. In some cases reference is made to the prohibition of double prosecution 
and double sanctions,123 whereas in other cases reference is only made to the prohibition 
of double sanctions.124 In cases where the Dutch judiciary refers to both prohibitions, they 
mainly apply the prohibition of double sanctions.125 It thus appears, on the basis of the limited 
number of cases on this matter, that only the prohibition of double sanctions plays a role in 
Dutch competition law proceedings. In light of the approach of the Union judiciary this is not 
strange, but merely a consequence of the infl uence of EU case law on the application of the 
non bis in idem principle in Dutch competition law proceedings.
123   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1; Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 
2.4.
124   CBb (28 August 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX7256, par. 3.3.4; CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9426, par. 3.3; CBb (14 March 
2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3; CBb (1 December 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159, par. 5.1.
125   Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 2.4, confi rmed on appeal: CBb (1 December 2011) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159, par. 5.1. In Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1, the District Court of 
Rotterdam did not apply any prohibition, since the facts between the current and the previous case were not identical. On appeal, 
however, reference was only made to the prohibition of double sanctions; see CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3.
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6.4.3 Accounting principle and the prohibition of double sanctions
In the previous chapter, it was explained that the Union Courts fi nd the accounting principle 
to be part of the non bis in idem principle. The Commission is obliged to take into account 
a previously imposed sanction by the Commission itself or an NCA in order to prevent an 
infringement of the non bis in idem principle, and more specifi cally an infringement of the 
prohibition of double sanctions. This is also referred to as ‘to set off ’ a fi ne. 
In Dutch competition law proceedings, it is not that clear whether the accounting principle 
plays a role. In the Vermeer & Ballast Nedam case,126 the NMa did set off  a fi ne, since there 
were previous fi nes imposed. This case dealt with a fi ne in the construction sector. During 
that time there were also many decisions taken in the so-called construction industry fraud, 
which dealt with bid-rigging in this sector. The fi ne in the Vermeer & Balast Nedam case diff ered 
from the fi nes in the construction fraud cartel. The NMa, nonetheless, took into account the 
fi nes imposed on these undertakings in the construction industry fraud. This appears to be 
part of the discretionary powers of the NMa and thus not a consequence of the accounting 
principle. As stated in the previous chapter, the accounting principle is an obligation to take 
into account a previously imposed fi ne. In 2015 respectively 2016, both the District Court of 
Rotterdam127 and the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal128 appeared to hint at the existence 
of the accounting principle in Dutch competition law proceedings. 
A case from 2009 might provide some better insight into the application of the accounting 
principle in Dutch competition law proceedings. In this case two undertakings were fi ned for 
their anti-competitive behaviour. The cartel in which the undertakings took part lasted three 
years. During the last four months, the undertaking concerned bought another undertaking 
and the latter thus became a subsidiary. The subsidiary and the parent undertaking were 
both fi ned for their behaviour in the cartel. The undertaking which became the subsidiary 
argued that it was fi ned twice: once for its own conduct and once for the conduct of the 
parent undertaking. Neither the District Court of Rotterdam nor the Trade and Industries 
Appeals Tribunal agreed.129 The NMa did set off  the penalty in both decisions. The fi ne of 
the independent undertaking was based on the turnover of two years and eight months. 
By contrast, the turnover of the last four months was taken together with the turnover 
of the parent undertaking in the decision addressed to the group of undertakings. By 
setting off  the fi ne, there was no double sanction.130 It thus appears that the accounting 
principle plays a role in Dutch competition law proceedings. By setting off  a fi ne, the 
ACM may prevent a double sanction and thus comply with the non bis in idem principle.
126   Rb (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1; on appeal: CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3.
127  Rb Rotterdam (9 July 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:4885, par. 12.
128  CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3.
129   Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 2.4, confi rmed on appeal: CBb (1 December 2011) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159, par. 5.1.
130   Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 2.4, confi rmed on appeal: CBb (1 December 2011) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159, par. 5.1.
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6.4.4 Final decision
The non bis in idem principle will only apply when there is a fi nal decision from a competition 
authority on this matter.131 The annulment of a decision of the ACM on procedural grounds 
will not be regarded as a fi nal decision.132 In the Bell Pepper cartel the decision was annulled by 
the Dutch court, since the statement of objections and the fi nal decision referred to diff erent 
participants in the cartel. For some associations of undertakings it was unclear whether they 
would be fi ned separately. The District Court of Rotterdam also ruled that the non bis in idem 
principle would not prohibit the ACM to sanction these associations of undertakings.133 A fi nal 
decision should thus be taken on the merits, which means that the sanction should become 
fi nal or the undertaking concerned should not be held liable. 
The question remains though whether the fi nal decision of any competition authority would 
suffi  ce to activate the non bis in idem principle. It is clear that the non bis in idem principle 
applies when the ACM wants to sanction the same behaviour twice.
Whether the non bis in idem principle applies becomes less clear when dealing with a previously 
imposed sanction of the Commission, an NCA in the EU or a third country NCA. The fi rst two 
situations might occur frequently, since NCAs are obliged to enforce Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
when they apply their own cartel prohibition or the prohibition of an abuse of a dominant 
position and when there is an eff ect on trade between Member States. One might argue that 
Article 50 of the Charter is applicable in these instances. This article provides the non bis in idem 
principle in criminal law proceedings. The Court of Justice has explained the term criminal law 
proceedings in light of the so-called Engel criteria of the ECtHR.134 The ECtHR has, on the basis 
of these criteria, ruled that Italian competition law fi nes are of a criminal law nature.135 One could 
therefore argue that Article 50 of the Charter is applicable in competition law proceedings. It 
might be strange when the Union Courts use the same criteria as the ECtHR with regard to the 
same situation, but with a diff erent result. Nevertheless, the Union Courts have chosen not to 
apply Article 50 of the Charter in competition law proceedings, although they still apply the 
non bis in idem as a general principle of EU law.136 It is thus arguable that national competition 
authorities should apply this general principle137 when the Commission, or perhaps even 
another EU NCA, has already taken a fi nal decision on the matter. This fi nal decision can be 
an acquittal138 or conviction by the Commission, or a conviction by an NCA.139 As mentioned
131  See Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1.
132  Rb Rotterdam (12 June 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4689, par. 17.8.
133  Rb Rotterdam (12 June 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4689, par. 17.8.
134   ECJ, C-489/10 (Criminal proceedings against Lukasz Marcin Bonda), par. 37; see also: ECJ, C-617/10 (Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson), 
par. 35.
135  ECtHR, no. 43590/08 (A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy), par. 44.
136  See e.g. ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others).
137   There is an obligation for national authorities to comply with general principles of EU law when they implement or execute Union law. 
See for an overview of cases on this obligation for example Craig & De Búrca (2015), p. 410-412; and Ward (2014), p. 1433-1447.
138   See Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003, namely the decision of inapplicability because the conditions of Article 101(1) or Article 102 TFEU 
are not met, or because an exemption is applicable.
139   NCAs cannot take a decision that there is no infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU; see ECJ, C-375/09 (Tele2 Polska), par. 29-30.
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in the previous chapter, only the accounting principle will play a role in these situations. 
The Dutch judiciary has not explicitly ruled that the non bis in idem principle applies when 
there is a fi nal decision of the Commission or an NCA. It follows from the Silverskin Onion case 
that the ACM in general tries to avoid non bis in idem problems by consulting with NCAs or 
the Commission on possible anti-competitive behaviour which it suspects to have occurred.140
This, in general, could explain the lack of cases on the non bis in idem principle in Dutch 
competition law. 
In the Vermeer & Ballast Nedam case, the District Court held that the non bis in idem principle is 
applicable when there is a fi nal decision of the Commission. This was merely a slip of the pen 
though, since there was no Commission decision. Nevertheless, the District Court quoted the 
decision of the NMa in appeal. The NMa referred in its decision to the Union non bis in idem 
principle which prevents the Commission from prosecuting or sanctioning an undertaking 
for the second time when the Commission itself already imposed a fi ne. It is, nonetheless, an 
indication that the Union non bis in idem principle might be applicable in Dutch competition 
law proceedings when a foreign competition authority has already imposed a fi ne for the 
same anti-competitive behaviour. 
In the 2014 Silverskin Onion case, the District Court of Rotterdam did refer to the non bis in idem 
principle in light of a concurrent sanction of the ACM and the German competition authority. 
The undertaking concerned argued that the ACM should only have taken the turnover on the 
Dutch market into account. The argumentation of the undertaking was based on the North Sea 
Shrimp case in which the NMa only took into account the turnover on the Dutch market. The 
District Court held that the NMa used this turnover in the North Sea Shrimp case, since there 
was no experience yet with case allocation and the cooperation in the European Competition 
Network.141 Furthermore, it provided that the ACM, by taking into account only the eff ects 
on the Dutch territory, tried in that case to prevent a non bis in idem problem for the German 
NCA.142 The Silverskin Onion judgment was confi rmed on appeal.143 The reasoning of the 
Dutch courts in the Silverskin Onion case is not conclusive on the question whether the non bis 
in idem principle applies when an EU NCA also enforces Article 101 or 102 TFEU. The Dutch 
courts take into account that the non bis in idem principle might prevent a second prosecution 
and/or sanction by an EU NCA when the ACM has already taken a fi nal decision. In order to 
prevent this, the ACM takes only into account the eff ects on the Dutch market. Nonetheless, 
the two Dutch courts merely contended that this used to be the case, since there was not 
140   See also CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3, where the CBb mentioned that the ACM did consult with other 
competition authorities in the EU to fi nd out whether any of them would initiate proceedings on the same alleged cartel. As the CBb 
held, because of this approach, no situation arose where the undertakings were punished twice for the same infringement. 
141  Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 80.
142  Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 80.
143  CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3.
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enough experience yet with case allocation within the ECN. Nowadays, the ACM is allowed 
to take into account the eff ect on the EU market.144 In this case there was, however, no problem 
with the non bis in idem principle, since there were no proceedings initiated or concluded by 
another NCA or the Commission before the ACM fi ned the undertakings. This approach has 
also been confi rmed in other cases. In both the Onion Set cartel and the Flour cartel, the District 
Court and the Appeals Tribunal accepted that the ACM takes into account the turnover on the 
EU market.145 In the Onion Set case, the Appeals Tribunal referred to the fact that the ACM 
checked with the Commission and other NCAs whether the latt er would initiate proceedings 
for the same behaviour.146 By contrast, the Bundeskartellamt did indeed initiate proceedings for 
the same behaviour in the Flour cartel, but the German competition authority thereby took into 
account the previously imposed fi ne by the ACM when it determined the amount of the fi ne.147
There are no judgments of the Dutch judiciary dealing with a previously imposed sanction 
for anti-competitive behaviour by third country NCAs. Under EU competition law, decisions 
of third country NCAs do not trigger the non bis in idem principle at all. This would also be a 
sensible approach to adopt in Dutch competition law proceedings. 
In conclusion, it is arguable that the Dutch judiciary obliges the ACM to take into account fi nal 
decisions by the Commission or an NCA from another Member State. The interpretation of the 
non bis in idem principle by the Dutch judiciary is strongly infl uenced by case law of  the Union 
Courts. Furthermore, national authorities are bound by general principles of EU law when 
they implement or execute EU law.148 It is therefore highly likely that the Dutch judiciary takes 
a similar approach as the Union Courts on this matter. This would also mean that the ACM is 
not obliged to take into account previously imposed fi nes by third country NCAs, since, as the 
Union Courts explained, the condition of ‘identity of the legal interest’ is not met in those cases. 
6.4.5 Conditions
The principle of non bis in idem in Dutch competition law proceedings is, inspired by Union 
law, subject to the trinity of unities, namely the (i) unity of off ender, (ii) the unity of the legal 
interest protected, and (iii) the identity of the facts.149 These three conditions are examined in 
the following paragraphs.
6.4.6 Unity of off ender
The non bis in idem principle is only applicable when there is unity of the off ender. Dutch 
competition law uses the same functional defi nition of the concept of “undertaking” as Union 
144   Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 80, on appeal: CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3.
145   CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.8-9;  Rb Rotterdam (26 January 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:637, par. 8.1.
146   CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.8. This prevented non bis in idem problems, see also Huizing (2017), p.368.
147  Rb Rotterdam (26 January 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:637, par. 8.1.
148  ECJ, 5/88 (Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft).
149   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190; Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 2.4, confi rmed 
on appeal, but without reference to the three conditions: CBb (1 December 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159.
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law.150 This means that every entity engaged in an economic activity will be regarded as an 
undertaking in light of Article 6 or 24 Mw. Furthermore, it means that the parent-subsidiary 
liability case law of the Union Courts is also used in Dutch competition law proceedings.151
Parents and subsidiaries can be seen as one undertaking,152 and thus as the same off ender.
In 2015, the District Court of Rotterdam seemed to depart from case law of the EU judiciary. The 
Union Courts have ruled that the imposition of a fi ne on an association of undertakings does not 
prevent the Commission from imposing a fi ne on the undertakings which are members of that 
association.153 Neither the non bis in idem principle nor the principle of proportionality requires 
this.154 The facts of the aforementioned Dutch case were a bit diff erent. The ACM imposed a 
fi ne on an association of undertakings and an undertaking which was charged with the selling 
of sweet pepper. The latter undertaking only sold sweet pepper originating from undertakings 
which were members of the association of undertakings. According to the District Court, the 
ACM was under an obligation to ensure that the sweet pepper producers were not punished 
twice by the fi nes imposed on the association of undertakings and the undertaking which sells 
bell pepper.155 The duty to set off  the fi ne appears to refer to the accounting principle. The District 
Court of Rotterdam seems to identify the association of undertakings (and the organisation 
selling the sweet pepper) with its members. This leaves room for future cases to argue that the 
imposition of a fi ne on an association of undertakings and the imposition of a fi ne on its members 
is prohibited by the non bis in idem principle. Future case law should, in the author’s view, bring 
the concept of unity of off ender back in line with the case law of the Union Courts, which would 
mean that a fi ne on an association of undertakings does not trigger the non bis in idem principle 
when the ACM imposes a fi ne on the undertakings which are members of that association. 
In its decision after the judgment of the District Court, the ACM seemed to do this. The ACM 
states there that the principle of proportionality, and not the non bis in idem principle, requires 
the ACM to set off  the fi ne.156 The ACM states that no fi ne was imposed on the sweet pepper 
producers, but that they will probably pay the fi ne through the association of undertakings and 
the undertaking selling the sweet pepper. 
6.4.7 Unity of the legal interest
In EU competition law proceedings, the criterion of unity of legal interest is mainly used as a 
safeguard of the jurisdiction of the Commission, since NCAs and third country NCAs pursue 
diff erent legal interests with their competition law rules. There is until now no case in Dutch 
competition law proceedings which deals explicitly with this criterion. 
150  Explanatory memorandum Mw.
151  See e.g. CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 11.3.2.
152   See e.g. CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 11.3.2; and, in light of the application of the non bis in idem principle: Rb Rotterdam 
(14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8766, par. 2.4, confi rmed on appeal: CBb (1 December 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9159, par. 
5.1; and  Rb Rotterdam (26 January 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:588, par. 13.2.
153  See chapter 5, par. 5.4.6.
154  See chapter 5, par. 5.4.6.
155  Rb Rotterdam (9 July 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:4885, par. 12.
156  ACM Decision 7036_1/768 (10 June 2016), par. 30.
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One case does provide some indication of the approach of the Dutch judiciary. The Trade and 
Industries Appeals Tribunal has referred to the competence of the ACM to impose a fi ne for 
an infringement of the EU competition rules. In that ruling, it continued by stating that this 
competence does not know any territorial limitation.157 This might be an indication that the 
ACM can always apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU, since there is no jurisdiction limitation. 
The Appeals Tribunal did mention, with reference to the ECJ case of Innolux, that there is 
a distinction between the territorial competence and the determination of the fi ne.158 This 
might indicate that there could be consequences for the determination of the fi ne when there 
is a previously imposed sanction by the Commission or an NCA, since the ACM may take 
into account the eff ects on the internal market.159 The Appeals Tribunal did not state this 
explicitly, but the reference to the Innolux case might imply this, since it is a case dealing with 
the prohibition of double sanctions. 
It is nonetheless a bit strange that reference is made to the Innolux case of the ECJ and not to 
another case. The Innolux case deals with the non bis in idem principle in case of concurring 
proceedings between a third country NCA and the Commission, and not with concurring 
proceedings between an NCA and the Commission. As the Union Courts have ruled on 
multiple occasions, the accounting principle only plays a role in the latter situation.160
6.4.8 Identity of the facts
To establish whether the facts of two cases are the same, the Dutch courts will examine all 
the circumstances. When examining whether two cartels are the same, the Dutch courts will 
look into the structure of the cartel and the participants.161 The three cases dealing with this 
condition are three cases dealing with the same two cartels.162 Therefore, it is not exactly clear 
which factors are taken into account by the Dutch judiciary to determine whether the facts of 
two cases are identical. It is furthermore highly likely that the Dutch judiciary will follow a 
similar approach as the Union Courts with regard to this condition. This means that a second 
sanction for the same behaviour by the ACM itself will not be permitted. Conversely, when the 
Commission or an EU NCA has imposed a fi ne for the same behaviour, the second sanction 
will not be prohibited per se. As held before, the accounting principle will in those cases kick 
in, which means that the ACM should set off  the fi ne against the previously imposed fi ne. 
6.4.9 Résumé
The non bis in idem principle in Dutch competition law proceedings appears to see mainly on 
the prohibition of double sanctions. Even though the domestic courts do refer to the prohibition 
of double prosecution, there are no cases explicitly banning a second prosecution. Obviously, 
157   CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3. For a commentary on this case, see also Van Bockel (2016).
158  CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3.
159  The ACM may use the EU turnover of the undertaking to establish the fi ne. 
160  See chapter 5, par. 5.4.7-5.4.8.
161   CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1, 
confi rmed on appeal; see CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3.
162   CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.1, 
confi rmed on appeal; see CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.3.
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this can also be explained by the fact that the ACM never prosecutes an undertaking twice for 
exactly the same off ence. 
The application of this principle in Dutch competition law proceedings is heavily infl uenced 
by case law of the Union Courts. It is thus not that strange that the accounting principle plays 
an important role in the Netherlands as well. 
Lack of clarity exists as to the question which decisions may be found to be fi nal decisions. 
When the ACM has taken a fi nal decision, confi rmed on appeal or not challenged on appeal, 
it will be regarded as a fi nal decision which triggers the non bis in idem principle. It is less 
clear whether decisions of the Commission, an EU NCA, or a third country NCA may trigger 
the non bis in idem principle. In older case law, the Dutch judiciary did not allow the ACM to 
take into account the eff ects outside the Dutch market to ensure that an EU NCA would be 
prevented from starting proceedings. The Dutch courts have put this judgment in perspective 
in later case law by referring to the lack of clarity in case allocation. Nowadays, the ACM 
is allowed to take into account the eff ects in the EU. The ACM should nonetheless set off  
a fi ne when the Commission or an EU NCA has already imposed a fi ne on the same anti-
competitive behaviour in case the Dutch judiciary decides to follow the approach taken by 
the Union Courts.
The trinity of unities, used by the Union Courts, is also used in the Netherlands. The unity of 
off ender is explained with reference to the functional defi nition of an undertaking. The Dutch 
courts only deviate from case law of the Union Courts with regard to a fi ne imposed upon 
an association of undertakings and fi nes imposed upon the members of that association. This 
could merely have been a slight mistake on the part of the Dutch courts. Nevertheless, the 
ACM tried to bring this deviation back in line with the case law of the CJEU. 
The unity of the legal interest protected might be a safeguard to protect the competence of the 
ACM to impose a fi ne even when the Commission or an EU NCA has already imposed a fi ne. 
The Dutch courts refer to case law of the CJEU on this matter. It thus appears that the ACM 
may still impose a fi ne on an undertaking even when it was already fi ned by the Commission 
or an EU ACM, because all jurisdictions pursue a diff erent legal interest. By contrast, it will 
probably be necessary to set off  a fi ne in such a case when the facts are the same. 
There are not that many cases dealing with the condition of identity of the facts. It is clear 
though that the Dutch courts will examine all relevant factors, and in particular when there is 
a cartel case, the structure of that cartel and the participants. More case law is, nevertheless, 
necessary to determine which factors might be conclusive in this regard. In EU competition law 
proceedings, Union Courts also consider all factors. Nonetheless, for concurring proceedings 
by an EU NCA and the Commission, this seems to boil down to the question whether the 
object of the anti-competitive behaviour is the same. This approach could also be taken by the 
Dutch courts, since they explicitly mention their adherence to the EU approach. 
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6.5 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
6.5.1 Introduction
As stated in the previous chapter, the burden and standard of proof are two principles that can 
be found in diff erent areas of law. These principles are closely related to the presumption of 
innocence.163 In the following subparagraphs, fi rst the burden of proof in Dutch competition 
law proceedings is discussed (6.5.2), after which the standard of proof is examined (6.5.3). 
6.5.2 Burden of proof
In the UK, a distinction is made between the legal and evidential burden of proof. This distinction 
is not made as such in the Netherlands, although it can be used to denote the approach of the 
Dutch judiciary. The Dutch competition authority bears the burden to prove an infringement 
of the competition rules.164 The burden of proof for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
also follows from Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003.165 The burden of proof on the ACM is a legal 
and evidential burden of proof, which means that the ACM should state that an infringement 
has taken place to establish the case prima facie (evidential burden of proof). Furthermore, the 
ACM should substantiate this statement to the requisite legal standard (legal burden of proof).
The Dutch courts created some confusion with regard to one of the conditions of the cartel 
off ence, namely the appreciability requirement in Article 7 Mw.166 Strikingly, in 2004 the District 
Court of Rotterdam ruled that there is no case law which unconditionally and explicitly puts 
the burden of proof for the appreciability requirement solely on the NMa.167 Later case law 
of the Trade and Industries Appeals Tribunal seems to correct this a bit.168 Since 2014, the 
Appeals Tribunal ruled that the evidential burden of proof for the appreciability requirement 
rests on the ACM.169 This means that the ACM merely has to mention that the infringement 
appreciably restricts competition on the market. The legal burden of proof rests on the ACM 
only when the undertaking concerned disputes the non-application of the appreciability 
requirement.170 Since 2017, this approach created by the Appeals Tribunal is also applied by 
163   See e.g. CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.10.4.1; and CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 
3.3.4.1, where the Dutch court referred to the presumption of innocence, after which the burden of proof was discussed.
164   Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8610, par. 16.3; and Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, 
par. 8.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.2; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.2; CBb (18 
November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.3; CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.3.4.1 
and 3.3.4.3; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.5.1; CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.10.4.1 
and 3.10.4.3; CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6629, par. 7.5; CBb (13 December 2007) ECLI:NL:CBB:2007:BC1396, par. 9.2; Rb 
Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (11 December 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AF1811, par. 2.4.3.
165   The Dutch courts sometimes refer to this article as well: see CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.2.4.3; CBb (18 
November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.3.4.3; CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.10.4.3. 
166  For information on this provision, see Van de Gronden (2017), p. 118-120.
167  Rb Rotterdam (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2004:AO3912, par. 2.4.2. This judgment and the decision of the NMa were annulled on 
appeal, since the NMa did not establish the relevant product market (jeans market or clothing market). The Appeals Tribunal did not 
discuss or repeat the statement of the District Court. See CBb (7 December 2005) ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:AU8309, par. 6.5.
168  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3.
169   The District Court of Rotterdam explicitly ruled in line with this judgment in 2015 and 2016, see: Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2015) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8610, par. 16.3; and Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 8.3.
170   CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3.
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the District Court of Rotterdam.171 The undertaking thus bears an evidential burden of proof 
to argue that the appreciability requirement has been met, since it merely needs to dispute the 
non-applicability of the appreciability requirement. 
Even though the burden of proof rests on the ACM, this does not exempt the 
undertaking concerned from producing counterevidence. The evidential burden of 
proof may thus shift, since the undertaking should provide suffi  cient evidence that 
the facts as proven by the ACM and their assessment is incorrect.172 As mentioned 
below (7.5.3), sometimes it will be necessary for the undertaking concerned to 
substantiate its counterevidence to a certain standard. This seems to indicate that an 
undertaking may, in some circumstances, bear an evidential and legal burden of proof.
The ACM may also, within reasonable boundaries, presume the guilt of an undertaking, as long 
as the undertaking concerned is given the opportunity to prove that it cannot be blamed for 
the infringement.173 Lastly, the Dutch courts have also ruled that the parent-subsidiary liability 
presumption is not a prohibited reversal of the burden of proof. Proving the infringement and 
attributing liability are two diff erent evidential issues,174 since the ACM already has to establish 
that the infringement took place and that the undertaking participated in the infringement.175
The burden of proof for an exemption ground rests on the undertaking concerned.176 It should 
be mentioned that it is unclear whether the (potential) exemption grounds under the abuse of 
a dominant position will be regarded by the Dutch judiciary as part of the infringement or as 
a separate exemption ground. It seems likely, in light of case law of the Union judiciary, that 
the second approach will be taken. In general this means that undertakings bear an evidential 
and legal burden of proof with regard to the exemption grounds, since they have to prove to 
the requisite legal standard that the exemption ground is met.
6.5.3 Standard of proof
As mentioned above, the ACM bears the legal burden of proof for the infringement, whereas 
undertakings bear the burden of proof for exemption grounds. This means that the ACM needs 
to prove the infringement to the requisite legal standard. The undertaking needs to prove the 
exemption to the requisite legal standard. The burden of proof on a national competition 
171  Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 14.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 15.3.
172   CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.6.4.2; CBb (13 September 2009) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0973, par. 
3.2.4.8; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0961, par. 3.2.4.8; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0990, 
par. 3.2.4.8; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0952, par. 3.2.4.8; CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0866, 
par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6925, par. 3.4; College van Beroep voor het bedrijsleven (1 September 
2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9349, par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6911, par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (1 September 
2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9357, par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (31 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6707, 3.2.4.7; CBb (31 August 
2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6711, par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0545, par. 3.2.4.7; CBb (7 July 2010) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.2.4.8.
173  CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.5.1.
174   See e.g. CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.2.4.4; and CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, 3.10.4.4.
175   See e.g. CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.2.4.7; and CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, 3.10.4.6.
176   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 14.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 14.4; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.16.2; Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.5.3; Rb 
Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.5.
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authority for an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU is governed by Regulation 1/2003. 
By contrast, this Regulation provides explicitly that it does not aff ect national rules on the 
standard of proof.177 The standard of proof is thus, within the outer limits of procedural 
autonomy,178 a matter for the Member States to decide on.
The Dutch judiciary uses diff erent terminology to refer to the standard of proof for the ACM in 
competition law proceedings. In some cases, the Dutch judiciary refers to suffi  cient evidence,179
adequate evidence,180 make the infringement (suffi  ciently) plausible,181 or even convincing 
evidence.182 The highest standard of convincing evidence seems to fl ow from the presumption 
of innocence in Article 6(2) ECHR.183 This might imply that the Dutch courts accept the high 
standard of ‘benefi t of the doubt’, although, as stated in the previous chapter,184 when discussing 
the standard of proof in EU competition law, this does not necessarily have to be the case. 
In 2009, Gerbrandy already pointed to the lack of coherence in the terminology used by the 
Dutch judiciary.185 It is thus diffi  cult for practitioners to determine the specifi c standard of 
proof for the ACM in competition law proceedings. Furthermore, according to Gerbrandy, it 
appears that the standard of proof as formulated by the Appeals Tribunal in Dutch competition 
law proceedings is lower than the standard of proof in EU competition law proceedings.186
This might thus create uncertainty for undertakings. Nevertheless, it appears that, in the end 
it all comes down to whether the Dutch court has reached the inner conviction in a particular 
case. This is also the approach taken by the Union Courts. A court should be convinced by 
the evidence adduced on the basis of the unfettered evaluation of evidence that the anti-
competitive behaviour by a certain undertaking occurred. The Dutch courts did create, just 
as the Union Courts, some evidential rules relating to the use of direct and indirect evidence, 
and the possibility to rebut this evidence. 
177  Recital 5 Regulation 1/2003.
178   Even though the EU legislator has left the matter to the Member States, they are still bound by the principles of eff ectiveness and 
equivalence when adopting and applying procedural rules, see e.g. Prechal & Widdershoven (eds.) (2017), p. 328.
179   In Dutch: voldoende bewijs, see:  Rb Rotterdam (13 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:7663, par. 7.6; Rb Rotterdam (13 October 2016) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:7663, par. 7.6; Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 6.3; Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 47 (in other paragraphs the District Court referred to plausible evidence); CBb (13 December 2012) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BZ2037, par. 3.3.4; Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5 (both insuffi  cient evidence 
and adequate evidence were used in this case).
180   In Dutch: genoegzaam bewijs/genoegzaam maken, see: CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 7.3.6; CBb (24 March 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.3.3; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 6.21; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 6.21; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 6.21; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 6.21; Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5 (both insuffi  cient evidence and adequate evidence were used in this case).
181   In Dutch: (genoegzaam/voldoende) aannemelijk maken, see: Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 48-49; CBb 
(17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.2; Rb Rotterdam (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BP3913, par. 2.5.2; CBb 
(8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.11; CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.11; CBb (3 July 
2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6635, par. 9.2; CBb (13 December 2007) ECLI:NL:CBB:2007:BC1396, par. 9.2; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.1.
182   In Dutch: overtuigend moet blijken/bewijs moet de vaste overtuiging kunnen dragen, see: Rb Rotterdam (12 June 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4689, par. 12.1; Rb Rotterdam (3 April 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2273, par. 21; Rb Rotterdam (24 June 2005) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2005:AT8817, par. 2.4.
183   Rb Rotterdam (24 June 2005) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2005:AT8817, par. 2.4; see also e.g. Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2173, 
par. 10.6.
184  Chapter 5, par. 5.5.3.
185  Gerbrandy (2009), p. 251.
186  Gerbrandy (2009), p. 252.
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The Dutch judiciary has accepted that deduction of certain facts and elements of the 
infringement is necessary to prove an infringement. This reasoning is in line with case law of the 
CJEU. The Dutch judiciary refers in some cases, but not in all, explicitly to the Aalborg  Portland 
case of the ECJ. The formulation is the same as in the ECJ case, even in cases where reference 
is not explicitly made to Aalborg Portland. The phrasing in Aalborg Portland is as follows:
Even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlawful contact 
between traders, such as the minutes of a meeting, it will normally be only fragmentary 
and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction. 
In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be 
inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the 
absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the 
competition rules.187
The Dutch judiciary translated this quotation and used it, in the same or sometimes similar 
wording, in its own case law.188 The ACM may use direct evidence, such as the minutes of 
a meeting, and it may deduce the infringement from inferences and coincidences,189 which 
means that the ACM may resort to the use of indirect evidence.190 The use of deduction and 
indirect evidence is allowed due to the secret character of anti-competitive behaviour:191 the 
activities relating to this behaviour are performed in a secretive manner, the meetings are 
187   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 56-57.
188   In the following case reference was explicitly made to the Aalborg Portland case of the ECJ, see: Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 30.
   In one case, reference was made to ECJ, C-634/13 (Total Marketing Services v Commission), par. 26, which referred in turn to Aalborg 
Portland, see: Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 5.10.
   The District Court of Rotterdam also referred in one case to GC, T-113/07 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 78ff : Rb Rotterdam (3 April 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2273, par. 21.
   In the following cases, the Dutch courts referred to ECJ, C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P (Siemens, Mitsubishi and Toshiba v 
Commission), par. 133 and ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 42-51 and 
case law referred to in those cases: Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 8.1; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 9.1; CBb (3 July 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 5.4; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 
3.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.2.
   In the following case law, the Court did not refer explicitly to any CJEU case, although the same formulation was used as in the Aalborg 
Portland case: Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, 
par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, 
par. 6.20; CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.3.4.4; CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962; par. 
3.3.4.4; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0990, par. 3.9.4.3; CBb (13 September 2009) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0973, par. 
3.9.4.3; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0952, par. 3.3.5; CBb (31 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6716, par. 3.5.3; 
CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.12.4.3.
189   Proving the elements of anti-competitive behaviour by deduction can go quite far. In the Telecommunications cartel case, the Appeal 
Tribunal held that the NMa did not adduce plausible evidence that Orange was present, but that the evidence which was brought 
forward did not rule out that Orange was not present. This statement seems to open more possibilities for the NMa to prove anti-
competitive behaviour by deduction. Nevertheless, at the end, the Appeal Tribunal did rule that the presence of Orange could not be 
proven in plausible manner. See CBb (13 December 2007) ECLI:NL:CBB:2007:BC1396, par. 9.3.2-9.3.3.
190   The District Court of Rotterdam referred in Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2, to a combination of 
direct evidence and indirect evidence and the use of logical deduction. 
191  Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2.
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secret, and the documentation is often kept to a minimum.192 The Dutch courts will examine 
whether the evidence adduced by the ACM is correct, reliable and consistent.193 Furthermore, 
they will determine whether the proof put forward by the ACM can form the relevant factual 
framework and substantiate the conclusions.194 In principle all evidence will be examined, on 
the basis of the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence that applies in administrative 
law.195 The evidence should, as mentioned, be precise and consistent, although it is not necessary 
for each part of the evidence to fulfi l this requirement as long as the evidence in its totality is 
precise and consistent.196 Credibility will be the only relevant criterion to determine whether a 
competition law infringement can be proven.197 To assess the credibility of evidence, the Dutch 
courts have referred to a general evidential rule as set by the General Court of the EU, namely:
According to the generally applicable rules on evidence, the credibility and, therefore, 
the probative value of a document depends on its origin, the circumstances in which 
it was drawn up, the person to whom it is addressed and the soundness and reliable 
nature of its contents […].198
Contemporaneous documents have, obviously, more evidential value than statements 
provided by representatives of the undertakings during the investigation of the ACM.199
There is a big role for the undertaking concerned that has allegedly infringed the competition 
rules. If they do not dispute the facts, the Dutch courts will quickly regard an infringement 
to be proven. In the Telecommunication case, the District Court assumed that three telecom 
192   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.2; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 6.20; Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 30.
193  CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.1.
194  CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.1.
195   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 8.2; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 
9.2; CBb (3 July 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 5.5; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.3; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 4.3; 
CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO5197, par. 3.4.2.4; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.5.1.
196   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 8.1; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 
9.1;  CBb (3 July 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 5.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 4.2.
197   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 8.2; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 
9.2; CBb (3 July 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 5.5; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.3; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 
4.3. In a similar vein as the Union Courts, leniency documents are not per se unreliable, but they do need to be treated with some 
caution, see CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.4-3.3.5; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.4-4.5; CBb 
(14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.4-4.5; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 4.4-4.5. In Rb Rotterdam (3 April 
2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2273, par. 24-32, the District Court of Rotterdam found that the ACM used leading questions when they 
interrogated employees in light of a leniency application of the undertaking. Furthermore, the ACM even corrected certain answers. 
This led the District Court to rule that the leniency statements were not credible evidence. 
198   GC, T-439/07 (Coats Holdings v Commission), par. 45. The following Dutch cases refer to this ruling: CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 
4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 4.3.
199   See e.g. Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 9.1; and Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, 
par. 10.1.
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providers were present at a specifi c meeting, since they did not deny their presence.200 This 
assumption was quickly made. Another example can be found in the Silverskin Onion cartel.201
In this case, the District Court used the non-denial of the undertaking concerned, together 
with other evidence, as suffi  cient proof of the presence of a representative of the undertaking 
at a meeting.202 There is a contrast between the Telecommunication case and the Silverskin Onion 
case. Whereas the District Court considered the presence of the undertaking proven by the 
mere lack of denial of its presence in the Telecommunication cartel, the District Court referred 
to more evidence in the Silverskin Onion cartel. 
The judgment of the District Court in the Telecommunication cartel contains a contradiction. 
The District Court assumed that representatives of some of the phone companies were 
present at a certain meeting where allegedly anti-competitive behaviour was discussed. O2 
disputed that a representative was present. The NMa did not have any other evidence that 
O2 was represented at the meeting. The combination of disputing the presence with the fact 
that there was no other evidence that proves the presence of O2 at the meeting, led the District 
Court to conclude that the presence of O2 was not proven. O2 referred, when disputing its 
presence, also to the Telfner case of the ECtHR and stated that the NMa nor the court could 
draw any inferences from the mere silence of the representative of O2, since that would lead 
to an infringement of the right to remain silent.203 The District Court accepted this reasoning. 
It is then strange that it could draw inferences from the fact that the other three undertakings 
did not dispute their presence at the meeting without there being any additional evidence for 
their presence. As the Telfner case of the ECtHR provides:
In requiring the applicant to provide an explanation although they had not been able 
to establish a convincing prima facie case against him, the courts shifted the burden of 
proof from the prosecution to the defence.204
Obviously, in the Telecommunications case there was a prima facie case,205 although there was 
no prima facie evidence of the presence of any of the directors at the particular time of the 
meeting when discussing the ant-competitive behaviour. The Dutch Courts should thus be 
wary to infer too much from an undertaking not disputing certain elements. Nevertheless, it 
is arguably allowed to interpret the passive stance of the undertaking concerned against that
200   Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.1. In a similar vein, the Appeals Tribunal ruled in the Bicycle 
Producer cartel case that the presence of certain persons at a meeting was not disputed, and therefore it was plausible that they were 
present. In principle no reference was made to other proof of their presence, although the documentation used to prove the content of 
the meeting referred to the diff erent bicycle producers. See CBB (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.7.1.5.
201   Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 45. 
202   Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 45. See e.g. also CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6629 where 
the Trade and Industries Appeal Tribunal also used a combination of not denying an element combined with other evidence to fi nd a 
certain constituent element of the cartel infringement to be proven. 
203   Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.1. In ECtHR, no. 33501/96 (Telfner v Austria), the Strasbourg Court 
found, strictly speaking, an infringement of the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2) ECHR, and not an infringement of the right 
to remain silent. 
204  ECtHR, no. 33501/96 (Telfner v Austria), par. 18 (emphasis added).
205   The use of inferences when there is a prima facie case is allowed, see e.g. ECtHR, no. 18731/91 (John Murray v United Kingdom), par. 51-54
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undertaking. A passive stance by undertakings will thus make it easier for the ACM to prove 
the case to the requisite legal standard of proof. 
The question then arises to what extent an undertaking has to provide counterevidence. This 
question seems to be connected to the status of the evidence used by the ACM. It is more 
diffi  cult to rebut direct evidence than indirect evidence. 
Undertakings have argued that they merely have to present a plausible alternative in case the 
ACM relies on direct evidence.206 The District Court of Rotterdam, nevertheless, did not agree 
with this argumentation. An undertaking should rebut the facts as established by the direct 
evidence of the ACM.207 To substantiate this view, the District Court referred to the “case law 
of the Union Courts”208 without specifying which case law. Conversely, the Appeals Tribunal 
ruled in the Flour cartel judgment that, in case of ambiguous and insuffi  ciently precise direct 
evidence, it will be enough to merely present a plausible alternative for the alleged anti-
competitive behaviour.209 These rulings of the District Court and the Appeals Tribunal appear 
at fi rst sight to be in confl ict with each other, although in the end the value and credibility 
of the (direct or indirect) evidence will be used to determine whether the anti-competitive 
behaviour can be proven. Hence, direct evidence can in general not be rebutted by merely 
providing an alternative explanation, unless the direct evidence relied on by the ACM is 
ambiguous and insuffi  ciently precise. Furthermore, the value and credibility of the evidence 
will determine whether the counterevidence provided by an undertaking is suffi  cient.210 In 
general though, it can be said that the counterevidence does not have to be of a conclusive 
nature.211
Dutch courts have ruled that the ACM did not prove certain elements of the anti-competitive 
behaviour, since it constructed the off ence by deduction for which the undertaking provided 
a plausible alternative.212 Therefore, there appears to rest an evidential burden of proof on an 
undertaking to provide a plausible alternative that may cast doubt on the facts as established 
by the ACM on the basis of indirect evidence. 
206   Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NLRBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 
2.6.1.
207   Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NLRBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 
2.6.1.
208   In Dutch: “gelet op de jurisprudentie van de gemeenschapsrechter”. There was no explicit reference to case law of the Union Courts. 
See: Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NLRBROT:2006:AY4035, 
par. 2.6.1.
209  CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 4.3.11 and 4.3.15-4.3.18.
210  See e.g. CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 4.3.6.
211   CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.7.5.7. This would run foul to Article 6 ECHR, according tot the Appeal Tribunal. 
212   CBb (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:457, par. 3.5; Rb Rotterdam (3 April 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2273, par. 39; Rb 
Rotterdam (14 March 2013) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:BZ4169, par. 7.15; CBb (6 October 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BF8820, par. 5.4; Rb 
Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.1; Rb Rotterdam (4 March 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC8958, par. 
2; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.3; Rb Rotterdam (24 June 2005) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2005:AT8817, 
par. 2.4.
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As mentioned, rebutting direct evidence is more diffi  cult, since this requires an undertaking 
to adduce more proof. However, it is unclear what kind of evidence an undertaking needs to 
provide. The amount of direct evidence plays a role to determine whether an infringement 
of the competition rules can be proven. Furthermore, the amount of direct evidence is also 
relevant for the value of the counterevidence. In the Homecare Services cartel, the ACM appears 
to rely mainly on one report and on statements which all came from one person. This was 
regarded as insuffi  cient to prove that competition was possible between the undertakings, 
and thus that the alleged agreements were capable of removing competition between the 
undertakings concerned.213
At the lowest end of the scale it might be suffi  cient to merely deny the infringement. This was 
e.g. enough in some of the construction industry fraud (Bouwfraude) cases.214 In these cases 
the NMa used the 2+2-rule, which means that participation in the cartel can be proven on the 
basis of two leniency documents and two other authentic documents. Authentic documents 
are documents created during the life of the cartel. In the case at hand, the NMa used two 
leniency applications and some non-authentic documents.215 A mere denial was, in light of the 
amount of direct evidence, suffi  cient for the Dutch Courts to rule that the infringement was 
not proven.216 Merely denying an infringement is nonetheless not always suffi  cient to rebut 
direct evidence.217
When there is more evidence produced by the ACM, it will be more diffi  cult to rebut it, 
which means that a plausible alternative would not suffi  ce either.218 In e.g. the fi rst North 
Sea Shrimp cartel case, the NMa used many statements of persons which concluded the anti-
competitive agreements, and it used multiple fax messages and minutes of the meeting.219
One of the undertakings in this cartel tried to create doubt on the participation in the cartel, by 
stating e.g. that the representative which was present at the meetings did not speak suffi  cient 
German to understand the content of the meetings where the anti-competitive agreements 
were concluded.220 The Appeals Tribunal was not convinced by this argument given the 
content of the evidence produced by the NMa.221 The available evidence even indicated that 
the representative of this particular undertaking proposed a particular price for the shrimps 
and a particular fi shing quota.222
213   Rb Rotterdam (12 April 2012) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BW1327, par. 2.5.5.
214   This is up until now probably the largest cartel which the ACM has fi ned. Therefore, specifi c procedures were created to end the 
anti-competitive behaviour of the undertakings concerned. For more information on these procedures and the approach of the Dutch 
judiciary, see Knoop-Rutten & Strijker-Reintjes (2012).
215  Documents created for the leniency application. 
216   CBb (13 December 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BZ2034, par. 3.4.4; CBb (5 April 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BW1393, par. 5.3; Rb Rotterdam 
(10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BP3914, par. 2.5.2; Rb Rotterdam (1 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ9175, par. 2. See 
also CBb (12 July 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6386, par. 3.2.4.1-3.2.4.2.
217  Rb Rotterdam (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BP3913, par. 2.5.2. 
218  CBb (3 July 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 6.18.
219  CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.9.2-9.9.3.
220  CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.9.4.
221  CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.9.4.
222  CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.9.4.
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Not only the amount of direct evidence plays a role to determine whether an infringement 
can be proven and to determine the relevance of the counterevidence. The quality of the direct 
evidence is also relevant. Direct evidence should be of a credible nature.223
As stated above, when the direct evidence is not unambiguous and not suffi  ciently precise, 
it will be enough to merely present a plausible alternative for the alleged anti-competitive 
behaviour.224 The ACM should thus try to present its evidence in an unambiguous and precise 
manner. Statements and documents which can be regarded as direct evidence and are coherent 
and consistent will provide strong evidence to support the fi nding of an infringement.225
As can be concluded from the foregoing, there is a strong role for the undertaking concerned, 
which might, by providing counterevidence, weaken the case of the ACM. In the previous 
subparagraph, it was said that the burden of proof may also rest on the undertaking when 
invoking an exemption ground.226 The application of an exemption ground should be made 
plausible by the undertaking concerned. The standard of proof seems to be on the ‘balance 
of probabilities’. The application of the exemption ground was not accepted in the Reading 
Folders cartel, because the District Court of Rotterdam followed the ACM in its argumentation 
that the measure was not necessary due to other less restrictive measures that were available 
to the undertakings.227
6.5.4 Résumé 
The ACM has to provide suffi  cient proof to establish the anti-competitive behaviour of an 
undertaking. This means that there is an evidential burden of proof (establish case prima facie) 
and a legal burden of proof (establish case to the requisite legal standard) on the ACM. Some 
confusion was created by the Dutch courts with regard to the evidence for the appreciability 
requirement in Article 7 Mw. The District Court of Rotterdam perceived it to be some sort of 
exemption to the prohibition, and thereby ruled that there was no case law which placed the 
burden to prove this requirement unconditionally and explicitly on the ACM. The Appeals 
Tribunal corrected this by stating that the ACM bears an evidential burden of proof, and, when 
the undertaking disputes the non-application of this principle, also a legal burden of proof. 
There are also circumstances where the evidential burden of proof shifts to the undertaking 
concerned.
223   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 3.3.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 4.3; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 4.3.
224   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:189, par. 4.3.11 and 4.3.15-4.3.18. The ambiguous nature of the evidence in the Foreclosure Auction
cartel meant that an alternative explanation of the undertakings was suffi  cient to rebut the direct evidence, see CBb (3 July 2017) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204, par. 6.2.-6.29.
225  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.3.3.
226   See also Rb Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.5; Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, 
par. 2.5.3.
227   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 13.4; and Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 
14.4.
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When invoking an exemption ground, the undertaking concerned bears the evidential and 
legal burden of proof. An undertaking should make the application of an exemption ground 
suffi  ciently plausible.228
The standard of proof for the ACM is not completely clear. In the end, it boils down to the 
question whether the Dutch courts have reached an inner conviction. Credibility of evidence 
is therefore the decisive criterion to determine whether an undertaking has infringed the 
competition rules. The ACM may use direct evidence and indirect evidence to prove an 
infringement. At this point, there is an important role for the undertaking concerned. It 
appears that an undertaking may prevent the court from achieving the inner conviction by 
merely providing a plausible alternative for the indirect evidence. This is more diffi  cult for 
direct evidence, where one needs to examine the quantity and quality of the evidence. In 
some cases a mere denial might be suffi  cient, whereas in other cases strong counterevidence 
is required. 
6.6 LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
6.6.1 Introduction
The (substantive) principle of legality prescribes that a legal basis exists before the state 
exercises its powers against an individual.229 This legal basis, and the powers to ensure 
adherence to that legal basis, should moreover be suffi  ciently accessible and foreseeable 
pursuant to the principle of legal certainty. In Dutch competition law proceedings, these 
principles play mainly, although not exclusively, a role with regard to the fi ning policy of the 
ACM. As illustrated in the previous chapter, it is not necessary to make a strict distinction 
between the legality principle and the legal certainty principle, since the Dutch courts, in a 
similar vein as the EU Courts, do not appear to make a strict distinction between both. 
In subsequent order, the legality principle in Dutch competition law proceedings in general is 
examined (6.6.2), after which the legality principle and fi ning policy of the ACM is discussed 
(6.6.3). Thereafter, some other cases which deal with the legality principle are discussed (6.6.4).
6.6.2 Legality principle – the content
As stated above, the legality principle ensures that the government may only act against an 
individual insofar as a preceding legal basis exists, whereas the principle of legal certainty is 
broader by requiring an accessible and foreseeable law. The Dutch courts sometimes refer to 
Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) when they 
discuss the legality principle.230 Reference to the ICCPR occurs only when the Dutch courts
228   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 13.4; and Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 
14.4.
229  Kristen (2010), p. 641.
230   CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NLCBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3; CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9426, par. 3.4; CBb (14 March 2012) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.4; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
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discuss specifi cally the lex mitior principle, which fl ows from the legality principle. The legality 
principle as such does not play a signifi cant role in Dutch competition law proceedings, aside 
from the occasional application of the lex mitior principle.
The principle of legal certainty is more important in Dutch competition law proceedings. In 
light of e.g. the fi ning policy of the ACM, the District Court of Rotterdam has ruled that the 
competence to impose fi nes should be exercised in a reasonably predictable and consistent 
application, which still leaves room to tailor the application of that competence to a specifi c 
case.231 Some form of unpredictability is in Dutch competition law proceedings still allowed. 
6.6.3 Legality and fi nes
In general, it can be said that there are two main types of cases when dealing with the principle of 
legality and fi nes. First of all, there are cases where an undertaking invokes the lex mitior principle. 
Secondly, undertakings have argued that the rules infringe the principle of legal certainty.
The lex mitior cases all deal with a change in the fi ning policy by the ACM. The Dutch courts 
apply Article 15(1), third sentence, ICCPR in cases dealing with the lex mitior principle and 
a change in fi ning policy of the ACM. Article 15(1), third sentence, ICCPR provides the 
following:
If, subsequent to the commission of the off ence, provision is made by law for the 
imposition of the lighter penalty, the off ender shall benefi t thereby.
This article refers only to a change in legislation, but the District Court of Rotterdam has ruled 
that the “general principle”232 that forms the foundation of this article also applies to a change 
in the fi ning policy after an administrative law fi ne has been imposed upon a person.233
The lex mitior principle is thus also applicable when there is a change in fi ning policy of an 
administrative authority. The application of this principle in administrative law proceedings 
can currently also be found in Article 5:46(4) Awb, which refers to the lex mitior rule in the 
Dutch criminal code.234 The lex mitior principle can also be invoked when the change in the 
sanctioning regime occurred during the appeal procedure.235 Strangely enough, tin 2014 the 
District Court referred to the 2009 Fining Guidelines, which provide that they only apply, in 
line with the legality principle, to infringements committed after they entered into force.236
231   Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006: 
AY4035, par. 2.6.4; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4. In Dutch: “Onverminderd de noodzaak van een redelijkerwijs voorspelbare en voorts 
consistente toepassing van de onderhavige bevoegdheid, moet worden vastgesteld dat binnen die grenzen sprake kan en ook moet 
zijn van “maatwerk”.”
232   The Dutch court does not explicitly state which general principle this is, but it can be assumed that it would be the legality principle. 
233  ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
234  See also CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3, which deals with a change of the De Minimis requirement.
235   CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
236  Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.2.
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This seems to exclude the application of these Guidelines in the appeal procedure when 
they provide for more lenient penalties. Nevertheless, in the case itself the ACM did use a 
combination of the old and the new fi ning guidelines to ensure the most lenient approach.237
In practice, the argumentation of an undertaking on the basis of the lex mitior principle has not 
been proven to be successful.238 It should fi rst of all be very clear that the application of the 
new guidelines would indeed lead to a lower fi ne,239 before the Dutch courts would consider 
applying them. To date, this has not been suffi  ciently proven yet. It is not entirely clear, but 
this might be explained by the fact that the Fining Guidelines leave discretion for the ACM to 
determine a fi ne in an individual case. Nevertheless, in 2016, the Appeals Tribunal held that 
the ACM applied the older Fining Guidelines insofar as this would lead to a more favourable 
treatment for the undertaking concerned.240 It thus seems that in practice, the ACM will take 
into account the lex mitior principle.
Some other cases dealt with the lex mitior principle and fi ning guidelines for a specifi c sector. 
In the Construction Industry Fraud cartel, the NMa created multiple new Fining Guidelines to 
deal with the high number of cases. These Fining Guidelines were thus created for a specifi c 
cartel, whereas the ‘normal’ Fining Guidelines applied to other cartels. Some undertakings 
argued that the Construction Industry Fraud Fining Guidelines provided for more lenient 
penalties, and should thus be applied to them as well. The Dutch courts did not accept this 
argument. The argumentation of the undertakings was based on the assumption that the 
Construction Industry Fraud Guidelines did provide more lenient penalties.241 As the Dutch 
courts stated, even if that were true, these Fining Guidelines were created for a specifi c 
purpose, and therefore did not apply in other cartels or in situations in which a fi ne was 
already imposed upon the undertaking concerned.242 The Dutch judiciary thus accepted that 
the ACM might create specifi c Fining Guidelines to deal with extraordinary circumstances, 
such as the large scale construction sector fraud.
Other cases that discuss the fi ning policy of the ACM and the legality principle examine more 
specifi cally the principle of legal certainty. As mentioned before, the competence to impose 
fi nes should be exercised in a reasonably predictable and consistent application, which still 
237   Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.12; on appeal: CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.6.
238   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 6.3.1; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.1; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 10.3.1; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:N:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 10.4; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 9.7; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 9.19; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
239   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 6.3.1; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.1; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 10.3.1; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:N:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 10.4; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 9.7; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 9.19; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
240   CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.6.
241   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.2; CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.4; CBb (14 
March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9426, par. 3.4.
242   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.2; CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.4; CBb (14 
March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9426, par. 3.4.
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leaves room to tailor the application of that competence to a specifi c case.243 This tailoring can be 
done by applying the factors in the Fining Guidelines, but also by deviating from the method of 
calculating a fi ne in the Guidelines.244 Deviation from this method is sometimes even necessary 
in light of general principles of sound administration, such as e.g. the proportionality principle.245
Moreover, not every provision of the Fining Guidelines has to be completely clear. It is 
suffi  cient when the structure of the Guidelines and the other provisions are clear as to enable 
the undertaking to ascertain what the unclear provision entails.246
6.6.4 Legality and other cases
In other cases dealing with the legality principle in Dutch competition law proceedings, it 
appears that not the legality principle as such plays a role, but the principle of legal certainty. 
There is one exception to this statement. 
In the Tree Nursery cartel, the Appeals Tribunal applied the lex mitior principle to a change in the 
de minimis provision. The Dutch legislator decided to increase, among others, the percentage 
for the de minimis rule from 5% to 10%. This change was, according to the Appeals Tribunal, 
similar to a change of a criminal law off ence. Nevertheless, the change of the de minimis rule 
was not made due to some change of insight of the of the legislator on the off ence itself, 
but merely a policy change.247  In the legislative history, three arguments were mentioned to 
broaden the de minimis rule.248 It was e.g. held that small distributors could, with this change, 
make agreements to counter the buying power of big undertakings.249 This did not mean that 
there was a change of insight on the off ence. It was merely a policy change to broaden the de 
minimis rule. Therefore, the ACM was allowed to use the old (less lenient) threshold.
Undertakings should know which behaviour could infringe the competition rules. In the North 
Sea Shrimp case, the (associations of) undertakings argued that it was unclear whether their 
behaviour fell foul of the competition rules, since the behaviour could also fall under the EU 
fi shery policy.250 The District Court of Rotterdam did not agree with this point of view, since 
the undertakings should have known that their behaviour could infringe the competition 
rules.251 The Dutch court reclassifi ed the infringement from very serious to serious, and 
thereby changed the method of calculating the fi ne.252
243   Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006: 
AY4035, par. 2.6.4; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4. 
244   For the latter, see e.g. Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5. The NMa may deviate from the method used 
in the Fining Guidelines, but it may not use the criteria in the Guidelines in an incorrect manner, since that would be an infringement 
of the legal certainty principle; see CBb (20 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BW3671, par. 4.3.7
245  Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5.
246  Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3687, par. 2.4.
247  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3.
248 CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3.
249  CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:119, par. 4.5.3.
250  Rb Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.7.
251  Rb Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.7.
252  Rb Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223, par. 2.5.7.
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In the Bicycle Producer cartel, the undertakings argued that the interpretation of the concept of 
concerted practice infringed the lex certa principle.253 The undertakings nevertheless should 
have known, according to the District Court of Rotterdam, the case law of the CJEU and the 
practice of the Commission.254 Furthermore, the Dutch courts already had the opportunity 
to rule on this concept as well.255 Therefore, the plea based on the lex certa principle was not 
successful.256
In the Bicycle Producer cartel, the Dutch courts referred to case law of the CJEU and case law 
of the Dutch courts themselves. Nevertheless, one case does not make for a fi xed line of case 
law, and therefore cannot raise legitimate expectations that an approach formulated in one 
judgment will be followed in the future.257 The ACM is therefore allowed to deviate from such 
an approach. 
6.6.5 Résumé 
Not that many cases have been brought before the Dutch judiciary which deal with the 
principle of legality and the principle of legal certainty. Cases dealing with the legality 
principle have mainly focused on the lex mitior principle. Appeals on the basis of the principle 
of legal certainty are more common. 
The ACM received some leeway to apply diff erent Fining Guidelines. It does not appear that 
it infringes the lex mitior principle. In one case, the ACM even applied old and new guidelines 
in order to ensure the most lenient penalty. The principle of legal certainty does not prohibit 
the ACM from using Fining Guidelines which leave room for manoeuvre.
Other cases not dealing with the Fining Guidelines mainly focus on the principle of legal 
certainty. A strong emphasis is put on the undertaking to make sure that it knows the law. If 
certain concepts have been explained in case law in the past, then an appeal to the unclarity 
of that concept is not accepted. 
6.7 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
6.7.1 Introduction
The ACM has to take the proportionally principle into account when it imposes a sanction on 
an undertaking or a natural person. This principle can be found in the General Administrative 
Law Act.258 Nevertheless, the Dutch courts also often refer to Article 6 ECHR when discussing 
the judicial review of the proportionality of a sanction.259
253  Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.4.
254  Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5.
255 Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5.
256   This was also confi rmed on appeal, although the Appeal Tribunal only referred to case law of the CJEU, see CBb (4 October 2011) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.17.3. 
257   CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.9; and CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3.
258  Article 3:4(2) Awb.
259   An annex contains an overview of all references, for some of the larger footnotes. See the annex, Dutch Competition law, point 1.
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When the ACM applies Article 101 or 102 TFEU, it also has to take the Charter provisions into 
account, such as Article 49(3). There is also an obligation on Member States to ensure that fi nes 
are eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive.260
In the following subparagraphs, the Fining Guidelines are discussed briefl y (6.7.2), after 
which the proportionality of sanctions in general is examined (6.7.3). Some factors have to 
be taken into account, but are merely mentioned by the Dutch judiciary (6.7.4), whereas the 
Dutch courts elaborate more on others (6.7.5). Furthermore, there are factors which the ACM 
does not have to take into account (6.7.6). 
6.7.2 Fining Guidelines
Since the creation of the Dutch Competition Law Act, four (general)261 Fining Guidelines 
have been created. These Guidelines are intended to elaborate upon the existing legal basis 
for imposing a fi ne. Article 57 (old) Mw only referred to the gravity and duration of the 
infringement and the maximum of a fi ne. The current Article 57 Mw only refers to the maximum 
of a fi ne. Other boundaries can currently be found in Article 5:46(2) Awb, which states that 
an administrative authority should take into account the gravity of an infringement and the 
degree of culpability of that infringement to the off ender. Furthermore, this article provides 
that the administrative authority should, if necessary, take into account the circumstances in 
which an infringement has been committed.
The current Fining Guidelines, adopted by the Minister of Economic Aff airs, divide the 
calculation method in three phases to determine the amount of the fi ne.262 First, the ACM 
will set the foundation of the fi ne on the basis of the turnover on the market where the anti-
competitive behaviour took place.263 The ACM will use 10% of this turnover as a basis,264 after 
which the amount will be adapted by multiplying it with a certain factor. This factor, with 
a maximum of fi ve, is calculated on the basis of the gravity of the infringement.265 At this 
point the basic amount of the fi ne is set. In order to set the fi nal amount of the fi ne, the ACM 
will examine whether there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances.266 The ACM always 
has the possibility to deviate from these guidelines and impose merely a symbolic fi ne.267
260   See Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 76, where the ACM referred in its argumentation to these criteria.
261   The NMa did also create Guidelines to deal specifi cally with the construction sector fraud. Besides these specifi c Guidelines, four 
general Fining Guidelines have been adopted in respectively 2001, 2007, 2009 and 2014. The 2014 Fining Guidelines was changed in 
2016. 
262   See Article 2.3 of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
263   Article 2.4(1) of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
264   Article 2.5 of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
265   Article 2.6 of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
266   Article 2.12-2.14 of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
267   Article 2.17 of the Beleidsregel van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 4 juli 2014, nr. WJZ/14112617, met betrekking tot het 
opleggen van bestuurlijke boetes door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Boetebeleidsregel ACM 2014).
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As mentioned, the Fining Guidelines are intended to elaborate more upon these factors 
and, by doing so, provide clarity to undertakings. In multiple cases, the methodology of the 
Fining Guidelines was accepted by the competent domestic courts.268 The fi ning guidelines 
have, moreover, suffi  cient correction and fi ne-tuning possibilities.269 Nevertheless, even if the 
calculation method is reasonable, the courts have made clear that the ACM, and the judiciary 
itself, should always check whether the fi ne is suitable and necessary.270 It might be necessary 
to deviate from the method used on the basis of principles of sound administration when 
the fi ne is clearly unfair.271 There has not been a case yet in which the Dutch courts have 
explicitly ruled that there was a need to deviate from the method used on the basis of the 
Fining Guidelines.
268   Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 
6.1; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2; CBb (14 July 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 10.3.2; CBb (14 July 
2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 6.3.2; CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3; Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 72; Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.1; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 
2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 15; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 16; Rotterdam (18 
December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10174, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam 
(7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2172, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2173, par. 12; Rb Rotterdam (7 
April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 12; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, par. 12; Rb Rotterdam (7 
April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 
April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 
April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 15; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 
April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (12 June 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4689, par. 18.2; CBb (14 March 
2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.5; CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; CBb (10 February 2011) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8. 
269   CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb 
Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NLRBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4.
270   CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.1; Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 63; CBb (6 October 
2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.4; Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 6.1; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2; CBb (14 July 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, 
par. 10.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 6.3.2; CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3; Rb Rotterdam 
(20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 72; Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.1; Rb Rotterdam 
(18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 15; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 16; 
Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10174, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, par. 
14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2172, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2173, par. 
12; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 12; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, par. 
12; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 
14; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 13; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 15; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 14; Rb 
Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 14; Rb Rotterdam (12 June 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4689, par. 18.2; CBb 
(14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.5; CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; CBb (10 February 
2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8.
271   CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.12.7; Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010: Rb Rotterdam 
(1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.3; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 
2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007: Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) 
ECLI:NLRBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4.
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6.7.3 Proportionality of sanctions in general
Sanctions should be proportionate to the aim they pursue.272 As mentioned above, a fi ne 
should be suitable and necessary. There are not that many guidelines created by the Dutch 
judiciary to determine whether a fi ne is proportionate. 
In some cases the domestic courts are very succinct in their reasoning, and merely state, with 
or without a general reference to the methodology used by the ACM, that a certain fi ne is not 
disproportionate.273 The Dutch courts will only examine whether all factors are taken into 
account and whether they are taken into account in a correct manner. This is thus a review 
of the choices made by the ACM. It will therefore be important for undertakings to raise 
arguments why the choices made by the ACM are incorrect, since the Dutch judiciary does 
not necessarily examine these points on their own motion. 
The method of review of the Dutch courts can be explained by, fi rst of all, the repeated 
statement of the courts that the ACM has a wide margin of discretion to set the fi ne and to 
determine which factors it takes into account in order to determine the fi ne.274 This wide 
margin of discretion might also make it more diffi  cult for undertakings to raise proper 
arguments. As Lachnit argues:
The way the national competition authorities use this room for discretion is diffi  cult 
to determine, because the application of the diff erent adjustments and discounts is not 
always transparent, and neither are the commitments or the scope of the cooperation 
provided. Even though in some cases the calculation of the fi ne is made transparent in 
the fi nal decisions, it is not always clear what weight has been attributed to the diff erent 
factors that have aff ected the basic amount of the fi ne and the discounts granted.275
Secondly, as mentioned in the previous subparagraph, there are suffi  cient correction and fi ne-
tuning mechanisms in the Fining Guidelines. Thirdly, the Dutch courts have stated that the 
maximum of the fi ne in Article 57 Mw provides suffi  cient protection against disproportionate 
sanctioning in relation to the size and power of the undertaking concerned.276 In the Silverskin 
Onion cartel and the Flour cartel, the Appeals Tribunal relied heavily on the 10% cap.277
According to the Appeals Tribunal, it was not necessary to take into account a possible 
mitigating circumstance, because the 10% cap already substantially decreased the fi ne. 
272   See e.g. CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
273   Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6819, par. 2; CBb (18 March 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM2423, par. 5.3; CBb (8 
April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.5; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (9 
January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; CBb (28 May 
2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.5; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
274  See the annex, Dutch Competition law, point 2.
275  Lachnit (2016), p. 139.
276   Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 
2; Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2. In Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, 
par. 21.1, the District Court of Rotterdam mentioned the protection in relation to the fi nancial capacity to pay the fi ne, instead of the size 
and power of the undertaking concerned.
277   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 6.3.5; CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.10.3.
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Possibly taking into account the mitigating circumstance would not decrease the fi nal amount 
of the fi ne imposed upon the undertaking. The maximum amount thus protects in general 
against disproportionate fi nes, although the Dutch judiciary will still check whether all factors 
are taken into account and are taken into account in a proper manner. The proportionality 
stricto sensu test is, up till now, absent in this review. As stated in par 6.2.2, the legislator has 
decided to increase the maximum of the fi ne in case of cartels which lasted more than one 
year. To the mind of the present author, this might be problematic for the proportionality of 
fi nes. The Dutch judiciary has stated that 10% of the turnover of the undertaking concerned 
in the preceding business year ensures that fi nes are not disproportionate per se. If the Dutch 
judiciary would accept that 40% still ensures that fi nes are not disproportionate,278 the 
aforementioned reasoning with regard to the 10% cap would become, in the author’s view, a 
fallacy. It is thus possible that the review by the Dutch judiciary becomes more intense when 
the ACM could use the new higher cap than the previous 10% maximum. The Dutch courts 
should apply, in the author’s view, a proportionality stricto sensu test to their review due to the 
abolishment of the 10% cap. This would require an extra review step whereby the Dutch courts 
would ‘stand back’279 to review the fi nal amount of a fi ne. This would be a similar approach 
to the one the English judiciary has already adopted in competition law proceedings. This 
approach would require a court to check on its own motion whether the fi nal amount of the 
fi ne is proportionate in light of all circumstances, irrespective of the arguments raised by 
undertakings on the (dis)application of specifi c factors. It would therefore not be suffi  cient for 
the Dutch judiciary to merely review whether all factors are taken into account and whether 
they are taken into account in a correct manner. A proprio motu review should thus be required 
when the fi ne exceeds the 10% limit. The Dutch judiciary should in such a situation ‘stand 
back’ to see whether all the circumstances of the case would justify a particular fi ne. 
It would, in the author’s view, thus be necessary to introduce a proportionality stricto sensu 
test when fi nes exceed the 10% limit, since this limit is regarded by the Dutch judiciary280 as an 
important safeguard against excessive fi nes. The District Court of Rotterdam ruled however 
in the Reading Folders case that a fi ne which exceeds the relative limit of 10%, but remains 
under the absolute limit of € 450,000281 is still proportionate. Reliance by the undertakings 
on other case law of the Dutch and EU judiciary to substantiate their point of view that the 
relative limit of 10% should be applied instead of the absolute limit was not accepted.282 The 
278   The increase of the maximum limit to 40% would not lead per se to disproportionate fi nes, according to the legislator; see Tweede 
Kamer 2014/15, 34 190, nr. 3, p. 25. For more information on this change, see Van de Gronden (2017), p. 378-380.
279   This is a term borrowed from the English judiciary describing their method of review in competition law proceedings. For more 
information, see Chapter 7, par. 7.5. 
280  But also by the EU judiciary, as explained in chapter 5, par. 5.7. 
281  The absolute maximum is since 1 July 2016 € 900,000.
282   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5722, par. 10.2-10.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 
22.2-22.5; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5774, par. 9.2-9.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5777, 
par. 9.2-9.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 23.2-23.5; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5779, par. 14.2-14.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5781, par. 14.2-14.3; Rb Rotterdam (27 
July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5782, par. 14.2-14.3. 
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10% cap therefore does not appear, in contradiction to previous case law, to be a safeguard 
against excessive fi nes. This could mean that Dutch judiciary has set aside the statement in 
its own case law and that of the Union Courts that a 10% limit protects against excessive 
fi nes. On the other hand, the fi ne was still below the absolute maximum. Perhaps case law 
on the protection against excessive fi nes by the relative limit of 10% could be transposed 
to the absolute limit as well. However, this would mean that fi nes can be higher than the 
10% limit when they remain under the absolute limit. It would be strange to rule in such 
a case that a fi ne is not per se excessive. Again, this would be in contrast to previous case 
law of the Dutch and EU courts. To do justice to this case law, it will be necessary, in the 
author’s view, to include a proportionality stricto sensu test when fi nes exceed the 10% 
limit to check that they are not excessive. Practically, this would mean that the Dutch 
judiciary should ‘stand back’ to see whether the fi nal amount is overall proportionate.
6.7.4 Factors taken into account 
Article 57 (old) Mw provided that the ACM should base its fi ne on the gravity and duration 
of the infringement. This article was changed in 2014 with the entering into force of the so-
called Stroomlijningswet. Nowadays, the proportionality principle can be found in Article 
3:4(2) Awb which refers to the gravity of the infringement and the degree of culpability of 
that infringement to the off ender. Furthermore, this article provides that the administrative 
authority should, if necessary, take into account the circumstances in which an infringement 
has been committed. Even though Article 3:4(2) Awb refers to diff erent factors than Article 
57 (old) Mw, it appears that the Dutch judiciary still favours the two former factors, namely 
the gravity and the duration, to assess the proportionality of a fi ne.283 Nevertheless, in other 
(recent) cases reference is merely made to the gravity and the culpability.284
The duration, as a factor to assess the proportionality of a fi ne, does nonetheless not appear 
to play a big role in the cases brought before the Dutch competition courts. The duration 
is expressed in the turnover which the ACM takes into account to calculate the starting 
amount of the fi ne.285 Obviously, when the ACM takes an incorrect duration into account, the 
Dutch courts will reduce the fi ne accordingly.286 The gravity (or seriousness),287 is calculated
283   Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 17.2; Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 89.
284   CBb (12 October 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:325, par. 7.3.1; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5722, par. 8.1; Rb Rotterdam 
(27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 18.1; Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5774, par. 8.1; Rb Rotterdam (27 
July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5777, par. 8.1; RB Rotterdam (16 March 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:1907, par. 4.1; and CBb (6 October 
2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.4.
285   CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.3; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, 4.12.7; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 
2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.8.3; Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2.
286   See e.g.  Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 70; and Rb Rotterdam (12/03/2004) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2004:AO3912, par. 2.4.6.
287   In Dutch, it is mentioned that the ernst (gravity/seriousness) as a factor is calculated on the basis of the zwaarte (gravity/weight) of the 
fi ne. Both Dutch terms can be translated with gravity. To avoid confusion, gravity is used for the overarching factor.
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on the basis of the weight of the infringement and the economic context in which the infringement 
took place.288
Many factors are mentioned in the case law to assess the gravity of the fi ne. In general all 
factors have to assessed, although they might diff er per case since they should be assessed in 
light of the circumstances in which the infringement took place.289 No exhaustive list of factors 
exists.290 It is nevertheless clear that a fi ne should be tailored to the specifi c undertaking, to 
prevent the fi ne from being found disproportionate.291
The ACM can take into account repeated infringements, the degree of participation in the 
infringement, ceasing the infringement on the undertaking’s own motion, the profi ts made by 
the anti-competitive behaviour, the dominant position on the market, the size of the relevant 
market, the short period in which the collusion took place, the structure of the market, the specifi c 
economic context, the nature of the goods or services concerned, the eff ects on the market, the 
consequences of the anti-competitive behaviour in general, the nature of the infringement, the 
damage suff ered by third parties, cooperation in the investigation, justifi able unfamiliarity 
with the prohibited nature of the behaviour, the degree of culpability, the number and size of 
participating undertakings, the lack of action by the ACM in the investigation, general and 
specifi c deterrence, being a fi rst time off ender, potential bankruptcy and the fi nancial capacity 
of an undertaking, legislation which is in place, the (reluctant) implementation of the anti-
competitive behaviour, the (small) participation in the infringement, the leading role of an 
undertaking in the cartel, the impact on the economy, the overlap with another infringement 
which was already sanctioned, and the fi nancial consequences for an undertaking besides 
the fi ne itself. The intensity of the collusion and the nature of anti-competitive information 
exchanged are factors which can be taken into account. Furthermore, it is also relevant to 
examine whether competition remains possible on the market. Lastly, the Dutch courts have 
made clear that the termination of an infringement on own motion is a factor which can be 
taken into account.292
Some of the aforementioned factors are mentioned only briefl y by the Dutch courts, whereas 
others are more extensively discussed. In the following subparagraph the factors are examined 
that are more extensively discussed by the domestic courts. 
288   Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 21; CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 8.3.3; Rb Rotterdam 
(1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam 
(24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 
2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; Rb Rotterdam 
(22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4.
289  See the annex, Dutch Competition law, point 3.
290  Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
291   See e.g. CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; CBb (8 
February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.2; Rb Rotterdam (23 July 
2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2.
292  See the annex, Dutch competition law, point 4-35.
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6.7.5 Factors taken into account - further elaborated upon by the Dutch 
judiciary 
The Dutch courts have often stated that the termination of an infringement by the undertaking 
on its own motion might be a mitigating circumstance.293 Arguments put forward by 
undertakings on the basis of this mitigating circumstance are rarely accepted by the courts. 
Discontinuing an infringement is merely restoring the situation to what the undertaking 
already should have done, namely not infringing the competition rules.294 The possibility for 
this factor to be a mitigating circumstance is left open, although it will only be accepted in 
exceptional circumstances.295 An undertaking should have done more than merely ceasing 
the infringement, otherwise it would mean that the ACM is obliged to grant a lower fi ne to 
every undertaking which participated once in anti-competitive behaviour, but which ceased 
that behaviour before the ACM started its investigation.296 The Dutch courts have not made 
clear what an undertaking should have done additionally, but it might e.g. include warning 
the ACM297 or publicly distancing oneself from a cartel.
The (potential) damage suff ered by third parties, namely competitors, buyers, and end-
consumers, can be a circumstance which should be taken into account by the ACM.298 This 
might probably be an aggravating circumstance. It is not completely clear how the Dutch courts 
deal with this criterion, although granting compensation may be a mitigating circumstance.299
Granting compensation should be done before the ACM takes a decision,300 and even before 
the ACM starts a procedure.301 There is thus a strong incentive for undertakings to end an 
infringement and compensate the disadvantaged parties.
Cooperating with the ACM is another mitigating circumstance.302 This cooperation should be 
more than merely complying with the duty to cooperate.303 In the Gazelle case, the Appeals 
Tribunal ruled that the Gazelle company only admitted certain aspects of the infringement 
twice, whilst for the rest it merely complied with its legal obligation to cooperate. This 
cooperation was not suffi  cient to lead to a reduction of the fi ne.304 Furthermore, if an 
293  See the annex, Dutch competition law, point 35.
294   Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.5; Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 
2; Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.6.4.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2.
295   Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.5; Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2.
296  Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2.
297  This could be done in the framework of the leniency policy.
298   Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 
4.14.7; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.1; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 
2.6.4; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
299   Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 
2.4.6.
300  Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2.
301  Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6.
302   Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.6; BT6521, par. 4.16.5; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
303  See par. 6.2.
304  CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.16.5.
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undertaking wishes to provide more information than it is obliged to provide, it should show 
that the information concerned has an additional value.305
Undertakings might argue that they were not aware that their behaviour infringed the 
competition rules. 306 In exceptional cases this might be a mitigating circumstance. However, 
the Dutch courts have mostly refused arguments based on this mitigating statement, by 
referring to the point of departure that undertakings should be aware of the competition 
rules.307 Undertakings do have their own responsibility not to infringe the competition 
rules.308 In one case, the District Court of Rotterdam referred to, amongst others, the size of the 
undertakings and the nature of the infringement, and held that the undertakings could not 
have been ignorant of the law.309 Furthermore, the District Court stated that the undertakings 
had intentionally acted in violation of the competition rules.310
The four factors referred to before all show that there is a strong tendency of the Dutch courts 
to refer to the responsibility of undertakings not to infringe competition law. It is therefore 
also unlikely that any plea based on one of those four factors as a mitigating circumstance will 
be successful. 
Deterrence is an important factor that might increase the amount of a fi ne.311 Both general 
and special deterrence can be pursued by the ACM. The ACM has e.g. increased the amount 
of a fi ne, since an undertaking participated in a previous cartel. According to the ACM, the 
previous fi ne was thus not suffi  cient to deter this undertaking from participating in cartels; 
therefore an increase of the fi ne was justifi able.312 In the Breda Notary case, the District Court 
decided to decrease the fi ne to a symbolic level, because there was, amongst others, no need 
for specifi c deterrence.313 According to the District Court, notaries would not engage in 
cartels in the future, due to the status of their profession.314 The Appeals Tribunal annulled 
the judgment of the District Court, and ruled that the reduction by the NMa was already 
suffi  cient.315 A symbolic fi ne was not suffi  ciently deterrent. 
305  Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.6.
306   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 
2.5.4; CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.2; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 
2.3.4.
307   Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 
2.5.4.
308   Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4. For the role of compliance programmes in the ACM decision 
making practice, see Lachnit (2016), p. 250-256.
309  Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3.
310  Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3.
311   Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 13.2-13.3; Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, 
par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 
9.4.3; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; Rb 
Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.3; Rb 
Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
312  Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 13.2.
313  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
314  Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
315  CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3.
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General deterrence appears to have less of an infl uence than specifi c deterrence.316 Only in one 
case did general deterrence seem to have had a bigger role than specifi c deterrence. In 2010, an 
undertaking argued that specifi c deterrence was not necessary, since the two board members 
who engaged the undertaking in the cartel had left the company. According to the District 
Court, it was still necessary to ensure general deterrence.317
Bankruptcies purely on the basis of a fi ne for infringing the competition rules should 
be prevented. Therefore, the ACM is obliged to examine the fi nancial capacity318 of an 
undertaking to pay the fi ne when it might lead to a bankruptcy. In some cases, a decrease in 
the fi ne was accepted by the ACM and/or the courts because of the bad fi nancial situation 
of the undertaking concerned. There are quite some cases dealing with these factors which 
the ACM might take into account, although not many of them have been successful for the 
undertakings concerned. 
An appeal on this factor should be substantiated with ascertainable and verifi able evidence319
that bankruptcy is likely to occur due to the fi ne.320 Merely presenting a series of probabilities 
is not suffi  cient.321 Bankruptcy might become less likely when the ACM is lenient with regard 
to the payment by providing a payment scheme.322 Furthermore, it is possible for a viable 
undertaking to attract suffi  cient fi nancing to pay the fi ne in case the own fi nancial capacity is 
insuffi  cient.323
It is possible for the ACM to take into account the fi nancial position of an undertaking. In 
the North Sea Shrimp cartel, the NMa correctly took into account the fi nancial capacity of an 
association of undertakings, since the members of the associations would leave, which led 
to a decrease in their fi nancial capacity.324 In the Foreclosure Auction cartel, the District Court 
of Rotterdam reduced the fi ne with 10% in some cases due to the fi nancial consequences for 
the undertakings, which were natural persons, in their personal and business capacity.325 The 
banks of the undertakings decided in both cases to cease providing its services. This led to 
(extraordinary) fi nancial consequences for the undertakings concerned. The reduction of the 
316  CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.3.
317   Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2. The District Court also ruled that fi nes are imposed upon the 
undertaking and not on a natural person. This provided a second reason why the argumentation of the undertaking was not successful.
318   This is in general a factor which should be taken into account, see e.g. CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.1.
319  See the annex, Dutch competition law, point 36.
320  The fi ne itself should make the bankruptcy likely, see: CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 12.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 14.3.2; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 7.3.2 and 7.3.4; Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 9.3; CBb (18 November 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU5581, par. 3.3.4; 1215, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (13 May 
2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI6696, par. 2; CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6911, par. 3.9.4; BD8261, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (22 
May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4.
321  CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6629, par. 7.15.4.
322   Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 
2.5.4.
323   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 7.3.4; CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 14.3.6.
324  CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.6.
325   Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 8; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 
22.1; Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 22; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, 
par. 21.1; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 15.1; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, 
par. 15; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 17.3; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, 
par. 20.1; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 17; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, 
par. 17; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 21; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 
19.1; Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 20.1.
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fi ne in both the North Sea Shrimp cartel and the Foreclosure Auction cartel was applied, because 
the negative fi nancial situation was a direct result of the decision of the NMa/ACM. In the 
North Sea Shrimp case, the undertakings left the associations of undertakings because these 
associations infringed the competition rules. In the Foreclosure Auction cases, the bank decided 
to stop providing its services, because of the anti-competitive behaviour. The undertakings 
concerned thus also got ‘punished’ by other actors on the market. An undertaking will 
therefore only be able to invoke this factor when the negative consequences are a direct result 
of the fi nding of an infringement. Bad economic circumstances in general are never a ground 
for a reduction of the fi ne.326
The legislative framework in place might lead to problems for undertakings to adhere to 
the competition law rules. In the Home Care cartel, the Appeals Tribunal held that a change 
in the legislative framework meant that companies which previously did not fall under the 
competition law rules, now had to change their ‘mentality’ in a short period of time.327 The 
Appeals Tribunal accepted that this ‘mentality’ change could not be completely made within 
the short time between the legislative change and the procurement procedure for home care 
services.328 The gravity factor was, amongst others on this factor, adjusted from 1.5 to 0.5.329
The last factors which are more extensively discussed by the Dutch judiciary are not easy 
to separate from each other. In multiple cases the courts have ruled that the ACM should 
take into account the economic context in which the infringement took place,330 the nature 
of the infringement,331 the nature of the goods and services concerned,332 the impact on the 
economy,333 the legislation which is in place,334 the eff ects on the market,335 and the number 
326   See e.g. Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 10.10. The general interest, e.g. the impact on employment 
in a certain area after a bankruptcy, is also not a factor which the ACM has to take into account, see Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2.
327  CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.9.
328  CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.9.
329  CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.10.
330   Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 9.24 and 9.26; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3; Rb 
Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
331   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; CBb (12 August 
2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.9.2; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; CBb (12 March 
2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3.
332   CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 4.14.7; Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 
2.5; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
333   Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 17.1
334   Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; Rb 
Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, 
par. 2.5.4; Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6; CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 
6.4.2.
335   CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
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and size of the undertakings participating in the anti-competitive behaviour.336 These 
conditions are often discussed together in order to examine the whole situation. Interestingly, 
these factors are also discussed in some cases dealing with cartels that restricted competition 
by object, even though the eff ects are not relevant for the ACM to establish the infringement 
as such. Whereas it is not obliged to examine the eff ects of an object restriction on the market, 
it might thus still do so in order to increase the fi ne. 
Some of the aforementioned factors relate to the turnover on the relevant market, and are thus 
used to determine the basic amount of the fi ne. Others deal with the multiplying factor based 
on the gravity of the infringement. The severity of the infringement might thus be reclassifi ed 
on the basis of these factors. Furthermore, they might even be mentioned as mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances. It is thus not entirely clear under which heading these factors will 
be discussed. 
An example where the District Court used these factors to reclassify an infringement can be 
found in rulings of 2015 and 2016. In those cases, the District Court of Rotterdam ruled, with 
reference to case law of the Competition Appeals Tribunal in the UK, that cover pricing337 is 
less harmful to competition than bid-rigging, which meant that the multiplying factor was 
reduced.338
Another example can be found in the North Sea Shrimp cartel case, where the District Court 
declassifi ed an infringement from ‘very serious’ to merely ‘serious’, since the legal framework 
in which the associations of undertakings had to operate was unclear.339 The Appeals Tribunal 
confi rmed this reclassifi cation, but also considered the unclear legal framework and the special 
responsibilities for the associations on the basis of EU law to be a mitigating circumstance.340
The abovementioned factors, often discussed together, might thus be taken into account at 
any stage of the determination of a fi ne.341
336   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.8; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 10.10; CBb (24 March 
2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.10.3; College van Beroep voor het bedrijsleven (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9349, par. 
3.10.4.3; CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0545, par. 3.8.4.3; CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9357, par. 3.10.4.3; 
CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0952, par. 3.8.4.3; CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.8.4.3; CBb (13 
September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0961, par. 3.8.4.3; CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0973, par. 3.8.4.3; CBb (18 
November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.11.4.3; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; Rb Rotterdam 
(18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; Rb Rotterdam (19 July 
2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6; CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3.
337   Cover pricing is the behaviour of an undertaking to participate in a tender without the intention to win the tender. An undertaking 
might ask information on the tenders of other parties in order to submit a higher price. Undertakings often used this method to stay in 
the picture of an authority to ensure that they will be invited for future tenders, even if they do not have the possibility to execute the 
current tender. Therefore, a so-called “cover price” is submitted. Bid-rigging is, by contrast, used to ensure that one party wins a tender. 
Undertakings would agree on the party which would win the tender and set a price for that undertaking. The other undertakings 
will then submit higher prices. The profi ts of the winning party are often divided between the undertakings participating in the bid-
rigging. 
338   Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 12.3; Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8610, par. 
18.8.
339  See e.g. Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6. 
340   CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.4.
341   There are ample examples where the domestic courts examine the aforementioned factors in light of any of the calculation steps of the 
Commission. It would however go beyond the scope of this research to discuss all these diff erent cases.
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6.7.6 Factors which do not have to be taken into account 
In some cases, the domestic courts have ruled that certain factors do not have to be taken into 
account. Publicity or a lot of media attention is e.g. not a mitigating factor which needs to be 
taken into account.342 In a similar sense, the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal ruled that 
public attention, outrage, and social unrest cannot form an aggravating circumstance, otherwise 
every fi ne on undertakings for participating in a cartel should be increased.343 The Appeals 
Tribunal quashed the judgment of the District Court, which was of the opinion that social 
unrest and public outrage could form an aggravating circumstance.344 The general interest is 
not a factor which should be taken into account by the ACM when fi ning an undertaking. It 
is e.g. not necessary for the ACM to take into account a loss of employment in a geographical 
area due to the bankruptcy of an undertaking after it paid a fi ne.345 Undertakings have also 
argued that they were placed in a worse competitive position due to the fi ne,346 or that it was 
necessary to take the fi nancial position into account when determining the amount of the 
fi ne.347 Both factors do not have to be taken into account, since that leads to an unjustifi ed 
competitive advantage for the undertakings concerned. As stated in par. 6.7.5, the fi nancial 
position only has to be taken into account in exceptional cases. The ACM does not necessarily 
have to take into account the relation between the fi ne and the capital of the undertaking348
or between the fi ne and the profi ts made.349 Profi ts made could, as mentioned above, be an 
aggravating circumstance though. 
Other factors which do not need to be taken into account are: the fact that the undertaking 
is a single product company,350 bad economic circumstances,351 or the advanced age of the 
natural person who makes up the undertaking.352 It is also, according to the Dutch judiciary, 
completely irrelevant who the owner is.353 The ACM might take into account the size of an 
undertaking when imposing the fi ne, but it does not have to compare the amount of the fi nes 
on diff erent smaller and larger undertakings.354 In paragraph 6.7.4, it was also mentioned 
that the leading role of an undertaking might be an aggravating circumstance. By contrast, 
not having a leading role is not a mitigating circumstance.355 Furthermore, being coerced into 
a cartel cannot form an excuse, since there is still an obligation to comply with the law.356
342   Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 22; CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3
343  CBb (20 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BW3671, par. 4.3.7.
344   Rb Rotterdam (11 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK6975, par. 2.5.6. The NMa increased the fi ne on the basis of this factor with 
30%. The District Court agreed with the NMa that this could be an aggravating circumstance, but found an increase of 10% to be 
proportionate.
345   Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2. The bankruptcy should also be an immediate consequence of the 
fi ne before it is taken into account.
346  Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2
347  Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2
348   Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2
349  Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2
350   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, 12.3.10; CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.15.3.
351   CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.10; Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 10.10; 5884, par. 
10.10
352  Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 20.1.
353  Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2.
354  Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2.
355   Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2.
356  Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 7.3.
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An argument that the undertaking is a family business is not a valid reason to reduce a fi ne.357 It 
is also not possible to argue that the small market share of the undertaking is a reason to mitigate 
the fi ne, since this factor will already be taken into account to set the basic amount of the fi ne 
on the basis of turnover in the relevant market.358 Lastly, in general it can also be mentioned, 
perhaps a bit superfl uously, that the absence of aggravating circumstances is not a mitigating 
circumstance.359 Undertakings have unsuccessfully tried to argue that this would be the case.360
6.7.7 Résumé 
The ACM has to take the proportionality principle into account when imposing a fi ne upon an 
undertaking. This means that the fi ne should be necessary and suitable. The Dutch judiciary 
has created no general guidelines to examine whether a fi ne might be disproportionate. 
In general, there is much leeway for the ACM to determine the amount of a fi ne. The domestic 
courts will review the calculation method used by the ACM. Policy choices made by the ACM 
are thus allowed. Three reasons can be found for this manner of review. First, the ACM has a 
wide margin of discretion to set the fi ne and to determine which factors it takes into account. 
Secondly, there are suffi  cient fi ne-tuning and correction mechanisms in the fi ning guidelines. 
Thirdly, the former maximum of 10% of the preceding business years prevents a fi ne from 
being disproportionate per se.
Many factors might be taken into account by the ACM, although the Dutch courts have only 
examined a couple of these more in-depth. There are also factors which do not need to be 
taken into account by the ACM. Overall, there should be a direct link between the factor 
invoked and the undertaking or the fi ne imposed.
6.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some principles discussed in this chapter still need to be further developed by the Dutch 
judiciary. The approach by the Dutch judiciary towards certain principles is not always clear. 
Dutch competition law could benefi t from a more coherent body of case law elaborating upon 
the legal safeguards applicable in competition law. Many aspects of the freedom from self-
incrimination and the non bis in idem principle are e.g. not exhaustively refl ected on. 
The trigger for the freedom from self-incrimination seems to be diff erent in case law from 
the intention of the legislator. Whereas the judiciary focuses on the statement of objections, 
the legislator intended the trigger to be applicable before that stage, namely during the 
interrogation. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether an obligation to provide documents 
is, just as under EU competition law, categorically excluded from the freedom from self-
incrimination. It is also not entirely clear what the consequences of an infringement of the 
357  CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 9.3.2.
358  RB Rotterdam (16 March 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:1907, par. 7. 
359  CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 9.3.3.
360  CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 9.3.3.
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freedom from self-incrimination would be, although exclusion of that evidence seems to be 
most likely. 
The non bis in idem principle is also underdeveloped in Dutch competition law. It is e.g. not 
entirely clear whether the ‘accounting’ principle is indeed an obligation in Dutch competition 
law. Moreover, there is no case law on the condition of the ‘unity of the legal interest’, there 
are only some cases on the ‘identity of the facts’, and the applicability of the non bis in idem 
principle in cases where there is a previously imposed fi ne by the Commission or another 
NCA is unclear. Lastly, the interpretation of the ‘unity of the off ender’ by the Dutch judiciary 
seems to depart from case law of the CJEU, even though the Union Courts do refer to their 
adherence to that case law. 
The approach with regard to other principles can at times be criticised. The Dutch competition 
law judiciary mention that they follow the approach of the CJEU where it concerns the rebuttal 
of evidence adduced by a competition authority. The Dutch judiciary nevertheless uses a 
more refi ned approach towards the rebuttal of direct evidence, without mentioning why, or 
even that, it deviates from case law of the CJEU. Lastly, it was argued that the change by the 
legislator of the maximum amount of a fi ne in cases of cartels, should lead to the introduction 
of the proportionality stricto sensu test. This means that the Dutch judiciary would be required 
to examine on own motion whether a fi ne is not excessive in light of all the circumstances of 
the case. Relying on the 10% cap by stating that fi nes are not per se excessive would in such 
cases not be suffi  cient anymore. 
Overall, there are quite some questions left open by the Dutch judiciary. Obviously, there 
should be cases brought before the judiciary in which they can indeed rule upon these aspects. 
It nevertheless becomes apparent that the Dutch competition law systems is still somewhat 
underdeveloped with regard to the legal safeguards applicable to undertakings. 

CHAPTER 7
English Competition Law
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous two chapters, the scope and content of fi ve principles were discussed in EU 
competition law and Dutch competition law. The focus of this chapter lies on the scope and 
content of fi ve principles in English (administrative) competition law procedures. The relation 
of England with the ECHR and the EU is in current times somewhat strained. However, this 
research, conducted from 1 January 1998 up to 1 January 2018, focuses on a period when the 
UK is still part of the EU. Therefore, EU law, but also the ECHR rules, still apply to the UK at 
the time of this research. Furthermore, we cannot exclude alignment between the UK and EU 
competition law systems in the future after the Brexit.1
EU law, which includes general principles of EU law, prevails by way of supremacy2 over 
national law. Member States should therefore comply with general principles of EU law when 
Union law is applicable.3 The Competition and Markets Authority in the UK is obliged to 
comply with general principles of EU law – whether or not codifi ed in the Charter – when it 
applies Article 101 or 102 TFEU in parallel with the Chapter 1 (cartel) and Chapter 2 (abuse of a 
dominant position) prohibition. Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003 obliges national competition 
authorities to apply Article 101 or 102 TFEU in parallel to their own competition rules. 
From a UK perspective, the application of EU law is not that straightforward. Sovereignty 
of Parliament4 as the summum bonum complicates the relationship between EU law and UK 
law. Nevertheless, in 1972, the UK Parliament adopted the European Communities Act 1972, 
which ensures compliance with the supremacy of EU law.5 The relationship between Union 
law and parliamentary sovereignty remained, nonetheless, a matter of some ambiguity. 
Supremacy of Union law in the UK legal order remains a subject of debate today. For example, 
in 2002, the High Court still made the principle of supremacy subject to parliamentary 
sovereignty by ruling that parliament could, with a later act, repeal any eff ect of EU law.6
This obviously would entail a (direct or indirect) repeal of the European Communities Act 
1972, which, according to the England and Wales High Court, can only be done expressly by 
UK parliament.7 The Supreme Court had to examine the issue of repealing the EU Treaties in 
2017. As the Supreme Court ruled: “[M]inisters generally enjoy a power freely to enter into 
and to terminate treaties without recourse to Parliament.”8 By contrast, one may argue that 
1  For more information, see also Chapter 9. 
2  ECJ, 6/64 (Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.).
3  For more information see chapter 6, par. 6.1.
4   Dicey (1885), p. 3-4, refers to the Sovereignty of Parliament as follows: “The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither 
more nore less than this, namely, that Parliament tus defi ned has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any 
law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament.”
5  See Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. 
6  England and Wales High Court (18 February 2002) [2002] 3 WLR 247, par. 58-59.
7  England and Wales High Court (18 February 2002) [2002] 3 WLR 247, par. 69-70.
8  Supreme Court (24 January 2017) [2017] 2 WLR 583, par. 5.
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EU law is part of domestic law, due to which a minister, by withdrawing from the EU through 
the so-called Royal Prerogative, could change domestic law without consent of Parliament.9
The latter is not allowed in the UK. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the ‘Brexit-
case’ did not accept the argument of the UK government that withdrawal from the EU Treaties 
can be enacted under the Royal Prerogative.10 This means that UK Parliament should, by way 
of statute, repeal the EU Communities Act. 
Supremacy of EU law is thus dependent on its acceptance by UK Parliament. After all, 
Parliament can withdraw from the EU if it does not want the UK to be bound by this principle 
anymore. The enforceability of EU law in general is thus, from a UK perspective, dependent 
on an Act of Parliament. Nevertheless, supremacy is accepted by the UK judiciary as long as 
the UK is part of the EU. 
The UK legislator wanted to prevent confl icts between EU competition law and UK competition 
law and for that reason inserted in the Competition Act 1998 already a specifi c provision 
to ensure consistency between EU and UK competition law. Section 60 of the Competition 
Act 1998 provides that any UK court “must act […] with a view to securing that there is no 
inconsistency between” the principles applied by the UK court and “the principles laid down 
by the Treaty and the European Court, and any relevant decision of that Court, as applicable 
at that time in determining any corresponding question arising in Community law”.11 This 
provision was already applicable prior to the 2004 modernisation of EU competition law and 
the decentralisation which this modernisation brought about. The principle of supremacy 
is thus less relevant in UK competition law proceedings, due to the statutory consistency 
requirement in Section 60 Competition Act 1998.12 It is, however, not entirely clear whether 
this consistency requirement also applies “to the procedures for enforcing the prohibitions”.13
The European Convention on Human Rights, in contrast to the EU system, does not feature 
a system of supremacy and direct eff ect. There is nonetheless a duty to respect the rights in 
the Convention, but as stated in the previous chapter, there is much room for Member States 
to decide on the methods in order to ensure compliance with this obligation. In the UK, the 
Parliament decided to create the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides that the judiciary 
should “take into account” judgments of the ECtHR and decisions by the Committee of 
Ministers.14 Domestic law should be interpreted conform the Convention rights in as far as 
possible,15 although Acts of Parliament remain valid if there is a confl ict which cannot be 
9  Supreme Court (24 January 2017) [2017] 2 WLR 583, par. 5.
10   Supreme Court (24 January 2017) [2017] 2 WLR 583, par. 86. See also par. 99 where the majority of the Supreme Court refers to similar 
rulings of “eminent judges”. In par. 112, the majority ruling does mention that Parliament may create a prerogative power by statute if 
done so in unequivocal wording. 
11   Section 60(2) Competition Act 1998 (old). The same provision can also be found in the current Competition Act 1998. 
12   Section 60 of Competition Act 1998, requires conform interpretation as far as possible. See Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 387-390 for more 
information on this requirement and the diff erences between EU competition law and UK competition law which are still allowed. 
13   Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 390. These also mention that it “could reasonably be argued that the procedural rules for public and private 
enforcement do not themselves raise questions ‘in relation to competition’”.
14   Section 2(1) Human Rights Act 1998. This provision also refers to decisions of the former Commission on Human Rights. 
15  Article 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998.
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remedied by conform interpretation.16 National courts may nonetheless issue a declaration 
of incompatibility for Acts of Parliament.17 In turn, the government then needs to amend the 
confl icting national rule.18
The duty of UK courts to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into account does not mean, according 
to the Supreme Court, that this case law should always be followed. Lord Phillips held, 
supported unanimously by the other Law Lords, in the ruling R v. Horncastle that:
The requirement to “take into account” the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally 
result in this Court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg 
Court. There will, however, be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to 
whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court suffi  ciently appreciates or accommodates 
particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to this court 
to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course. 
This is likely to give the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to reconsider the particular 
aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a 
valuable dialogue between this court and the Strasbourg Court. This is such a case.19
The deference of the Supreme Court in R. v. Horncastle to the Strasbourg Chamber Judgment 
in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK did not lead to a deadlock between both courts. The ECtHR 
revised its stance in its Grand Chamber judgment and found no infringement of Article 6 
ECHR.20 The UK judiciary, however, does reserve the right not to follow ECtHR jurisprudence, 
albeit on “rare occasions” only.21
Overall, one can thus say that the UK is bound by EU law and the ECHR as long as it is part 
of both systems. EU law seems to have stronger mechanisms to ensure compliance. The UK 
judiciary also accepted supremacy so long as Parliament did not abrogate this principle by 
way of Act of Parliament. The ECHR contains a duty to respect Convention rights. The UK 
judiciary is required to interpret domestic law in light of the ECHR and ECtHR judgments. 
The duty to take into account the ECHR and case law of the ECtHR is however more loosely 
interpreted than the obligation to respect EU law. Nevertheless, this has not led to many 
problems up till now. 
16  Section 3(2) and 4 Human Rights Act 1998.
17  Section 4(2) Human Rights Act 1998. 
18  See section 10 Human Rights Act 1998 on the power of the government to take remedial actions. 
19  Supreme Court (9 December 2009) [2009] UKSC 14, par. 11. 
20   ECtHR, no 26766/05 and 22228/06 (Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK), par. 158 and 165. For more information see also Glas (2016), p. 353-354.
21  See e.g. Supreme Court (9 December 2009) [2009] UKSC 14, par. 11.
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7.2 ENFORCEMENT OF ENGLISH COMPETITION LAW
UK competition law has undergone quite some changes over the years. In the 19th century, UK 
competition law was characterised by a liberal, laissez-faire approach.22 At the beginning of 
the 20th century, some statutory provisions dealing with competition law were created. In 1948, 
a more comprehensive act was adopted to deal with competition concerns. Over time some 
other acts were also adopted. 1998, however, was a landmark year for UK competition law, as 
the Competition Act 1998 was introduced. This act “radically altered UK competition law”23 by 
repealing older acts. Furthermore, this competition law statute aligned the cartel prohibition 
and the abuse of a dominant position with EU competition law.24 These prohibitions are also 
known as, respectively, the Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 prohibition.25 The registration system 
for agreements26 was abandoned by a proper ex post enforcement regime. This establishes, 
as Parker argued, “[…] a much tougher regime and one in which penalties for infringement 
are intended to be draconian”.27 A further change to UK competition law came in 2002, 
when the Enterprise Act was adopted. This act criminalised the involvement in a cartel by 
natural persons working for an undertaking.28 Other changes included, amongst others, the 
introduction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT),29 a specialised competition tribunal, 
and the creation of the Offi  ce of Fair Trading (OFT) by which the body of Director General 
of Fair Trading (DGFT) was abolished.30 In April 2014 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013 (ERRA13) entered into force. This act once again introduced some reforms to the 
UK competition law enforcement regime. Both the Competition Commission (CC)31 and the 
OFT32 were abolished. In their place the Competition and Markets Authority was created.33
The ERRA13 also introduced some new investigative powers. Another notable change was 
the abolishment of the dishonesty requirement for the cartel off ence,34 whereas new defences 
were introduced for natural persons as well.35
This research focuses on the period from 1 January 1998 up to 1 January 2018. Therefore, the 
enforcement regime from 1998 till 1 April 2014 (7.2.1) and the relevant changes per 1 April 
2014 (7.2.2) shall be examined in the following two paragraphs. 
22  Wardhaugh (2014), p. 211; MacCulloch & Rodgers (2015), p. 21.
23  MacCulloch & Rodgers (2015), p. 24.
24  For more information on the 1998 changes, see Parker (2000).
25  Respectively Section 2 Competition Act 1998 (old) and Section 18 Competition Act 1998 (old).
26  For more information on the registration system, see e.g. Parker (2000), p. 290. 
27  Parker (2000), p. 301.
28  See Section 188 Enterprise Act 2002 for the so-called “cartel off ence”.
29   Section 12(1) Enterprise Act 2002. From 1998 till the Enterprise Act entered into force, a Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal 
existed within the Competition Commission itself. See for more information Parker (2000), p. 286-287. Reference is only made here to 
the CAT, even when the CCAT issued the ruling. 
30   See Section 1(1) and 2(2) of the Enterprise Act 2002 (old). Reference is only made here to the OFT even when the DGFT offi  cially took a decision. 
31  Section 26(1) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.
32  Section 26(2) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
33  Section 25(1) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
34  Section 47(2) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
35   Section 47(6) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the (new) Section 288B of the Enterprise Act 2002.
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7.2.1 The pre-2014 enforcement regime
From 1998 till 2014, two competition authorities existed simultaneously in the UK, namely the 
Director General of Fair Trading / Offi  ce of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. 
For our purposes the DGFT, and its successor the OFT are of relevance. The DGFT/
OFT conducted investigations in the so-called Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 prohibitions. The 
Competition Commission did not have any powers to act independently, since it was reliant 
on another authority to refer cases to it. The CC was, for example, competent to investigate 
mergers and it was competent to conduct market investigations,36 both on referral from the 
OFT. 
The OFT could open an investigation into a possible cartel or abuse of a dominant position 
when there were “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that such an infringement existed.37 No 
obligation existed under the Competition Act 1998 to start an investigation.38 There was no 
Section 25 trigger when the OFT found an individual, a block, or a parallel exemption to be 
applicable.39 Reasonable grounds to commence an investigation were not present when there 
was insuffi  cient evidence.40 The OFT could use e.g. “information provided by disaff ected 
members of a cartel, statements from employees or ex-employees, or a complaint”41 as sources 
to reach the conclusion that the Section 25 trigger was met.
The OFT could, amongst others, start a preliminary investigation on the basis of a complaint, 
to determine whether there was suffi  cient evidence for the Section 25 trigger. Case law on 
third party complaints where the OFT decided not to proceed with the case in the preliminary 
investigation phase could be indicative for determining when there was suffi  cient evidence. 
In such cases, the thin line between the preliminary investigation phase and the formal 
investigation phase had become apparent. The OFT could decide not to further investigate 
a case, which could result in a decision or merely a statement to not further proceed with the 
investigation. A decision could only be reached “as a result of an investigation”.42 Suffi  cient 
evidence for the Section 25 trigger was thus established when the CAT decides that a decision
had been reached after a preliminary investigation. In 2003, Alese summarised these situations 
as follows:
36  Market investigations are inquiries in a certain sector where competition law concerns have risen. If the OFT found that a sector 
was prone to competition problems, it could refer the matter to the CC which could then investigate the matter and take necessary 
measures to remedy any anti-competitive eff ects. For more information see e.g. Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 469 ff . 
37  Section 25 of the Competition Act 1998 (old).
38   Section 25(1) of the Competition Act 1998 (old) provided that the OFT “may” conduct an investigation under certain circumstances. UK 
Courts have also referred to the discretion of the OFT to start an investigation. See e.g. England and Wales High Court (24 July 2009) 
[2009] EWHC 1875, par. 45, where the High Court referred to the discretion of competition authorities with reference to case law of the 
former Court of First Instance. 
39   Section 25(8)-(11) Competition Act 1998 (old). The UK Competition Act referred to a parallel exemption when there was an EU block 
exemption applicable or where it would have been applicable were there was an eff ect on trade between Member States. For more 
information see Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 375.
40  CCAT (26 March 2002) case no. 1006/2/1/01 (admissibility judgment), par. 88-89.
41  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.3.
42  Section 31(1) Competition Act 1998 (old).
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The logical conclusion that could be drawn from Freeserve in relation to preliminary 
investigations is that the offi  ce should be cautious in categorising a decision as 
provisional where:
 •  it has not carried out a fresh investigation as per the case at hand but relied on its 
previous investigation as a point of reference;
 •  it determines a complaint after consulting the party complained about and 
informing it of the decision taken in relation to the case;
 •  it uses defi nitive language in the main parts of a dismissal letter but closes the 
letter with provisional language; and
 •  it publishes any preliminary decisions in its bulletins.43
These situations did not necessarily indicate when there was suffi  cient evidence, although they 
did provide a practical indication that the OFT found suffi  cient evidence to be present, since 
it appeared that a decision to the complainant ended the investigation. It is, as mentioned, 
diffi  cult to establish when the OFT found suffi  cient evidence to be present in order to start an 
offi  cial investigation. This did not necessarily lead to problems, since the OFT could only use 
its powers of investigation in the investigation phase and not to establish whether there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of the competition rules. 
During an offi  cial investigation, the OFT had in general three main powers: the power to 
require a person to produce documents or to provide information,44 to enter business premises 
without a warrant,45 and to enter and search any premises with a warrant.46
The power to require the production of documents and information could be found in 
Section 26 of the Competition Act 1998 (old). The OFT could require any person to produce 
specifi ed information and specifi ed documents. This was in contrast with the powers of the 
OFT under the criminal cartel off ence, where the OFT was allowed to request answers or 
other information relating to any matter of the investigation.47 The power to request information 
or documents could be used before or after carrying out an inspection. Any person could 
be asked to provide the information or documents. Section 26 of the Competition Act 1998 
(old) was thus not limited to requesting information or documents from undertakings which 
allegedly participated in a cartel. The OFT did not have a power to interrogate a person.48
The OFT could copy documents, require a person which produced the document to provide 
an explanation of that document, or, if the document could not be produced, state where the 
document could be found.49
43  Alese (2003), p.621.
44  Section 26 Competition Act 1998 (old).
45  Section 27 Competition Act 1998 (old).
46   Section 28 Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
47  Section 193 Enterprise Act 2002 (old).
48   The entering into force of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 changed, amongst others, the Competition Act 1998 and 
included, as is explained in par. 7.2.2, a power to interrogate persons.
49  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 3.5.
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The power to require information could be used “to require the compilation and production 
of information that is not already in recorded form”.50 This could mean that a person had to 
create a document. 
Non-compliance with the request for information or documents made a (legal or natural) 
person51 guilty of an off ence.52 The Competition Act 1998 did include some statutory defences 
for failure to comply with, amongst others, a Section 26-request.53 There were, however, 
“no statutory defences to the charges of knowingly or recklessly destroying documents or 
providing false or misleading information”.54 Non-compliance with a request for information 
or documents could lead to a fi ne not exceeding the statutory maximum55 when the off ence 
was tried summarily, or an unlimited fi ne when it was serious enough for an indictment.56
Destroying documentation or providing false or misleading information could, besides the 
aforementioned fi nes, also lead to imprisonment of up to 2 years when the off ence was tried 
on indictment.57
As stated above, under the cartel off ence, the OFT had broader powers to obtain information 
from a person. A person was obliged to provide the information58 asked for before the deadline 
expires, or, in case of a compulsory interview,59 immediately. In order to protect the freedom 
from self-incrimination, the OFT could not use the information obtained in the investigation 
phase of a criminal investigation as evidence in court.60 Obviously, the information obtained 
still had intelligence value rather than evidential value.61
The OFT was allowed to conduct criminal and administrative proceedings in parallel.62 This 
could lead to the situation where the OFT used its powers in a criminal investigation to gather 
evidence for its administrative law case or vice versa. The legislator excluded the possibility 
to use information obtained in administrative proceedings in a criminal law procedure by 
way of Section 198 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (old), which in turn created Section 30A of
50  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 3.7.
51   It was possible that both the undertaking and a natural person, such as a director, manager or secretary, were held accountable for an 
off ence. See Section 72 Competition Act 1998 (old) and OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 7.4.
52  Section 42(1) Competition Act 1998 (old).
53  Section 42(2)-(4) Competition Act 1998 (old). 
54   Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 402. Knowingly or recklessly destroying documents was an off ence which could be found in Section 43(1) 
Competition Act 1998 (old). Providing false or misleading information was an off ence to be found in Section 44(1)-(2) Competition Act 
1998 (old).
55   The statutory maximum was £5,000, see Section 37(2) Criminal Justice Act 1982. In 2014 the government amended the statutory 
maximum to an unlimited amount, see Section 85 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Off enders Act 2012 and Section 37(4) 
Criminal Justice Act 1982.
56   In its Guidance, the OFT mentioned that failure to comply with a request for information or documents without reasonable excuse 
would not be tried on indictment, see OFT guidance Powers of investigation, table 7.1. Section 42(6)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) did 
leave room to try non-compliance on indictment.
57  See Section 43(2) and Section 44(3) of the Competition Act 1998 (old).
58   Other than information protected by professional privilege (Section 196(1) Enterprise Act 2002 (old)) or protected by bank confi dentiality 
(Section 196(2) Enterprise Act 2002 (old)). 
59   The OFT could conduct voluntary interviews and compulsory interviews, see OFT guidance Powers of investigating criminal cartels, 
par. 4.3. A voluntary interview / enquiry could take place when the OFT did not have suffi  cient evidence yet, in order to trigger the 
threshold in Section 192(1) Enterprise Act 2002 (old). During this interview the OFT would take into account all relevant criminal 
procedures, since there was the possibility that the cartel off ence was breached. This included administering the caution. See OFT 
guidance Powers of investigating criminal cartels, par. 4.1-4.2. 
60   Section 197 Enterprise Act 2002 (old); see also the OFT guidance Powers of investigating criminal cartels, par. 6.3. 
61  MacNeil (2003), p. 152. 
62  Nazzini (2003), p. 484-486.
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 the Competition Act 1998 (old). Evidence obtained in the administrative investigation could 
not be used in the criminal investigation.63 Conversely, during the parliamentary debate 
on the Enterprise Act, Lord Kingsland suggested to insert an opposite restriction in the 
Enterprise Act.64 This would have barred the OFT from using information in administrative 
proceedings when it was obtained in a criminal investigation relating to the cartel off ence. 
This amendment did not make it into the fi nal act. As Lord Sainsbury insisted: 
Amendment No. 255 seeks to prevent an investigator or prosecutor from using 
any information obtained under Part 6 of this Bill for the purpose of subsequent 
proceedings under the Competition Act 1998, unless that information could have been 
obtained by the OFT or the SFO in any event using their existing powers. All powers 
contained in Part 6 of the Bill are modelled on existing powers contained in Part 2 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Therefore, these powers are neither new nor novel, and 
are regularly applied during criminal investigations. 
 If during an investigation evidence is uncovered that points to a diff erent off ence 
having been committed, it is accepted and common practice by law enforcement 
agencies that that evidence can be used in a court of law. The decisive point is that 
evidence has to be obtained using proper powers and observing all existing safeguards. 
Information gathered under Part 6 powers will have been obtained to the highest 
standard and should, therefore, be admissible for the purpose of civil proceedings 
under the Competition Act 1998.65
Even though there was no legal restriction for the OFT to use information from its criminal 
investigation in administrative proceedings, the OFT bound itself not to do so in a consultation 
paper on the Enterprise Act and in its Guidance Paper on the powers for investigating criminal 
cartels.66 There thus appeared to be a strict dividing line between the powers of the OFT in 
criminal proceedings and in administrative proceedings, which prevented against misuse of 
powers. 
The second power which the OFT possessed to discover anti-competitive behaviour was the 
power to enter business premises without a warrant. This power could be found in Section 27 
Competition Act 1998. The OFT had, as a general rule, to inform the occupier of the premises 
through a written notice at least two days before the inspection.67 It was not necessary for 
the OFT to issue a written notice before the inspection when the undertaking concerned was 
63  See also Nazzini (2003), p. 485.
64   See House of Lords (29 July 2002) Vol. 638, column 739. The amendment read: “[S]ave that where the information has been obtained by 
the OFT or the SFO using the powers contained in Part 6 of this Act, and no action is taken in relation to section 183, the information 
cannot be used for the purpose of any proceedings under the Competition Act 1998, unless that information could have been obtained 
by the OFT in any event using its existing powers.”
65  See House of Lords (29 July 2002) Vol. 638, column 742.
66   See respectively OFT Powers for investigating criminal cartels – a consultation paper, par. 4.3 and OFT guidance Powers of investigating 
criminal cartels, par. 4.3.
67 Section 27(2) Competition Act 1998 (old).
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allegedly involved in the anti-competitive behaviour the OFT investigated,68 or when the 
offi  cer concerned was unable to give notice.69 In general, it was thus an obligation to give 
a written notice when the OFT wanted to investigate the premises of a third party, but not 
when it wanted to investigate the premises of an alleged cartelist or an undertaking allegedly 
abusing its dominant position.
The power in Section 27 could “be described as a ‘right of peaceful entry’”,70 since no force 
could be used to enter premises or on the premises itself. Furthermore, the OFT did not have 
the power to search premises when it inspected premises without a warrant. 
Any necessary equipment could be brought by an authorised offi  cer to the inspection. This 
could e.g. be “portable computer equipment and tape recording equipment”.71 During the 
inspection, the OFT could ask any person on the premises to produce documents;72 the OFT 
could require any person to provide an explanation of any document provided;73 it could ask 
any person to state where documents could be found;74 it could make copies or take extracts 
of those documents;75 it could request information stored in electronic form to be produced 
in a form in which it could be read and taken away;76 and it could take any steps to preserve 
documents or prevent interference with documents,77 which included sealing of (part of) 
premises.78
Non-compliance with the Section 27 powers constituted, just as non-compliance with a Section 
26-request, an off ence. Moreover, destroying documents or providing false or misleading 
information was also an off ence. The same maximum penalties applied to Section 27.79 There 
was one diff erence with the system under Section 26: intentionally obstructing an offi  cer 
during a Section 27 inspection was also an off ence,80 which could be fi ned in magistrates’ 
court, and thus on summary conviction, with a fi ne up to the statutory maximum, or on 
indictment to the Crown Court by any fi ne.81
The third power the OFT possessed was the power to enter and search any premises with 
a warrant.82 The 28 and 28A Competition Act were broader than the powers in Section 27 
Competition Act. Any premises, including domestic premises, could be entered and searched. 
This was a “right of forcible entry”,83 since the OFT could use force to gain entry to the 
inspected premises.84 The power to enter business premises and domestic premises could, 
68  Section 27(3)(a) Competition Act 1998 (old).
69   Section 27(3)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old). The offi  cer should have taken “all such steps as are reasonably practicable to give notice”. 
70  Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 397.
71  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.6.
72  Section 27(5)(b)(i) Competition Act 1998 (old).
73  Section 27(5)(b)(ii) Competition Act 1998 (old).
74  Section 27(5)(c) Competition Act 1998 (old).
75  Section 27(5)(d) Competition Act 1998 (old). 
76  Section 27(5)(e) Competition Act 1998 (old).
77  Section 27(5)(f) Competition Act 1998 (old).
78  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.5.
79  See above, in the present subparagraph, where the penalties for Section 26 requests are discussed.
80  Section 42(5) Competition Act 1998 (old).
81  Section 42(6) Competition Act 1998 (old).
82   Section 28 Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
83  Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 398.
84   Section 28(2)(a) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(a) Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
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until 2004, be found in the same article. These powers were split into two provisions in 2004. 
There were three circumstances under which a judge might issue a warrant to inspect business 
premises. The OFT might have reasonable grounds that documents are on the premises of an 
undertaking (i) which have not been produced on request under Section 26 or in the course of 
a Section 27 inspection; (ii) which might be concealed, removed, tampered with or destroyed 
where the OFT use its Section 26 powers; or (iii) which might be on the premises, but the OFT 
was unable to enter the premises without warrant.85 The fi rst and second circumstances could 
also be used to issue a warrant for domestic premises.86
The OFT could use, as mentioned above, “such force as is reasonably”87 necessary to enter 
any premises. Furthermore, the OFT could search premises; take copies of or extracts from 
documents; take documents88 if it was necessary to preserve them or prevent interference 
with them or if it was not possible to copy them; take any other steps to preserve documents 
or interference with documents, such as the sealing of (part of the) premises; require an 
explanation from a person on information contained in any document; the OFT could, lastly, 
request information stored in electronic form to be produced in a form in which it can be 
read and taken away.89 All these powers related to documents of the “relevant kind”, which 
meant “any document appearing to be of a kind in respect of which the application under 
[Section 28(1) or Section 28A(1)] was granted”.90 The OFT could only require the production 
of documents which were not produced under Section 26 or Section 27, when it initiated an 
inspection pursuant to the fi rst abovementioned circumstance.91 A court could extend the 
production of documents under the second circumstance to any other documents relating 
to the investigation.92 Lastly, under the third circumstance, the warrant extended to all 
documents the OFT could have obtained were it able to conduct a Section 27 inspection.93
Section 28 was enforced by criminal sanctions, since non-compliance was regarded as 
an off ence. Statutory defences were not available for non-compliance with a Section 28 
investigation. This was “presumably because the judge asked to issue the warrant would 
eff ectively consider them anyway; furthermore it is possible to challenge the issue of the 
85  Section 28(1)(a)-(c) Competition Act 1998 (old).
86   Section 28A(1)(a)-(b) Competition Act 1998 (old). There was only one diff erence: the OFT could not have used its Section 27 powers to 
investigate domestic premises. Therefore, the fi rst circumstance only saw on a Section 26 request.
87   Section 28(2)(a) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(a) Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
88   These documents could only be kept for a maximum of three months, see Section 28(7) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) 
and Section 28A(8) Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
89   Respectively: Section 28(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) 
(domestic premises); Section 28(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) 
(domestic premises); Section 28(2)(c)(i) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(c)(i) Competition Act 1998 
(old) (domestic premises); Section 28(2)(c)(ii) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(c)(ii) Competition Act 
1998 (old) (domestic premises); Section 28(2)(d) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(d) Competition Act 
1998 (old) (domestic premises); Section 28(2)(e) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(e) Competition Act 
1998 (old) (domestic premises); Section 28(2)(f) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(f) Competition Act 
1998 (old) (domestic premises).
90 Section 28(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) (business premises) and Section 28A(2)(b) Competition Act 1998 (old) (domestic premises).
91  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 5.9.
92  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 5.9.
93  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 5.9.
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warrant itself”.94 Destroying documents or providing false or misleading information was also 
an off ence. The sanctioning regime applicable to Section 26 infringements was also applicable 
to Section 28 infringements.95 Intentionally obstructing an offi  cer was also regarded as an 
off ence,96 which could be fi ned if tried summarily with a fi ne up to the statutory maximum or 
on indictment by any fi ne and/or imprisonment of up to two years.97
There were some limits to the powers of the OFT. A person did not have to provide information 
or documents, on request or during an inspection, when this might infringe legal professional 
privilege or the freedom from self-incrimination. The protection of legal professional privilege could 
be found in the Competition Act.98 The protection against self-incrimination could not be found 
in the Competition Act, but only in the Guidance of the OFT on its powers of investigation.99 This 
Guidance explained in detail the way in which the OFT would use its statutory powers. Privileged 
communication in light of the principle of legal professional privilege meant communication:
(a) between a professional legal adviser and his client, or
(b) made in connection with, or in contemplation of, legal proceedings and for the 
purposes of those proceedings,
which in proceedings in the High Court would be protected from disclosure on 
grounds of legal professional privilege.100
This principle was broader than the EU principle of legal professional privilege, since it also 
applied to in-house lawyers.101 This principle applied even when the OFT acted on behalf of 
the European Commission or another NCA.102
The freedom from self-incrimination in UK competition law was not enshrined in an Act of 
Parliament, but followed, as stated above, from the OFT’s Guidance. The OFT explained this 
principle as follows:
The OFT may compel an undertaking to provide specifi ed documents or specifi ed 
information but cannot compel the provision of answers which might involve an 
admission on its part of the existence of a competition law infringement, which it is 
incumbent upon the OFT to prove. The OFT may, however, request documents or 
94   Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 401-402. A person could seek to discharge or vary a warrant, but had to do so immediately upon the warrant 
being served, see Section 9.1-9.4 of the Practice Direction – application for a Warrant under the Competition Act 1998.
95  See above, in the present subparagraph, where the penalties for Section 26 requests are discussed.
96  Section 42(7) Competition Act 1998 (old).
97  Section 42(7) Competition Act 1998 (old).
98   Section 30 Competition Act 1998 (old). See also OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 6.1-6.4.
99  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 6.5-6.7.
100  Section 30(2) Competition Act 1998 (old).
101   OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 6.2. A higher fundamental rights standard under national law when executing EU law 
might prove to be contrary to EU law and in particular the primacy, eff ectiveness and unity of EU law, see C-399/11 (Stefano Melloni v 
Ministerio Fiscal), par. 60. For a commentary on a higher protection of the principle of legal professional privilege in light of the limits 
in Melloni, see Veenbrink (2015b).
102   OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 6.2 and 9.9. When the Commission conducts an investigation itself (with or without 
assistance of the OFT) the EU rules will continue to apply, see OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 6.4 and 9.7-9.8.
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information relating to facts: for example, whether a particular employee attended a 
particular meeting.103
It might appear that the OFT made a distinction in its Guidance between factual information
and admissions of guilt. This distinction as such is diff erent from the EU Orkem rule, where 
the Court of Justice only made this distinction when the Commission requests answers, but 
not when it requests documents. The OFT presumably did not want to diff erentiate from the 
Union approach, since it also referred to ECJ jurisprudence in a previous paragraph.104 As 
Whish and Bailey argued: “The power of the OFT to obtain documents already in existence 
does not off end the right against self-incrimination.”105 The distinction between factual 
information and admissions of guilt seemed thus only to be relevant when the OFT requested 
information, but not when it requested documents.
During an inspection with or without a warrant, the undertaking was allowed to contact its legal 
advisers. This was referred to in the OFT’s Guidance, and in the procedural rules approved by 
the Secretary of State.106 The OFT would wait a “reasonable time for legal advisers to arrive”,107 if 
it was “appropriate to do so in the circumstances”.108 However, exercising the “right to consult a 
legal adviser must not unduly delay or impede the inspection”.109 In general, the OFT would not 
wait on a legal adviser when a notice had been given or when in-house council was present.110
7.2.2 Changes to the enforcement regime per 1 April 2014
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13) entered into force in April 2014. 
This act reformed UK competition law. As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph (7.2), 
both the Competition Commission and the OFT were abolished.111 Many provisions referred 
to in the previous subparagraph (7.2.1) are still applicable and merely changed OFT into 
CMA. The Section 26, 27 and 28 powers have e.g. been integrally transferred to the CMA. 
A couple of changes should be mentioned here though. Firstly, a warrant under Section 28 
or Section 28A can also be obtained from the CAT,112 instead of only from the High Court or 
Court of Sessions in Scotland. 
103   OFT guidance Powers of investigating criminal cartels, par. 6.6.
104   See OFT guidance Powers of investigating criminal cartels, par. 6.5, where the OFT referred to EU case law, which, in the its view, 
was consistent with the requirements under the ECHR. The Guidance also refers in a footnote to a domestic case from 2003, which is 
discussed below under the heading of the freedom from self-incrimination. This domestic case also referred extensively to EU case law. 
See Veenbrink (2015a) for more information on the consistency of the EU freedom from self-incrimination with the requirements under 
the ECHR.
105   Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 399, fn. 87. The authors refer in this regard to the obligation of UK authorities to interpret national law in light 
of EU law (and thus also case law of the CJEU), which can be found in Section 60 Competition Act 1998 (old). See also Smith (2001), p. 
2.
106   See respectively OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.10-4.11 and Section 3 of the Schedule to The Competition Act 1998 (Offi  ce 
of Fair Trading’s Rules) Order.
107  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.10.
108  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.10.
109  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.11.
110  OFT guidance Powers of investigation, par. 4.11.
111   There are still multiple sector regulators which also have the power to enforce the competition law rules. See for a list of these sectoral 
regulators, Nazzini (2016a), p. 48.
112  Section 41 and Schedule 13 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.
333
English Competition Law | CHAPTER 7
Ch
ap
te
r 7
Secondly, the CMA obtained two new powers; (i) the power to interview individuals,113 and (ii) 
the power to publish a notice at the start of a formal investigation.114 Regarding the fi rst power, the 
CMA can require a person to provide information. This is a compulsory interview which may only 
be held with a person who has “a connection with” an undertaking subject to an investigation. 
The connection with an undertaking “may be a current connection or a former connection, for 
example where the individual used to work for the undertaking under investigation”.115
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the criminal off ences for non-compliance with the 
investigative powers of the CMA have been replaced with civil sanctions.116 The criminal 
off ences for obstructing an investigation of providing false or misleading information have not 
been abolished. In the Explanatory Notes, it is provided that the change to civil sanctions for 
non-cooperation should “provide a more eff ective deterrent to non-cooperation”.117 Strangely 
enough, the Impact Assessment only refers to potential changes for market studies which would 
then include civil sanctions for information requirements.118 It is therefore not entirely clear why 
civil sanctions would provide for a more eff ective deterrent for non-cooperation and why civil 
sanctions are not the way to go for obstructing an investigation or providing false or misleading 
information. The change thus seems to be a bit arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that it 
will be easier for the CMA to penalise non-cooperation, since it does not have to go to a criminal 
court anymore to have sanctions imposed upon a (natural or legal) person. 
7.3 FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION, NON BIS IN IDEM AND 
PRINCIPLES OF LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
7.3.1 Introduction
This research only examined cases brought before national courts on the basis of a competition 
law fi ne. Enforcement decisions, such as a decision to issue a dawn raid, are not part of it. For 
English competition law, this meant that there are almost no relevant cases dealing with the 
freedom from self-incrimination, the non bis in idem principle and the principles of legality 
and legal certainty. These three principles are therefore touched upon in this paragraph (8.3.2-
8.3.4), but an extensive elaboration cannot be made due to the somewhat striking lack of 
case law on these principles over the last 20 years. By contrast, EU and Dutch jurisprudence 
seems to be more developed on these principles in competition law proceedings. The higher 
amount of cases might explain this diff erence. Perhaps the reform with the ERRA will lead, 
113  Section 26A Competition Act 1998.
114  Section 25A Competition Act 1998.
115   Guidance on the CMA’s investigation procedures in Competition Act 1998 cases, par. 6.19. The CMA provides in its guidance that it 
will determine on a case-by-case basis whether a person has a connection with an undertaking, see par. 6.20. In fn. 63, the CMA refers 
to multiple categories of persons who can have a connection with an undertaking. 
116   Section 40A Competition Act 1998. Civil sanctions are, from a continental perspective, administrative law sanctions, not private law 
sanctions. 
117  Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, p. 17.
118   Department for Business Innovation & Skills, a competition regime for growth: a consultation on options for reform, Impact 
Assessment, p. 78-83. 
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as the government intended, to a higher amount of decisions made by the CMA and thus 
to more case law also on these principles. Another reason to explain the underdevelopment 
of certain principles, is the adversarial nature of civil proceedings in the UK.119 This leads 
to a more passive stance from judges and a more active participation in the procedure by 
the parties concerned.120 Nevertheless, in English, EU and Dutch competition law emphasis 
is already on the parties concerned. As is explained in the previous chapters under the 
standard and burden of proof and, as is explained in this chapter under the same heading, 
the active involvement of an undertaking is important to rebut evidence brought forward by 
a competition authority. The role of parties to the procedure is therefore not fundamentally 
diff erent in order to explain the aforementioned diff erence. It thus remains unclear what the 
reason is of the underdevelopment of certain principles in comparison with their counterparts 
in Dutch and EU competition law. 
7.3.2 Freedom from self-incrimination
The freedom from self-incrimination is touched upon by the CAT in a football shirt cartel case, 
namely Umbro and others v OFT.121 In the judgment on the penalty, AllSports argued that a 
reduction of the fi ne should be given on the basis of cooperation. The CAT indeed confi rmed that 
an undertaking is “not required to make any admissions or to incriminate itself”.122 However, 
according to the CAT, a discount for co-operation only has be given if the admission is “frank”. 
In this case the admission was disingenuous, since AllSports downplayed its role in the cartel.123
Nevertheless, it follows from this case that undertakings do not have to incriminate themselves. 
Otherwise, incriminating oneself would not be a ground for a reduction of the fi ne. 
It also appears, as asserted in paragraph 7.2, that UK competition law makes a distinction 
between providing documents and providing answers. The former should always be 
provided, whereas the latter should only be given if it does not contain an admission. As is 
clear for Umbro and others, providing an admission is not required, but if given voluntarily and 
if frank, it may lead to a reduction in the fi ne. 
There is one case before the High Court which deals in detail with the freedom from self-
incrimination.124 The OFT here requested a warrant to conduct an inspection from the England 
and Wales High Court. Review of enforcement decisions is, as stated above, not part of this 
research. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the judge discussed some fundamental 
rights to determine whether issuing the warrant will lead to an infringement of the Human 
119  For a discussion on the nature of civil proceedings, see Smith et al. (2007), p. 934ff .
120  See e.g. Sorvatzioti and Manson (2018), p. 114.
121  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 231-233.
122  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 231.
123  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 232.
124   England and Wales High Court (14 May 2003) [2003] EWHC 1042 (Comm). The undertakings subject to the inspection were obviously 
not present during this hearing. As MacCulloch (2006), p. 225, insists, this aspect makes the judgment “limited”, since there “was not 
a full hearing of the issues with any representations from target undertakings”. 
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Rights Act. With regard to the freedom from self-incrimination, the judge concerned followed 
the Orkem reasoning of the Court of Justice.125 This is a logical approach in light of the conform 
interpretation requirement in Section 60 Competition Act 1998. Unfortunately, there is no 
telling what the approach of the UK courts will be when more complex questions as to the 
scope of the freedom from self-incrimination arise. 
There are, furthermore, no cases dealing with the principle of legal professional privilege. 
However, as stated in par. 7.2, this principle is codifi ed in the Competition Act 1998.126 This 
principle applies also to in-house lawyers, even when the CMA conducts an investigation on 
the request of the Commission or another NCA.127
7.3.3 Non bis in idem
No cases on the non bis in idem principle have arisen in UK competition law proceedings. It 
is thus unclear how UK courts handle submissions of undertakings as to the non bis in idem 
principle. Here again, the UK courts might apply the approach taken by the Union Courts 
on the basis of their conform interpretation obligation of Section 60 Competition Act. Even 
though the Union Courts appear to be inconsistent in their approach, it has been argued in 
chapter 5 that a consistent line can be discovered from a close reading of their case law. 
The ‘accounting principle’ is also applicable in UK competition law. Section 38(9) Competition 
Act 98 (old and current version) requires the OFT/CMA to take into account “a penalty or 
a fi ne [that] has been imposed by the Commission, or by a court or other body in another 
Member State” on an undertaking when setting the amount of a fi ne for the same anti-
competitive behaviour. The 2018 CMA Guidance on penalties provides the following:
If a penalty or fi ne has been imposed by the European Commission, or by a court or 
other body in another member state in respect of an agreement or conduct, the CMA 
must take that penalty or fi ne into account when setting the amount of a penalty in 
relation to that agreement or conduct. This is to ensure that where an anti-competitive 
agreement or conduct is subject to proceedings resulting in a penalty or fi ne in another 
member state, an undertaking will not be penalised again in the UK for the same anti-
competitive eff ects.128
125   Nazzini (2016a), p. 181-182, asserts that it is likely that the CMA will use the same approach as the CJEU in a purely domestic context. 
According to Nazzini, the CMA is even “bound by the EU rules on the privilege when it enforces EU law or UK law in parallel with 
EU law”. It is, however, not entirely clear though whether the consistency requirement under s. 60 Competition Act 1998, requires such 
an approach (see par. 7.1). Furthermore, the CJEU has accepted the procedural autonomy of Member States within certain boundaries. 
Any adherence to the CJEU for the freedom from self-incrimination will thus probably be voluntarily. 
126  See Section 30 Competition Act 1998. See also Nazzini (2016a), p. 188.
127  See the references to the Guidance of the OFT/CMA in chapter 7, par. 7.2.1.
128   CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.28. The same provision could also be found in the previous OFT’s 
Fining Guidance.
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The obligation to take into account penalties imposed by NCAs or the Commission for the 
same anti-competitive conduct is meant to avoid double jeopardy.129 The accounting principle 
is also the only expression of the non bis in idem principle under EU competition law when the 
Commission enforces the competition rules against an undertaking already penalised for its 
behaviour by an EU NCA. 
The Fining Guidance should also, by way of Section 38(1A) Competition Act 1998, set out the 
conditions under which the NCA may take into account the eff ects in another Member State. 
The 2018 Fining Guidance provides that turnover in another Member State can only be taken 
into account when the “relevant geographic market is wider than the UK and the express 
consent of the relevant member state or NCA, as appropriate, is given in each particular 
case”.130 This, in combination with the codifi ed accounting principle, could prevent non bis 
in idem problems for the CMA when it concerns a previously imposed penalty by an EU 
competition authority.131
7.3.4 Legality & legal certainty
There are a couple of cases of the CAT where – explicitly or implicitly – reference is made to 
the principle of legal certainty. The CAT refers explicitly to the legal certainty principle and 
the legality principle in cases dealing with, respectively, limitation periods and a change in the 
Fining Guidance of the CMA. In other cases, we can also read between the lines to distinguish 
an eff ect of the legal certainty principle. These cases are discussed fi rst, whereas the explicit 
referral to the principles of legal certainty and legality are discussed thereafter.
In NAPP, the CAT held that some paragraphs of the Notice on the assessment of cartels 
were not “happily worded”132, although NAPP could not  “credibly claim to have been 
misled by those paragraphs into believing that its hospital pricing policy in this case was not 
abusive”.133 The uncertainty created by the wording of the OFT did lead the CAT to regard 
this as a mitigating factor for the calculation of the fi ne.134 Taking into account the unhappily 
formulated wording as a mitigating factor could follow from the legal certainty principle. 
However, the CAT did not refer to this principle in its reasoning.
In some cases, the CAT regarded uncertainty as to the legality of certain practices as a 
mitigating factor. This happened in multiple cases relating to cover pricing in the construction 
sector.135 The main arguments, to which the other cases also refer, can be found in the Kier 
129  See the heading of Step 5 in the CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty.
130   CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.14. The 2012 Guidance also contained the obligation to obtain the 
express consent of another NCA, whereas the 2000 Guidance did not include such an obligation, see Huizing (2017), p. 368-369.
131  This could be either the Commission or an EU NCA.
132  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 522.
133  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 522.
134  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 523.
135   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14. Cover pricing is a practice 
where undertakings wishing to participate in a tender, but which, for various reasons, do not want to win the tender, ask other 
undertakings what the amount of their bid is in order to provide a less competitive bid. Undertakings might wish to do so to remain 
in the picture of a tenderer, to ensure they will be asked to submit future tenders as well.
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judgment.136 Textbooks and other materials used for the training of industry participants e.g. 
referred to the matter of cover pricing and conveyed the impression “that cover pricing is a 
normal and acceptable practice where an invitee does not wish to win the work”.137 This led 
the OFT to decide to write a letter to the authors of a textbook suggesting them to adjust their 
book on this point.138 Furthermore, the endemic, and thus accepted, nature of cover pricing 
in this industry led the CAT to rule that there was “general uncertainty and ambivalence as 
to the legitimacy of the practice”.139 The CAT considered this to be a mitigating factor for the 
penalties.140 By contrast in the Argos case, the CAT took the view that the common nature of 
the price fi xing practices in the toy industry was not a ground for a reduction of a fi ne but 
“ all the more reason for the OFT to take a serious view” of the practices in the industry.141 The 
CAT also asserted that there was no “uncertainty as to what was lawful and what was not, or 
as to where the line was”;142 the behaviour was “plainly contrary to the Chapter 1 prohibition 
in accordance with well known legal principles”.143
The principle of legal certainty is explicitly referred to in two cases. In these cases, the CAT 
accepted it as a fundamental principle that is applicable in competition law proceedings.144 The 
two cases dealt with the absence of a limitation period in competition law proceedings. The 
undertakings concerned argued that the absence of this period led to an infringement of  the 
legal certainty principle. However, the CAT quickly refuted the criticism that the absence of a 
limitation period in UK competition law would infringe the legal certainty principle. Hence, 
the absence of limitation periods did not contravene this principle, according to the CAT.145
In some construction sector cases, undertakings argued that the fi nes increased due to the 
retrospective application of the Fining Guidance. The OFT used to take into account the turnover 
in the infringement year as a starting point for the determination of a fi ne, but changed this to the 
turnover in the year of the decision.146 The turnover was higher in the year of the decision than 
in the year of the infringement. This would, according to the undertakings concerned, infringe 
Article 7 ECHR.147 The CAT dealt with this question for the fi rst time in the Tomlinson case.148 Both 
the Barrett Estate Services case and the Crest Nicholson case refer to the Tomlinson case.149 The CAT 
referred to the leading criminal case on this issue and applies it to the case at hand:
136  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3.
137  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 104.
138  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par .104.
139   See CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, respectively par. 103 and 115 for the observations of the CAT on the endemic nature and on the 
general uncertainty and ambivalence.
140  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 115.
141  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
142  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
143  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
144  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 173; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 48.
145  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 173; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 48.
146   CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 103-105; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 19; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 10, par. 45.
147   CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 105; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 19; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 10, par. 45.
148  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 103-110. 
149   Respectively CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 10, par. 45-48, and CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 19-22. 
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The leading case on the application of article 7 to revisions of sentencing legislation 
is R (Uttley) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 38, [2004] 1 WLR 
2278. That case concerned a prisoner who had been sentenced in October 1995 to 12 
years imprisonment for crimes that he had committed before 1983. If he had been 
sentenced at the date he committed the crimes, he would have served two-thirds of 
his sentence in prison and then been released without being subject to any further 
conditions. The eff ect of legislation coming into force before his sentence was imposed 
was that his release after serving two thirds of the 12 year sentence was subject to 
licence conditions and left him at risk of being recalled to prison if he committed a 
further imprisonable off ence before the licence period expired.150
The House of Lords did not fi nd this to be an infringement of Article 7 ECHR, since the sentence 
was not higher than the sentence which “could have been imposed on the defendant under the 
law in force at the time the off ence was committed”.151 Under both old and new law, the accused 
could have been sentenced for life. 12 years, with or without early release, was still less than a 
life sentence. The CAT then compared this criminal law case to the case at hand: 
Seddon and Tomlinson sought to distinguish Uttley by arguing that the maximum 
applicable penalty with which the fi nes imposed on them had to be compared was 
not the statutory cap under the Original Turnover Order but rather the maximum 
fi ne that could have properly been imposed under the earlier Guidance for this 
particular infringement. We do not consider that is a correct reading of Uttley. The 
question whether the off ences committed by Uttley could at the date of his conviction 
properly have resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment was not considered by their 
Lordships as relevant to the question whether life imprisonment should be treated as 
the maximum “applicable” in that case. This was also clear from the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights to which Baroness Hale and Lord Rodger referred: 
Coëme v Belgium Application nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 
33210/96, at paragraph 145: 
“T he court must therefore verify that at the time when an accused person 
performed the act which led to his being prosecuted and convicted there was in 
force a legal provision which made that act punishable, and that the punishment 
imposed did not exceed the limits fi xed by that provision.”152
In conclusion, the CAT ruled that the statutory cap of 10 percent of the turnover of the 
undertaking in the year of the infringement in the UK was applicable to the situation before 
150  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 106.
151  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 107.
152  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 108.
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and after the change in the Fining Guidance. This means that the overall fi ne could never be 
higher than the statutory cap.153 A change in the statutory cap would therefore seem to trigger 
the legality principle, but a change in the Fining Guidance does not. 
7.3.5 Résumé
The freedom from self-incrimination, the non bis in idem principle and the principles of legality 
and legal certainty, all have some presence in UK competition law. It is, however, diffi  cult to 
establish what these principles exactly entail in UK competition law due to the lack of case 
law. This forms quite a striking diff erence with the case law of the Union Courts, but even of 
the case law of the Dutch courts. The current regime in the UK and the current regime in the 
Netherlands both date from 1998, so one would have expected to fi nd similar aspects to be 
discussed in both jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it seems some principles have not found their 
way yet to the UK competition law courts. 
7.4 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
7.4.1 Introduction
The UK parliament did not include a provision in the Competition Act that provides a 
burden and/or standard of proof for competition law proceedings. The UK courts therefore 
have had to determine which elements have to be proven by the CMA and which by the 
undertaking allegedly infringing the competition law rules. Furthermore, the standard of proof 
in competition law proceedings was also established in case law. The NAPP case154 constituted 
the fi rst competition law case tried before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. This case presented 
an opportunity for the CAT to have, as the CAT puts it, a somewhat “academic” discussion155
on the burden and standard of proof in competition law proceedings. In subsequent cases, 
the judgment in NAPP was strongly criticised by undertakings. The regime chosen for the 
standard of proof appeared not to be so straightforward as the CAT made it seem to be in NAPP.
In the introduction of this chapter it was already mentioned that Section 60 of the Competition 
Act requires UK courts to act in conformity with principles laid down in EU law and as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice. The approach taken by the CAT in NAPP is, according to 
that tribunal, in conformity with the approach of the Union Courts. The CAT ruled:
Whether or not section 60 of the Act is to be construed as requiring us to follow the case 
law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on issues such as the burden 
and standard of proof, we believe that the approach we have outlined above is in line 
with the approach of those Courts. There is no doubt that in proceedings under Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proof rests on the Commission (see Montecatini
153  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 109-110.
154  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1.
155  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 113. 
340
CHAPTER 7 | English Competition Law
at paragraph 179). As far as the standard of proof is concerned, the European Courts, 
faced with the diff erent traditions of the Member States, have simply indicated 
that the infringement should be demonstrated to the “requisite legal standard” (à 
27 suffi  sance de droit), but there is no doubt that, in general, those Courts require 
convincing proof that the alleged infringements have been committed in the form 
of a “fi rm, precise and consistent body of evidence”: see Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM 
and Rheinzink v Commission cited above, paragraphs 16 to 20; Cases C-89/85 etc 
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paragraph 127. 
We have no reason to suppose that the standard of proof we propose to follow 
is any diff erent from that followed in practice by the courts in Luxembourg.156
As can be seen in the quote above, the CAT presumed that the approach it took was the 
same as the approach of the General Court. It left the question open whether it was obliged 
to follow the same approach as the Union Courts with regard to the burden and standard 
of proof. Strikingly, two and half years later the CAT ruled in AllSports, with reference to 
paragraph from NAPP quoted above, that the entering into force of Regulation 1/2003 
“reinforces [the CAT’s] view that the standard of proof [the CAT applies] should not be out 
of line with that applied by the Court of First Instance and Court of Justice when 
considering an appeal against a decision of the European Commission”.157 The 
phrase “whether or not” in NAPP was thus actually meant to be a confi rmation of 
the obligation fl owing from Section 60 Competition Act 1998 to follow the Union 
Courts’ case law on the standard and burden of proof. In AllSports, the CAT did confi rm 
that it followed the approach taken by the Court of Justice in Aalborg Portland.158
In the next paragraphs, fi rst the burden of proof is examined (7.4.2). Secondly, the approach 
of the UK courts with regard to the standard of proof in competition law proceedings is 
discussed (7.4.3). 
7.4.2 Burden of proof
It is established case law that the legal burden to prove an infringement rests on the CMA. 
The CMA thus has to present a prima facie case (evidential burden) and prove it to the requisite 
legal standard (legal burden).159 As is seen below, the CMA may rely on inferences, in the 
156  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 112.
157  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 207.
158   CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 207. See also ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 
P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 338.
159   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 100; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 123; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 
148; CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17 par. 931; CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 157; CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 
29, par. 132-133; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 13; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 93; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 
11, par. 81; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 45; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 14; and CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] 
CAT 31par. 88 and 111.
341
English Competition Law | CHAPTER 7
Ch
ap
te
r 7
absence of any countervailing indications.160 This is in line with the CJEU Aalborg Portland161
judgment, to which the CAT sometimes refers.162
The CMA has to prove an infringement, but this does not necessarily mean that an undertaking 
can stand idly by. There is an evidential burden of proof on undertakings in order to challenge 
facts as presented by the CMA. With regard to inferences, the UK courts have mentioned, as 
stated above, that countervailing indications may rebut them. In general, the CAT provided in 
the Racecourse Association & Ors v OFT case that an evidential burden rests on an undertaking to 
rebut arguments and facts as presented by the OFT.163 As the CAT stated: “Once that evidence 
was before the OFT, the overall legal burden still remained on the OFT to prove the infringement 
of the Chapter I prohibition that it was asserting.” An undertaking should thus prove that which 
it asserts,164 at least to the threshold where it can be taken into account by the CAT. This case 
shows that there is merely an evidential burden to disprove elements for which the CMA has a 
legal burden of proof, but it does not lead to a legal burden of proof on the undertaking. 
The CAT has also stated that applying for leniency or invoking a weak fi nancial position, both 
in order to receive a reduction in the fi ne, reverses the evidential burden of proof, so that it 
comes to rest on an undertaking.165 An undertaking should prove it is eligible for a reduction 
of the fi ne. It is not for the CMA to disprove the application for a reduction of the fi ne.166
Nevertheless, in practice it appears that an undertaking cannot always limit itself to merely 
providing an alternative explanation or providing a counterargument. Sometimes, the UK 
courts require more from an undertaking, which might lead to a legal burden of proof to 
rebut the case made by the CMA. The quite logical approach taken by the Union Courts and 
the Dutch courts,167 where they make a distinction between direct and indirect evidence in 
order to determine the burden of proof on an undertaking, is not that clearly present in UK 
competition law, although reading between the lines, this does seem to be the approach taken 
by the UK courts in competition law proceedings. This is further discussed below, under the 
standard of proof.
The CMA does not have to discuss all possible exemption grounds that have not been raised 
by an undertaking.168 This implies at least an evidential burden of proof on undertakings 
to raise exemptions. Undertakings have to put forward all information on which they rely
160   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 110-111; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 256; CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, 
par. 131-132; CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] CAT 11, par. 47; and CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 96. Sometimes the CAT refers 
to circumstantial evidence instead of inferences, see CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 96; and CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, 
par. 86.
161   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission).
162  CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] CAT 11, par. 47; and CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 96.
163   CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 133-134. The CAT refers to the apparent restriction which might be “justifi ed”. The CAT 
probably did not refer to the exemption grounds for an infringement, but merely to the test to determine whether there is a restriction. 
This assumption is reinforced by examining paragraph 134 where the CAT explicitly refers to the burden of proof for exemption 
grounds. See also e.g. EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 95.
164  CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par .133.
165  CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par .100.
166  CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 100.
167  Respectively Chapter 5, par. 5.5.3, and Chapter 6, par. 6.5.3.
168  CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 577.
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in order to get anti-competitive behaviour exempted/justifi ed.169 The CAT has also ruled 
that an undertaking does not merely have an evidential burden of proof when it raises an 
exemption ground, but is also subject to a legal burden of proof “which can be discharged on 
the balance of probabilities”.170
7.4.3 Standard of proof
The standard of proof is a hot potato in UK competition law. UK law, as a common law system, 
is quite familiar with a standard of proof and therefore it seems logical for competition law 
lawyers to require a straight answer from the CAT on this matter. It appears, however, that 
the CAT has struggled to fi nd the standard of proof which should be used in competition law 
proceedings, or, at least, that it has found it diffi  cult to explain the proper standard of proof. 
Overall, it is quite clear that a civil standard of proof is used. This standard entails that the 
CMA, but also the undertaking concerned when it bears the legal burden of proof, should 
prove the case on the balance of probabilities.171 The fi rst competition law case dealt with
by the CAT, namely the NAPP case, caused the fi rst confusion on the proper 
standard of proof to be used. The CAT held that there is a graduation of degrees of 
probability: “Within the civil standard, however, the more serious the allegation, the 
more cogent should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation 
is established on the preponderance of probability.”172 The CAT continued: 
Since cases under the Act involving penalties are serious matters, it follows from Re H 
that strong and convincing evidence will be required before infringements of the Chapter 
I and Chapter II prohibitions can be found to be proved, even to the civil standard. 
Indeed, whether we are, in technical terms, applying a civil standard on the basis of 
strong and convincing evidence, or a criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, 
we think in practice the result is likely to be the same. We fi nd it diffi  cult to imagine, 
for example, this Tribunal upholding a penalty if there were a reasonable doubt in our 
minds, or if we were anything less than sure that the Decision was soundly based.173
Furthermore, the CAT concluded that it does “not think that it makes any material diff erence 
to the outcome in this particular case whether we apply the domestic civil standard in the 
way described above, or the domestic criminal standard as traditionally expressed”.174
169  CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 578.
170  CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 134. 
171   For the standard of proof on the OFT/CMA, see: CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 101-105; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 
4, par. 149; CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 187-196; CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 150 and 164-165; CAT (2 
August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 132; CAT (24 February 2005) [2005] CAT 4, par. 60; CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] CAT 11, par. 46; CAT 
(27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 14; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 94; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 81; CAT (27 
April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 46; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 15; and CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 88 and 
111. This is confi rmed on appeal: EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 70. For the standard of proof of the undertaking 
concerned, see CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 134.
172  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 107.
173  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 108.
174  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 113.
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These statements caused confusion on the part of undertakings which allegedly infringed the 
competition rules. In JJB Sports and AllSports v OFT, the CAT had to explain that the statements 
in NAPP did not bring in a criminal standard through the back door. A civil standard of proof 
on the balance of probabilities should be applied in competition law proceedings, although 
the probability requirement should be read in light of the gravity of what is alleged.175 A “bare 
balance of probabilities” is thus not the standard used by the CAT in UK competition law 
proceedings.176 As it explained:
In our view it would not, in this Tribunal, be appropriate to “leap across” the distinction 
between a criminal prosecution and the wholly diff erent and essentially administrative 
system established under the Act to prevent restrictions on competition. The authorities 
cited above in relation to football banning orders, anti-social behaviour orders and sex 
off ender orders refer to matters which come before the criminal courts and aff ect the 
freedom of the individual. In our respectful view, those authorities concern diff erent 
legislation and do not warrant the introduction of the law and psychology of the criminal 
process into proceedings before the Tribunal. Nor do we think that that was the intention.177
The civil standard of proof is thus not a criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
In the Makers case, the CAT also ruled that the civil standard of proof is not “akin” to the 
criminal standard. Both JJB Sports and AllSports and Makers seem to be in contrast with NAPP, 
although the CAT does not seem willing to admit this. Furthermore, as the CAT and the 
Court of Appeal have stated on multiple occasions, any doubt should benefi t the undertaking 
concerned.178 In 2011, the CAT referred in three cases to a “great deal of debate” as to whether 
there is a “heightened standard” of civil proof in serious cases.179 According to the CAT, three 
House of Lords cases, one from 1986 and two from 2008, have put this discussion to rest. To 
refer to the latter two cases:
It is recognised by these statements that a possible source of confusion is the failure 
to bear in mind with suffi  cient clarity the fact that in some contexts a court or tribunal 
has to look at the facts more critically or more anxiously than in others before it can be 
satisfi ed to the requisite standard. The standard itself is, however, fi nite and unvarying. 
Situations which make such heightened examination necessary may be the inherent 
unlikelihood of the occurrence taking place (Lord Hoff mann’s example of the animal
175  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 202-203.
176  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 931.
177  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 202.
178   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 109; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 149; CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 
202; CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 158; CAT (24 February 2005) [2005] CAT 4, par. 60; CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] 
CAT 11, par. 46; and CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 88. See also CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 14; CAT (22 March 
2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 94; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 81; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 46; and CAT (27 April 
2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 15, which refer to the relevant passages in NAPP and JJB Sports and AllSports. This is also confi rmed on appeal 
EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 70.
179  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par .15; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 47; and CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 16.
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 seen in Regent’s Park), the seriousness of the allegation to be proved or, in some cases, 
the consequences which could follow from acceptance of proof of the relevant fact. 
The seriousness of the allegation requires no elaboration: a tribunal of fact will look 
closely into the facts grounding an allegation of fraud before accepting that it has been 
established. The seriousness of consequences is another facet of the same proposition: 
if it is alleged that a bank manager has committed a minor peculation, that could entail 
very serious consequences for his career, so making it the less likely that he would 
risk doing such a thing. These are all matters of ordinary experience, requiring the 
application of good sense on the part of those who have to decide such issues. They 
do not require a diff erent standard of proof or a specially cogent standard of evidence, 
merely appropriately careful consideration by the tribunal before it is satisfi ed of the 
matter which has to be established.180
I think that the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard 
of proof and that is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not. I do 
not intend to disapprove any of the cases in what I have called the fi rst category, but I 
agree with the observation of Lord Steyn in McCann’s case (at 812) that clarity would 
be greatly enhanced if the courts said simply that although the proceedings were civil, 
the nature of the particular issue involved made it appropriate to apply the criminal 
standard.181
There is thus no heightened civil standard of proof. Strikingly, the CAT still refers in its 2011 
cases to NAPP and JJB Sports and AllSports.182 Apparently, these cases are not in contrast with 
the approach taken by the House of Lords in the 2008 cases. All factors should be taken into 
account in order to determine whether, on the balance of probabilities, an allegation is proven. 
However, this does not mean that a criminal standard applies. According to the House of 
Lords rulings, courts have to be transparent as to the standards they use. There is one civil 
standard and one criminal standard. 
In the Tesco case, the CAT appears to try to combine a criminal standard of proof, with the civil 
standard of proof by ruling that “[a]ny doubt in the mind of the Tribunal as to whether a point 
is established on the balance of probabilities must operate to the advantage of the undertaking 
alleged to have infringed the competition rules”.183
Overall though, the CAT seems to focus mostly on the nature of the evidence. The body of 
evidence should be strong and convincing/compelling.184 The distinction between the legal 
180  House of Lords (11 June 2008) [2008] UKHL 33, par. 28
181  House of Lords (11 June 2008) [2008] UKHL 35, par. 13.
182   CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 14; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 46; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 15.
183  CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 88.
184   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 108; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 118 and 256; CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 
17, par. 200, 204, 885 and 932; CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 166, 311, 726 and 777; CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, 
par. 192; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 95; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 86 and 107.
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test used to prove an infringement and the nature of the evidence to satisfy that test was 
already made by the CAT in JJB Sports and AllSports.185 In GMI Construction for example, 
the CAT found evidence to be present to prove two plausible but contradictory versions of 
possible events. In the end the CAT was not persuaded that the OFT version was more likely 
than not.186 In order to prove an infringement, the CMA should present strong and convincing 
evidence that supports the case on the balance of probabilities. 
No hierarchy of evidence exists,187 although contemporary documents have a high probative 
value.188 Witness statements, even though they can be coloured, can have probative value if 
the CAT fi nds the witness reliable.189 For this, the CAT examines amongst others whether 
statements by witnesses are corroborated by other documents or witness statements, or 
whether the context corroborates the statements made.190 The CAT can also assess the 
credibility of a witness by considering the eff orts of a witness to assist the CAT and the 
motives of a witness.191 Factual errors in a witness statement do not necessarily undermine its 
credibility though.192
“After-the-event documents” and interview records by contrast do not have a high probative 
value.193 Early resolution agreements by which an undertaking admits its participation in a 
cartel can be used to prove the participation of non-admitting undertakings.194 Nevertheless, 
the CAT questions the probative value of these documents and has suggested that the CMA 
align its approach with the approach of the Commission in settlement procedures, since those 
settlement documents have more probative value than the ERAs in their current form.195
Sporadic and indirect counterevidence is not suffi  cient.196 An unequivocal denial by a witness 
might, if not challenged by the CMA, in combination with some other unresolved concerns, 
be suffi  cient to ensure that the case cannot be proven on the balance of probabilities.197
The CMA may rely on inferences and presumptions in order to prove a case.198 The UK courts 
will however quash a decision when it is based on speculation only.199 Inferences should 
also be logical, or probable, which seems to boil down to common sense.200 Relying on the 
185  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 199.
186  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 71. 
187  CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 127 and 128.
188  CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 312.
189   See e.g. CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 295. For an example of a case where the CAT held that the statements by witnesses 
were coloured, see CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 288-293.
190   CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 148; CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 294; CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 
499; CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 127.
191   See respectively e.g. CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 32, and CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 117.
192  CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 317-319.
193   See respectively CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 49, and CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 109-110; CAT (15 April 2011) 
[2011] CAT 11, par. 87; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 49 and 67; CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 139.
194  CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 100-114.
195  CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 114.
196  CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 211.
197  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 30-31.
198   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 110-111; CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 132; CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] CAT 
11, par. 47; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 95; and CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 86. 
199  CAT (2 August 2005) [2005] CAT 29, par. 203.
200   CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 212. See e.g. also CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 121 and 123.
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“endemic practice” in an industry is a factor which can be used to prove that an undertaking 
has engaged in a cartel.201 It will however be necessary to show that a particular undertaking 
did indeed participate in a cartel. Merely referring to the endemic practice and thereby 
linking a particular undertaking to those anti-competitive practices is insuffi  cient to prove the 
individual participation of that undertaking in the cartel, when that undertaking contests its 
participation.202 As the CAT furthermore ruled, with reference to case law of the Union Courts 
and Opinions of AGs: “[E] ven a single item of evidence, or wholly circumstantial evidence, 
depending on the particular context and the particular circumstances, may be suffi  cient to 
meet the required standard”.203 Undertakings are tasked with rebutting evidence provided 
by the CMA. Standing idly by might lead the UK courts to fi nd a case to be proven. A passive 
stance is thus to the detriment of the accused undertakings. 
It seems that an evidential burden of proof rests on an undertaking to challenge 
circumstantial evidence produced by the CMA. An alternative explanation advanced 
by an undertaking to rebut indirect, or circumstantial, evidence needs to be 
convincing.204 Unparticularised assertions are not suffi  cient to rebut inferences,205
although this statement does not seem to imply more than an evidential burden of 
proof. Undertakings merely have to point to a plausible alternative explanation. 
Lastly, an undertaking needs to provide direct evidence in order to rebut direct evidence used 
by the CMA.206 As stated before, the UK judiciary in this regard follows the approach of the 
Union Courts. Evidence adduced by an undertaking should be used to show, as the Union 
Courts have e.g. explicitly held, that the direct evidence of the competition law authority is 
insuffi  cient. This requires more than merely pointing to evidence or adducing evidence for a 
prima facie case. This approach is probably present in English competition law proceedings 
as well, due to the adherence by the UK judiciary to the approach in EU competition law 
proceedings. 
7.4.4 Résumé
The legal and evidential burden of proof rests on the CMA to prove an infringement of the 
competition rules. Undertakings do have an evidential burden of proof to rebut indirect 
evidence, whereas there seems to be an evidential and legal burden of proof where it concerns 
the rebutting of direct evidence. For exemption grounds, the undertaking concerned bears the 
legal burden of proof. The standard of proof in such cases is on the balance of probabilities. 
201  See e.g. CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 86.
202  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par. 36-38; 15, par. 59 and 64.
203  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17, par. 206.
204  CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, par. 356.
205  CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 201.
206   See e.g. CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 151. But see also Competition Appeal Tribunal (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24, 
par. 314, where explanations of contemporary documents were not suffi  ciently convincing to rebut the OFTs assertions, since there was 
no document which was “on its face” inconsistent with the OFTs case. In CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, 235, the CAT ruled that a 
contemporary document from an undertaking how it saw the market may be decisive evidence. 
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Overall, the standard of proof for both the CMA and the undertaking, when it bears a legal 
burden of proof, is the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The body of evidence 
adduced by the CMA should be consistent and convincing. Both direct and indirect evidence 
may be used by the CMA to prove its case. To rebut direct evidence, it appears direct evidence 
is needed. By contrast, it seems that, for an undertaking to rebut indirect/circumstantial 
evidence, a logical alternative explanation is suffi  cient. 
7.5 PROPORTIONALITY OF SANCTIONS
7.5.1 Introduction
The CMA may impose penalties for an infringement of the Chapter 1 or 2 prohibitions and 
their corresponding EU law provisions, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.207 A fi ne is limited to 10% 
of the turnover of the undertaking.208 Turnover is defi ned as of 1 May 2004 as follows: 
The turnover of an undertaking for the purposes of section 36(8) is the applicable 
turnover for the business year preceding the date on which the decision of the OFT 
is taken or, if fi gures are not available for that business year, the one immediately 
preceding it.209
The ERRA 2014 inserted in the Competition Act of 1998 that the CMA should take into account 
the seriousness of the infringement and the objective of general and specifi c deterrence.210
These two objectives were already mentioned in the OFT’s Fining Guidance,211 but have 
found their way into the Competition Act 1998 itself, and can also be found in the 2018 ACM’s 
Fining Guidance.212
The proportionality of a sanction is, as such, not referred to in the Competition Act 1998. The 
CAT however ruled on multiple occasions that a fi ne should be appropriate, or proportionate. 
In Barrett Estate Services, the CAT mentioned this principle as merely a factor which needs to 
be taken into account.213 By contrast, in Sepia Logistics, it was only stated that proportionality 
should be viewed from two angles, namely “whether there was proportionality as between 
the amounts of the penalties imposed on the […] undertakings [concerned], and whether the 
amount of the penalties was proportionate to the type and seriousness of infringement”.214
207   Section 36(1) and 36(2) Competition Act 1998. The OFT had, before the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, only the power to impose a 
penalty for an infringement of the national competition rules.
208  Section 36(8) Competition Act 1998 (old and current).
209   See Section 2(3) of The Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) (Amendment) Order, which amends the Section 
3 of the 2000 Order.
210  Section 36(7a) Competition Act 1998.
211  OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 1.4. 
212  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 1.4.
213   CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 54.
214   CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 111. The fi rst aspect (comparison between undertakings) is e.g. also mentioned in: EWCA (Civ 
Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 71.
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There are, however, multiple cases in which the CAT referred to proportionality in a more 
general wording or even as a “cardinal principle”.215 Both the CAT and the CMA have to “stand 
back” and take an overall look at the penalty to determine whether it is proportionate.216 In 
Balmoral Tanks Ltd v CMA, the CAT ruled e.g. the following with regard to this obligation to 
stand back and take an overall look:
Finally we have taken a step back to consider the fairness and proportionality of the fi ne 
imposed on Balmoral for this infringement. We have concluded that there is no basis 
for criticising it. It is an appropriate amount given the nature of the infringement, the 
need to send a clear signal to other undertakings of the dangers of casual discussions 
about price but also given the very positive eff ect Balmoral had on this market by 
its decision to compete vigorously on price and to cooperate with the CMA in its 
investigation of the Main Cartel.217
This last step seems to boil down to a proportionality stricto sensu test. After all factors are 
taken into consideration and after examining whether a fi ne is thus suitable and the least 
restrictive, the CAT will still “stand back” to determine in light of all the circumstances of the 
case whether the fi ne is proportionate. 
The Fining Guidelines are discussed in the subparagraph below (7.5.2). Undertakings 
sometimes argue that inspiration should be drawn from criminal law by the review and 
setting of a competition law fi ne. This is discussed as well (7.5.3). After an examination of 
these cases, the factors which need to be taken into account for determining a competition law 
fi ne are discussed (7.5.4).
7.5.2 Fining Guidance
The Fining Guidance was created by the CMA pursuant to a statutory obligation.218 The 
Secretary of State has to approve the Guidance before it takes eff ect.219 The Fining Guidance 
prescribe a six-step approach for the CMA.220 The Competition Act itself only provided 
for a statutory maximum until up April 2014. The ERRA 2014 included Section 36(7A) in 
the Competition Act 1998, which provides that the CMA should also have regard to the 
seriousness of an infringement and the need for specifi c and general deterrence. Therefore, 
the matters which should be taken into account for setting a fi ne should be set out in the 
215  For the latter, see CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 175.
216   CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 106; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 74 and 166; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 
72; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 44; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 201. See respectively for the obligation on the CAT 
and the OFT/CMA to stand back: CAT (27 January 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 234; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 166; CAT (24 
March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 72; and CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 168; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 44; CAT (15 
April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 201.
217  CAT (6 October 2017) [2017] CAT 23.
218   Section 38(1) and 38(1A) Competition Act 1998. See CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 1.8.
219   Section 38(4) Competition Act 1998. See also CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 1.9.
220   Reference is only made to the 2018 version. The previous 2012 version also contained a six-step approach, whereas the one before the 
2012 version referred to a fi ve-step approach (wherein the last step was not as such included). 
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Fining Guidance.221 In April 2018, the CMA adopted a new Fining Guidance, whereas before 
that time it still used the 2012 OFT’s Guidance. A major change should be referred to here; 
the CMA will take the need for general deterrence already into account when setting the starting 
amount of the fi ne under Step 1, whereas previously only the seriousness of the infringement 
was taken into account. 
The starting point of the fi ne is a percentage of the relevant turnover, in light of the seriousness 
of the infringement and the need for general deterrence.222 The CMA may go for a percentage 
of up to 30% of the relevant turnover under step 1 in order to refl ect the seriousness of the 
infringement and the need for general deterrence.223 In general, the ACM will use a percentage 
between 21-30% for the most serious types of infringements and a percentage between 10-
20% for less serious infringements.224 This step is the same for all undertakings participating 
in the same infringement and not intended to refl ect “the particular circumstances of each 
undertaking’s unlawful conduct”.225 This is thus similar to the approach of the Commission, 
where the absolute gravity is assessed under the fi rst step, and the relative gravity when 
taking into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
A multiplier may be used for the duration of an infringement under step 2.226 The multiplier 
used may not be more than the number of years of the infringement. However, parts of years 
can be rounded up to whole years for this multiplier. An infringement of less than one year will 
be rounded up to one year, although the CMA may exceptionally decrease a fi ne on this basis.227
Step 3 consists of an adjustment for aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances.228 The 
Guidance provides a non-exhaustive list of factors which can be taken into account. The 
following aggravating factors are mentioned: 
[P]ersistent and repeated unreasonable behaviour that delays the CMA’s enforcement 
action; role of the undertaking as a leader in, or an instigator of, the infringement; 
involvement of directors or senior management (notwithstanding [the possibility to 
prosecute for the cartel off ence]); retaliatory or other coercive measures taken against 
other undertakings aimed at ensuring the continuation of the infringement; continuing 
the infringement after the start of the investigation; repeated infringements by the 
same undertaking or other undertakings in the same group (recidivism); infringements 
which are committed intentionally rather than negligently; retaliatory measures taken 
or commercial reprisal sought by the undertaking against a leniency applicant; failure 
221  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 454.
222   CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.3-2.15. The previous Guidance did not refer to general deterrence 
under step 1, see OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.3-2.11.
223  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.4.
224  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.6.
225  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.10.
226  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.16.
227  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.16.
228  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.17.
350
CHAPTER 7 | English Competition Law
to comply with competition law following receipt of a warning or advisory letter in 
respect of the same or similar conduct.229
Mitigating circumstances include: 
[The] role of the undertaking, for example, where the undertaking is acting under 
severe duress or pressure; genuine uncertainty on the part of the undertaking as to 
whether the agreement or conduct constituted an infringement; adequate steps having 
been taken with a view to ensuring compliance with Articles 101 and 102 and the 
Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions; termination of the infringement as soon as the 
CMA intervenes; cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded 
more eff ectively and/or speedily.230
The CMA may adjust a fi ne for specifi c deterrence and proportionality reasons under step 4.231
This may lead to an increase or a decrease of the penalty. A Minimum Deterrence Threshold 
(MDT) may be used to increase the fi ne. However, the CMA also has to examine whether the 
penalty overall is appropriate. This is an obligation, as stated above, which was also referred 
to by the CAT. 
Step 5 creates the obligation for the CMA to adjust the penalty when it exceeds the statutory 
maximum and the obligation to take into account fi nes imposed by the European Commission 
or NCAs.232
The last step will allow for a reduction under the leniency programme, for settlement 
agreements and for an approved voluntary redress scheme.233 The CMA could also reduce the 
fi ne to take into account fi nancial hardship.234
The CMA must have regard to the Guidance, which is a stronger obligation than merely taking 
the Guidance into account.235 This does not mean that derogating from this Guidance is not 
possible. There is some margin of discretion for the CMA in the application and interpretation 
of the Guidance,236 although a signifi cant departure from the Guidance should be properly 
motivated.237
229  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.18.
230  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.19.
231  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.20-2.24.
232  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.25-2.28.
233  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.29-2.32.
234  CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, par. 2.33.
235   CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 101; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 33. This approach is confi rmed on appeal by the 
EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 160-161.
236   CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 102 and 154; CAT (31 October 2006) [2006] CAT 24, par. 15; CAT (22 February 2007) [2007] CAT 
11, par. 117; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 76; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 34; and CAT (6 October 2017) [2017] CAT 
23, par. 134. This approach is confi rmed on appeal by the EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 160-161.
237   EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 160-161; CAT (31 October 2006) [2006] CAT 24, par. 16; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] 
CAT 6, par. 134.
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As mentioned, the CMA is thus bound by the Guidance, unless there are reasons to deviate 
from it. The CAT ruled in the NAPP case that it will carry out an ab initio review.238 It does 
not fi nd itself to be bound by the Guidance, nor should it have regard to the Guidance.239
Furthermore, the CAT also held that it does not serve “much purpose to examine minutely 
the way in which the OFT interpreted and applied the Guidance at each specifi c step”.240
Nevertheless, in general, if a fi ne is overall excessive, it will be important to examine at which 
stage the error crept in, since an “excessive or unjust penalty” is probably the result of some 
“misapplication or misinterpretation of the Guidance”.241 The statutory maximum is the only 
constraint on the CAT.242
The CAT is not bound by the Guidance, although it fi nds it appropriate to take the Guidance 
into account when assessing a penalty.243 Section 38(8) Competition Act 1998 requires the 
CMA and the CAT to have regard to the Fining Guidance. Since 2014, the obligation to “have 
regard” to the Fining Guidance has been inserted in the Competition Act 1998 for the CAT, 
whereas this duty already exists for the CMA since 1998. This change in legislation would 
probably not lead to a change in the case law of the CAT, since the latter already takes into 
account the Guidance. After adjusting a fi ne itself, the CAT even uses in multiple cases the 
Guidance as a cross-check to examine its own setting of the fi ne.244 This is not that strange, 
since the CAT uses a “broad brush”245 approach to set a fi ne when the penalty needs to be 
adapted. 
The method in the Guidance should not be regarded as a “mechanical exercise”, which follows 
a “predetermined mathematical formula”.246 In the Barrett Estate Services case, the CAT even 
mentioned that the application of the Minimum Deterrence Threshold was a prime example 
of the “dramatic consequences of applying a formulaic and identical methodology”.247
7.5.3 References to criminal law
Sometimes undertakings have tried to compare competition law fi nes with sanctions in 
the criminal law sphere. In Tomlinson for example, the undertakings concerned argued that 
the fi nes imposed in competition law are much higher than the fi nes contemplated by the 
guideline on sentencing for corporate manslaughter and health and safety off enses causing 
238   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 499. See also e.g. CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 81; and CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] 
CAT 7, par. 72.
239   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 497; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 489; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 103; 
CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 33. This approach is confi rmed on appeal by the EWCA (19 October 2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, 
par. 182.
240   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 76. See also CAT (6 October 2017) [2017] CAT 23, par. 134.
241   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 77. See e.g. also EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 71.
242  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 501; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 212.
243   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 500; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 103; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 74; 
CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 33.
244   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 539-541; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 202 and 206; CAT (27 January 2005) [2005] 
CAT 13, par. 245-246; CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par 81. This approach is confi rmed on appeal by the EWCA (19 October 2006) 
[2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 182 and EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 71.
245   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 500; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 709; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 196; 
CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 81.
246  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 105.
247  CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 53.
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death.248 The CAT did not fi nd it appropriate to use the criminal law regime as inspiration for 
the level of a competition law penalty. It ruled: 
We consider that these comparators are too far removed from the competition regime 
with which we are dealing to be helpful in assessing the reasonableness of the fi nes 
imposed in this or in any other infringement decision under the 1998 Act. The 1998 
Act does not require the OFT to consider fi nes in other statutory contexts when 
deciding how to exercise its discretion under section 36. The statutory maximum 
fi ne for a competition infringement is set in section 36(8), apparently without 
regard to fi nes in those other contexts. The Guidance which the OFT is required to 
publish, and which has been approved by the Secretary of State, does not suggest 
that the OFT must or should have regard to fi nes for corporate manslaughter or for 
breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 as relevant pointers when setting 
the fi nes for cartel infringements. We accept the OFT’s submissions that those other 
regimes are subject to diff erent policy imperatives from those which apply here. 
We also agree with the OFT that any search for some overarching principles of fairness 
or reasonableness across all regimes which impose fi nancial penalties would be an 
unproductive search. As the OFT put it, there is no scheme of rationality which is able 
to bring the fi ning regime under the 1998 Act into line with the universe of criminal 
penalties and imperatives for justice in diverse fi elds of criminal application. It is true 
that certain factors, such as the relative culpability of the behaviour may be relevant in 
all such contexts. But that does not suggest to us that the corporate manslaughter fi nes 
should operate in some way as a ceiling or benchmark for the fi nes that are imposed 
under the 1998 Act.249
In Kier, a second case where undertakings used criminal law as a source of inspiration, the 
CAT held that the “circumstances in [certain criminal law cases] are so diff erent from an 
infringement of the competition rules that any comparison is likely to lack substance”.250 A 
third case is the North Midland Construction case, where the CAT referred to both Kier and 
Tomlinson and ruled that criminal law and competition law are “subject to diff erent policy 
imperatives”.251 According to the Tribunal, inspiration for the amount of a fi ne can thus not be 
taken from the criminal law domain. 
An argument to take a specifi c criminal law factor into account as a factor when setting a 
fi ne was not accepted by the CAT either. It refused to take into account the concept of mens 
248  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 136-137.
249  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 138-139.
250  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 314.
251  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 99.
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rea in competition law cases.252 Similarly, explaining a factor in light of the approach taken in 
criminal law to a similar factor is an “inapposite” argument.253
By contrast, the review approach of competition law fi nes, adopted by the CAT in competition 
law cases is, according to the England and Wales Court of Appeal, similar to that in criminal 
law. Patten LJ, to which the other Lord Justices concurred, ruled: 
 It may be said that it is only by being able to compare the end result of the Step 3 
assessment in Interclass with that in the other appeals that it becomes possible 
to say that there is something disproportionate about the level of sentence and 
that had it stood alone the level of penalty imposed on Interclass could not be said 
to be obviously wrong. But in a case where the tribunal has failed to give any real 
explanation of the uplift then it is, in my view, permissible to take the general level 
of fi nes imposed at Step 3 into account as a cross-check on whether something has 
in fact gone wrong with the process. The position is not dissimilar to the approach 
adopted by this Court when dealing with cases of disparity in criminal sentences.254
Overall, criminal law does not have an impact on the setting of a fi ne or when examining 
factors in order to set a fi ne. The review approach taken is, according to the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal, in line with the approach taken in criminal law. Criminal law did 
not necessarily infl uence the review approach of the competition law courts in the UK. The 
reference to criminal law occurred after multiple judgments were already handed down by 
the CAT. The review method was thus already established before reference was made to 
criminal law. The reference by the England and Wales Court of Appeal merely confi rms that 
the review approach taken in competition law cases since the NAPP case is “not dissimilar” 
to that in criminal law cases.
7.5.4 Factors taken into account
The UK competition law courts put quite some emphasis on the deterrent eff ect of fi nes.255
A fi ne should be “deterrent in terms of today’s money values”,256 and is thus not supposed 
to be painless for an undertaking.257 This does not mean that only specifi c deterrence should 
be taken into account. It is clear that ensuring deterrence entails ensuring both specifi c and 
252  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 458.
253   See CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 86, where the undertaking concerned argued that a “lack of eff ect on competition should 
equate to a lower starting point”. It substantiated its point with reference to the diff erent approach taken in criminal law sanctioning 
for “death by way of dangerous driving” and “dangerous driving”.
254   Patten LJ also quoted two paragraphs of a judgment in a criminal law case. See EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, 
par. 71.
255   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 98; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 492; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 705; 
CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 228; CAT (31 October 2006) [2006] CAT 24, par. 19; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 140; 
CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 44 and 54; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 99; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 109.
256  CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 174.
257  See e.g. CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 114.
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general deterrence.258 Nevertheless, the CAT seems to focus in its rulings mainly on specifi c 
deterrence.259 General deterrence is often referred to as a goal of the penalty, but barely 
discussed in essence. In Genzyme, the CAT even dismissed the idea that general deterrence 
should be taken into account, since an infringement was in the particular circumstances of the 
case not likely to occur in the future.260
The need to ensure deterrence can sometimes be at odds with other factors. In the Kier case, 
the CAT ruled: “Whilst deterrence is a relevant consideration when assessing proportionality 
in this context, so equally is the culpability of the off ender/seriousness of the off ence. If these 
two considerations pull in diff erent directions, a fair balance should be sought.”261
As mentioned above, when discussing the Fining Guidance, the CMA can increase a fi ne under 
Step 3 with a fi xed percentage of worldwide turnover. This is the use of a so-called Minimum 
Deterrence Threshold (MDT). The OFT used this general MDT percentage in the construction 
sector cases as a “blunt tool” to ensure deterrence, which could lead to disproportionate fi nes.262
As the CAT also stated, with reference to case law of the ECJ: “[Determining] the penalty on 
a fi xed percentage of worldwide turnover, regardless of the scale or area of infringement, and 
without consideration of any other features of the undertaking subject to the penalty, is an 
inappropriately mechanistic and narrow approach”.263 Deterrence is thus an important factor 
which needs to be taken into account and which can also ensure that fi nes have to be increased 
at a later stage of the assessment of the fi ne. Nevertheless, it is not the only one. 
Culpability has already been mentioned as a factor which can place limits on the extent of an 
increase of the fi ne based on the need to ensure deterrence.264 It is not extensively elaborated 
upon though, although reference to it is sometimes made when discussing other factors. In 
Eden Brown, the CAT referred to the need not to lose sight of “culpability of the undertaking in 
terms of the seriousness, and hence the scale and eff ect of the infringement”.265 It continued by 
ruling that the “determination of the penalty requires a refi ned consideration and assessment 
of all the relevant circumstances, and the element of deterrence, while undoubtedly one of 
those circumstances, should not lead to the level of penalty being calculated according to a 
mathematical formula”.266 It appears that culpability is referred to as an overarching element 
which means to ensure that all relevant circumstances are taken into account.
258   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 502; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 706; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 
167; CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 92 and 114; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 166, 232 and 338; CAT (24 March 2011) 
[2011] CAT 7, par. 196, 209, 221, 258 and 277; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 134, 146, 164, 176, 190 and 204; CAT (22 March 2011) 
[2011] CAT 6, par. 174; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 206.
  This is confi rmed on appeal EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 64.
259   See e.g. CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 168-171, where the CAT, after mentioning specifi c and general deterrence, focused 
mainly on the need for deterrence in relation to the size of the undertakings concerned. 
260  CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 706.
261  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 175.
262   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 169; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 118; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 40 and 
53; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 95-96.
263  CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 92.
264   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 175. See also CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 54.
265  CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 99.
266  CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 99.
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Strikingly, in Quarmby, the CAT actually ruled that it was not in a position to assess the relative 
culpability of the undertakings concerned, since the construction sector cases concerned 
“collective punishment or representative justice”.267 In another construction sector case,
the Kier case, the CAT ruled that the percentage of the relevant turnover used under Step 1 
should refl ect in general the diff erence between culpability of cover pricing and e.g. a “multi-
partite horizontal price fi xing or market sharing cartel”.268 It appears though that this case 
leaves room not to assess the individual culpability, as ruled in Quarmby. There nevertheless 
appear to be some inconsistency in the use of the culpability factor. This inconsistency is not 
explained by the CAT.
The size and fi nancial position of an undertaking is a factor which should be taken into 
account.269 This can be done by examining the turnover of an undertaking. It is for example 
possible to use a certain percentage of the relevant turnover under Step 1 of the Guidance as a 
starting amount for the fi ne. In general, the CAT has approved this approach.270
In the construction cartel cases, the use of turnover to assess the size and fi nancial position 
of an undertaking, and thus to ensure that a fi ne is deterrent under Step 3 of the Guidance, 
was not always regarded as a suffi  cient proxy for this objective. Cash fl ows and profi ts should 
also be taken into account.271 The construction sector is characterised by high turnover but 
low margins, inter alia due to the need to use subcontractors.272 In its own re-assessment of 
the fi ne, the CAT would take into account total turnover, net fees, profi t in the UK and profi t 
worldwide.273 Strangely, in the fi rst two cases where the CAT refers to the “high turnover, 
low margins” characteristics of the sector, namely the Kier judgment and the Tomlinson 
judgment, it later on only examined the need for deterrence under Step 3 of the Guidance 
in light of the worldwide turnover and not in light of total turnover, net fees and profi ts.274
One of the undertakings that was part of the proceedings in Tomlinson raised an appeal at the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal on the amount of the fi ne. The Court of Appeal referred 
to the discrepancy between the rule (taking into account other factors than turnover) and the 
application of the rule (only taking into account worldwide turnover). Patten LJ, supported 
by the other two Lord Justices, ruled: 
What I think is troubling about the multiplier used for Interclass is that the fi gure it 
produces is so out of line with the level of fi nes which the CAT thought necessary to
267  CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 172-173.
268  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 114.
269  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 168 and 177.
270   CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 494; CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 198-206, as confi rmed on appeal: EWCA (19 October 
2006) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, par. 231; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 54.
271  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 171.
272   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 172-173; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 133-135; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 
63-64; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 188 and 193; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 98; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, 
par. 109.
273   CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 165-167; 179-180, 193-195 and 208-210; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 209-210; CAT (1 
April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 104-105.
274   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 340; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 178-180, 196, 209, 221, 258, 277.
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act as a deterrent in other similar cases. If one uses the methodology of the CAT by 
taking global group turnover in the Decision Year as an approximate indicator of fi nancial 
strength (and ignores the actual profi t fi gures for that year) one can see that Interclass was 
fi ned 1.3% of turnover whereas Tomlinson, Sol, Seddon and Galliford Try were fi ned 
0.37%; 0.8%; 0.19% and 0.1% respectively.275
The Court of Appeal dismissed the case on the basis of the unjustifi ed diff erentiation between 
the undertakings concerned and not on the basis of the discrepancy in the ruling of the CAT.276
There exists, however, a lack of consistency between the fi rst construction sector cases ruled 
upon in March 2011 (where the CAT only examined turnover in light of deterrence), and those 
ruled upon in April 2011 (where it also examined profi t besides turnover as the sole ground 
for deterrence). This diff erence does not appear to be based on justifi able reasons, nor is it 
explained by the CAT.
The CAT often refers to other factors that may lead to a decrease or an increase of the fi ne. 
Terminating the infringement after an investigation has started has sometimes been accepted 
as a mitigating factor.277 By contrast, in Quarmby it was ruled that a “[p]rompt termination 
following intervention by the OFT is a proper response but not one that, in our view, justifi es any 
reduction in penalty in the circumstances of the case”.278 Furthermore, in Argos & Littlewoods,
the CAT ruled that ceasing an infringement cannot be a mitigating factor, since it “should 
happen as a matter of course”.279 Continuing with an infringement after an investigation has 
started can never be an aggravating factor though.280 Again, the inconsistency in approach is 
not explained by the CAT.
A duration of an infringement of less than one year may be taken into account as a mitigating 
factor,281 although this depends in particular on the facts of a case. In case of cover pricing, 
one cannot speak of the end of an infringement after the tender, since the eff ects cannot be 
undone.282 Furthermore, a short duration of an infringement, because of its quick discovery 
by the OFT, can obviously not lead to a reduction in the fi ne.283
Financial hardship is a factor which may, in exceptional circumstances, lead to a reduction of 
the fi ne, although the OFT has a margin of discretion when considering this factor.284 In the 
275  EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 67 (emphasis added).
276  EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 69-70.
277   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 514. In both CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 495, and CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 
9, par. 124-125, the OFT took this factor into account already. It thus saw no need to reduce the fi ne on the basis of this factor.
278  CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 198.
279  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 233.
280  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 512-514
281  CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 498; CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 181.
282   CAT (24 February 2005) [2005] CAT 4, par. 277-278; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 104.
283  CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 90.
284   CAT (31 October 2006) [2006] CAT 24, par. 43 and 55; CAT (9 March 2007) [2007] CAT 13, par. 94; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, 
par. 315; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 222, 232, 242 and 262; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 113-116, 135-139 and 194; 
CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 201; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 110.
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Tomlinson judgment, the CAT fi rst seemed not to allow a claim on fi nancial hardship based on 
the behaviour of the directors of the undertaking. It ruled:
We agree with the OFT that when considering fi nancial hardship it is appropriate 
to look at the group as a whole rather than at the companies within the group 
thatare directly involved in the infringing conduct. The relevant question is whether 
the continued viability of the undertaking is threatened. We also agree that the 
substantial increase in directors’ emoluments for the year ended 31 October 2008 
casts doubt on Interclass’s claim of hardship. The fact that pay and bonuses were 
contractually due under terms and conditions put in place in more prosperous times 
is not the end of the matter. If the directors are not prepared to forego or postpone 
substantial bonus or pension contribution entitlements even though this may 
jeopardise the existence of the company, they cannot at the same time argue that the 
Tribunal should substantially reduce the fi ne to enable the company to stay afl oat.285
Nevertheless, the CAT did allow the claim to succeed on the basis of the latest available fi gures 
brought forward in the court proceedings which showed a poor fi nancial performance.286
Uncertainty as to the legality of the behaviour has led the CAT in some cases to reduce a fi ne. 
This was also asserted previously when discussing the legality and legal certainty principles. 
It was stated that the statement in the “Notice on the assessment of cartels” was not “happily 
worded” and could thus lead to a reduction of the fi ne, since it was from the document not 
entirely clear whether the behaviour infringed the competition rules.287
In NAPP, the CAT also referred to the uncertainty about the legality of excessive pricing, 
which could be regarded as a mitigating factor as well.288 Uncertainty surrounding the legality 
of particular behaviour was also a mitigating factor in the construction sector cartel.289 As 
mentioned above, textbooks and other materials used for the training of industry participants 
led them to believe that cover pricing was an acceptable practice. In these cases, the focus 
seemed to be on the endemic nature of the practice. The CAT even explicitly referred in Durkan 
Holdings to the responsibility of the customers of the undertakings infringing the competition 
rules. The customers kept the system of cover pricing in place by letting undertakings believe 
that if they did not participate in the tender, they would be excluded from future tenders.290
Undertakings which were not able to provide the service at that time therefore merely 
participated in order to remain “on the radar” of the customers. 
285  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 232.
286  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 236.
287  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 523. 
288  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 533.
289   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14.
290  CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 175-176.
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In the discussion of the legality and legal certainty principle it was also argued that the 
approach in Argos was completely diff erent from that in the construction sector cartel. The 
common nature of the practices could not be regarded a ground for a reduction of a fi ne but 
“all the more reason for the OFT to take a serious view” of the practices in the industry.291 The 
CAT ruled that there was no “uncertainty as to what was lawful and what was not, or as to 
where the line was”;292 the behaviour was “plainly contrary to the Chapter 1 prohibition in 
accordance with well known legal principles”.293 It is, again, not clear why in multiple cases 
the CAT uses a diff erent approach towards this factor.
Compliance programmes are sometimes regarded as a mitigating circumstance. The CAT 
ruled on this matter in the construction cartel cases.294 Strangely enough, in 2005, the CAT 
ruled that creating a compliance programme whilst continuing with an infringement can be 
regarded as an aggravating factor, when a compliance programme had drawn the attention 
of executives to the competition rules but they kept infringing them.295 Nevertheless, in the 
same case the CAT ruled that further steps which were taken to strengthen the compliance 
programme would be given some credit as a mitigating factor.296
There are also other factors mentioned by the CAT as mitigating or aggravating factors, but 
which are not extensively elaborated upon. Mitigating factors can include: committing an 
infringement negligently instead of intentionally,297 cooperation, even at the appeal stage,298
accepting responsibility and trying to make amends,299 and the lack of evidence of specifi c 
harm to consumers.300 Aggravating factors include: blatantly ignoring a clear warning;301
giving assurances after an early investigation and then still infringing the competition rules;302
removing competitors from the market;303 being a price leader in the market;304 being the 
instigator;305 involvement of the senior management;306 and the importance of a certain sector 
for the economy.307
291  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
292  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
293  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 218.
294   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 233, 292, 315, 324 and 341; CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 181, 198, 211 and 259; CAT 
(15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 125, 140, 154, 168, 182, 211; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 127.
295  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 254.
296  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 263-266.
297   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 454 and 455; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 484; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 
4, par. 689.
298   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 527; CAT (23 June 2003) [2003] CAT 11, par. 495-496; CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 
233 and 292; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 125.
299  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 201; CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 238.
300   CAT (6 October 2017) [2017] CAT 23, par. 145-146. This factor was used to select a lower multiplier under the fi rst step of the 
determination of the fi ne, and strictly speaking not as a mitigating factor under the third step.
301  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 541.
302  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 173.
303  CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 704.
304  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 214, 217 and 235-235.
305  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 203; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 37.
306   CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 203; CAT (22 March 2011) [2011] CAT 6, par. 179; CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 121; CAT 
(15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 211; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 198.
307  CAT (1 April 2011) [2011] CAT 8, par. 76.
359
English Competition Law | CHAPTER 7
Ch
ap
te
r 7
Furthermore, sometimes a cartel created with regard to high profi le products, such as 
pharmaceutical products,308 replica football shirts,309 and well-known toys310 should lead to 
higher fi nes. 
Current economic conditions,311 the nature of the infringement,312 the harm done to the 
market,313 and potential distorting eff ects of the penalties themselves314 could be taken into 
account as factors when assessing a penalty.
Lastly, taking into account the gains of an infringement cannot be the sole or main factor to 
establish the seriousness of an infringement.315
7.5.5 Résumé
Fines should be proportionate in competition law proceedings. The Fining Guidance, which 
take into account case law of the UK competition law judiciary, should ensure that fi nes are 
proportionate. This Fining Guidance should, in general, be followed by the CMA, although the 
latter may depart from it on the basis of its discretionary powers. The judiciary is not bound by 
the Guidance. Overall, the infl uence of criminal law is explicitly excluded by the UK judiciary, 
although review of sanctions in competition law is “not dissimilar” to that in criminal law. 
The Fining Guidance and case law of, in particular, the CAT provides an extensive list of factors 
which should be taken into account when determining a fi ne. Nevertheless, the inconsistent 
application of some of these factors by the judiciary is striking and also somewhat alarming, 
since it can never be ruled out that a factor will be applied completely diff erent from previous 
judgments. 
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
English competition law is somewhat underdeveloped as regards the application of some 
of the principles studied in this research. Chirita also referred to the underdevelopment of 
English competition and the consequences of this underdevelopment for the upcoming Brexit:
As an academic, I should also stress that the UK body of competition decisions 
and case-law is insuffi  ciently developed. Most commentators have focused with 
constructive criticism on what the EU Commission has done well and not so well. 
There is very little to learn from the UK, so turning our back on EU competition law 
might not be wise at all.316
308  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 525; CAT (11 March 2004) [2004] CAT 4, par. 702.
309  CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 156.
310  CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 214, 217 and 234.
311  CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 193. 
312  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 93 and 108.
313  CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3, par. 93 and 102.
314  CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 194.
315   CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 507-511; CAT (29 April 2005) [2005] CAT 13, par. 227.
316  Chirita (2017) – Written evidence (CMP 0013), par. 7. 
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It is indeed true that the principles discussed in this chapter are somewhat underdeveloped. 
The English judiciary is struggling to fi nd a consistent and coherent approach, at least towards 
the principles central to this study. 
The underdevelopment of English competition law is particularly apparent with regard to 
the freedom from self-incrimination, the non bis in idem principle and the legality and legal 
certainty principle. In two cases reference is made to the freedom from self-incrimination. It 
appears that the English judiciary follows the Orkem jurisprudence of the CJEU. There are 
no cases on the non bis in idem principle, although the ‘accounting’ principle is codifi ed in 
legislation and applies when there is a previously imposed fi ne by the Commission or an EU 
NCA. This is similar to the approach of the Union Courts, although there are no further cases 
which means that the particularities of the non bis in idem principle are not discussed. There 
are only a couple of cases on the legality and legal certainty principle. 
More case law exists on the burden and standard of proof and on the proportionality of 
sanctions. Case law on the standard of proof in English competition law is, however, quite 
confusing. Some cases hint at a criminal law standard of proof, whereas others refer to a 
‘heightened’ civil law standard of proof. There are also cases in which it is asserted, with 
reference to House of Lords cases, that there is only one civil law standard of proof, which 
means that a ‘heightenend’ civil law standard of proof does not exist. 
Case law on the proportionality of sanctions, and more specifi cally the factors which need 
to be taken into account when determining the level of a fi ne, is at times incoherent and 
inconsistent. The culpability factor, the factor of terminating an infringement after an 
investigation has started, and the factor as to the uncertainty as to the legality of the behaviour 
are applied in a confl icting manner in diff erent cases. 
It became apparent from this chapter, that some principles central to this research are 
underdeveloped in English competition law. Competition law enforcement in England seems 
to be still in its infancy. More case law is sorely needed to further develop this area of law. 
361
English Competition Law | CHAPTER 7
Ch
ap
te
r 7

PART IV
The Impact of Criminal Law Principles on 
Administrative Competition Law Proceedings

CHAPTER 8
The (Potential) Impact of 
Criminal Law Principles on the 
Administrative Law Enforcement 
of Competition Law
366
CHAPTER 8 | The impact of criminal law principles
367
The impact of criminal law principles | CHAPTER 8
Ch
ap
te
r 8
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous two Parts of this research, fi ve principles were discussed in criminal law and 
in competition law. These fi ve principles are the freedom from self-incrimination, the non bis 
in idem principle, the burden and standard of proof, the legality and legal certainty principle 
and the proportionality of sanctions. These principles, which form the basis of this research, 
are used to determine whether, and if so to which extent, criminal law enforcement impacts 
the administrative law enforcement of competition law proceedings. The question thus is 
whether criminal law principles are fi nding their way into administrative competition law 
proceedings. This chapter ties the previous two parts together by examining whether criminal 
law principles (discussed in Part II) have an impact on the administrative law enforcement of 
competition law in the Netherlands, England and the EU (discussed in Part III). 
The impact of criminal law in competition law proceedings can be by explicit reference of the 
competition law judiciary. If this is the case, reference is made to the infl uence of criminal law 
principles on competition law. It is seen that only the criminal law legality and legal certainty 
principles infl uence their counterparts in competition law proceedings, as explicit references 
are made to criminal law. 
For other principles, no explicit infl uence can be established, even though the approach taken 
is often comparable to that in criminal law and competition law. In those cases, it is diffi  cult to 
speak of an infl uence of criminal law on competition law, since it is not clear whether judges 
indeed intended to take such a comparable approach. There is thus no infl uence of criminal 
law on competition law, although there is still some impact. Reference is therefore made to the 
similar approach in both areas of law to a certain principle. A similar approach of a principle 
in criminal law and competition law could be spontaneous, without any intention to let the 
criminal law principle infl uence its competition law counterpart. This approach could be 
criticised, as it is not clear what the courts intended to achieve by such an approach. 
Lastly, there are also criminal law principles which do not infl uence their competition law 
counterpart, nor can a comparable approach be discerned. In these cases, sometimes the courts 
explicitly rejected a criminal law infl uence, whereas in other cases a diff erence just occurred 
spontaneously. A consistent, well-considered approach is therefore not always discernible 
in these types of cases. There is, however, no impact to be found in these cases. Therefore, 
reference is made to the diff erent approach in competition law from that in criminal law. 
This chapter is divided into three main paragraphs in which the infl uence of the criminal law 
principles on competition law proceedings and the similarities and the diff erences between 
the application of a particular principle in criminal law and competition law are discussed. 
The fi rst paragraph (9.2) discusses the principles which are infl uenced by their criminal law 
counterpart. The second paragraph discusses the principles which are applied in competition 
law proceedings in a comparable manner as their criminal law counterpart (8.3). Lastly, the 
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principles are discussed which are applied diff erently in criminal law and competition law 
(8.4). 
The following paragraphs are further subdivided per principle. The choice of structure has 
some consequences which should be mentioned here. Multiple competition law principles in 
the Netherlands and in England are interpreted and applied in a manner which is comparable 
to that on the European level. There thus seems to be some form of spontaneous and voluntary 
alignment with regard to the application and interpretation of some principles.1 It is striking 
that the national judiciary seems to be infl uenced in such a measure by the Court of Justice of 
the EU, especially since the latter regards national law as a source for general principles of EU 
law. As Tridimas eloquently puts it:
[G]eneral principles of law are children of national law but, as brought up by the 
Court [of Justice of the EU], they become enfants terribles: they are extended, narrowed, 
restated, transformed by a creative and eclectic judicial process.2
EU principles may fi nd their way back into the national legal order after this transformation 
by the Court of Justice. This is at least true for some of the competition law principles in this 
research as shown in the following table:
Freedom 
from self-
incrimination
Non bis in 
idem
Burden and 
standard of 
proof
Legality 
and legal 
certainty
Proportionality 
of sanctions
NL Infl uence EU 
competition law
Infl uence 
EU 
competition 
law
Infl uence EU 
competition 
law
Own 
approach
Own approach
ENG Infl uence EU 
competition law
No case 
law
Infl uence EU 
competition 
law
Own 
approach
Own approach
1   For more information see also Gerbrandy (2009). It should be mentioned, that there is no obligation under Dutch law to synchronise the 
procedural rules in competition law proceedings with those of the EU. Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998, in contrast to Dutch law, 
does impose a consistency requirement on the English judiciary; see chapter 7, par. 7.1. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether this 
consistency requirement extends to the procedures for the enforcement of the competition law rules; see Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 390. 
Not all principles are extensively elaborated upon by the domestic courts. Therefore, it is at times diffi  cult to determine whether their 
interpretation and application is infl uenced by the approach of the Union Courts. The proportionality of sanctions is still interpreted 
by the English and Dutch competition law judiciary in a manner which is not infl uenced by the Union Courts. There is therefore, with 
regard to this principle, no spontaneous and voluntary alignment.
2  Tridimas (2006), p. 6.
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The table shows where national courts have explicitly decided, on a voluntary basis, to take 
an approach in conformity with that of the Union Courts in competition law proceedings 
(infl uence), or where they acknowledge that their approach is similar to that in EU competition 
law proceedings. It does not mean that there is no infl uence where this is not explicitly stated. 
Reference is made to the ‘own approach’ of the domestic judiciary when there is no explicit 
impact of EU law on domestic law. This does not necessarily mean that the domestic judiciary 
takes a diff erent approach the Luxembourg Courts. 
The fi nding that the domestic law enforcement of the competition law rules is infl uenced by 
EU competition law (see table) does have consequences for this research. If a competition 
law principle, as applied by the Union Courts, is infl uenced by its counterpart under EU 
criminal law and the ECHR, or if the approach towards a principle is similar or diff erent 
under EU competition law as compared to EU criminal law and the ECHR, then the same 
reasoning could be extended to the application of this principle on the domestic level. The 
(potential) impact of a criminal law principle, under EU criminal law and/or the ECHR, 
on its counterpart in EU competition law proceedings would thus also lead to a (potential) 
impact of this principle under EU criminal law and/or the ECHR on its domestic competition 
law counterpart. It should however be mentioned that the conclusion on the (potential) 
impact of that particular principle in national criminal law on its domestic competition law 
counterpart does not have to be the same. It could therefore occur that there are similarities in 
the application of a principle as explained by the Union Courts in criminal law proceedings 
or by the ECtHR on the national competition law counterpart, whereas under national law 
a diff erence exists in the application of a principle in criminal law and competition law. The 
conclusion on the (potential) impact of a principle under EU criminal law or under the ECHR 
on that principle in Dutch or English competition law proceedings is merely a consequence 
of the voluntary alignment of these domestic competition law principles with their EU 
competition law counterpart. The (potential) impact of a criminal law principle, EU or ECHR, 
on domestic competition law proceedings only exists, because the approach taken by the 
Union Courts suggests such a (potential) impact. 
In what follows, the diff erent competition law principles are examined in light of their criminal 
law counterparts in order to determine whether criminal law has an impact on competition 
law proceedings, whether there are similarities between the application of the principles in 
the two domains, or whether the principles are applied diff erently in both areas of law. This 
requires a comparison of two fi elds of law – criminal law and competition law – and four 
jurisdictions – EU law, Dutch law, English law and the ECHR. The following table is made to 
visualise in a general manner the fi ndings of this research. For each principle, is it is indicated 
whether a criminal law jurisdiction has had an impact on the application of a particular 
principle in EU, Dutch (NL) or English (ENG) competition law proceedings. As mentioned, 
there can be an infl uence of criminal law. It is also possible that the principle is explained in a 
similar manner in competition law and criminal law. Furthermore, a principle could also be 
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applied in a diff erent manner in both areas of law. It might also be unclear whether there is an 
impact of criminal law. 
  Jurisdiction
Principle 
ECHR criminal law EU criminal law Domestic criminal law
Freedom from self-
incrimination
EU3
Similar
NL
Similar
ENG
Similar
Similar
Similar
Similar
-
Diff erent
Similar
Burden of proof EU
Similar
NL
Similar
ENG
Similar
Similar
Similar
Similar
-
Similar
Similar
Standard of proof EU
Similar
NL
Similar
ENG
Similar
Unclear4
Unclear
Unclear
-
Diff erent
Diff erent
Non bis in idem EU
Diff erent
NL
Diff erent
ENG
Unclear5
Diff erent
Diff erent
Unclear
-
Diff erent
Unclear
3  EU, NL, and ENG, refer to the three diff erent competition law domains.
4  EU criminal law is silent on the standard of proof. A comparison can thus not be made.
5   There is currently no case law of the English judiciary on the non bis in idem principle in competition law proceedings. Therefore, it is 
not possible to compare this principle in competition law proceedings to its criminal law counterpart. 
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Legality and legal 
certainty
EU
Infl uence
NL
Similar
ENG
Infl uence
Similar
Similar
Similar
-
Infl uence
Infl uence
Proportionality of 
sanctions
EU
Similar
NL
Similar
ENG
Similar
Similar
Similar
Similar
-
Diff erent
Diff erent
8.2 INFLUENCE
There is one competition law principle which is explicitly infl uenced by its criminal law 
counterpart. This is the case for the legality and legal certainty principle under EU, Dutch 
and English competition law. As shown in the table above, the legality and legal certainty 
principle in ECHR criminal law has not had an explicit infl uence on the legality and legal 
certainty principle in English competition law. Nevertheless, there is an infl uence of English 
criminal law on English competition law. Furthermore, the approach under the ECHR and by 
the English judiciary in competition law proceedings is similar. An infl uence by criminal law 
can, however, still be discerned in England. It should also be mentioned that the approach 
towards the legality and the legal certainty principle is not explicitly infl uenced by EU criminal 
law, although the approach in this criminal law domain is similar to that in the discussed 
competition law regimes. Overall though, the infl uence is still apparent from the reference in 
competition law proceedings to ECHR criminal law proceedings and/or domestic criminal 
law proceedings. 
8.2.1 Legality and legal certainty principle
The criminal law legality and legal certainty principle have had an infl uence on the application 
of this principle in competition law proceedings. This is particularly apparent for Dutch and 
English competition law proceedings. Conversely, the Union Courts have found it diffi  cult to 
be conclusive on this matter. In some cases of the Union Courts, reference is explicitly made 
to the approach of the ECtHR.6 Nevertheless, the Luxembourg Courts have in other cases, 
rejected an approach that was in conformity with that in criminal law proceedings.7
6   Chapter 5, par. 5.6.2.
7   See the discussion on the “criminal law light” or “administrative law plus” approach. In 2017, the General Court did however apply 
the criminal law legal certainty principle, see GC, T-180/15 (Icap v Commission), par. 194.
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The English competition law judiciary takes three diff erent approaches towards the (potential) 
infl uence of the criminal law legality and legal certainty principle. Where explicit reference is 
made to the legality and legal certainty principle, we can see that the CAT takes a comparable 
approach to that in criminal law, and in some cases we can see an explicit infl uence of criminal 
law. Whether a comparable approach is taken, or even whether the CAT explicitly refers to 
criminal law proceedings, seems to depend, as is explained below, on the arguments of the 
undertakings. In the mind of the present author, the infl uence is overall notable though.
The ambivalence as regards the (potential) infl uence of criminal law on the legality and 
legal certainty principle cannot to be found in Dutch criminal law. The lex mitior principle of 
Article 1(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code (DCC) is by virtue of Article 5:46(4) of the General 
Administrative Law Act (GALA), applicable in competition law proceedings. This expression 
of the legality principle8 is often subject of debate in Dutch competition law proceedings. 
The legislator has thus explicitly confi rmed the application of criminal law for the lex mitior 
principle. As is explained below, for other aspects of the legality principle, we can see an 
approach comparable to that in criminal law proceedings. It is thus highly conceivable that 
the Dutch judiciary also took inspiration from criminal law in these cases, since the infl uence 
on part of the legality principle was already confi rmed by the Dutch legislator. 
In the three jurisdictions discussed, a distinction can be made between cases dealing with 
legality, legal certainty and fi nes, and other cases.9 This division is followed below to outline 
the infl uence of criminal law on the competition law legality and legal certainty principle. 
Legality & legal certainty and fi nes
A fi rst argument of undertakings, namely that Fining Guidelines are not suffi  ciently clear, 
has been dismissed by the Dutch judiciary and the Union Courts. In England, this argument 
has not been raised. Both the Dutch courts and the Union Courts have dismissed the 
argument relatively easily. The approach taken is, nonetheless, a bit diff erent. The Union 
Courts have dismissed the argument for being based on the misconception that the Fining 
Guidelines are the legal basis for infringements. The legal basis can be found in the Procedural 
Regulation.10 In Dutch competition law, the courts have made clear that the application of 
the Fining Guidelines should be consistent and predictable, but that it could leave room for 
deviation in specifi c cases. Furthermore, it has been stated that the Fining Guidelines do not 
have to be entirely clear, as long as the structure of the Guidelines and the other provisions
8   It has been argued in legal literature that the lex mitior principle is not part of the legality principle. Peristeridou (2015), p. 16, e.g. 
regards the lex mitior principle as a separate principle which “is interpreted from Article 7 ECHR and codifi ed in Article 49 of the 
Charter”. See also Timmerman (2018), p 70, who refers to the “general requirement that only the law can defi ne a crime and prescribe a 
penalty” and to the specifi c requirements of lex certa, lex stricta and lex praevi, but not to the lex mitior principle, which could be regarded 
as a principle separate from the legality principle. 
9   This distinction is less visible for English competition law, since there are not that many cases dealing explicitly or implicitly with the 
legality and legal certainty principle. It is, however, still possible to make this distinction even for English competition law. 
10  Regulation 1/2003.
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 are suffi  ciently clear to enable a person to ascertain what the unclear provision entails. The 
Dutch competition law courts thus tackle arguments as to the vagueness of Fining Guidelines 
substantively, whereas the Union Courts dismiss these arguments on a somewhat more 
procedural ground: the Guidelines are not the legal basis itself. Both approaches are, in my 
opinion, viable, although the approach taken by the Union Courts is probably more sound. 
The ECtHR indeed requires a legal basis for off ences and penalties to be suffi  ciently clear 
and accessible.11 Dutch courts superfl uously12 refer in competition law cases to the content 
of the legal certainty principle and rely on foreseeability to dismiss contrary arguments of 
undertakings. This discussion is, in light of the criminal law approach under the ECHR and in 
the Netherlands, unnecessary. Nevertheless, Dutch criminal law, the ECHR nor EU criminal 
law requires norms which are completely clear and devoid of any vagueness. The outcome 
in Dutch competition law proceedings that the Fining Guidelines do not infringe the legal 
certainty principle is thus in line with the outcome in criminal law.
A second argument which could be raised in competition law proceedings relates to the broad 
or somewhat vague wording of the legal basis for fi nes in competition law proceedings. This 
argument has as of yet only been raised in EU competition law proceedings. The legal basis 
of fi nes for substantive infringements can currently be found in Article 23(2) of Regulation 
1/2003. This provision is worded in a general manner. However, as the ECtHR has held grey 
areas or vague terms may exist. Case law and the possibility to obtain legal advice might 
prevent a vague term from being found to infringe the principle of legality or legal certainty. 
A similar approach is taken by the Union Courts in criminal law proceedings, although no 
reference is made to the possibility of obtaining legal advice. The Union Courts have referred 
in competition law proceedings to the quantifi able and absolute ceiling of fi nes in the 
Procedural Regulation, the objective requirements of gravity and duration, the well-known 
practice of the Commission and settled case law. These four reasons have been used to explain 
that the legality or legal certainty principle are not infringed by the somewhat vague terms in 
the Procedural Regulation. Foreseeability seems to be the most important aspect for the Union 
Courts to rule that Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 is suffi  ciently clear.
A third argument raised by undertakings in both EU competition law and English competition 
law deals with the retroactive application of the Fining Guidelines. Case law on the clarity 
of the EU Fining Guidelines is, as mentioned above, based on the misconception that these 
provide the legal basis for fi nes. The legal basis for imposing a penalty should be suffi  ciently 
clear and accessible, whereas the Fining Guidelines merely explain the practice of the
11   Guidelines merely provide more clarity on how penalties are calculated. As is explained below, the approach taken on the potential 
vagueness of the legal basis itself is also in conformity with that of the ECtHR. 
12   The ECtHR does not require Guidelines to be suffi  ciently clear and accessible. Similarly, in Dutch criminal law the principles of legality 
and legal certainty do not seem to apply to guidelines of the public prosecutor. The approach taken by the Dutch competition law 
judiciary in this regard is thus superfl uous in light of the approach taken in criminal law proceedings. 
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Commission and thus provide legal certainty for undertakings. In contrast to the arguments 
on the clarity of the EU Fining Guidelines, arguments on the retroactive application of those 
are discussed substantively, and not dismissed on a more procedural ground that they are 
not the legal basis. The Commission uses the guidelines which are applicable at the time 
of imposing the fi ne, not at the time of the infringement. This approach is accepted by the 
General Court. It is foreseeable, as the Union Courts have held on multiple occasions, that 
the fi ning policy of the Commission might change whenever the eff ective enforcement of EU 
competition law so requires. This approach is in complete alignment with the approach taken 
by the ECtHR in these matters. The ECtHR has held that it will “[..] verify that at the time 
when an accused person performed the act which led to his being prosecuted and convicted 
there was in force a legal provision which made that act punishable, and that the punishment 
imposed did not exceed the limits fi xed by that provision”.13 Specifi cally for penalties, the ECtHR 
has provided that it will examine whether “the penalty imposed on the applicant did not exceed 
the maximum one provided for in the former [criminal law] applicable at the relevant time”.14 The 
maximum amount of the fi ne in competition law proceedings does not change with a change 
in the Fining Guidelines. The retroactive applicability of the Fining Guidelines does not mean, 
fi rstly, that the legal basis is applied retroactively; secondly, it does not mean that the 10% 
ceiling is changed. Again, the Union Courts seem to follow an approach in EU competition 
law proceedings which is in conformity with the approach in criminal law proceedings. In 
England, this argument has been raised in the construction cartel cases. Explicit reference 
was made there to criminal law proceedings dealing with a change in fi ning guidelines. The 
CAT ruled that the 10% cap still remained the same, which means that the maximum of the 
fi ne does not change with the adoption of new Fining Guidelines or a change in their content. 
Therefore, the criminal law legality principle does not prohibit the retrospective application of 
these guidelines. This indeed is the current approach taken by the English judiciary in criminal 
law cases.15 Comparing the maximum of a penalty is, as held above, also the approach taken 
by the ECtHR in criminal law proceedings. The explicit reference to English criminal law 
cases in the construction cartel cases, shows an infl uence of this criminal law principle in 
English competition law.
Lastly, arguments are raised by undertakings that more favourable Fining Guidelines should 
be applied retroactively. These arguments have been raised in both EU and Dutch competition 
law proceedings. In Solvay,16 the undertaking argued that the Commission should have used 
its more lenient Guidelines retroactively. The Commission did use its old Guidelines at 
fi rst. However, its decision was annulled on the basis of a procedural defect and therefore a 
13   ECtHR, no. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96 (Coëme and others v Belgium), par. 145 (emphasis added).
14   See e.g. ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 13113/03 (Ould Dah v France). For more information, see chapter 2, par. 2.5.3.1.
15   See the Tomlinson case, CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 106, for references to criminal law cases. However, see also the Supreme 
Court case in R v Docherty, Supreme Court (14 December 2016) [2016] UKSC 62.
16   GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission). 
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fresh assessment was necessary. The General Court held that the Commission was under no 
obligation to review its entire approach, and thus to use the new Guidelines. It is diffi  cult to 
compare this specifi c case to any ECtHR cases or one of the CJEU in criminal law proceedings. 
The maximum amount of the fi ne remains restricted by the 10% limit. In general, the reasoning 
of the ECtHR towards the prohibition of retroactivity could be used here as well. It needs to 
be examined whether the amount of the fi ne would be lower were the new rules applied. The 
legal basis did not change in Solvay, which means that the Commission could still impose a 
fi ne under the old and the new Guidelines in the range of 0% up till 10% of the turnover of 
the undertaking concerned in the preceding business year. The Dutch judiciary has ruled that 
the lex mitior rule is applicable to the fi ning policy of the ACM. This is already a more lenient 
application than in Dutch criminal law, where the principles of legality and legal certainty do 
not seem to apply to guidelines of the public prosecutor. Invoking the lex mitior principle does 
not prove very successful though. The Dutch competition law courts have made clear that 
it should be examined whether new Fining Guidelines would indeed lead to a more lenient 
penalty. The discretion of the ACM seems to make it diffi  cult in most cases to determine 
whether a more lenient rule could have been imposed on the basis of the new Guidelines. It 
should however be examined whether the maximum fi ne would have been lower by applying 
the new rules. For competition law proceedings this means, as asserted above, that a change 
in the Fining Guidelines would never lead to an application of the lex mitior rule, since the 
maximum of 10% of the turnover17 of the undertaking would still be in place. The ECtHR will 
also examine whether the maximum penalty which is imposed could have been lower under 
the new rules. EU criminal law is on this topic less elaborate, which makes it impossible to 
examine whether the approach would be the same. 
Legality & legal certainty and other cases
In other EU competition law cases, undertakings have argued that the competition law 
rules infringe the requirements following from the legality and legal certainty principle. 
The concept of a “dominant position” with those requirements was discussed in Telefónica,18
whereas in Intel and Romana the complexity of the case was discussed.19 Moreover, in Areva
the application of the parent-subsidiary liability was examined in light of the legality and 
legal certainty principle.20 Only in the Areva case was the undertaking successful in its 
appeal, since the Commission’s approach changed in comparison with other cases, due to 
which there was no precedent. A “prudent trader,”21 a “diligent/prudent undertaking/
17   This relative maximum has been adjusted in the Netherlands for cartel cases to a maximum of 40%. There is also an absolute maximum 
of €900,000. For more information, see chapter 6, par. 6.2.2.
18  GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission).
19  GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission); GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission).
20   ECJ, C-247/11 P and C-253/11 P (Areva and others v Commission).
21   Reference is made to this concept in: GC, T-138/07 (Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 108, on appeal: ECJ, C-501/11 P 
(Schindler Holding and others v Commission), par. 58; GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 139 and 147; CFI, 
T-69/04 (Schunk v Commission), par. 45; CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 83. 
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economic operator,”22 the “well-informed business undertaking,”23 or “persons carrying on 
a professional activity”24 should, in all these cases, be aware of case law of the Union Courts, 
the administrative practice of the Commission and EU legislation. The emphasis of the ECtHR 
on the task for the judiciary to clarify the law and on the advice which especially applies to 
“persons carrying on a professional activity”25 is completely in line with the CJEU’s approach 
in competition law proceedings. 
There are three types of other cases in Dutch competition law proceedings, not dealing with 
fi nes, in which undertakings relied on the legality or legal certainty principle. First of all, 
in the North Sea Shrimp case,26 the (associations of) undertakings argued that it was unclear 
for them whether their behaviour would fall under the competition law rules or under the 
EU fi shery policy. The District Court of Rotterdam was quite brief in its argumentation by 
providing that they should have known that their behaviour could infringe the competition 
law rules. Emphasis seems to have been placed on the own responsibility of the (associations 
of) undertakings to fi nd out whether the rules apply. As contended above, foreseeability of the 
consequences of one’s conduct can also be obtained in criminal law proceedings by asking for 
legal advice. This seems to be the underlying reasoning of the District Court. 
A second type of case in Dutch competition law deals with the lex mitor rule and the 
appreciability requirement. In the Tree Nursery cartel, the Appeals Tribunal ruled that the lex 
mitior principle did not apply to a change of the de minimis rule, since there was no change of 
insight but merely a policy change. The Appeals Tribunal hereby examined the argumentation 
in the parliamentary records. In Dutch criminal law the lex mitior rule does not apply when 
there is no change of insight in the punishability of an off ence. Examining the parliamentary 
records might also be necessary in criminal law proceedings. It is, however, unclear whether 
this criterion could be applied under Article 7(1) ECHR. 
In a third case, the undertakings concerned argued that the term ‘concerted practice’ was 
unclear.27 The Dutch competition law courts did not follow this argument, since the term 
was clear from case law of the CJEU, the practice of the Commission, and from case law of 
the Dutch courts. The emphasis seems to lie again on foreseeability. As argued above, this 
is also important for criminal law proceedings. Dutch criminal law, the ECtHR and the EU 
judiciary in criminal law proceedings allow for vague norms as long as a person can foresee 
the consequences of his behaviour. 
22   ECJ, C-352/09 P (ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission), par. 86: GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 323-324.
23  CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 90.
24   GC, T-470/13 (Merck v Commission), par. 463; GC, T-380/10 (Wabco and others v Commission), par. 175; GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica 
v Commission), par. 323; ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v 
Commission), par. 219.
25   ECtHR, no. 17475/09 (Varvara v Italy), par. 56.
26  Rb Rotterdam (20 June 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX9223.
27  Rb Rotterdam (28 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.4.
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As stated above, there are not that many cases in English competition law in which the 
legality or legal certainty principle (explicitly or implicitly) play a role. The few existing 
cases deal on an ad hoc basis with these principles. It is not possible to fi nd a coherent and 
consistent approach towards cases not dealing with fi nes. This might create uncertainty for 
the CMA and the undertakings concerned with regard to the application of this principle. 
In three construction cartel cases,28 a completely diff erent approach was taken from that in 
Argos,29 without a proper explanation by the judiciary. Foreseeability does not seem to be 
a highly valued standard in those cases. In the construction cartel cases, the uncertainty as 
to the legality of cover pricing was regarded as a mitigating factor. The CAT elaborately 
explained, amongst others by referring to the common nature of the practice of cover pricing, 
that uncertainty existed as to the legality of the behaviour. By contrast, in Argos, the common 
nature of the price fi xing practices in the toy industry was not a ground for a reduction of 
a fi ne but “all the more reason for the OFT to take a serious view” of the practices in the 
industry. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether uncertainty as to the illegality of behaviour 
should lead to a reduction of a penalty in criminal law proceedings. In light of the principle of 
strict construction of penal statutes, it would be preferable to take a restrictive approach if it 
is unclear whether Parliament wanted to prohibit the behaviour. Moreover, English criminal 
law is infl uenced substantially by the approach taken by the ECtHR. Vagueness of norms 
is allowed, although it should be foreseeable, if need be on the basis of legal advice or case 
law, whether the behaviour is illegal. Uncertainty about the illegality of certain behaviour 
is not regarded as a mitigating circumstance in criminal law proceedings.30 This is a strange 
approach of the CAT, especially in light of its reference to the criminal law legality and legal 
certainty principle in other construction cartel cases.31
In a second type of cases, explicit reference is made by the undertakings to the legal certainty 
principle. The CAT nevertheless, did not explicitly refer to criminal law proceedings, in 
contrast to its approach in cases dealing with the Fining Guidelines. It quickly dismissed the 
argument that the absence of limitation periods infringes the principle of legal certainty.32
Extending limitation periods does not seem to be a problem under the ECtHR as long as the 
initial limitation period has not expired yet, since this extension is merely an adaption of the 
procedural rules.33 This would mean that limitation periods do not have to be examined in 
light of the legal certainty principle. Under EU criminal law, it is less settled whether this is 
28   CAT (11 March 2011) [2011] CAT 3; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14. 
29  CAT (14 December 2004) [2004] CAT 24.
30   See also the NAPP case, in which the not “happily worded” paragraphs of the Notice on the assessment of cartels was also regarded 
as a mitigating factor:  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 522-523.
31   See the Tomlinson case: CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 106. Both the Barrett Estate Services case and the Crest Nicholson case refer 
to the Tomlinson case, see respectively CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 9, par. 19-22, and CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 10, par. 45-48.
32  CAT (24 March 2011) [2011] CAT 7, par. 173; CAT (15 April 2011) [2011] CAT 11, par. 48.
33   ECtHR, no. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96 (Coëme and others v Belgium), par. 149. See also ECtHR, decision as 
to the admissibility, no. 1845/08 (Previti v Italy), par. 80-81; and ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 55959/14 (Borcea v Romenia), 
par. 64-65.
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the case.34 Reference to case law of the ECtHR could have substantiated the argumentation 
of the CAT. This would also have been preferable in light of its approach in the construction 
cartel cases. 
8.2.2 Concluding remarks
Overall, the approach taken by the EU, Dutch and English competition law judiciary is either 
explicitly infl uenced by criminal law or comparable to that in criminal law. The infl uence 
of criminal law seems, in light of the references to criminal law in some judgments of the 
Union Courts and the English judiciary, and in light of the references in the Dutch General 
Administrative Law Act, apparent for the legality and legal certainty. Nevertheless, as 
illustrated above, the Union Courts and the English courts are not always entirely clear on this. 
They should, in my opinion, make explicit in all cases that criminal law has an infl uence on this 
principle, instead of giving mixed signals. The current approach in referring to criminal law 
does not show any consistency and could lead, ironically, to uncertainty as to the application 
of the legality and legal certainty principle. The application of these principles in English 
competition law is already contradictory. Arguments of undertakings seem to determine 
whether the CAT will take an approach in conformity with, or even infl uenced by the legality 
and legal certainty principle in criminal law proceedings or not. The confusion created by 
the English judiciary should be resolved. Either the CAT should take an approach infl uenced 
by criminal law proceedings, or it should not. Making it dependent on the arguments of the 
undertakings is inconsistent. The English judiciary should, also in cases where the legality 
and legal certainty principle are implicitly invoked, take an approach which is comparable to 
that in criminal law proceedings. 
8.3 SIMILARITIES 
In what follows, some competition law principles are discussed that are applied in a similar 
way as their criminal law counterparts. It was already mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter that some competition law principles may be applied similar to those in EU criminal 
law and criminal law proceedings before the ECtHR, whereas there are diff erences in the 
application of these principles in domestic criminal law.35 Therefore, some of the principles 
discussed below also return in paragraph 8.4. 
34   See the Tarrico saga. In C-105/14 (Criminal proceedings against Taricco and others), the Court of Justice took a similar approach as the 
ECtHR with regard to limitation periods and the principle of legal certainty. However, in ECJ, C-42/17 (Criminal proceedings against 
M..A.S. and M.B (Taricco II)), in particular par. 61, the Court of Justice allowed Member States to set aside limitation periods when this 
would otherwise lead to an infringement of the legal certainty principle. For a further, and much more elaborate discussion, see e.g. 
Manes (2018); Manacorda (2018); Timmerman (2016).
35  See also the table in par. 9.1.
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8.3.1 Freedom from self-incrimination
The interpretation and application of the freedom from self-incrimination in EU competition 
law proceedings already stems from 1989. This is thus a well-established approach of the 
Luxembourg Courts. It is then striking that the approach in English and Dutch competition 
law proceedings is not fully matured yet. In English competition law proceedings there is 
currently only one36 case which deals explicitly with the scope of the freedom from self-
incrimination. This case is based on a request from the OFT (CMA) to obtain a warrant for 
a dawn raid. The undertakings concerned therefore did not have the possibility to raise any 
objections, and therefore it remains unclear what the scope of this principle is in English 
competition law proceedings. In this one case, the judge decided to follow the well-established 
Orkem judgment of the Court of Justice.37 Dutch competition law proceedings also seem to 
follow the Orkem ruling. 
The approach taken in criminal law proceedings is not that straightforward either. Directive 
2016/34338 does contain the freedom from self-incrimination, although it does not provide 
much information on the scope of this principle. Case law of the ECtHR can be characterised 
as confusing. This has led e.g. to a diverging approach between the Dutch judiciary in criminal 
law proceedings and the Strasbourg Court. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
outcome between procedures before the Dutch judiciary and the Strasbourg Court would 
diff er.39 The freedom from self-incrimination in English criminal law is more aligned with 
that of the Strasbourg Court. Overall, it should fi rst be established whether there is some 
form of compulsion or coercion. Second, the actual interference must be examined. In English 
criminal law, the judiciary does not necessarily make this distinction, but examines whether 
there is a derogation from the freedom from self-incrimination and whether it can be justifi ed. 
This is slightly diff erent approach, although the cooperation requirement inherently entails a 
form of coercion. In the following, fi rst the coercion requirement is examined, after which the 
actual interference is discussed. It is shown that EU competition law, English competition law 
and, to a certain extent, Dutch competition law, apply the freedom from self-incrimination in 
a similar manner as their approach in criminal law. 
Coercion
The Union Courts, the Dutch judiciary, and probably also the English judiciary require in 
competition law proceedings some form of coercion or compulsion on a person, before an 
examination can take place whether there is an interference with the freedom from self-
incrimination itself. This is the same for the ECtHR in criminal law proceedings. The ECtHR
36   In Umbro and others v OFT, reference was also made to the freedom from self-incrimination, which applies in English competition law 
proceedings, but no more was said on the scope of this principle; see CAT (19 May 2005) [2005] CAT 22, par. 231. Strictly speaking, there 
are thus two cases in which references have been made to this principle. 
37  ECJ, 374/87 (Orkem v Commission).
38 Directive (EU) 2016/343.
39  Supra chapter 3, par. 3.2.1.
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 uses the nature of the compulsion to determine whether there is a form of compulsion. 
Criminal law penalties are always regarded as compulsion by the ECtHR. Directive 2016/343, 
which is the only instrument in which the freedom from self-incrimination can be found in EU 
criminal law, focuses on “force” to obtain answers or materials. It is nevertheless not entirely 
clear whether this includes pressure by penalties, although the preamble does refer in general 
terms to the obligation to take into account ECtHR case law. The focus here is therefore mainly 
on case law of the ECtHR and not on Directive 2016/343. The Dutch judiciary also requires 
some form of coercion, whereas the English judiciary generally focuses in criminal law 
proceedings on an interference immediately when it is established that there is a cooperation 
requirement.40
Hence, it should fi rst be established whether some form of coercion exist in both criminal 
law and competition law proceedings. As the Court of Justice provided in Limburgse Vinyl: 
“[B]oth the Orkem judgment and the recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
require, fi rst, the exercise of coercion against the suspect in order to obtain information from 
him and, second, establishment of the existence of an actual interference with the right which 
they defi ne.”41 The Court of Justice thus confi rms that its case law, which preceded case law 
of the ECtHR on the freedom from self-incrimination, is on this aspect in conformity with 
ECtHR case law. In the Orkem case, the Court of Justice did refer to the compulsion exerted 
by the Commission in competition law proceedings, but the twofold test of coercion and the 
interference cannot be found in this case. It thus appears that the Court of Justice might have 
been infl uenced in Limburgse Vinyl by developments in ECtHR case law to further explain its 
reasoning in the Orkem case. After Limburgse Vinyl, the case law of the Court always focuses, 
fi rstly, on the form of coercion and, secondly, on the actual interference with the freedom from 
self-incrimination. Coercion will exist, according to the Court of Justice, when the Commission 
can impose a fi ne for non-cooperation. This means that only decisions for information under 
Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003 and inspection decisions under Article 20(4) of Regulation 
1/2003, lead to compulsion. According to the ECJ, reductions of a fi ne by way of participation 
in a settlement or leniency procedure do not amount to compulsion. This approach would 
probably also be taken by the English judiciary due to their apparent adherence to the case 
law of the Court of Justice in Orkem. However, it remains to be seen what the English judiciary 
will do when the UK leaves the EU. In Dutch competition law, coercion should also exist. 
Here again, one can observe some voluntary adherence to EU law by the Dutch judiciary. 
Nevertheless, Dutch competition law does provide more protection than EU competition law, 
or even Dutch criminal law, since the right to remain silent under Article 53 Mw extends to all 
40   Many English statutes that allowed for a limitation of the freedom from self-incrimination, were changed after the Saunders judgment of 
the ECtHR. These changes were made in order to safeguard the freedom from self-incrimination. Consequently, multiple cooperation 
duties have been abolished for suspects. 
41   ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others 
v Commission), par. 275. 
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employees, as long as that employee is heard on the part of the undertaking. This approach 
might make it more diffi  cult for the ACM to prove an infringement of the competition rules, 
national and EU alike. If this would be to the detriment of the eff ective enforcement of EU 
competition law, then it might not be allowed.
Currenterly there are no cases from the ECtHR in which it ruled that compulsion by the carrot 
– e.g. a lower sanction for the ultimate penalty in exchange for cooperation – is compatible 
with the freedom from self-incrimination. Case law of the ECtHR generally focuses on the 
stick, and thus on penalties for non-cooperation. In the Ibrahimovic case, the ECtHR e.g. merely 
referred to compulsion. It ruled: “It is the existence of compulsion that gives rise to concerns 
as to whether the privilege against self-incrimination has been respected. For this reason, the 
Court must fi rst consider the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence.”42
Moreover, in e.g. Saunders, the ECtHR focused on “legal compulsion to give evidence”.43 It 
seems unlikely that providing for a reduction in the ultimate penalty of an off ence, or refusing 
to provide a reduction when not complying with the leniency programme, would amount to 
legal compulsion. 
Requests for information under Article 18(2) of Regulation 1/2003 and written authorisations 
ordering an inspection under Article 20(3) of Regulation 1/2003 do not amount to compulsion 
either. Again, this would probably be the case in Dutch and English competition law as well. 
A comparison can be made with the ECtHR Bykov case. In this case, the Russian authorities 
“tricked” Bykov, according to the applicant, in providing evidence against himself for the 
purpose of criminal law proceedings. The ECtHR held: 
The Court notes that in the present case the applicant had not been under any pressure 
to receive V. at his “guest house”, to speak to him, or to make any specifi c comments 
on the matter raised by V. Unlike the applicant in the Allan case (cited above), the 
applicant was not detained on remand but was at liberty on his own premises attended 
by security and other personnel. The nature of his relations with V. – subordination of 
the latter to the applicant – did not impose any particular form of behaviour on him. 
In other words, the applicant was free to see V. and to talk to him, or to refuse to do 
so. It appears that he was willing to continue the conversation started by V. because 
its subject matter was of personal interest to him. Thus, the Court is not convinced that 
the obtaining of evidence was tainted with the element of coercion or oppression which in the 
Allan case the Court found to amount to a breach of the applicant’s right to remain 
silent.44
42   ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 267.
43  ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 70.
44  ECtHR, no. 4378/02 (Bykov v Russia), par. 102 (emphasis added).
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The ECtHR did not fi nd an element of coercion in this case, even though it later on still 
examined whether there was an interference with the freedom from self-incrimination. When 
a request for information is made or a dawn raid by written authorisation is conducted, the 
persons providing that information are at the premises or the undertaking. This was for the 
ECtHR in Bykov a circumstance that led it to rule that there was no coercion. The nature of the 
relationship, a second circumstance the ECtHR used in Bykov to determine whether there was 
coercion, might be more problematic when it concerns the Commission, the CMA or the ACM 
requesting information. Nevertheless, the undertakings concerned remain “free to see [the 
offi  cials of competition authorities] and to talk to [them], or to refuse to do so”. No pressure 
exists from written authorisations or requests for information. Case law of the Union Courts 
on the freedom from self-incrimination in competition law proceedings seems therefore to 
mimic case law of the ECtHR on the criminal law freedom from self-incrimination. Similarly, 
in Dutch criminal law a certain pressure is allowed, but violence and threats are prohibited.45
English criminal law in general requires an obligation to cooperate when discussing the 
interference with the freedom from self-incrimination. 
Concerning the fi rst step, namely the question whether there is compulsion/coercion, there 
thus exists a comparable approach towards the criminal law and competition law freedom 
from self-incrimination. Nevertheless, competition law has had to deal with some questions 
that are specifi c to this area of law, such as whether a written authorisation to conduct an 
inspection amounts to coercion. It is in general less likely that criminal law authorities make 
use of similar written authorisations. A comparison is thus more diffi  cult to make with written 
authorisations in criminal law and competition law.
Actual interference
The second step46 in competition law proceedings and criminal law proceedings is to examine 
whether there is an actual interference. In the Orkem case, the ECJ ruled that the Commission 
is allowed to obtain factual answers and documents by compulsion. This ruling has been 
confi rmed multiple times, even though the Court of First Instance has tried to adapt this 
approach in 2004 in the Tokai Carbon judgment.47 It there examined the content of certain 
pre-existing48 documents, and ruled that the content of those documents would lead the 
undertaking to admit its infringement. The Court of First Instance applied the reasoning of the 
45   The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure generally does not allow for coercion being exerted on a suspect, whilst special legislation 
(administrative law or criminal law) may contain cooperation requirements. Obviously, the Dutch Code does allow for some forms of 
pressure, such as police interrogations.
46   As stated, this two-stepped approach of examining the coercion and the interference is less apparent in English criminal law. The 
judiciary will determine whether there is a limitation of this principle and whether it can be justifi ed. In chapter 4, par. 4.2.1, it has been 
mentioned that Glover (2017), p. 691, distinguishes three steps in the assessment to determine whether an infringement of the freedom 
from self-incrimination exists. 
47   CFI, T-236/01, 239/01, 244/01, 246/01, 251/01 and 252/01 P (Tokai Carbon and others v Commission), par. 409.
48   These are documents existing before an undertaking is requested to hand these over to a competition authority. Undertakings thus do 
not have to create these documents.
383
The impact of criminal law principles | CHAPTER 8
Ch
ap
te
r 8
Court of Justice with regard to questions also to requests for documents, and thus examined 
whether the documents contained factual information or incriminating information. This 
ruling was quashed on appeal by the Court of Justice.49 Interestingly, this approach would be 
completely in line with that of the Dutch judiciary in criminal law proceedings. Nevertheless, 
the ECtHR does not require such a far-reaching approach. It is therefore logical for the ECJ to 
confi rm its preceding case law. 
The ECtHR examines whether there is improper compulsion, and thus an actual interference, 
on the basis of multiple criteria. It examines (i) the degree of compulsion, (ii) the safeguards 
in the procedure, (iii) the use to which materials obtained by compulsion are put, and (iv) the 
general interest protected by requesting the information concerned. This is not an approach 
taken by the Dutch and English judiciary in criminal law proceedings. Domestic courts in 
those jurisdictions mainly make a distinction between requests for answers and requests for 
documents, and then determine whether there is an actual interference with the freedom from 
self-incrimination. This approach can also be found in Directive 2016/343. It appears that the 
ECtHR is more lenient towards pre-existing documents than to answers. Therefore, in the 
following analysis, a division is made between the obligation to provide documents and the 
obligation to provide answers.50
Actual interference - documents: ECHR
The ECtHR seems to be a bit more lenient in its approach towards pre-existing documents than 
to questions, which means that more compulsion may be exerted to obtain those documents. 
The fi rst criterion, namely the degree of compulsion used, might therefore in itself be so small 
for the request for documents that there is no actual interference. There might thus be no need 
to discuss the other criteria. In Funke the authorities were fi shing for information and in J.B. 
the authorities required the handing over of documents without knowing the size and content 
of them. In both cases, the authorities requested the persons to make a substantive appraisal 
which evidence to hand over to the authorities. The ECtHR did fi nd an infringement of the 
freedom from self-incrimination in both cases. 
In Nexans France, the General Court had to review an inspection decision to determine amongst 
others that the decision itself had been taken on proper grounds. The General Court ruled: 
The Court of the European Union may be called upon to review a decision adopted 
under Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003 for the purposes of ensuring that it is in no 
way arbitrary, that is to say, that it has not been adopted in the absence of facts capable 
of justifying an inspection. It must be borne in mind that the inspections carried out 
by the Commission are intended to enable it to gather the necessary documentary 
49  ECJ, C-301/04 P (Commission v SGL Carbon), par. 48.
50   Dutch criminal law takes a diff erent approach towards the “actual interference” step than Dutch competition law. This is further 
discussed in par. 9.4.1.
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evidence to check the actual existence and scope of a given factual and legal situation 
concerning which it already possesses certain information.51
The Commission may not use its powers in an arbitrary manner. Even though this case dealt 
with the inspection decision itself and not the powers during an inspection or request for 
information, it is still possible to apply it to those cases. Inspections are thus, according to 
the General Court, “intended to enable [the Commission] to gather necessary documentary 
evidence to check” whether the information already in the possession of the Commission is 
correct. This statement seems to focus on a directed use of the powers of the Commission, 
by which the latter confi rms its suspicions on the basis of evidence which it already has in 
its possession. Fishing expeditions by the Commission during competition law proceedings 
are thus not allowed, since they require a subjective appreciation from the undertaking 
concerned about the information which should be handed over.52 This approach thus seems 
to be similar to that by the ECtHR. Similarly, in Dutch competition law proceedings, fi shing 
expeditions, and also asking information in a broad manner, are not allowed. As mentioned, 
it is not entirely clear what the approach is in English competition law proceedings, although 
it appears that the English judiciary follows case law of the Union Courts on this matter. 
It follows from Hoechst53 that the Commission does not have the power to search business 
premises, unless the undertaking concerned does not cooperate with an inspection decision 
of the Commission, and when the Commission thus has to request the assistance of police 
or other enforcement authorities in a Member State. As asserted in paragraph 5.2.1, this 
does not mean that the Commission has to stand idly by, although this puts some pressure 
on undertakings to produce documents or to allow Commission offi  cials to use laptops or 
computers to search for information. The ACM does not have the power to search business 
premises. The CMA only has the power to search business premises when it conducts an 
inspection by warrant.
It is also possible for the Commission, the ACM and the CMA to request documents before 
or after an inspection. Fishing expeditions are not allowed for these requests for information 
either. 
The obligation for undertakings to produce documents during an inspection or on request by 
decision does not seem to sit well at fi rst sight with the ECtHR’s Funke judgment, in which the 
Strasbourg Court referred to the fact that Funke had to produce the documents himself “as 
opposed to being subjected to the execution by others of a search warrant for them, [which 
means that] the evidence was not obtained independently of his will”.54 This seems to imply
51  GC, T-135/09 (Nexans France), par. 43.
52   See e.g. ECJ, C-583/13 (Deutsche Bahn and others v Commission), par. 63, where the Court of Justice ruled that the Commission may 
not instruct its offi  cials to search for diff erent anti-competitive behaviour, not part of the subject-matter of the current inspection as 
formulated in the inspection decision. See also GC, T-135/09 (Nexans France v Commission), par. 43.
53   ECJ, 46/87 and 277/88 (Hoechst AG v Commission), par. 31-32.
54  Harris et al. (2014), p. 422.
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that the freedom from self-incrimination in competition law proceedings is diff erent from its 
counterpart under the ECHR. However, the reference by the ECtHR to the search warrant 
is, in the author’s view, less relevant than the content of the request for information in that 
case. In Funke, the authorities did not know whether information existed. As mentioned, 
the Commission, the ACM and the CMA have to ask for specifi c documentation from 
undertakings. The approach of the competition law courts by requiring undertakings to 
provide documents therefore appears to be in conformity with case law of the Strasbourg Court. 
Actual interference - documents: England
In England, the judiciary does not protect materials which exist independent of the will of 
a suspect. This so-called ‘materials based approach’ was established in England after the 
Saunders judgment of the ECtHR. A duty to provide documentation which exist independent 
of an order or request does not unduly limit the freedom from self-incrimination. An Orkem 
based approach in England would thus be in line with the application of the freedom from 
self-incrimination in English criminal law. One critical observation can be made in this regard: 
in 2007 the Court of Appeal ruled that the application of the freedom from self-incrimination 
in civil and criminal law proceedings should not be diff erent.55 Longmore LJ stated the 
following in the majority judgement: 
As to the fi rst submission, I would only say that it would be most surprising that a 
privilege designed to protect a defendant in circumstances where he might be facing 
criminal proceedings should vary in its content depending on whether the privilege 
were invoked in civil proceedings or in the criminal proceedings themselves. If anything 
one would expect the privilege to be less extensive rather than more extensive if it is 
invoked in civil proceedings. But there is, in truth, no warrant for suggesting that the 
rule is any diff erent in civil proceedings from criminal proceedings.56
This statement can lead to two diff erent conclusions on the impact of the criminal law principle 
on administrative law proceedings. It could be argued that there is no impact of criminal 
law,57 since the scope of the principle should, in both type of proceedings, be the same. This 
would mean that there is no purely criminal freedom from self-incrimination. Conversely, it 
is also possible to argue that the criminal law freedom from self-incrimination is applied in 
civil law proceedings as well. This would also ensure that this principle is applied in the same 
manner in criminal law and civil law. The latt er conclusion shows an impact of this criminal 
law principle on competition law. 
55   Civil law proceedings are all non-criminal law proceedings, and thus cover, in continental terms, both administrative law and civil law 
proceedings. 
56  England and Wales Court of Appeal (22 May 2007) [2007] EWCA Civ 493, par. 33.
57   The ECtHR focuses for the application of the freedom from self-incrimination on the concept of a ‘criminal charge’, although this does 
not necessarily mean that the approach in administrative law proceedings and criminal law proceedings is the same. In this research, 
only (hard core) criminal law cases were examined. 
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Actual interference - answers: ECtHR 
Under EU competition law proceedings, the obligation to respond to questions only relates to 
factual answers and not to admissions of guilt. In general, the ECtHR does not allow for obligations 
to provide answers, whether or not they are of a “non-incriminating nature – such as exculpatory 
remarks or mere information on questions of fact”.58 Some compulsion is allowed though. A 
person can be coerced e.g. into stating a simple fact. The obligation to provide factual answers in 
EU competition law proceedings cannot be regarded as merely stating a simple fact. At fi rst sight, 
one cannot speak of a similar approach in criminal law and competition law as regards to this 
aspect of the freedom from self-incrimination. Other factors have to be discussed as well though.
The ECtHR will examine as a second step, in order to assess whether there is an actual 
interference with the freedom from self-incrimination, the safeguards in the procedure. 
Firstly, a decision of the Commission or the CMA under respectively Article 18(3) of Regulation 
1/2003 and Section 26 of the Competition Act 1998 should comply with the conditions in those 
articles. This means, amongst others, that the request for information should be as precise as 
possible and that a deadline should be set for the response of the undertaking concerned. 
The ACM does not take a decision to request information under Article 5:16 of the General 
Administrative Law Act. As the Council of State has held, these are factual acts, and therefore 
do not lead to a decision under the General Administrative Law Act. Similar safeguards in 
Regulation 1/2003, to which the Commission has to adhere in competition law proceedings, 
therefore do not exist for the ACM in the General Administrative Law Act. The ACM will, 
however, always provide information on the nature of the dawn raid. Legally privileged 
documentation is protected under all three jurisdictions.
An inspection decision of the Commission and the CMA should comply with the conditions 
that can be found, respectively, in Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 and Section 27 and 28 of 
the Competition Act 1998. Here again, the principle of legal professional privilege applies. 
The ACM does not take a decision under Article 5:15 General Administrative Law Act. The 
inspection is regarded as a factual act, which does not lead to a decision. 
Secondly, the Commission, CMA and ACM will wait for a lawyer to be present. This is, however, 
merely a service to the undertaking concerned instead of a right of that undertaking. It will, 
however, be logical for the ACM and the CMA to conduct an investigation immediately if an 
in-house lawyer is present. This is obvious in light of the protection of privileged information, 
which in Dutch and English competition law proceedings is extended to in-house lawyers.
The third step of the ECtHR is to determine the use to which materials obtained are put. 
Excluding the use of evidence is an important safeguard to protect the freedom from self-
incrimination, according to the ECtHR. Evidence obtained by compulsion can be used by the
58   See e.g. ECtHR, no. 19187/91 (Saunders v United Kingdom), par. 71; ECtHR, no. 39660/02 (Aleksandr Zaichenko v Russia), par. 54; and 
ECtHR, no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom), par. 268.
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Commission in court proceedings. The use of evidence obtained by compulsion is thus not 
excluded by the Union Courts. This is not per se prohibited under the ECHR, as long as there 
are suffi  cient other safeguards and as long as the evidence is not the main or sole evidence. 
Obviously, in competition law proceedings, the Commission, CMA and ACM rely heavily on 
evidence obtained from undertakings. Furthermore, it is not clear what will happen when 
evidence is used in violation of the freedom from self-incrimination. The Union Courts have 
e.g. ruled that exclusion of evidence is likely when the Commission infringes the principle of 
legal professional privilege, but it is not clear whether this reasoning will be extended to the 
freedom from self-incrimination. Whether exclusion of evidence is a likely consequence for a 
derogation from the freedom from self-incrimination in competition law proceedings, is not 
apparent from English and Dutch competition law either. 
The last factor which the ECtHR discussed is the public interest requirement. The ECtHR is 
not entirely clear on this condition, which gives the impression of a confusing and inconsistent 
approach. In two circumstances did the ECtHR accept a public interest justifi cation, namely 
with regard to traffi  c violations when a person merely had to state a simple fact, and in case 
of tax proceedings. In contrast, the public interest was not a relevant factor in corporate fraud 
proceedings, insolvency proceedings, and customs proceedings.
In competition law proceedings, the public interest seems to be the underlying reason to 
interpret the duty to cooperate widely. Eff ective enforcement is balanced with the freedom 
from self-incrimination. This is a clear justifi cation to limit the scope of the freedom from self-
incrimination.
Requesting factual answers in EU, Dutch and English competition law does not infringe 
the freedom from self-incrimination. ECtHR case law seems to allow for this as well. The 
actual interference should also be examined in competition law proceedings. Even though the 
courts are not that elaborate in competition law proceedings on the criteria to determine this 
actual interference, it seems that the approach in competition law proceedings leads to the 
same outcome as that in proceedings before the ECtHR. One might therefore discern some 
similarities between criminal law and competition law in this respect. 
Actual interference – answers: England
 In general, English criminal law does allow for some limitations to the freedom from 
self-incrimination by Act of Parliament. Statutory law could “expressly or by necessary 
388
CHAPTER 8 | The impact of criminal law principles
implication”59 derogate from the freedom from self-incrimination. The powers of the OFT/
CMA in the Competition Act 1998 which require cooperation from the undertaking concerned 
do by “necessary implication” limit the freedom from self-incrimination. If this would not be 
the case the eff ective enforcement of English competition law would be hindered. 
There have been multiple cases where the English judiciary allowed obligations to provide 
(factual) answers in criminal law proceedings. This is allowed when the general interest 
requires the freedom from self-incrimination to be set aside for a duty to cooperate. It is possible 
to discern here a pressing social need for the eff ective enforcement of English competition law, 
which could lead to a derogation from the freedom from self-incrimination. We can therefore 
observe a similar approach in English criminal law and competition law.
 8.3.2 Burden and standard of proof
The comparison of the burden and standard of proof in criminal law and competition law 
is a diffi  cult one to make. This is e.g. the case because the ECtHR cannot be regarded as a 
‘fourth instance’ tribunal. Furthermore, the ECtHR allows Contracting Parties to create their 
own criminal laws and procedures, which leaves room for diff erences.60 Moreover, in Dutch 
criminal law, there is strictly speaking not a burden of proof, and Directive 2016/343 merely 
touches upon some aspects of the burden and standard of proof. In what follows, a distinction 
is made between the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The approach taken towards 
the burden and standard of proof in competition law proceedings in the Netherlands and 
England is found to be infl uenced by that of the Union Courts in competition law proceedings. 
Burden of proof
In competition law proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the Commission, the ACM or the 
CMA. This is an evidential and legal burden of proof, since the competition authorities have to 
prove an infringement to the requisite legal standard. 
The ECtHR and EU criminal law both require that the evidential and legal burden of proof rests 
on the prosecuting authorities. This follows, according to the ECtHR, from the presumption of 
innocence. The ECJ has ruled in a similar vein in Thomasz Rubach.61 Moreover, Article 6(1) of 
Directive 2016/343 requires Member States to ensure that the burden of proof of establishing 
an infringement rests on the prosecution. In England, the evidential and legal burden of proof 
also rest on the authorities. Strictly speaking, Dutch criminal law does not know a burden of 
proof. Nevertheless, the (de facto) evidential and legal burden of proof do rest on the public 
prosecutor. The approach towards the burden to prove an infringement in competition law 
proceedings is thus similar to that in criminal law proceedings. 
59   See for obligations to provide answers in traffi  c regulations: Supreme Court (22 July 2015) [2015] UKSC 49, par. 61; or England and 
Wales High Court (19 June 2008) [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin), par. 73; in extrajudicial bankruptcy procedures: England and Wales 
Court of Appeal (22 March 2002) [2002] 1 WLR 2815, par. 54-56; and in terrorism proceedings: England and Wales Court of Appeal (9 
October 2008) [2009] 1 WLR 1489, par. 25.
60  Notable are the diff erences between the continental systems and the common law systems.
61  ECJ, C-344/08 (Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach), par. 32.
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The rule that the burden of proof must rest on the prosecution does not mean that there 
is never a burden of proof on a suspect. A suspect in criminal law, or an undertaking in 
competition law, may bear a burden of proof e.g. when trying to discharge proof adduced by 
the authorities or when invoking a defence. 
Under EU, Dutch and English competition law, undertakings bear, generally speaking, an 
evidential burden of proof when discharging indirect evidence, an evidential and legal burden 
of proof when discharging direct evidence, and an evidential and legal burden of proof when 
invoking defences.62 It is not clear whether there is a burden of proof on an undertaking for 
invoking a defence under the prohibition to abuse a dominant position. There is, as mentioned, 
an evidential and legal burden of proof when invoking a defence under the cartel prohibition. 
The approach of the Dutch competition law judiciary on the burden (and standard) of proof 
in competition law proceedings is inspired by the approach of the Union Courts, whereas the 
English judiciary has confi rmed that its approach is similar to that of the Union Courts. 
Placing an evidential burden of proof on a suspect to discharge evidence produced by the 
authorities seems to be allowed by the ECtHR. There are indications that a legal burden of 
proof is also allowed in those circumstances.63 For defences, it is not entirely clear whether 
the ECtHR merely accepts evidential burden of proofs, or also legal burdens of proof. Here as 
well, there are indications that a legal burden of proof on a suspect to invoke a defence will 
not encroach upon the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR. 
As mentioned above, Dutch criminal law in general does not allow for a burden of proof on a 
suspect. This placing would make a comparison between Dutch criminal law and competition 
law diffi  cult, since there are no similar reference points. However, similar to competition law 
proceedings, a suspect might lose the case if (s)he does not provide counterevidence, or in 
other words, if (s)he does not raise a defence challenging the constituent elements of an off ence. 
The Dutch judiciary will only accept in criminal law proceedings an alternative explanation 
when it is substantiated to a certain standard of proof. This seems to imply an evidential and 
legal burden of proof. Depending on the evidence of the ACM, it seems that the courts require 
more proof from a suspect in criminal law than from the undertaking in competition law. This 
is quite logical in light of the ample use of deductions and assumptions in competition law 
proceedings. In Dutch criminal law, it is not entirely clear whether a suspect has to prove an 
exculpatory or justifi catory defence to a certain legal standard of proof. In chapter 3, par. 3.4.3, 
it has been mentioned that the Dutch Supreme Court sometimes only allows for an evidential 
burden of proof, which means that a suspect merely has to substantiate his/her defence. In 
other cases, a suspect has to prove an exculpatory or justifi catory defence to the plausibility 
62 The approach in Dutch competition law is more nuanced, as is explained below under the standard of proof. 
63  There are, however, no indications that this is not allowed. 
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standard of proof. It is thus not entirely clear whether an evidential and legal burden of proof 
may rest on a suspect in criminal law proceedings when invoking exculpatory or justifi catory 
defences or merely an evidential burden of proof. Dutch competition law does put an 
evidential and legal burden of proof on undertakings when raising defences. This is thus a 
diff erent approach in Dutch criminal law than in Dutch competition law. 
The approach in English competition law towards the burden of proof on an undertaking is 
comparable to that in criminal law proceedings, even though the English courts have, since 
the Lambert64 case was ruled upon, started reading down the legal burden of proof for some 
defences to merely an evidential burden of proof. For providing counterevidence, an evidential 
burden is accepted in criminal law proceedings as well as in competition law proceedings.
Standard of proof – competition authority
The standard of proof in EU competition law seems to be similar to that in criminal law 
proceedings before the ECtHR. Since the standard of proof in Dutch and English competition 
law is aligned65 with the approach of the Union Courts, similarities can also be discerned 
between the standard of proof in competition law proceedings in those two jurisdictions and 
criminal law proceedings before the ECtHR. Conversely, the standard of proof in Dutch and 
English competition law is diff erent from that in the criminal laws of those jurisdictions. This 
is examined in par. 8.4.2. 
In legal doctrine, there is a lively discussion on the standard of proof in EU competition law 
proceedings. The Union Courts seem not to have been entirely consistent here. Overall, it 
seems to boil down to the conviction intime of the Union Courts instead of a particular standard. 
Whether conviction intime exists will be determined on the basis of the whole body of evidence. 
This body of evidence should be suffi  ciently precise and consistent. The Commission can use 
direct evidence, but also indirect or circumstantial evidence. This approach is similar in Dutch 
and English competition law. 
The ECtHR also accepts that authorities use direct and indirect evidence in criminal law 
proceedings.66 No rules as to the use of indirect evidence have been developed by the ECtHR, 
since this tribunal does not deal with the assessment of facts. The European Commission 
of Human Rights did nonetheless set two limits to the use of indirect evidence; (i) the 
causal relationship between circumstantial evidence and consequences should be assessed 
properly; and (ii) circumstantial evidence should as a whole be unambiguous. The latter 
is also a requirement of CJEU in EU competition law proceedings. The causal relationship 
64  House of Lords (5 July 2001) [2001] 3 WLR 206.
65   The approach in Dutch competition law proceedings is a bit more nuanced, and thus diff erent from that of EU and English competition 
law, with regard to providing counterevidence when the ACM has used direct evidence to substantiate its point of view. 
66  ECtHR, decision as to the admissibility, no. 44324/11 (Lawless v United Kingdom), par. 30.
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between indirect evidence and consequences is inherent in competition law proceedings. 
The Commission will obviously “infer” a fact from indirect or circumstantial evidence. As 
the Court of Justice stated in e.g. Aalborg Portland: “In most cases, the existence of an anti-
competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia
which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute 
evidence of an infringement of the competition rules”.67 Inferences will be drawn from 
indirect evidence, and these are reviewed by the Union Courts. Here, again, the Dutch and 
English competition law judiciaries follow a similar approach. The same boundaries as set by 
the European Commission of Human Rights seem to exist in competition law proceedings as 
well. 
Standard of proof – undertaking 
An undertaking can also bear a burden of proof when it tries to discharge evidence produced 
by the Commission. For direct evidence, in EU and English competition law proceedings an 
undertaking needs to show that the evidence is insuffi  cient to prove the infringement. In the 
Netherlands, the approach is a bit more refi ned, since the judiciary decides on the basis of the 
quality and amount of direct evidence, whether a denial could be suffi  cient or whether the 
undertaking has to present proof to a requisite legal standard. The Dutch judiciary might do 
well to follow the case law of the Union Courts on this aspect more strictly, or to explicitly 
state that a diff erent approach is taken. It is strange that the Dutch judiciary explicitly confi rms 
that it follows the approach towards the burden and standard of proof by the Union Courts, 
while taking a more nuanced approach to the burden of proof to rebut direct evidence. An 
undertaking only has to provide a plausible alternative explanation when the Commission, 
ACM or CMA uses indirect evidence. 
An evidential and legal burden of proof rests on the undertaking to discharge direct evidence, 
whereas only an evidential burden of proof, and thus the establishing of a prima facie case, is 
suffi  cient to rebut indirect evidence. There is not a specifi c standard of proof on an undertaking 
when it bears the legal burden of proof. By producing counterevidence, the undertaking 
concerned should raise doubt to ensure that the Union Courts will not reach the conviction 
intime. The ECtHR nor EU criminal law is clear on the burden of proof on a suspect; therefore, 
it also remains a bit unclear what the approach will be towards the standard of proof for 
providing counterevidence. 
The same uncertainty exists regarding the standard of proof on a suspect when invoking 
a defence. Neither the ECtHR nor EU criminal law provides any indications here. In 
competition law proceedings, the CJEU is not entirely clear on this topic either. In 
GlaxoSmithKline, the Court of Justice provided that an undertaking should prove the 
67   ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission), par. 57 
(emphasis added). For the same phrasing see also: GC, T-72/09 (Pilkington Group and others v Commission), par. 83; GC, T-83/08 (Denki 
Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki and Denka Chemicals v Commission), par. 54; GC, T-377/06 (Comap v Commission), par. 58; CFI, T-53/03 (British 
Plasterboard v Commission), par. 63; ECJ, C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P (Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission), par. 51.
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defence to a “suffi  cient degree of probability”. Other case law focuses on the conviction 
intime again. There is a diff erence here between the evidence which can be produced by the 
Commission, and the evidence which can be produced by undertakings. The Commission 
may rely on all relevant evidence to prove an infringement. Undertakings are required 
to produce documentary evidence to substantiate their defence. The Union Courts are 
thus stricter for undertakings with regard to the evidence which should be used when 
they have to substantiate a defence. The ‘balance of probabilities’ standard applies to 
undertakings when they should substantiate a defence in English and Dutch competition law.
8.3.4 Proportionality of sanctions
The judicial review of sanctions and the ‘deterrence’ factor will now be examined to compare 
the proportionality of sanctions in competition law proceedings with that in criminal law 
proceedings. Case law on this principle from the Union Courts and the Dutch competition law 
courts seems to be similar to that in EU criminal law and under the ECHR. Notable diff erences 
exist however between the proportionality of sanctions as applied in Dutch competition law 
and Dutch criminal law.
There is no similarity between the interpretation of this principle by the English competition 
law judiciary and the Strasbourg or Luxembourg Courts in criminal law proceedings. The 
English judiciary explicitly excluded the infl uence of criminal law on factors which can be 
applied to determine a sanction, although the review of a sanction is, according to the English 
judiciary, “not dissimilar”.68
Judicial review 
In general, the proportionality of competition law sanctions is assessed by the CJEU and 
the Dutch courts on the basis of the appropriateness, or suitability, of a measure and on the 
necessity of the measure, which means that the measure should be the least restrictive. These 
two tests can also be found in the case law of the Union Courts dealing with the proportionality 
principle in general. The ECtHR in contrast focuses mainly on the proportionality stricto sensu. 
This test cannot be found in EU competition law proceedings. The Union Courts exclude the 
application of the stricto sensu proportionality test, by providing that the 10% limit ensures 
that fi nes are not excessive. A notable diff erence exists in this regard with the review by 
the ECtHR, although the Union Courts use a similar approach in relation to criminal law 
sanctions. 
The suitability test and the least restrictive test seem to be incorporated in the review by 
the Dutch competition law judiciary. In the Breda Notary case,69 the District Court decided to 
decrease the fi ne to a symbolic one; a normal fi ne was thus not suitable. The Appeals Tribunal 
did fi nd a (non-symbolic) fi ne to be suitable though. By examining whether all relevant factors 
are taken into account and by examining whether they are taken into account correctly, the 
68  See EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 71.
69   Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702; on appeal: CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479.
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Dutch judiciary ensures that the amount of the competition law fi ne is the least restrictive. This 
is thus a similar approach as the one taken by the EU Courts in competition law proceedings, 
but also in criminal law proceedings. A diff erent approach is taken by the ECtHR, due to the 
focus on the proportionality stricto sensu test, which is not applicable in Dutch competition 
law proceedings. The English judiciary does use the three diff erent proportionality tests, and 
will examine the suitability of a fi ne, whether the fi ne is the least restrictive, and lastly it will 
use a proportionality stricto sensu test and balance all interests at stake. This approach thus 
combines the approach of the Union Courts and the ECtHR in criminal law proceedings. 
Judicial review and the discretion of competition law authorities
In EU competition law proceedings, a wide margin of discretion exists as to the powers of the 
Commission to impose an appropriate fi ne. The Union Courts will determine whether the 
fi ne has been set in a coherent manner and whether the choices made by the Commission are 
consistent and objectively justifi ed. Only when an error of assessment exists, will the Union 
Courts interfere with the imposition of a fi ne. This approach is quite similar to that in Dutch 
and English competition law proceedings, even though the English judiciary will always 
examine as a last step whether the fi ne as a whole is proportionate. 
In other areas of EU law where discretion exists, a manifest disproportionality test is used 
by the CJEU.70 Nonetheless, the Union Courts are stricter towards acts by Member States, 
since the proportionality principle determines whether a restriction of Union law by Member 
States, in particular the fundamental freedoms, is allowed or not. The ECHR system allows 
for a margin of discretion for Member States, which means that the proportionality test might 
be less intense when this discretion exists. The approach taken in criminal law proceedings 
before the ECtHR and the Union Courts in EU competition law proceedings, therefore allows 
for some discretion, and thus for a less intense review. This review is also less intense when it 
concerns (administrative law) Union measures, although the Union Courts are stricter when 
it concerns acts by Member States. When an error has been found, the Union Courts will 
adapt the competition law sanction. This can be done quite quickly with reference to the 
arithmetical formula of the Commission, but there are also cases, in particular when there 
are more errors, where the Union Courts engage in a fresh assessment. It is not clear how the 
Union Courts will assess a criminal law sanction when a domestic authority has adopted it, 
since that will be up to the domestic courts. Similarly, the ECtHR does not fi x a criminal law 
sanction itself, but only concludes whether a sanction is proportionate or not. 
Deterrence 
Specifi c and general deterrence is an important factor to determine the level of a competition 
law fi ne. Other factors are sometimes used as part of the deterrence factor. Fines which only 
70  Craig (2012), p. 600ff .
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negate the negative eff ects of a competition law infringement are not suffi  ciently deterrent. 
The Union Courts have similarly held that fi nes for the enforcement of EU law should be 
eff ective or dissuasive. In criminal law proceedings, deterrence is thus used by the Union 
Courts to ensure the eff ective enforcement of EU law.
Conversely, deterrence is sometimes also used by the Union Courts to rule that a criminal law 
sanction limiting EU law is proportionate. As the Court of Justice held: “[Member States] are 
not justifi ed in imposing a penalty so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement that it 
becomes an obstacle to the free movement of persons.”71 The ‘chilling eff ect’ of a sanction is 
also used by the ECtHR to determine whether the prosecution of a person could unjustifi ably 
interfere with, in particular, Article 10 ECHR. In EU competition law proceedings, this aspect 
does not seem to play an important role. In one case however, the General Court reduced 
the amount of the fi ne, because it was found to be too excessive. The arguments in this case 
turned on the poor fi nancial situation of the undertaking, which is, generally, not a factor 
which needs to be considered. However, the General Court exceptionally took into account 
the poor fi nancial situation of the undertaking. It ruled the following:
In the present case, the applicant is a small undertaking whose share capital came 
to only EUR 1.1 million in 2005 and whose shareholding structure is that of a family 
company, as its capital is held by only two natural persons, Mr and Mrs B. […]. It 
also follows from the fi ndings made in the interim measures proceedings concerning 
the present case that in 2005, in order to contribute to a reserve to cover the risk of 
payment of a fi ne of EUR 1 million, the applicant had to sell a factory in Cerratina, in 
the municipality of Pianella (Italy), thus reducing the value of the immovable assets to 
a sum below the amount of the fi ne imposed by the Commission […].72
The undertaking concerned had to recapitalise or had to be wound-up when the fi ne, 
exceeding twice the value of the shares, was added to the accounts. A bank guarantee 
could not be obtained anymore by the undertaking, and the bank concerned suspended the 
credit lines because of the poor fi nancial situation. The General Court took into account the 
dissuasiveness or deterrence of the fi ne to conclude that the fi ne was disproportionate. It held:
In the light of the foregoing considerations, and taking account in particular of the 
cumulative eff ect of the illegalities previously found and also of the applicant’s weak 
fi nancial capacity, the Court considers that an equitable assessment of all the circumstances 
of the case will be made if it sets the fi nal amount of the fi ne imposed on the applicant 
at EUR 1 million. In eff ect, a fi ne in such an amount makes it possible to penalise the
71  ECJ, 118/75 (Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann), par. 21. (emphasis added)
72   GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 281. (emphasis added and references omitted)
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 applicant’s unlawful conduct eff ectively, in a manner which is not negligible and which 
remains suffi  ciently deterrent. Any fi ne above that amount would be disproportionate to 
the infringement found against the applicant appraised as a whole.73
The approach towards deterrence in EU competition law proceedings seems to be a bit one-
sided by focusing on the negative side of this factor. Fines should be dissuasive and eff ective. 
This approach is in line with the approach by the Court of Justice in criminal law proceedings 
when Member States enforce EU law by criminal law means. Conversely, the other side of the 
coin, namely the ‘chilling eff ect’ of the fi ne, is not necessarily a factor which the Union Courts 
take into account in EU competition law proceedings. Nevertheless, in extraordinary cases 
this does happen. This approach is more often applied by the ECtHR and by the Union Courts 
when dealing with cases where Member States limit EU law by criminal law means. The 
Dutch competition law judiciary also seems to be more receptive to take the ‘chilling eff ect’ 
of fi nes into account. The impact of criminal law on the deterrence factor in competition law 
proceedings is thus limited, although some similarities between EU and Dutch competition 
law and criminal law can be discerned.
8.3.5 Concluding remarks
The Court of Justice applies the freedom from self-incrimination, the burden and standard of 
proof and the proportionality of sanctions in competition law proceedings in a similar manner 
as the ECtHR in criminal law proceedings. This approach is also similar to that in EU criminal 
law proceedings. The Dutch and English judiciary are infl uenced by the CJEU in relation to 
the freedom from self-incrimination and the burden and standard of proof in competition 
law proceedings. It is thus logical that these two principles are also applied similar to the 
approach in criminal law proceedings by the ECtHR and the CJEU. The domestic courts are 
not infl uenced by the CJEU when it concerns the proportionality of sanctions. Nevertheless, 
the approach taken in domestic competition law proceedings is similar to that in criminal law 
before the CJEU and the ECtHR. There are still diff erences in the application of these three 
principles in domestic competition law and criminal law, as is explained in the following 
paragraph. The burden of proof in Dutch and English competition law proceedings is, 
however, similar to that in domestic criminal law. Furthermore, the freedom from self-
incrimination in English criminal law and competition law is applied in a similar manner. 
Diff erences between domestic criminal law and competition law exist when analysing the 
approach to the freedom from self-incrimination in the Netherlands, the standard of proof in 
England and the Netherland and the proportionality of sanctions in those two jurisdictions. 
73  GC, T-11/06 (Romana Tabacchi v Commission), par. 284. (emphasis added)
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8.4 DIFFERENCES 
The non bis in idem principle is the only principle which is applied completely diff erently in 
EU and Dutch competition law74 in comparison to its counterpart in EU, ECHR and Dutch 
criminal law. For the other principles discussed in this paragraph, we can see similarities 
in so far as it concerns EU, Dutch and English competition law and EU criminal law and 
criminal law proceedings before the ECtHR. Diff erences often exist when it concerns domestic 
competition law and domestic criminal law. 
8.4.1 Freedom from self-incrimination
The application of the freedom from self-incrimination was already discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Only in the Netherlands, some notable diff erences exist between the question 
whether there is an actual interference with this principle in competition law proceedings and 
in criminal law proceedings. The interpretation of the fi rst step, namely the question whether 
there is coercion in competition law proceedings, is comparable to that under the ECHR and 
in Dutch criminal law.
Actual interference - documents
The approach taken towards documents goes further in Dutch criminal law than in Dutch 
competition law proceedings. In criminal law proceedings, a far-reaching ‘materials based 
approach’ is taken by the Dutch judiciary. The Dutch criminal courts always examine whether 
the information in documents encroaches upon the freedom from self-incrimination, and 
thus whether the information in the document is of a testimonial nature. Documents are 
generally excluded from the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination in competition 
law proceedings. It is thus possible that not only objective information is contained in those 
documents; e.g. minutes of a meeting might also contain incriminating information. In such 
cases, Dutch criminal law would provide a more extensive protection. 
A similarity between Dutch criminal law and Dutch competition law is, however, the 
prohibition of fi shing expeditions and the prohibition to ask broad questions.75
Actual interference – answers
The approach in protecting testimonial evidence actually goes further than the approach in 
Dutch criminal law proceedings. The Dutch Supreme Court e.g. ruled that an obligation in 
Dutch traffi  c legislation to provide information on the identity of the driver of a car led to 
an infringement of the right to remain silent as contained in Article 29 of the DCCP. This 
approach emphasises the (almost) absolute nature of a person to remain silent, and is thus
74   There is no case law on this principle in English competition law, which means that it is unclear how it would be interpreted and 
applied by the English judiciary. 
75   See the non-criminal law ruling Hoge Raad (24 April 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1130, par. 4.3.3. This judgment is extendable in the 
author’s view to criminal law proceedings. Cf. Van Toor (2017), p. 242; Stevens (2007), par. 3. Similarly, there is no competition law case 
yet in which this aspect has been ruled upon, although it appears that the approach taken in a regulatory case dealing with spamming 
(CBb (10 April 2014) ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:116, par. 5.7) might also be applicable in competition law proceedings.
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in contrast to the approach in Dutch competition law proceedings, but also in contrast to the 
approach under the ECtHR. 
Here again, a similarity between Dutch criminal law and Dutch competition law is the 
prohibition of fi shing expeditions and the prohibition to ask broad questions.
Testimonial evidence cannot be used in criminal law proceedings, since the use of that 
evidence will lead to an infringement of the freedom from self-incrimination. Evidence 
which falls under the freedom from self-incrimination and is obtained by coercion should 
be excluded from criminal law proceedings. It appears that a similar approach is taken in 
Dutch competition law proceedings. The reference to the criminal law judgment in Drainpipe76
suggests that inspiration is taken from the criminal law domain in this respect. It is striking 
though that the Dutch competition courts are infl uenced on some aspects of this principle 
by the freedom from self-incrimination in (Dutch) criminal law proceedings, whereas on 
other aspects they seem to take a diff erent approach. This is due to the infl uence of Union 
competition law on domestic competition law, but it does lead to an approach which is at 
times similar to (or even infl uenced by) criminal law, and at other instances diff erent. 
8.4.2 Standard of proof
It was already stated in par. 8.3.2 that the standard of proof in Dutch and English competition 
law proceedings is infl uenced strongly by case law of the Union Courts in competition law 
proceedings. This case law is in conformity with that of the ECtHR, and thus similar to that in 
criminal law proceedings before the Strasbourg Court. However, the Strasbourg Court only 
sets a minimum threshold. Contracting Parties may, obviously, provide more protection. In 
Dutch and English criminal law, a diff erent interpretation is given to the standard of proof 
than that of the ECtHR. This approach is substantially diff erent from that in competition 
law proceedings. In what follows, the criminal law standard of proof is compared to the 
competition law standard of proof in the Netherlands and England. 
The Netherlands: constituent elements
Diff erent formulations are used in competition law proceedings to refer to the standard of 
proof. Reference is made to suffi  cient evidence, adequate evidence, making the infringement 
(suffi  ciently) plausible, or even convincing evidence. The highest standard of convincing 
evidence seems to fl ow from the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2) ECHR. This 
could imply a high standard of the ‘benefi t of the doubt’. Nevertheless, the standard used 
is not entirely clear. It boils down in the end to whether the judiciary has reached the inner 
conviction on the basis of the available evidence. Dutch criminal law is characterised by the 
conviction raisonnée of the judge and the evidential rules which should be complied with
76  Hoge Raad (30 March 2004) ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533.
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 before a conviction could be established. The system of the conviction raisonnée seems, at 
fi rst sight to be diff erent from the system of the conviction intime which appears to be used 
in Dutch competition law proceedings. Nevertheless, the Dutch judiciary has created some 
evidential rules in competition law proceedings, and thereby restricted the principle of the 
unfettered evaluation of evidence somewhat. A comparison of the evidential rules is thus 
necessary to determine whether there is some impact of the criminal law standard of proof 
on the competition law standard of proof. It should be mentioned though that the standard 
of proof in criminal law proceedings seems to be the standard of in dubio pro reo. At fi rst sight, 
the standard of proof appears to be substantially diff erent in criminal law and competition 
law proceedings. 
In competition law proceedings both direct and indirect evidence is allowed. Dutch criminal 
law also allows for the use of direct and indirect evidence. In competition law proceedings, 
evidence should be correct, reliable and consistent, but in the end, credibility is the only relevant 
criterion to determine whether a competition law infringement can be proven. Credibility is 
in general also the main element for the criminal law judiciary. A notable diff erence is that 
indirect evidence, or deductions, are quite common in competition law proceedings and 
easily accepted by the courts, unless the undertakings provide counterevidence. This ample 
use of indirect evidence is probably not in line with the criminal law practice. It is e.g. in 
Dutch criminal law proceedings not allowed to make use of a witness statement in which the 
witness was guessing, or assumed or presumed certain facts.77 This example of the witness 
statement already reveals a higher threshold as regards the use of evidence in criminal law. 
A similarity between competition law and criminal law proceedings can be found in the 
substantiation of some evidence. The Supreme Court has held that the use of statements of 
witnesses78 and confessions of a suspect should be substantiated with other evidence. In a 
similar vein, the Dutch courts allowed for the 2+2 rule created by the ACM in the construction 
industry fraud cases, which means that participation in the cartel can be proven on the basis 
of two leniency documents and two other authentic documents.
Overall though, there are more diff erences in the application of this principle in criminal law 
and competition law than similarities. 
The Netherlands: meritorious defences
Undertakings can be required to provide suffi  cient counterevidence in order to prevent a 
conviction for an infringement of the competition rules. The course of action adopted by 
undertakings during the proceedings is quite important, especially in light of the evidence 
which can be used in competition law proceedings. In criminal law proceedings, the role 
of the suspect is of less relevance, due to higher standard to evidence, the role of the public 
77  Dubelaar (2014), in particular 302-304.
78  This follows from Article 342(2) DCCP. 
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prosecutor and the role of the judge. Nevertheless, a suspect could try to prevent a conviction 
by providing an alternative situation or an interpretation of the facts. Diff erent phrasings are 
used to elaborate upon the standard which this evidence should adhere to in criminal law. 
The Supreme Court held e.g. that the alternative should be plausible, not unbelievable or not 
highly unlikely. The competition law system is more refi ned. Rebutting evidence depends 
fi rst of all, on the type of evidence used, and, second, on the amount and quality of evidence. 
If indirect evidence is used, then merely providing a plausible alternative explanation 
is suffi  cient. This does not have to be proven to a certain standard. However, when direct 
evidence is used, it depends on the quality and amount of that evidence to determine whether 
a plausible alternative explanation should be substantiated with more evidence. 
It is unclear what the standard of proof is in criminal law proceedings for a suspect when 
invoking an exculpatory or justifi catory defence. In competition law proceedings, this 
standard rests on the balance of probabilities. 
England: proving an infringement and substantiating defences
The standard of proof appears to be a ‘hot potato’ in English competition law proceedings. 
The civil standard of balance of probabilities applies to both the CMA and the undertakings 
when they bear a legal burden of proof. However, the standard of proof for the CMA is not as 
straightforward as may appear. In NAPP79 the CAT referred to a high balance of probabilities 
whereby the result of applying this standard would be similar as to that in criminal law 
proceedings. In JJB80 reference was made to a high civil standard of proof, which is not similar 
to that in criminal law proceedings. To make matters even more confusing, it has often been 
held that any doubt should benefi t the accused. Nevertheless, in 2011, the CAT ruled, with 
reference to House of Lords judgments, that there is no “heightened standard”.81 The most 
recent statement to date of the CAT was given in the Tesco case, where it provided that “[a]
ny doubt in the mind of the Tribunal as to whether a point is established on the balance of 
probabilities must operate to the advantage of the undertaking”82 concerned. 
The NAPP case showed some infl uence of the criminal law standard of proof. Conversely, 
later case law held that any doubt must benefi t the accused. This case law seems to show 
similarities with the criminal law standard. There are also judgments which explicitly reject 
this notion. In Tesco, the CAT combines the confusing line of judgements into one approach. 
The inconsistent line of cases does not show that the CAT has thought about the impact of 
its earlier statements that the civil law standard of proof is similar to that in criminal law 
79  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1.
80  CAT (1 October 2004) [2004] CAT 17.
81  CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 12, par .15; CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 13, par. 47; and CAT (27 April 2011) [2011] CAT 14, par. 16.
82  CAT (20 December 2012) [2012] CAT 31, par. 88.
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proceedings.83 Moreover, the latest cases do show that the infl uence or similarity of the 
standard of proof in competition law and criminal law proceedings does not exist anymore. 
There is, however, some similarity as to the standard of proof for the suspect/undertaking 
concerned. In both types of proceedings, the subject of the proceedings has to substantiate its 
defence, when it bears a legal burden of proof, to the balance of probabilities.
In order to rebut counterevidence, it is of particular importance in competition law proceedings 
whether the CMA presents direct or indirect evidence. Circumstantial evidence can be rebutted 
by a convincing alternative explanation. This is similar to criminal law proceedings. To rebut 
direct evidence, the undertaking concerned should use direct evidence as well in competition 
law proceedings. This is not necessarily the case in criminal law proceedings. 
8.4.3 Proportionality of sanctions
The proportionality of sanctions in Dutch and English competition law is applied in a diff erent 
manner than in criminal law proceedings. For the Netherlands a distinction is below between 
the judicial review and the factors which can be taken into account to determine a sanction. 
This distinction is not made for the English system due to some notable characteristics of the 
criminal law system, which already distinguish this system from competition law proceedings. 
Netherlands: Proportionality of sanctions – judicial review
The Dutch judiciary will, in general, review the choices made by the ACM when it determines 
the amount of the fi ne. This means that the judiciary will examine whether all relevant 
factors are taken into account and whether they are taken into account in a correct manner. A 
proportionality test stricto sensu does not exist in competition law proceedings, due to the 10% 
maximum which ensures that fi nes are not disproportionate per se. The ACM enjoys a wide 
discretion in setting the fi ne and to determine which factors it takes into account. Review of 
a fi ne will, in general, focus on the elements brought up by the undertaking concerned. This 
will lead to a full review of these arguments and the elements on which they focus. In Dutch 
criminal law, the judiciary will determine the sanction. The legislator does not places many 
limits on the judiciary to determine the sanction and the amount of a sanction. It also appears 
that the judiciary can be quite brief in its reasoning on the (amount of the) sanction, although 
certain motivation requirements might prevent the judiciary from merely stating that it took 
into consideration the seriousness of the off ence, the circumstances at the time of the off ence, 
and the behaviour and personal circumstances of the perpetrator. Competition law is more 
elaborate on the factors which can be taken into account, and also the factors which cannot be 
taken into account. This is more logical since an ACM decision is reviewed by the judiciary, 
whereas in criminal law proceedings the judiciary itself imposes the fi ne. The lack of reference 
83  See also, in general, Glover (2017), p. 132-137 about the “blurring” of the civil and the criminal law standard of proof.
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to the proportionality of sanctions in criminal law proceedings is perhaps also due to the 
emphasis of Dutch criminal law on the criminal liability of the behaviour and of the person 
concerned. 
The ‘ability-to-pay’ principle is a specifi c principle incorporated in the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure. This principle focuses partly on deterrence, if the ability to pay is suffi  cient, and 
partly on preventing disproportionate sanctions. In practice, this principle does not seem to 
play an important role in criminal law proceedings. In Dutch competition law proceedings, 
deterrence is an important goal of the fi nes. The other side of the coin, preventing 
disproportionate fi nes, is also an important factor in Dutch competition law proceedings. The 
10% cap of the fi ne ensures in general that fi nes are not disproportionate to the size and power 
of the undertaking concerned. However, bankruptcies due to the competition law fi ne should 
be prevented. Furthermore, the fi nancial situation of an undertaking can be a factor to reduce 
the fi ne. It will be for the undertakings concerned to refer to these factors. An appeal to the 
fact that the fi ne would lead to a bankruptcy should e.g. be substantiated with ascertainable 
and verifi able evidence. Similarly, a criminal law judge is not required to investigate whether 
a person is capable of paying the fi ne, which means that the defence should raise this issue. 
There are thus diff erences between criminal law and competition law in the review of a 
sanction and in the application of the proportionality principle.
Netherlands: deterrence
Deterrence might lead to an increase or a decrease of the fi ne in Dutch competition law 
proceedings. The focus seems to be on the increase of the fi ne though. In Dutch competition 
law, the 10% cap prevents, as mentioned, that fi nes are disproportionate to the size and the 
power of the undertaking concerned. In Dutch criminal law proceedings, the ability-to-pay 
principle could also require that a fi ne is increased, since it would otherwise not be deterrent. 
Nevertheless, a parking fi ne for a millionaire should e.g. not be immediately increased 
because of his ability to pay the fi ne, unless other factors would justify such an increase. The 
Dutch competition law judiciary also focuses on multiple factors to determine whether an 
increase on the basis of deterrence is necessary. The size and power of an undertaking are thus 
not elements which would immediately lead to an increase in the fi ne. Therefore, the ability 
to pay is not necessarily an element in both Dutch criminal and competition law proceedings 
that would warrant an increase of a fi ne to ensure deterrence. It all depends on other factors 
whether such an increase would be suitable. 
England: judicial review and factors taken into account
The proportionality principle is a ‘cardinal principle’ in competition law proceedings, 
although sometimes its importance is diminished by the CAT to merely one of multiple 
factors which need to be taken into account. The status of this principle in criminal law 
proceedings is also subject to debate. Nevertheless, the Sentencing Guidelines Council does 
regard the proportionality principle as a ‘framing’ principle for the sentencing guidelines. 
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The application of these guidelines would thus, in general, lead to a proportionate fi ne. 
Similarly, the application of the Fining Guidance could also lead to a proportionate fi ne, since 
all relevant factors will be taken into account. This does not dissolve the CMA nor the CAT 
from the obligation to ‘stand back’ and take an overall look at the penalty to examine whether 
the methodology used leads to a proportionate fi ne. This method of ‘standing back’ is not 
apparent in criminal law proceedings, where judges are required to ‘follow’ the sentencing 
guidelines, unless it would be contrary to interest of justice. There is no obligation to ‘stand 
back’ to determine whether the application of the sentencing guidelines lead to a proportionate 
fi ne. Competition law proceedings therefore seem to take a more relaxed approach with 
regard to the deviation of the Fining Guidance. There is always an obligation to ‘stand back’ 
to determine whether a fi ne is proportionate. Furthermore, it is probably more easy for the 
CMA to deviate from the Fining Guidance, since it has discretion as to the application of the 
Fining Guidance, even though it should have regard to the Guidance. The CAT only has to 
have regard to the Fining Guidance of the CMA.
The discretion in competition law proceedings, and in particular the obligation to ‘stand 
back’ mean to ensure that fi nes are always proportionate. In criminal law proceedings, there 
is a diff erent trend towards sentencing due to the sentencing guidelines. Since the 1990s, 
the discretion of the judiciary has been limited somewhat, in order to restrict, as Koff man 
contends, the “unfettered discretion [which] could lead to indefensible disparities in 
sentencing practice”.84 Criminal law and competition law have thus taken diff erent paths 
in sentencing policy. In my opinion, this looser approach in competition law proceedings 
does lead to some “indefensible disparities in sentencing practice”. Some factors, such as 
the individual culpability, are applied inconsistently in multiple cases. This is quite striking 
and somewhat alarming, since it could lead to arbitrariness by the judiciary. The criticism on 
criminal law proceedings before the 1991 Criminal Justice Act could therefore also be aimed 
at competition law proceedings. Perhaps inspiration can be drawn from the solutions in 
criminal law proceedings to prevent these disparities in the sentencing policy. This could be 
ensured by inserting an obligation to “follow” the Fining Guidance in the Competition Act 
1998. This would require a change in the creation of the Fining Guidance, since this Guidance 
is currently made by the CMA itself. The sentencing guidelines are established, after an open 
consultation, by a Council which is composed of not only judges, but also of legal scholars 
and practitioners.
The diff erence between sentencing policy in criminal law and competition law is also explicitly 
referred to by the CAT and the Court of Appeal. Both courts have explicitly ruled out a method 
of calculating a fi ne based on principles in criminal law proceedings. The proportionality 
84  Koff man (2006), p. 285.
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of sanctions is thus applied diff erently in both areas of law. The review of a penalty by the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal is, however, according to that court, “not dissimilar”85 to 
that in criminal law proceedings. Nevertheless, in practice it appears that there are still some 
notable diff erences. 
8.4.4 Non bis in idem
The non bis in idem principle is the only principle the application of which is diff erent in EU 
competition law proceedings from that in criminal law proceedings. Dutch competition law 
follows the approach by the Union Courts. The interpretation and application of the non bis in 
idem principle in English competition law proceedings is, due to the lack of case law on this 
principle, completely unclear. However, the accounting principle has been codifi ed in English 
competition law. 
General aspects
The non bis in idem principle in EU criminal law, in EU competition law, in Dutch competition law 
and in case law of the ECtHR prevents against double prosecutions and double punishments. 
As indicated before, there have been no competition law cases where the competition law 
judiciary has found a prosecution to be prohibited on the basis of this principle. In general, 
the only infl uence the non bis in idem principle currently has on competition law proceedings 
is by introducing the accounting principle, which means that a previous fi ne should be set off  
against the fi ne which is imposed in the second procedure. The accounting principle itself has 
found its way in the case law of the ECtHR and the Union Courts in criminal law proceedings, 
in order to, respectively, examine whether an infringement of the non bis in idem principle 
exists, or to justify an established limitation of the principle. This is further discussed below. 
The accounting principle does not follow clearly from Dutch criminal law either, where 
the focus is on the double prosecution and sanction. In the 2015 Alcolock judgment86 of the 
Supreme Court however, reference was made to the accounting principle.
A fi nal decision in EU competition law proceedings is only taken when it concerns the merits 
of the case. Procedural annulments of decisions of competition authorities are not regarded 
as fi nal decisions. In ThyssenKrupp, the undertaking concerned argued that the non bis in 
idem principle in Article 54 CISA was infringed due to the decision taken by the Commission 
after the Belgian authorities issued a provisional leniency decision. This provisional leniency 
decision still had to be fi nally adopted by the Belgian Competition Council. According to the 
General Court, this did not amount to a fi nal decision in EU competition law nor under Article 
54 CISA “even supposing” that this article is applicable.87 For the application of Article 4 of 
85  See EWCA (Civ Div) (31 July 2012) [2012] EWCA Civ 1056, par. 71.
86  Hoge Raad (3 March 2015) ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, par. 4.3.4. 
87  GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v Commission), par. 167.
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Protocol 7, Article 50 of the Charter and Article 54 CISA a fi nal decision should also be taken 
on the merits. The fi nality of a decision is thus a prerequisite for the non bis in idem principle, 
which applies to criminal law proceedings and competition law proceedings alike. Article 54 
CISA is the only provision which imposes an extra condition, namely that the sanction is in 
the process of being executed or already has been executed. This is not a requirement which 
can be found in other proceedings. The impact of the criminal law non bis in idem therefore 
does not seem to be present with regard to the fi nality of a decision, since this prerequisite is 
merely a logical requirement for the application of the non bis in idem principle. 
The non bis in idem principle is only triggered in Dutch competition law proceedings when 
there is a fi nal decision, taken on the merits. It is not clear whether the non bis in idem principle 
also applies when a decision is taken by an EU NCA or the Commission. The Silverskin Onion 
case88 provides some indications that this might the case. The Dutch judiciary did make clear 
in this case though that the ACM is not prevented from taking into accounts the eff ects on the 
EU market. The Union Courts focus in general on the object of the anti-competitive behaviour 
when it concerns a fi ne of an EU NCA, since it seems to be presumed that EU NCAs do indeed 
take eff ects on part of the EU market into account. Dutch criminal law takes a liberal stance 
as regards the condition of a fi nal decision. This condition is also met when there is a fi nal 
decision of a foreign criminal law court. A fi nal decision should have been taken on the merits, 
which means that procedural decisions cannot bar a second prosecution and/or sanction. 
This is thus a similar approach to the one the Dutch judiciary has taken in competition law 
proceedings.
Unity of the off ender
EU and Dutch competition law take a functional approach towards the concept of an 
undertaking. Any entity engaged in an economic activity is regarded as an undertaking 
for the purposes of competition law. This also means that parent-subsidiary liability does 
not infringe the non bis in idem principle, since both companies are considered as the same 
undertaking and thus as the same off ender. The Dutch judiciary appears to be more liberal 
towards the condition of the unity of the off ender, since it applied the non bis in idem principle 
to an association of undertakings and its members, by ruling that the fi ne on the association 
of undertakings and the fi nes on the members should be set off  against each other. This is 
in contrast to the approach taken by the Union Courts. The ACM, however, has brought 
this ruling in line with the case law of the Union Courts by deciding that the fi ne could be 
taken into account on the basis of the proportionality principle, and not on the basis of the 
accounting principle.
88  Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, and on appeal: CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56.
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There is not much case law of the ECtHR or the Union Courts in criminal law cases on this 
condition. It seems that the ECtHR discusses the same off ender sometimes under the idem
heading. Whether a functional approach taken by the CJEU in competition law proceedings 
is taken by the ECtHR with regard to companies is unclear. The Court of Justice referred in 
an Article 50 Charter case to Aalborg Portland89 and mentioned the condition that the person 
should be the same. This might actually indicate that competition law has an impact on 
EU criminal law. The CJEU distinguished proceedings against companies and proceedings 
against those natural persons acting as legal representative of those companies. Again, the 
CJEU has not explicitly stated that a functional approach should be taken in criminal law 
proceedings, although the reference to Aalborg Portland may be an indication that is likely to 
be the case. This would mean that competition law is infl uencing criminal law and not the 
other way around. 
Dutch criminal law does not use a functional approach to determine whether a corporate 
structure can be regarded as one entity. It is necessary to determine which legal person in 
the group committed the off ence. Only in extraordinary cases can a group of companies be 
regarded as one entity for the purposes of Dutch criminal law. This is therefore a notable 
diff erence with Dutch competition law. The approach in Dutch competition law is thus 
diff erent from that in Dutch criminal law.
Unity of the legal interest
The unity of the legal interest is used by the Union Courts in EU competition law proceedings 
to protect the jurisdiction of the Commission. The non bis in idem principle does not prevent 
double punishments or double prosecutions when there is no unity of the legal interest 
protected by the competition law authorities. NCAs always pursue diff erent interests/
ends by the enforcement of their competition law rules than the Commission. It does not 
matter whether the NCA is from a third country or from a Member State. The Commission 
tries to protect the internal market, whilst NCAs focus on the eff ects in their own state. This 
criterion is therefore used as a procedural safeguard for the Commission. There are no cases 
in competition law where the Dutch judiciary has ruled on the unity of the legal interest. 
It is thus not entirely clear whether this condition is applicable in Dutch competition law 
proceedings. Reference was made in one Dutch case to the InnoLux90 case of the Union Courts, 
which might indicate that this condition is applicable in Dutch competition law proceedings.
The unity of the legal interest is not a criterion as such used in criminal law proceedings before 
the ECtHR and before the CJEU. Therefore, there is no impact of criminal law on competition 
89  ECJ, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P (Aalborg Portland and others v Commission).
90  GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux Corp v Commission).
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law. The lack of consistency in application of the non bis in idem principle by the CJEU in 
competition law proceedings and other proceedings has also been subject to criticism, e.g. by 
AG Kokott in the Toshiba case.91 It has also been suggested that “[b]ecause […] this requirement 
is in breach of Article 50 EU Charter, this case law lacks foundation and should be overruled 
at the earliest opportunity”.92
The criticism on the approach of the CJEU in competition law proceedings is perhaps not 
entirely correct. Strangely enough, the condition of the unity of the legal interest has (partly) 
found its way into criminal law proceedings, although not as a separate condition. Both the 
ECtHR and the CJEU have accepted that dual proceedings leading to a criminal charge might 
be allowed under certain circumstances. The ECtHR allows for dual proceedings when two 
proceedings are suffi  ciently closely connected in substance and in time. The ECtHR elaborated 
upon the bis requirement to allow for dual proceedings. Whether dual proceedings are allowed 
is determined on the basis of fi ve requirements, namely (i) whether the proceedings pursue 
“complementary purposes” and thus address “diff erent aspects of the social misconduct”; 
(ii) whether the “duality of the proceedings concerned is a foreseeable consequence”93 on 
the basis of the same facts; (iii) “duplication in the collection as well as the assessment of the 
evidence” should be avoided as much as possible, and ; (iv) the second penalty should take 
into account the fi rst penalty which became fi nal in order to prevent an overall penalty which 
is disproportionate.94 The complementary purpose of the proceedings is thus used to allow 
for dual proceedings. A similar approach is taken by the CJEU in criminal law proceedings, 
although not under the bis heading, but under the heading of the justifi cation ground. An 
infringement of the non bis in idem principle might be justifi ed under Article 52(1) of the Charter 
when (i) dual proceedings are provided for by law, (ii) when dual proceedings and penalties 
pursue, for the purpose of achieving such a general interest objective, complementary aims, 
(iii) when the law clearly defi nes the possibility of dual proceedings, and thus makes these 
dual proceedings foreseeable, (iv) when there are coordination mechanisms, and (v) when the 
overall penalties are not excessive.95
Both courts thus allow for dual proceedings when certain criteria are met. A notable 
diff erence remains the moment of the assessment of these criteria to determine whether dual 
proceedings are allowed. The ECtHR uses the bis criteria for this assessment, but the CJEU 
uses the justifi cation ground for a similar assessment. The outcome and the criteria used are 
however similar. 
91   AG Kokott in ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 117. See e.g. also Sarmiento (2016), p. 126; Nazzini (2016b), p. 141-145; Tzouma 
(2014), p. 266-267; Tomkin (2014), p. 1411; Van Bockel (2010), p. 171. The General Court tried to adapt the application of this requirement 
after the 2004 modernisation of EU competition law, see GC, T-144/07, T-147-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp and others v 
Commission), par. 161-162. The ECJ, however, confi rmed its pre-2004 jurisprudence, see ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 81.
92  Nazzini (2016b), p. 161.
93  It should be foreseeable in law and in practice.
94  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 132. 
95   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 40-64; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 
42-63.
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Strikingly, the complementary purposes of dual proceedings are used by the ECtHR and 
CJEU in criminal law proceedings to allow for dual proceedings, whereas the CJEU uses the 
diff erent purposes of dual proceedings to allow for those dual proceedings in competition law 
proceedings. In competition law proceedings, NCAs and the Commission (clearly) pursue 
diff erent ends, and therefore dual proceedings are allowed. By contrast, in criminal law, when 
there are complementary purposes the non bis in idem principle will, if the other conditions 
are also met, not per se oppose dual proceedings. The criminal law non bis in idem principle 
is thus applied diff erently than the competition law non bis in idem principle, with regard to 
this aspect. 
It is, however, possible for the CJEU to adapt its case law in competition law proceedings 
to the approach taken by the CJEU itself in criminal law proceedings. Criminal law could 
thus infl uence competition law were the Court to overrule its previously established case law. 
The condition of unity of the legal interest could then be abolished. Obviously, this would 
mean that the non bis in idem principle might prevent dual proceedings by NCAs and the 
Commission, since the identity of the facts is the same. The CJEU could use its assessment 
under Article 52(1) of the Charter to allow for dual proceedings by NCAs and the Commission. 
By contrast, dual proceedings between a third country NCA and the Commission do not have 
to fall foul of the non bis in idem prohibition, since the identity of the facts remains diff erent.
Adapting the Court’s jurisprudence would require some changes. It would, fi rst of all, 
be a stretch to argue that enforcement of competition law by third country NCAs and the 
Commission pursue complementary aims. Using a justifi cation ground in those cases therefore 
does not seem likely. However, this can be solved by the interpretation of the identity of the 
facts. The criterion of the identity of the facts is always diff erent when it concerns enforcement 
by third country NCAs and the Commission. The facts are not the same when a third country 
NCA enforces competition law and when the Commission enforces competition law, since 
third country NCAs cannot take into account the eff ects on the EU market. This criterion of 
the identity of the facts is currently only used by the Union Courts to apply the accounting 
principle, but it is possible to extend that approach to the overall non bis in idem principle, and 
thus prevent dual proceedings. This would mean that the non bis in idem principle does not 
apply at all to dual proceedings by the Commission and a third country NCA, and thus does 
not protect against double prosecution and double punishment in those cases. Currently, the 
Union Courts use two conditions, the unity of the legal interest and identity of the facts, to 
come to this conclusion. 
The approach taken by the Union Courts with regard to dual proceedings by NCAs of 
Member States and the Commission would have to change as well. In such cases, the Union 
Courts could use the criteria created for the application of Article 52(1) of the Charter to justify 
an infringement of the non bis in idem requirement. This means that dual proceedings should 
be provided for by law, and the law should clearly defi ne the possibility of dual proceedings. 
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Obviously, the Commission and NCAs have the power to enforce EU competition law. It 
could be argued that Regulation 1/2003 provides a suffi  ciently foreseeable legal basis for dual 
proceedings, since it provides that the Commission and NCAs can enforce EU competition 
law, although it does not specifi cally allow for dual proceedings.96 Some adaption could 
thus be made e.g. in Article 11 by including an explicit provision allowing dual proceedings. 
The two aims could be to protect, on the one hand, free competition within the internal 
market for the Commission and to protect, on the other hand, free competition within the 
internal market and within a Member State as a goal for NCAs. These two goals could be 
regarded as complementary aims, as long as they relate “to diff erent aspects of the same 
unlawful conduct at issue”.97 Focusing on the behaviour within the internal market and on 
the behaviour within the internal market and a Member State, could perhaps be regarded 
as relating to diff erent aspects of the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU, 
even though there is no additional element in one of the two ‘off ences’.98 Previously imposed 
penalties should be taken into account as well in order to prevent the penalties from becoming 
excessive. This is currently also a requirement of the Union Courts when NCAs and the 
Commission both enforced the EU competition rules for the same facts. There is only one 
criterion that might have further-reaching consequences. The coordination between NCAs 
and Commission might not be suffi  cient at this point, since both NCAs and the Commission 
can conduct separate investigations. The ECtHR requires that there is coordination between 
the investigating authorities.99 The Court of Justice seems to be less strict than the ECtHR, 
so the cooperation via the ECN might be suffi  cient to satisfy this criterion. The absence of 
a proper coordination mechanism is still a problem though. It will therefore be necessary 
to ensure that this mechanism is included in the ECN, or, preferably in Regulation 1/2003. 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 1/2003 contains an explicit obligation on NCAs to inform the 
Commission of an investigation on Article 101 or 102 TFEU. The Commission has read an 
equivalent obligation in Article 11(2) Regulation 1/2003.100 Nevertheless, codifying such an 
obligation might be necessary to comply with the conditions of the CJEU and the ECtHR in 
criminal law proceedings. Furthermore, the possibility to exchange information under Article 
12(1) of Regulation 1/2003 should be adjusted to an obligation on NCAs and the Commission 
to exchange information collected in an investigation, to prevent a duplication of investigative 
proceedings and thus to prevent a double burden on an undertaking to cooperate. 
The Dutch criminal judiciary uses the behaviour of a suspect and the legal interest of diff erent 
provisions to determine whether the facts are the same. The legal interest is an increasingly 
96   Regulation 1/2003 does contain some rules on the coordination between EU and national competition law, but there are no rules on 
coordination in the investigation. 
97   ECJ, C-524/15 (Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci), par. 44; and ECJ, C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate and others v Consob), par. 46.
98   In ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 144, there was an additional element for the criminal law off ence, 
namely the “commission of culpable fraud”. NCAs and the Commission both enforce Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which means that 
there is no additional element in those cases. Furthermore, national competition rules are often modelled on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
which means that national competition rules do not require additional elements.
99  ECtHR, no. 24130/11 and 29758/11 (A and B v Norway), par. 146.
100  Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, par.17.
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important benchmark for the Dutch criminal judiciary to rule on the identity of the facts. If 
the legal provisions protect a substantially diff erent interest, the non bis in idem principle will 
not be triggered.
The unity of the legal interest is a factor taken into account in competition law proceedings 
and in Dutch criminal law, albeit with diff erent consequences. The use of this factor is tailored 
to the specifi c needs of the competition law domain. The unity of legal interest is never 
present when multiple competition authorities enforce the competition rules, and is used as 
a jurisdictional safeguard. This condition is thus meant to ensure that a double prosecution 
and/or punishment are not prevented when a third country or EU NCA and the Commission 
enforce the competition rules to the same anti-competitive behaviour. This does not mean 
though that the non bis in idem principle is not at all applicable. When European competition 
authorities101 enforce the competition rules for the same facts, a part of the non bis in idem 
principle, namely the accounting principle, still applies. Dutch criminal law would prevent 
dual proceedings altogether when the legal interest and the behaviour of the off ender are 
the same. EU competition law, and by extension probably Dutch competition law, provides 
therefore less protection for undertakings than Dutch criminal law in this regard.
Identity of the facts
The Union Courts and the Dutch courts take a factual approach in competition law proceedings 
to determine whether the facts are the same. The starting point for the CJEU is to determine 
whether the eff ects on the internal market are taken into account. Third country NCAs do not 
take the eff ects on the EU market into account, since the turnover on the EU market is not 
taken into account when determining the amount of a fi ne. Furthermore, it is not possible for 
third country NCAs to take into account the eff ects on the EU market, since this “would have 
clearly encroached on the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission”.102 The second step to 
determine the identity of the facts is thus only left for situations where an NCA of a Member 
State and the Commission both enforce the EU competition rules. In those situations, the 
Union Courts will examine whether the product market is the same, whether the members of 
a cartel are the same, whether the content of the agreements is the same, and whether the type 
of anti-competitive behaviour is the same. Overall, this seems to boil down to the question 
whether the object of the anti-competitive behaviour is the same. 
All relevant factors will be considered to determine whether the facts are the same in Dutch 
competition law proceedings. There are not that many cases that deal with this factor either. 
The Dutch competition law courts will look, amongst others, at the structure of the cartel and 
the participants to determine whether the facts are the same.
101  The Commission or an EU NCA. 
102   CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 103. See also CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 295.
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The ECtHR and the Union Courts have taken a factual approach in criminal law proceedings 
as well. The legal interest protected by the provisions which are enforced is not relevant, 
although some discussion exists whether the ECtHR still leaves room to take this into account 
for the determination of whether the off ence is the same. In Zolotukhin,103 the ECtHR ruled 
that the two off ences for which the applicant was prosecuted rested on the same factual 
constellation. The Union Courts have used a factual approach with regard to the enforcement 
of Article 50 of the Charter and Article 54 CISA. In both jurisdictions, the courts consider 
all circumstances of the case to determine whether the off ences/acts104 are the same. This 
seems to be a similar approach as in competition law proceedings when it concerns dual 
proceedings by NCAs and the Commission, although there is no indication that criminal law 
has an impact on the application of this condition. The enforcement by third country NCAs 
and the Commission is settled by examining whether the turnover on the internal market is 
taken into account for the determination of the fi ne. This is a less extensive approach than 
examining all the facts and circumstances, and does not seem to be similar to the approach in 
criminal law proceedings. 
In criminal law, the Dutch judiciary examines the behaviour and the legal interest of the 
alleged off ences to determine whether the facts are the same. The behaviour of the off ender 
will be determined on the basis of the identity of time and place and the nature and aim 
of the behaviour. These are factors which could be taken into account in competition law 
proceedings as well. However, for cartels the participants are also of particular relevance. This 
particular factor seems to be less relevant for criminal law proceedings. Overall though, one 
could say that the approach in both Dutch competition law and Dutch criminal law is based 
on an assessment of the particular circumstances. 
8.4.5 Concluding remarks
As shown in this chapter, the only competition law principle which is completely diff erent 
interpreted and applied than its criminal law counterpart is the non bis in idem principle. 
The CJEU is advised to interpret the non bis in idem principle in line with its criminal law 
counterpart, since this is the approach towards other principles as well. This change could 
easily be realised, whilst retaining the current outcome of the application of the non bis in 
idem principle currently in competition law proceedings. It nevertheless, requires some 
intervention by the EU legislator as well. 
There are some notable diff erences between domestic criminal law and domestic competition 
law. The safeguards in competition law proceedings are often lower than the safeguards in 
criminal law proceedings. It has become apparent that especially the domestic judiciary is in 
need of more guidance for the application of legal safeguards in competition law proceedings. 
103  ECtHR, no. 14939/03 (Zolotukhin v Russia).
104   Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR and Article 50 of the Charter refer to “off ences”. Article 54 CISA refers to “acts”. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
The appropriate level of safeguards in competition law proceedings is much debated in both 
legal literature and courtrooms. This discussion is not a storm in a teacup. It has become 
apparent from this research that the scope and application of some fundamental principles 
in competition law proceedings must be further developed. Undertakings and legal scholars 
have questioned whether competition law proceedings comply with the minimum safeguards 
of the ECHR. A discussion can also take place on possible higher safeguards than merely the 
ECHR level of safeguards. In this research, it has been examined whether the judiciary uses 
criminal law as a source of inspiration to create safeguards for undertakings. The leading 
question of this research therefore was: 
What is the impact of criminal law principles on the enforcement of the rules of 
competition law in the Netherlands, England, and at the European Union level?
The current research mapped whether, and if so how, fi ve criminal law principles are applied 
by the judiciary in competition law proceedings. In order to answer the main question, fi rst 
an examination of principles found in case law of the ECJ between 1998 and 2012 took place. 
Twenty principles could be found, as was stated in chapter 1, in the case law of the ECJ.1
From these twenty principles, a selection of fi ve principles was made in order to provide an 
answer to the main question. The second and third part of this research delved into the scope 
and application of these principles in criminal law and competition law.2 In the previous 
chapter, it was explored whether criminal law has an impact on competition law proceedings. 
From the present study, it becomes clear that the impact of criminal law on the administrative 
law enforcement of the competition law rules is minimal. This fi nding is further elaborated 
upon in the next subparagraph (9.2). Hereafter, the struggle for the competition law judiciary 
to develop safeguards for undertakings is discussed. Finally, some recommendations are 
provided to the legislator (9.3) and the judiciary (9.4). 
9.2 IS THERE AN IMPACT OF CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLES ON 
COMPETITION LAW PROCEEDINGS? 
In the previous chapter, a comparison was made between the freedom from self-incrimination, 
the non bis in idem principle, the burden and standard of proof, the legality and legal certainty 
principle and the proportionality of sanctions in criminal law and competition law. It was 
examined whether criminal law (explicitly) infl uences competition law proceedings.
1   This chapter answered the fi rst sub-question, namely: “Which principles (procedural and substantive, including fundamental rights) 
that traditionally belong to the realm of criminal law, have an impact on English, Dutch, and EU competition law?”. It was asserted that 
the case law of the ECJ presented a representative overview of all principles which could be relevant in competition law proceedings. 
2   The third part of this research extensively answered the second sub-question for the fi ve principles central to this research, namely: 
“How are these principles applied in practice by the respective competition authorities and competition courts, and what possible 
mutations and deviations have manifested themselves so far?”
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 Furthermore, if there was no explicit infl uence, it could still be the case that certain principles 
are applied in a similar manner in competition law and criminal law proceedings. A table 
that reveals whether there is an impact of criminal law on competition law proceedings per 
principle and per jurisdiction, was included in chapter 8.3 Some principles in Dutch and 
English competition law proceedings proved to be quite underdeveloped. This means that 
it is diffi  cult or even impossible to determine whether there is an impact of the respective 
criminal law principle on its competition law counterpart. 
The infl uence of criminal law on competition law proceedings turned out to be minimal. Only 
the legality and legal certainty principle in competition law proceedings were found to have 
been infl uenced by their criminal law counterpart. The reference to criminal law is used in 
these situations to explain why an undertaking should have been more careful in determining 
its behaviour on the market.4 An appeal to the legal certainty principle in particular is in 
most cases not very successful in competition law proceedings. The competition law judiciary 
thus uses criminal law in these cases to reject arguments of undertakings on the unclarity 
of competition law. Consequently, the application of criminal law does not lead to a higher 
protection for undertakings. 
The non bis in idem principle is clearly applied in a diff erent manner in competition law 
proceedings in the Netherlands and the EU in comparison to criminal law proceedings. As 
of yet, there are no cases in English competition law on the non bis in idem principle. The 
approach towards this principle can be aligned with that under the ECHR and under EU 
criminal law. As explained in the previous chapter, legislative intervention would be needed 
to explicitly allow for dual proceedings and to create an obligation to exchange evidence 
obtained in an investigation to prevent duplicate investigative procedures. Furthermore, this 
would require the CJEU to abolish the ‘unity of the legal interest’ condition as a jurisdictional 
safeguard for competition law authorities. This condition could then come back in the 
assessment of the justifi cation ground under Article 52(1) of the Charter. The outcome would 
in such cases be the same as under the current approach. Nevertheless, such a change would 
ensure consistency in the application of the non bis in idem principle in EU law. This was also 
the main criticism of AG Kokott in the Toshiba case, where she made the following remarks:
To interpret and apply the ne bis in idem principle so diff erently depending on 
the area of law concerned is detrimental to the unity of the EU legal order. The 
crucial importance of the ne bis in idem principle as a founding principle of EU law 
which enjoys the status of a fundamental right means that its content must not 
be substantially diff erent depending on which area of law is concerned. For the
3  See chapter 8, par. 8.1.
4   The legal certainty principle is mainly invoked in competition law proceedings. There are also multiple cases dealing with the 
prohibition of retroactivity and the lex mitior rule. No other expressions of the legality principle could be found in Dutch, English and 
UK competition law proceedings. 
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purposes of determining the scope of the guarantee provided by the ne bis in idem 
principle, as now codifi ed in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the same 
criteria should apply in all areas of EU law. This point has rightly been made by the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority.5
The other principles, namely the freedom from self-incrimination, the burden and standard 
of proof and the proportionality of sanctions, are applied in competition law proceedings in 
a manner which is comparable to that in criminal law proceedings brought before the ECtHR 
and the CJEU. The freedom from self-incrimination in English competition law is also applied 
in a similar manner as in domestic criminal law proceedings. The approach towards the 
burden of proof in domestic competition law proceedings is also in line with that in domestic 
criminal law proceedings. 
The ECHR obviously only provides minimum safeguards. This also becomes apparent when 
the principles central to this research in domestic competition law proceedings are compared 
to their domestic criminal law counterparts. In general, the judiciaries in the Netherlands 
and England apply a diff erent approach towards these principles in competition law and 
criminal law proceedings. The similarity of the approach in domestic competition law with 
that of the ECHR might be explained by the fact that in competition law proceedings, the 
domestic judiciary follows the approach of the CJEU in competition law proceedings towards 
certain principles.6 Nevertheless, the proportionality of sanctions in domestic competition 
law proceedings is not (explicitly) infl uenced by the CJEU in competition law proceedings, 
but is still applied in line with the approach of the ECtHR and the CJEU in criminal law 
proceedings. The domestic competition law judiciary thus also adheres on its own to the 
minimum safeguards of the ECHR. The infl uence of the CJEU on this process should thus not 
be overstated. Nonetheless, it is notable that the domestic judiciary reviewing the decisions 
of competition authorities often follows the CJEU in competition law proceedings. Following 
the Luxembourg Courts in competition law proceedings would also result in applying the 
minimum safeguards from the ECHR.
The diff erent application of some principles in domestic competition law and domestic criminal 
law leads to lower safeguards in competition law than in criminal law. This becomes e.g. clear 
from the standard of proof. The rebuttal of direct evidence adduced by the ACM or the CMA 
is more diffi  cult than raising doubt in criminal law proceedings. The (possible)7 approach 
towards an obligation to provide documents in Dutch competition law proceedings and the
5  AG Kokott in ECJ, C-17/10 (Toshiba and others), par. 117.
6   See chapter 8, par. 8.1. The domestic judiciary has for some principles explicitly confi rmed that it follows the approach set by the CJEU 
or that its approach is indeed the same as that of the CJEU. This is the case for the Netherlands for the freedom from self-incrimination, 
the non bis in idem principle and the burden and standard of proof. For England, this is the case for the freedom from self-incrimination 
and the burden and standard of proof. 
7   It is not entirely clear, as explained in chapter 6, par. 6.3.3, what the approach is of the Dutch competition law judiciary towards the 
obligation to provide documents in light of the freedom from self-incrimination.
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categorical exclusion of the freedom from self-incrimination also leads to lower safeguards 
than the approach in Dutch criminal law. In criminal law proceedings, the judiciary examines 
whether documents contain testimonial evidence. The freedom from self-incrimination is 
triggered when there is testimonial evidence in a document. The Dutch judiciary examines 
in criminal law proceedings the contents of a document to determine whether freedom 
from self-incrimination is triggered, whereas in competition law proceedings documents are 
categorically excluded from the scope of this principle. A suspect receives therefore more 
protection in criminal law proceedings than an undertaking in competition law proceedings. 
It is not clear from case law why the competition law judiciary does use the criminal law 
legality and legal certainty principle, whereas other principles are not explicitly infl uenced 
by their criminal law counterparts. A clear vision by the judiciary on the impact of criminal 
law on competition law proceedings is lacking. Nevertheless, the minimum criminal 
law safeguards from the ECHR are complied with by the Union Courts and the domestic 
courts. Higher (criminal law) safeguards are not applied in competition law proceedings. 
The judiciary cannot be blamed completely by not having a clear vision on the impact of 
criminal law principles on administrative competition law proceedings. An important task for 
the legislator exists to create such a vision. Unfortunately, the legislator in the Netherlands, 
England and the EU did not reveal a clear vision on the appropriate level of legal safeguards 
in competition law proceedings. 
9.3 COMPETITION LAW SAFEGUARDS: THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDGES
The application of some fundamental principles in competition law proceedings has proven 
to be a struggle for the judiciary. The discussion in legal literature on the proper safeguards for 
undertakings, already referred to in chapter 1 of this study, is thus not surprising. Undertakings 
and competition law enforcers need to be able to know the correct application of fundamental 
principles in the enforcement of the competition rules. The judiciary has attempted to fi nd a 
proper balance between the eff ective enforcement of the competition law rules and safeguards 
for undertakings. In general, safeguards are designed with the ECHR in mind. Some minimum 
safeguards are therefore present in competition law proceedings. Nevertheless, quite some 
diffi  culties have arisen in the courtroom battles between undertakings and competition 
authorities. It became clear from this research that it was not always possible for the judiciary 
to adequately deal with these courtroom battles and the diffi  cult legal questions arising from 
these discussions. Three types of cases can be found where the competition law judiciary 
struggled with the application of some fundamental principles. 
First, the consequences of a certain approach towards a principle is not always considered 
suffi  ciently by the judiciary. Not considering the consequences of a particular approach does 
not end the discussion on the scope and application of such a principle. A notable example 
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here is the application of the non bis in idem principle by the CJEU. Even its own Advocates 
General have strongly criticised the approach taken. Some more refl ection in judgments on the 
reasons for the current approach towards this principle could have diminished this criticism.
Second, it is not always clear what the approach is towards a certain principle. It took e.g. until 
2017 before the General Court explicitly confi rmed its approach towards rebutting direct and 
indirect evidence. This could raise concerns in light of the standard of proof in competition 
law proceedings. Undertakings and competition authorities stand to gain from more clarity 
from the judiciary in competition law proceedings on the approach taken. Again, some more 
refl ection in judgments could easily have provided more clarity. 
Third, other principles are applied in an incoherent and inconsistent manner. A particularly 
striking example here can be found in English competition law. Some factors to determine 
the level of a competition law fi ne are inconsistently applied there. The reasons for this 
inconsistent approach are unclear. 
The abovementioned observations present challenges for the judiciary, but can, in the present 
author’s view, easily be addressed by the judiciary by providing more background to the 
choices made. This does negate the fact that an important task was left by the legislator to the 
judiciary. It is now high time for the legislator to think through once more the competition 
law enforcement regime. 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LEGISLATOR 
The legislator has, as mentioned before, missed the opportunity to consider the level of 
safeguards in competition law proceedings. As is explained below, during the legislative 
processes attention seems to be given mainly to the eff ective enforcement of the competition 
law rules. The powers of competition law authorities are therefore well-developed. Less 
attention has been given to the safeguards surrounding the use of those powers. 
9.4.1 The lack of discussion on safeguards in competition law proceedings
The EU legislator did not refl ect on the choice for administrative law enforcement of the EU 
competition law rules. This is understandable, since the Commission did, and does, not have 
the competence to initiate criminal law proceedings.8 Some refl ection on the appropriate level 
of safeguards in administrative law proceedings must, however, still have taken place. 
In the Netherlands, the decriminalisation of competition law by the Competition Act was 
mainly done for economic and effi  ciency reasons. The Explanatory Memorandum elaborated 
upon these reasons. In this Explanatory Memorandum, reference was made to the capacity 
problems at the public prosecutor’s offi  ce which could lead to underenforcement of the 
8  This is also explicitly excluded in Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003.
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competition law rules if enforcement by criminal law means was chosen. Furthermore, the 
Explanatory Memorandum also referred to the complexity of the competition law rules9 and 
the lack of (public) concern for an infringement of the competition law rules which would 
lead again to underenforcement by the public prosecutor. Lastly, it was mentioned there that 
administrative law could more easily and quickly respond to competition law infringements.10
The legislative history in England does not show an indication of the particular choice for 
administrative law enforcement. Nevertheless, in 2013 criminal law sanctions for procedural 
infringements were (partly) replaced by civil law sanctions. In the Explanatory Notes to the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, it is asserted that the change to civil sanctions for 
non-cooperation should “provide a more eff ective deterrent to non-cooperation”.11 No more 
indications were given for a change from criminal law to administrative law enforcement, 
although eff ectiveness reasons thus seem to play a key role. 
9.4.2 Effi  ciency considerations
Effi  ciency reasons seem to be the main reason for the Dutch and English legislator to prefer 
administrative law enforcement over criminal law enforcement. In EU competition law, no 
other choice could have been made. The lack of an explanation of the choice for administrative 
law enforcement by the legislator can however be criticised. 
In the Netherlands, the Council of State e.g. rebuked the decriminalisation trend in the 
Netherlands, since administrative law enforcement provides less safeguards for persons 
against the state.12 It becomes clear from the present study that the judiciary indeed provides 
less protection to undertakings in competition law proceedings than in criminal law 
proceedings, even though the minimum criminal law safeguards from the ECHR are adhered 
to. It is nevertheless not clear whether, and if so to what extent, criminal law safeguards 
should be applicable in competition law proceedings. 
During the process of drafting the Competition Act, the Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands contended that the advantages and disadvantages for the choice of criminal law 
or administrative law enforcement should be set out.13 Moreover, the Commission Economic 
Competition14 insisted that attention should be given to “very important legal parameters,
9   See Raad van State, “Analyse van enige verschillen in rechtsbescherming en rechtspositie van de justitiabele in het strafrecht en in het 
bestuursrecht” Advies W03.15.0138/II, par. 4.
10   Memorie van Toelichting, Nieuwe regels omtrent de economische mededinging (Mededingingswet), Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, 24707, 
nr. 3, par. 11.2.
11  Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, p. 17.
12   Raad van State, “Analyse van enige verschillen in rechtsbescherming en rechtspositie van de justitiabele in het strafrecht en in het 
bestuursrecht” Advies W03.15.0138/II.
13   Memorie van Toelichting, Nieuwe regels omtrent de economische mededinging (Mededingingswet), Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, 24707, 
nr. 3, par. 3.2.
14   This was a governmental organisation which advised the Dutch government from 1958 up till 1998 on competition law matters, see 
https://actorenregister.nationaalarchief.nl/actor-organisatie/commissie-economische-mededinging-ez. (visited 20/10/2018). 
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such as the presumption of innocence, the legality principle, safeguards during the 
investigation and the alignment of the imposition of penalties with the General Administrative 
Law Act” if the choice was made to enforce the competition law rules by administrative law 
means.15 Unfortunately, the Dutch legislator did not heed these suggestions. The choice for 
administrative law enforcement was solely made on the basis of effi  ciency considerations. 
Moreover, no discussion on the appropriate safeguards is apparent from the legislative 
history. This assessment is also not apparent from the legislative history of the competition 
law rules in England.16
In chapter 1, it was stated that the goals of the procedural and sanctioning rules in competition 
law and criminal law are not that diff erent. Protection against the state and thus against ultra 
vires acts is, generally speaking, a goal of the procedural rules, whereas deterrence – specifi c 
and general – are, again generally speaking, overlapping goals of criminal law sanctions 
and competition law sanctions. This does not mean that the legal safeguards in both areas 
should be exactly the same. Nevertheless, some refl ection on the level of safeguards could 
have provided a more solid framework for the judiciary to work with. This would also have 
tackled many of the issues, which have now been subject to discussion in courtrooms and 
legal literature on the level of safeguards for undertakings. The legislator could have decided 
to draw inspiration from the safeguards in criminal law, or it could explicitly have refuted 
such an approach on the basis of well-founded arguments. Incorporating certain principles in 
competition law legislation could have created more clarity for stakeholders in the competition 
law fi eld. 
9.4.3 Creating a clear vision 
It becomes clear that the judiciary in the EU, the Netherlands and England was left with 
the task of the creation of an approach towards certain crucial principles in competition law 
proceedings. This has not exactly worked out, since, as has become apparent from this study, 
a clear vision on the impact of criminal law or a clear vision on the level of the safeguards 
in competition law proceedings seems to be lacking. The legislator should, in an open and 
democratic procedure, decide on the manner of enforcement of the competition law rules. 
The judiciary, by contrast, has the task to settle disputes and to address issues on a case-by-
case basis, not to create a whole body of safeguards from scratch. The choice of the legislator 
for administrative law enforcement should have been substantiated by a discussion on the 
15   Memorie van Toelichting, Nieuwe regels omtrent de economische mededinging (Mededingingswet), Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, 24707, 
nr. 3, par. 11.2 (English translation by author): “De Commissie economische mededinging stelt vast dat gekozen wordt voor bestuursrechtelijke 
handhaving. Zij wijst er nadrukkelijk op dat bij de uitwerking daarvan aandacht zal moeten worden geschonken aan de regeling van de bevoegdheden 
tot handhaving en aan bepaalde zeer belangrijke juridische randvoorwaarden, die nu al in het strafrecht zijn geregeld, zoals de onschuldpresumptie, 
het legaliteitsbeginsel, rechtswaarborgen in de opsporingsfase en aansluiting wat het opleggen van boetes betreft bij hoofdstuk 5 «Handhaving» van 
de derde tranche van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht.”
16   There are no explanatory notes to the Competition Act 1998. Only deterrence is mentioned as a reason at the Explanatory Notes to the 
Enterprise Act 2002, par. 402, for the introduction of criminal law enforcement, besides the already existing criminal law enforcement. 
Furthermore, as stated above, the abolishment of criminal law sanctions for procedural infringements was not explained by the 
legislator.
422
CHAPTER 9 | Conclusion and Recommendations
appropriate safeguards that should be applied in competition law proceedings. The legislator 
obviously has to take into account the minimum safeguards from the ECHR for criminal law 
proceedings that do not belong to the hard core criminal law domain. These safeguards are 
the point of departure from which a discussion on the appropriate scope and application 
of fundamental principles can take place. The legislator should then decide whether or not 
a higher level of protection is necessary and desirable in the competition law domain. It is, 
obviously, not necessary for the legislator to specifi cally lay down the scope and content of 
some fundamental principles in legislation. Nevertheless, some more guidance by legislator 
in legislation and explanatory memoranda could have helped the judiciary by developing 
a more coherent competition law enforcement regime. In the current situation, the Union 
legislator and the Dutch and UK legislators decided to leave some fundamental choices up 
to the judiciary, whereas the discussion on these choices does not belong in the courtrooms. 
Political choices should thus have been made when it was decided to enforce the competition 
law rules by administrative law means. 
In the Directive on the empowerment of NCAs, the EU legislator has decided that investigative 
powers of NCAs “should be subject to appropriate safeguards which at least comply with 
the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in 
particular in the context of proceedings which could give rise to the imposition of penalties”.17
The protection of fundamental rights is thus underlined in this Directive, although “[t]he 
design of those safeguards should strike a balance between the respect of the fundamental 
rights of undertakings and the duty to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are eff ectively 
enforced”.18 These statements in the Directive do not reveal a thorough discussion by the EU 
legislator on the appropriate level of safeguards in domestic competition law proceedings.19
Reference is made to effi  ciency considerations and to a minimum level of protection of 
fundamental rights. The safeguards following from the general principles and EU law and 
the Charter are interpreted by the CJEU in competition law proceedings in a similar manner 
as the level safeguards set by the ECtHR. There are no further indications in the Directive that 
a proper discussion took place on a possible higher level of protection for undertakings. For 
the Netherlands and England this is thus merely a confi rmation of the status quo created by 
the judiciary. 
17   See recital 14 of the  preamble to Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more eff ective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. 
18   See recital 14 of the preamble to Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more eff ective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.
19   Similarly, Regulation 1/2003, par. 37, provides that “[Regulation 1/2003] respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Accordingly, this Regulation should be 
interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.” Regulation 17/62, merely referred in the preamble to the right to 
be heard. No other fundamental rights were mentioned in the preamble of that Regulation. 
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In the present author’s view, it is necessary for the EU, the Dutch and the UK legislator to 
consider whether a higher level of safeguards is necessary and desirable in competition law 
proceedings. This would shift the burden of this task from the judiciary to the democratically 
legitimised legislator. A discussion on the level of these safeguards could then take place 
in the public domain. As mentioned, the minimum level of safeguards from the ECHR 
should at least be complied with, although discussion can thus take place on a higher level 
of safeguards. Legislative codifi cation could take place after such a public discussion. It is 
however questionable, in light of the prospective withdrawal of the UK form the EU, whether 
the UK legislator will engage in such a discussion. As Vickers et al. assert:
We accept that there is room for debate about more radical changes to the constitution 
and procedures of UK competition enforcement (such as a prosecution model for, 
antitrust infringements, a compulsory notifi cation regime for mergers, etc.) but we, 
think it would be unwise to link resolution of these questions to Brexit. On the, 
contrary, there will already be suffi  cient systemic change to which the private and, 
public sector will need to adapt. More radical proposals, some of which were anyway 
mooted and rejected at the time of the 2013 reforms leading to the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act of that year and the establishment of the CMA, would be better 
revisited, if at all, once Brexit reform has had a chance to bed down. This is consistent 
with the broad approach of the Government as set out in its White Paper in March that 
‘wherever practical and sensible, the same laws and rules will apply immediately before and 
immediately after our departure’ and that secondary legislation will not be ‘a vehicle for 
policy changes’.20
Legislative action is, however, sorely needed. Rules relating to the freedom from self-
incrimination, the non bis in idem principle, the burden and standard of proof, the legality and 
legal certainty principle, and the proportionality of sanctions could easily be codifi ed. These 
rules could be included in the Procedural Regulation at EU level, in the Competition Act in the 
Netherlands, and in the Competition Act 1998 in England. This would create more certainty 
for all stakeholders. Furthermore, this would also remove the burden from the judiciary in 
the Netherlands and England of creating a clear vision on some principles which are still 
somewhat underdeveloped in these jurisdictions. Legislation, obviously, does not have to 
codify the scope and application of each principle completely, although some more guidance 
in legislation could easily be provided.
20  Vickers et al. (2017), par. 1.10. (original emphasis and reference omitted) 
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9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY
The legislator bears a responsibility to decide on the application of the safeguards in 
competition law proceedings. This could, however, take quite some time, even if the legislator 
decides to address the issues mentioned. In the meanwhile, the judiciary still has to decide on 
the level of safeguards in competition law proceedings. The CJEU applies an approach which 
is, at least for the principles discussed in this study, in line with that of the ECHR in criminal 
law proceedings. This means that the minimum safeguards of the ECHR are complied with 
in those proceedings. A higher protection might run counter to the effi  ciency considerations 
of the legislator. Moreover, the Dutch and English judiciary already voluntarily follow the 
CJEU in the application of some principles.21 Even though they decided to follow case law of 
the CJEU, there are still some minor deviations by the domestic judiciary.22 The latter are not 
properly explained by those courts. It is therefore a task for the judiciary to bring its case law 
either back in line with that of the CJEU or to explain why it decides to deviate from that case 
law, whilst explicitly stating that its approach is in conformity with that case law. 
When there is no harmonisation, EU law does not prescribe the procedural rules which should 
apply in domestic law. The Directive on the empowerment of NCAs does not prescribe, 
as asserted above, specifi c safeguards which should be complied with. The minimum 
requirements set by general principles of EU law and the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU 
should, however, at least be complied with. Member States (and thus also the judiciary) 
can still set higher safeguards although the limitations set by the principles of eff ectiveness 
and equivalence should be adhered to.23 Within these boundaries, it is thus possible for the 
domestic courts to adopt a diff erent approach. However, if safeguards in domestic competition 
law proceedings are too extensive, this could fall foul of the eff ectiveness limit from Rewe/
Comet,24 since the eff ective enforcement of the competition law rules cannot be safeguarded.25
As mentioned, it might be best for the Dutch and English competition law judiciary to follow 
case law of the CJEU on the application of the principles central to this research. This would 
ensure (i) that minimum safeguards set by the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court would be 
complied with, (ii) that the eff ective enforcement of (EU) competition law is safeguarded, and 
(iii) it would help the judiciary with creating a coherent approach towards legal safeguards
21  See the table in Chapter 8, par. 8.1.
22  See e.g. the more refi ned approach in the Netherlands towards the rebuttal of direct evidence.
23   See e.g. ECJ, 33/76 (Rewe-Zentralfi nanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland), par. 5. See also ECJ, C-74/14 
(Eturas and others v Commission), par. 34: “That question must be regarded as relating to the assessment of evidence and to the s tandard 
of proof, with the result that it is governed — in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy and subject to the principles 
of equivalence and eff ectiveness — by national law.” For sanctions of an infringement of the EU competition law rules, it was e.g. 
held in ECJ, C-177/16 (Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra/Latvijas Autoru apvienība v Konkurences padome), par. 68, that 
“when a national competition authority imposes a fi ne, that fi ne must, like any penalty imposed by national authorities as a result of 
an infringement of EU law, be eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive”.
24   ECJ, 33/76 (Rewe-Zentralfi nanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaft skammer für das Saarland), par. 5.
25  See Veenbrink (2015b). See e.g. also ECJ, C-74/14 (Eturas and others v Commission), par. 35.
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in domestic competition law proceedings. In what follows, the application by the CJEU of the 
fi ve principles central to this study is summarised fi rst (10.4.1). In the fi rst subparagraph, some 
recommendations will be made. It has e.g. been mentioned that the non bis in idem principle 
is the odd one out when it concerns the impact of criminal law on the case law of the CJEU in 
competition law proceedings. This singularity can and should, as will be explained as well, 
be rectifi ed. This (new) approach is highlighted as well in the next subparagraph. In general 
though, merely an overview is given of the approach by the CJEU towards fi ve principles. The 
recommendations from this research shall in general be of interest to the domestic judiciary. 
As mentioned, it was suggested that the domestic judiciary follows the approach of the CJEU 
towards to the scope and application of the fi ve principles central to this research. After 
providing an overview of the approach of the CJEU in competition law proceedings towards 
these fi ve principles, some specifi c observations for the Dutch (10.4.2) and the English (10.4.3) 
competition law judiciary will be made. 
9.5.1 Case law of the CJEU: the minimum level of protection for undertakings
The freedom from self-incrimination 
The Orkem case of the ECJ forms the starting point as regards the application of the freedom 
from self-incrimination. The latter protects an undertaking against obligations to provide 
incriminating answers. Therefore, the Court of Justice has ruled that an undertaking does not 
have to provide such answers. Factual answers and documents should always be provided 
to competition authorities. The freedom from self-incrimination will only be triggered when 
there is some form of coercion in order to obtain those factual answers or documents. This 
means that the freedom from self-incrimination is only triggered when there is an obligation 
to cooperate. This obligation merely exists when the Commission can enforce cooperation by 
pain of a fi ne. Presenting a reduction of a fi ne in exchange for cooperation, e.g. in the leniency 
procedure, is not regarded as coercion. It is, however, not entirely clear what the consequences 
would be of an infringement of this principle. Exclusion of evidence is, in light of case law of 
the ECtHR, the most suitable solution here.
The burden and standard of proof 
The burden to prove an infringement should rest on the competition authority, whereas an 
exemption ground should be proven by the undertaking concerned. In both situations there 
is an evidential and legal burden of proof. 
It is diffi  cult to determine a particular standard of proof for competition authorities. Evidential 
rules be helpful in this respect. Both direct and indirect evidence can be used by competition 
law authorities. Credibility and consistency of evidence seems key to properly determine 
whether an infringement is proven. Undertakings can challenge the evidence produced by 
a competition law authority. The standard of proof for the Commission was explained by 
reference to evidential rules. An undertaking should show that direct evidence relied on by 
the Commission is insuffi  cient to prove the infringement. This means that direct evidence 
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should be used by an undertaking to rebut the direct evidence adduced by the Commission. 
Conversely, indirect evidence can be rebutted by merely providing a plausible alternative 
explanation.
There is not much information on the standard of proof for the undertaking concerned when 
it invokes a defence. More guidance by the Union Courts is thus required on the standard of 
proof in those cases. 
Principles of legality and legal certainty 
The application of the legality and legal certainty principle has been infl uenced by criminal 
law. There is more competition law jurisprudence on the legal certainty principle than on the 
legality principle. In general, it can be said that the legality and the legal certainty principle 
do not protect against the retroactive application of fi ning guidelines. A change of the (legal) 
maximum of the fi ne could trigger the legality and legal certainty principle though. 
Vague or broad terms in fi ning guidelines do not fall foul of the limits of the legal certainty 
principle either. Furthermore, case law of competition law courts and the administrative 
practice of the competition authorities ensure suffi  cient certainty to determine whether 
behaviour is illegal or not. Ignorance of the law is, in general, not a viable defence in 
competition law proceedings. 
Proportionality of sanctions 
In this research, the proportionality of sanctions was split up into two aspects, namely the 
judicial review of the proportionality of sanctions, and the factors which can be taken into 
account to determine a fi ne. Judicial review of the proportionality of a sanction focuses on 
the suitability of the measure and the least restrictiveness. This means that it was examined 
whether all relevant factors are taken into account and whether these factors are correctly 
taken into account. The third step, the proportionality stricto sensu, could not be discerned in 
the case law of the CJEU.
The factors mentioned by the CJEU, those further elaborated upon by the CJEU, and those 
which do not have to be taken into account in EU competition law proceedings can be found 
in chapter 5, par. 5.7.4-6. These factors are not further discussed here. 
The non bis in idem principle
The non bis in idem principle is the only principle in this research which turned out not to be 
infl uenced by criminal law, nor is its approach similar to that in criminal law proceedings. 
In EU competition law this is mainly due to the criterion of the ‘unity of the legal interest’. 
It is not always entirely clear from case law of the CJEU how the non bis in idem principle is 
applied. Nevertheless, the application of this principle is grosso modo clear. The non bis in idem 
principle is triggered when there is a preceding fi nal decision of an EU competition authority. 
Three conditions should be met in such a case; there should be (i) unity of the off ender, (ii) 
unity of the legal interest, and (iii) identity of the facts. 
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Currently, the non bis in idem principle in competition law proceedings only includes the 
accounting principle, which means that a previously imposed competition law fi ne should be 
set off  against the new fi ne. There are no cases where the Commission itself wants to impose 
a second penalty for the same behaviour. 
A functional approach is taken to determine whether the off ender is the same. This means that 
the CJEU uses the concept of an undertaking to determine whether multiple entities can be 
regarded as one undertaking. Furthermore, an association of undertakings and the affi  liated 
undertakings can be fi ned independently from each other. 
The unity of the legal interest is a jurisdictional safeguard created to ensure that the 
Commission can always initiate proceedings when an EU NCA or a third country NCA 
previously imposed a fi ne. The identity of the facts is then, as a second step, used to determine 
whether the accounting principle should play a role. This identity of the facts is always 
diff erent when it concerns a previously imposed fi ne by a third country NCA, since those 
NCAs do not take into account the turnover on the EU market when imposing a fi ne and 
are, according to the CJEU, not even allowed to do so. A more refi ned approach is taken by 
the CJEU when it concerns a previously imposed fi ne by an EU NCA. It depends on all the 
factual circumstances whether the facts are the same. In the end, this seems to boil down to the 
question whether the object of the anti-competitive conduct is the same. 
It has been asserted that the application of the non bis in idem principle is the odd one out when 
it concerns the impact of criminal law on competition law enforcement. There is no proper 
explanation why this approach is not similar to (or infl uenced by) criminal law, whereas 
this is the case for the other principles. The approach in competition law proceedings could 
easily be aligned with that in the ECHR and EU criminal law. The CJEU could abolish the 
criterion of unity of the legal interest, which it currently uses to protect the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. This jurisdictional safeguard could then be assured in a diff erent manner. The 
EU judiciary should, in the author’s view, bring its case law on the non bis in idem principle in 
line with that of the ECHR and in EU criminal law. This ‘new’ approach could then, in turn, 
be followed by the domestic judiciary. 
The ‘unity of the legal interest’ condition should thus be abolished. Nevertheless, this 
condition could still be incorporated in the application of the limitation ground of Article 
52(1) of the Charter. An infringement of the non bis in idem principle might be justifi ed 
under Article 52(1) of the Charter when (i) dual proceedings are provided for by law, (ii) 
when dual proceedings and penalties pursue, for the purpose of achieving such a general 
interest objective, complementary aims, (iii) when the law clearly defi nes the possibility of 
dual proceedings, and thus makes these dual proceedings foreseeable, (iv) when there are 
coordination mechanisms, and (v) when the overall penalties are not excessive. 
Two changes of the current competition law regime have to be made. First, it might be 
necessary to explicitly allow for dual proceedings in the EU in Regulation 1/2003. Secondly, 
the introduction of proper coordination mechanisms in the ECN, or preferably Regulation 
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1/2003, for the investigation of anti-competitive behaviour by two or more NCAs, or an NCA 
and the Commission is needed. 
Fines are prevented from being overly excessive when they are taken into account when 
determining the amount of the second fi ne. This is, as stated, already an obligation for 
competition authorities if there is identity of the facts. A possible adaptation of case law of the 
CJEU on the non bis in idem principle is thus easily made. Furthermore, it would bring more 
consistency in the CJEU’s approach towards the non bis in idem principle in EU law in general 
and, more specifi cally, towards the impact of criminal law on competition law proceedings. 
9.5.2 Recommendations for the Dutch judiciary: some specifi c observations
The Dutch judiciary already adheres to the approach of the CJEU when it concerns the freedom 
from self-incrimination, the burden and standard of proof and the non bis in idem principle. 
No explicit references are made to case law of the CJEU when it concerns the legality and 
legal certainty principle and the proportionality of sanctions. This does not necessarily mean 
that the approach taken by the Dutch judiciary diff ers. For the legality and legal certainty 
principle, this does not seem to be the case. The proportionality of sanctions is, however, 
slightly adapted to the specifi c characteristics of the Dutch competition law regime. Overall, 
it would not lead to major changes for the Dutch competition law judiciary to follow the case 
law of the CJEU on the fi ve principles. 
In what follows, three diff erent aspects are highlighted. The Dutch competition law courts 
do explicitly mention their adherence to case law of the CJEU when it concerns the burden 
and standard of proof. In practice, however, there is one notable diff erence. This is elaborated 
upon fi rst (10.5.2.1). Second, the approach towards the non bis in idem principle is discussed, 
since it was argued in the previous subparagraph that the current approach by the CJEU 
should be adapted (10.5.2.2). Third, the option of following case law of the Union Courts on 
the proportionality of sanctions is discussed (10.5.2.3). This principle is, as is explained below, 
the only principle where the Dutch courts should deviate somewhat from case law of the 
CJEU. 
9.5.2.1 The approach towards the standard of proof in Dutch competition law: an anomaly 
As indicated, some voluntary adherence to the case law of the CJEU in competition law 
proceedings already takes place in the Netherlands. There is, however, an unexplained 
anomaly to be found in Dutch case law where it concerns the standard of proof. The approach 
towards direct evidence is more nuanced in Dutch competition law. Direct evidence can in 
some circumstances also be challenged through a mere denial. Whether direct evidence, an 
alternative explanation or a denial is necessary to rebut the direct evidence adduced by the 
ACM depends on the value and credibility of that evidence. The Dutch competition law 
courts thus allow for more leeway than the CJEU, by allowing direct evidence sometimes to 
be rebutted by a mere denial. This might be to the detriment of the eff ective enforcement of 
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the EU competition law rules by the ACM, which could lead to an obligation to abolish this 
practice. The Rewe/Comet boundaries could be reached when this practice is to the detriment 
of the eff ective enforcement of the competition law rules. As the ECJ held in Eturas: “The 
principle of eff ectiveness requires however that national rules governing the assessment of 
evidence and the standard of proof must not render the implementation of EU competition 
rules impossible or excessively diffi  cult and, in particular, must not jeopardise the eff ective 
application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU.”26
The evidential rules created by the CJEU are also easier to apply. The competition law courts 
in the Netherlands have not explained why they take a more nuanced approach towards the 
rebuttal of direct evidence than the Luxembourg Courts. It is therefore also not clear whether 
an approach deviating from that of the CJEU was their intention. Therefore, it is preferable for 
the Dutch courts to bring their approach back in line with case law of the CJEU. 
9.5.2.2 Applying the EU non bis in idem principle
Currently, the ACM prevents non bis in idem problems by discussing a case, as mentioned 
in multiple judgments, with other NCAs before it initiates proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
ACM can be allowed to initiate proceedings after another (EU) NCA or the Commission has 
already sanctioned undertakings for the same anti-competitive behaviour. It was argued 
in the previous subparagraph, that the approach of the CJEU towards the non bis in idem 
principle should be adapted. The Dutch judiciary can only follow the current case law of 
the CJEU in competition law proceedings. Adapting its case law in line with that in criminal 
law proceedings, requires some legislative intervention by the EU legislator. Legislation 
should, as explained in chapter 8, allow for dual proceedings. Furthermore, coordination in 
the investigation should take place. This would probably also require legislative intervention 
by the EU legislator. 
9.5.2.3 The proportionality of sanctions
The proportionality of sanctions was, in the present study, discussed from the perspective of 
judicial review and the factors which need to be taken into account when determining the 
level of a fi ne . The review of competition law fi nes is in the Netherlands comparable to that of 
the Union Courts. This review should be changed, in the author’s view, when fi nes are raised 
above the 10% maximum, but below the new 40% maximum. In chapter 6, it was asserted that 
this change in Dutch legislation would require the judiciary to introduce a proportionality 
stricto sensu test. This test is not present in EU competition law proceedings, since the 10% 
maximum protects against disproportionate fi nes and makes such a third proportionality step 
nugatory. This would mean, as explained in chapter 6, that the Dutch judiciary will have to 
determine at the last stage of the proportionality review whether the fi ne, as it then stands, 
is overall still proportionate. Inspiration can be drawn from the approach of the English 
26  ECJ, C-74/14 (Eturas and others v Commission), par. 35. See also Veenbrink (2015b). 
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judiciary, which adopted such a test by ‘standing back’ and considering whether the fi ne is 
proportionate in light of the case at hand.27
There are some diff erences between EU competition law and Dutch competition law with 
regard to the factors that are taken into account to set a fi ne. An alignment with EU law 
is not appropriate for this aspect of the proportionality of a sanction. In the Netherlands, 
it is for example commendable that the ‘chilling eff ect’ of fi nes is taken into account more 
often than on the EU level. This could be explained by the investigations of the Commission 
and the ACM. Whereas the Commission focuses mainly on the larger companies and the 
hardcore infringements, national authorities focus in general on smaller companies. The focus 
on smaller companies means that it is more likely for NCAs to take into account the ‘chilling 
eff ect’ of a fi ne. The Dutch competition law system is quite clear on the factors which can and 
which cannot be taken into account when determining a fi ne. 
9.5.2.4 Résumé
Overall, the Dutch courts should thus, in line with their current practice, follow the case law 
of the CJEU insofar as it concerns the principles discussed in this research. For the non bis 
in idem principle, there is a choice to follow the CJEU in competition law proceedings or in 
criminal law proceedings. Both approaches would lead, however, to the same result. The only 
deviation from case law of the CJEU should take place when it comes to the factors that 
should or should not be taken into account when setting a fi ne. These recommendations can 
be followed until the legislator decides to take part in the discussion on the appropriate level 
of safeguards in Dutch competition law. 
9.5.3 Recommendations for the English judiciary: some specifi c observations
The case law on principles in English competition law proceedings is less developed than in 
Dutch competition law proceedings. Inspiration from the Union Courts could thereby help 
develop a strong enforcement regime with adequate safeguards for undertakings. In chapter 
8, it was already indicated that the CAT and the England and Wales Court of Appeal indeed 
follow case law of the Union Courts on the freedom from self-incrimination and the burden and 
standard of proof. To date, there is no case law on the non bis in idem principle. The observations 
made on this principle in the previous subparagraph for the Dutch competition law judiciary 
obviously also apply to English competition law. In this subparagraph two aspects are further 
discussed. The upcoming Brexit has some implications for the recommendation to follow 
case law of the Union Courts. This aspect is discussed fi rst (10.5.3.1). Second, the approach 
towards the proportionality of sanctions is discussed a bit more extensive, since the English 
courts should not follow, in the present author’s view, the case law of the Union Courts on 
this principle (10.5.3.2). 
27  For more information, see chapter 6, par. 6.7.3.
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9.5.3.1 Brexit and Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998
The English competition law courts have followed the Union Courts on the application of at 
least two principles discussed in this research. Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998 imposes 
a consistency requirement on the English judiciary.28 It is however not entirely clear whether 
this consistency requirement applies to procedural rules as well.29 In NAPP, the CAT e.g. held: 
Whether or not section 60 of the Act is to be construed as requiring us to follow 
the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on issues 
such as the burden and standard of proof, we believe that the approach we have 
outlined above is in line with the approach of those Courts. There is no doubt that 
in proceedings under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proof rests 
on the Commission (see Montecatini at paragraph 179). As far as the standard 
of proof is concerned, the European Courts, faced with the diff erent traditions 
of the Member States, have simply indicated that the infringement should be 
demonstrated to the “requisite legal standard” (à 27 suffi  sance de droit), but there 
is no doubt that, in general, those Courts require convincing proof that the alleged 
infringements have been committed in the form of a “fi rm, precise and consistent 
body of evidence”: see Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission 
cited above, paragraphs 16 to 20; Cases C-89/85 etc Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and 
others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paragraph 127. We have no reason to 
suppose that the standard of proof we propose to follow is any diff erent from that 
followed in practice by the courts in Luxembourg.30
It is thus not entirely clear whether a possible obligation on the English judiciary to adhere 
to case law of the CJEU on procedural rules and legal safeguards can be construed on the 
basis Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998. This is relevant in light of the UK leaving the 
EU. Much will depend on the future relationship between the UK and the EU in competition 
law matters. Multiple authors, the CMA and the House of Lords have advocated, however, 
to keep the consistency requirement in an adapted form in place after the Brexit. The duty to 
‘take into account’ case law of the Union Courts should in their view be changed to a duty to 
‘have regard to’ case law of the Union Courts.31 As e.g. the ACM explained: 
Overall, we consider that the current obligation on UK courts and authorities to act 
with a view to securing no inconsistency with European Court judgments should 
be replaced with a softer duty, for example a statutory obligation to ‘have regard’ 
28  See for more information chapter 7, par. 7.1. 
29  Whish & Bailey (2018), p. 390. 
30  CCAT (15 January 2002) [2002] CAT 1, par. 112.
31   Vickers et al. (2017), par. 2.7-2.9; Competition and Markets Authority (2017) – written evidence (CMP0002), par. 16; and House of Lords, 
Brexit: competition and State aid, par. 82.
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to EU l aw and precedent. We consider that such a duty would allow UK courts and 
authorities to depart from EU law where they considered it appropriate, retaining a 
useful procedural discipline to consider relevant EU law on antitrust questions and to 
provide rational reasons for departures. There may also be additional benefi ts in terms 
of reducing the risk of frivolous litigation, as well as for business in being sure of a 
consistency of approach.32
If the consistency requirement from Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998 would apply 
to procedural rules, it would be possible for the English competition law judiciary to ‘have 
regard’ to the case law of the Union Courts on legal safeguards for undertakings on the basis 
of this provision. Otherwise, the English courts might have to develop an approach towards 
these principles on their own. It is nevertheless recommendable for the English courts to draw 
inspiration from the Union Courts. This approach ensures that the minimum safeguards set 
by the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court are at least adhered to. 
9.5.3.2 Proportionality of sanctions
The English competition law judiciary seems to review competition law fi nes in the same 
manner as the Union Courts do, although the proportionality stricto sensu test is always 
applied by the English judiciary. The duty to ‘stand back’ to determine whether the fi nal 
amount is not excessive thus goes beyond the approach of the Union Courts. In the author’s 
view, this is not a problem in light of the proposed recommendation to follow the Union 
Courts. This proportionality test is present in the case law of the Union Courts, although the 
Union Courts do not apply such a test since the maximum of 10% prevents against excessive 
fi nes. The English judiciary merely takes an extra step, to determine in practice whether the 
overall fi ne is indeed not excessive. 
The factors which need to be taken into account when determining the level of a fi ne should, 
as mentioned in the previous subparagraph, be arranged on the domestic level to take into 
account the particular characteristics of the domestic competition law regime. The English 
competition judiciary is, as is explained, in need of some more guidance. The case law of the 
judiciary on the factors used to determine a fi ne is contradictory. A factor can in one case be 
used as aggravating, whereas in another case it is used as mitigating. 
In the 1980s, the English judiciary was also criticised for its approach in criminal law 
proceedings. Sanctions were determined in an arbitrary manner. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal and the Magistrate’s Association created sentencing guidelines to prevent disparities 
in case law. In 2003, a duty on the judiciary to take sentencing guidelines into account was 
created in legislation. This duty to take into account was changed in 2009 to a duty to ‘follow’.33
In 2014, the legislator also decided to place a duty on the CAT to ‘have regard’ to the UK
32  Competition and Markets Authority (2017) – written evidence (CMP0002), par. 16. (reference omitted)
33  For more information on this practice in criminal law, see chapter 4, par. 4.6.
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Fining Guidance when setting a competition law fi ne. This duty could be changed to a duty 
to ‘follow’ the Fining Guidance. This would prevent contradictory case law on the factors 
used to determine a fi ne. The procedure for the creation of the Fining Guidance should then 
be changed. This Guidance is currently created by the CMA and approved by the British 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The sentencing guidelines in 
criminal law are made, after an open consultation, by a Council which is composed of not 
only judges, but also of legal scholars and practitioners. These sentencing guidelines are thus 
not made by the Crown Prosecution Service. In competition law, this would thus require an 
independent body which creates the Fining Guidance. A duty to ‘follow’ the Fining Guidance, 
as long as it is thus created by an independent body, could create more certainty and prevent 
contradicting case law of the competition law judiciary. Furthermore, this method has proven 
to be workable in England. 
9.5.3.3 Résumé
It is suggested here that the English competition law judiciary follow the approach of the 
Union Courts, until the legislator decides to engage in a discussion on the appropriate level of 
safeguards in competition law proceedings. This recommendation depends also on the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU. Nevertheless, from the present research it appears 
that the English competition law judiciary is in urgent need of guidance on the application 
of safeguards in competition law proceedings. The current case law is underdeveloped and 
at times wholly inconsistent and incoherent on the proper level of safeguards. As Chirita 
responded to questions from the House of Lords on the implications of the Brexit for 
competition law: 
As an academic, I should also stress that the UK body of competition decisions 
and case-law is insuffi  ciently developed. Most commentators have focused with 
constructive criticism on what the EU Commission has done well and not so well. 
There is very little to learn from the UK, so turning our back on EU competition law 
might not be wise at all.34
Taking into consideration cases law of the Union Courts on these safeguards could therefore 
help develop a strong competition law regime with respect to the fundamental rights of 
undertakings.
34  Chirita (2017) – Written evidence (CMP 0013), par. 7. 
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9.6 FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
This study has revealed that the impact of criminal law on (administrative) competition law 
proceedings is limited. The EU, Dutch and English legislator did not have a clear vision of the 
consequences for the legal safeguards in competition law procedures. The judiciary therefore 
inherited the task of elaborating upon the safeguards for undertakings in competition law 
proceedings. Even though competition law has shaped up to become a relatively well-
developed administrative law domain, still quite some questions have been left open by the 
domestic judiciary on the legal safeguards in the enforcement of the competition law rules. 
Furthermore, the judiciary has not developed a clear vision of the safeguards that should 
apply in competition law proceedings either. The judiciary, however, cannot be blamed for 
not creating an all-encompassing and coherent framework for the safeguarding of the rights 
of undertakings, as this is a primary task for the legislator. The discussions in legal literature 
and the present study indicate that further refl ection on the legal safeguards in competition 
law proceedings is sorely needed. Steps towards the development of a more coherent and 
consistent enforcement regime should thus ultimately be taken to boost the safeguards for 
undertakings. 
435
Conclusion and Recommendations | CHAPTER 9
Ch
ap
te
r 9
436
SUMMARY
437
SUMMARY
Su
m
m
ar
y
SUMMARY
The application of fundamental rights in competition law proceedings is a contentious 
topic. In legal literature there is much discussion on the scope and application of certain 
fundamental rights in (administrative) competition law proceedings. This is not that strange 
due to the high stakes in competition law proceedings. This discussion in legal literature 
can also be found in the courtrooms. The judiciary has tried to fi nd a balance between the 
protection of fundamental rights on the one hand, and safeguarding the eff ective enforcement 
of the competition law rules. This research examined whether criminal law principles have 
an impact on (administrative) competition law proceedings. The potential impact of criminal 
law principles on competition law proceedings has not yet been researched. Therefore the 
following question is central to this research:
What is the impact of criminal law principles on the enforcement of the rules of competition 
law in the Netherlands, England, and at the European Union level?
Ultimately, fi ve principles were chosen to determine whether criminal law has an impact on 
administrative competition law proceedings. These fi ve principles are: (i) the principle of nemo 
tenetur, (ii) the non bis in idem principle, (iii) the burden and standard of proof, (iv) the legality 
and legal certainty principle, and (v) the proportionality of sanctions. The choice for these 
fi ve principles was elaborated upon in chapter 1. It should be mentioned that these principles 
are not per se criminal law principles. The burden and standard of proof can, for example, be 
found in multiple areas of law. However, the present study examines whether the criminal 
law application of these principles has found its way into the competition law domain. 
Some aspects of these principles were not discussed in this study, since the research is fi rstly 
confi ned to the question whether criminal law has an impact on administrative competition 
law proceedings. Obviously, this requires that the approach taken by the competition law 
judiciary is examined. Questions left open by that judiciary are therefore not investigated. 
The present study reveals that there is no unambiguous answer to the question whether there 
is an impact of criminal law principles on competition law proceedings. To avoid further 
repetition, the reader is referred to the summarized fi ndings in chapter 9, par. 9.2. The scope 
and application of each principle in criminal law and in competition law are per jurisdiction 
and per principle also summarized in the respective chapters. Therefore, no further summary 
shall be given.
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Hoofdstuk I bevat de inleiding op het onderzoek. In het mededingingsrecht vindt sinds jaar 
en dag discussie plaats over de reikwijdte van bepaalde fundamentele rechten. Dit is ook 
niet zo vreemd, aangezien de belangen voor ondernemingen zeer groot zijn. Er is dan ook 
veel geschreven over de toepassing van bepaalde fundamentele rechten in dit rechtsgebied. 
Daarentegen is er nog geen onderzoek naar de mogelijke invloed van het strafrecht op de 
bestuursrechtelijke handhaving van het mededingingsrecht, terwijl er wel voldoende 
aanknopingspunten zijn om te beargumenteren dat de reikwijdte en toepassing van bepaalde 
beginselen in het mededingingsrecht vergelijkbaar zou moeten zijn met die in het strafrecht. 
In dit onderzoek staat dan ook de volgende vraag centraal:
Wat is de impact van strafrechtelijke beginselen op de handhaving van de 
mededingingsregels in Nederland, Engeland en op EU-niveau? 
Uiteindelijk zijn vijf beginselen gekozen om te onderzoeken of er een impact van het 
strafrecht is in bestuursrechtelijke mededingingsprocedures. Deze vijf beginselen zijn (i) het 
nemo tenetur-beginsel, (ii) het ne bis in idem-beginsel, (iii) de bewijslast en -standaard, (iv) het 
legaliteitsbeginsel en het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel, en (v) de proportionaliteit van sancties. De 
keuze voor deze vijf beginselen is nader toegelicht in hoofdstuk 1. Wel moet hier benadrukt 
worden dat niet al deze beginselen per se van strafrechtelijke aard zijn. Zo zijn de bewijslast 
en de bewijsstandaard ook in andere rechtsterreinen te vinden. Uiteraard wordt dan in dit 
onderzoek bekeken of de strafrechtelijke toepassing van deze beginselen een impact heeft 
op het mededingingsrecht. Het onderzoek is verder in drie delen verdeeld, namelijk een 
analyse van deze beginselen in het strafrecht en in het mededingingsrecht, en een analyse 
of er een impact is van strafrechtelijke beginselen op het mededingingsrecht. De aard van 
dit onderzoek brengt met zich mee dat er gekozen is voor een positiefrechtelijke invalshoek 
waarbij slechts de elementen van de beginselen worden besproken die ook daadwerkelijk 
terugkomen in mededingingsrechtelijke jurisprudentie. Uiteraard betekent dit dat belangrijke 
aspecten misschien niet besproken worden, maar dit is een logisch gevolg van de opzet van 
dit onderzoek. Allereerst moet er bekeken worden of het strafrecht een impact heeft op het 
mededingingsrecht. Een bevestigend antwoord op deze vraag kan dan helpen om te bezien 
hoe openstaande vraagstukken uitgewerkt kunnen worden. Mocht er geen impact van het 
strafrecht zijn op het mededingingsrecht, dan zullen deze vraagstukken niet aan de hand 
van het strafrecht opgelost kunnen worden. De eerste vraag is dan ook of we dus inspiratie 
kunnen halen uit het strafrecht of niet. 
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In Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4 worden de vijf gekozen beginselen besproken vanuit een 
strafrechtelijk perspectief in het EVRM en in het Unierecht (hoofdstuk 3), in Nederland 
(hoofdstuk 4) en in Engeland (hoofdstuk 5). Het tweede hoofdstuk legt dus de focus op 
het EVRM en het Unierecht, maar deze rechtsgebieden komen ook zijdelings ter sprake 
in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 vanwege de impact op het nationale strafrecht. In het Unierecht kan 
er moeilijk gesproken worden over een strafrechtelijk domein. Dit betekent dan ook dat 
bepaalde beginselen niet altijd sterk ontwikkeld zijn op EU-niveau. Bij het EVRM moet 
uiteraard rekening gehouden worden met de karakteristieken van het Hof voor de Rechten 
van de Mens. Dit Hof is geen hof in laatste aanleg. Om deze reden worden de bewijslast 
en -standaard slechts marginaal besproken, terwijl andere fundamentele beginselen wel een 
nadere uitwerking hebben. 
Het nemo tenetur-beginsel is in het Unierecht te vinden in Richtlijn 2016/434. De richtlijn 
is slechts van toepassing op natuurlijke personen. De toepassing van dit beginsel richt zich 
sterk op de Saunders-jurisprudentie van het EHRM en hanteert een wat strikte benadering 
waarbij de aard van de verzochte informatie belangrijk lijkt te zijn om te bepalen of er voldaan 
moet worden aan een medewerkingsplicht. Het EHRM is daarentegen een iets andere weg 
in geslagen door meer de nadruk te leggen op de hoeveelheid dwang die wordt uitgeoefend. 
De aard van de informatie waarom verzocht wordt is dan slechts één van de factoren die 
gebruikt worden bij de bepaling of de hoeveelheid dwang die wordt uitgeoefend toegestaan 
is. Hier lijkt dan ook een wat uiteenlopende toepassing van dit beginsel plaats te vinden. 
In het Nederlandse strafrecht is het niet toegestaan om een verdachte te dwingen belastend 
materiaal af te staan. Daarnaast wordt het nemo tenetur-beginsel ook gewaarborgd doordat 
een verdachte niet hoeft te reageren op brede informatieverzoeken en zogenoemde fi shing 
expeditions. Toch betekent het niet dat materiaal verkregen in strijd met voornoemde situaties 
per defi nitie leidt tot een inbreuk op het nemo tenetur-beginsel. Het is dan van belang om te 
bezien hoe het materiaal gebruikt wordt. Dit laatste is ook één van de factoren die onder het 
EVRM van belang is om te bepalen of er een schending is van het nemo tenetur-beginsel. In 
het Engelse strafrecht prevaleert een medewerkingsplicht soms ook boven het nemo tenetur-
beginsel. Beperkingen van dit beginsel kunnen slechts plaatsvinden door middel van een 
formele wet en wanneer dit in het algemeen belang is. Zo kan het voorkomen dat een verdachte 
bepaalde antwoorden moet geven, ook al kan dat belastend voor hem/haar zijn. Voor (reeds 
bestaande) documenten geldt dat deze in principe altijd overlegd moeten worden door een 
verdachte zolang het bestaan van die documenten onafhankelijk van de wil van de verdachte 
is. Hier is dan ook gekozen voor een strikte toepassing van de Saunders-jurisprudentie van 
het EHRM. 
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Het ne bis in idem-beginsel is in het EU-strafrecht en onder het EVRM goed ontwikkeld. De 
twee Europese Hoven hanteren alleen een andere benadering van het ne bis in idem-beginsel. 
Kort gezegd kan een dubbele vervolging of bestraffi  ng van dezelfde persoon voorkomen 
worden (i) wanneer de feiten hetzelfde zijn of (ii) wanneer het rechtsbelang hetzelfde is. De 
vraag is dan ook of er gekeken moet worden naar de feitelijke constellatie (optie 1) om te 
bezien of iemand voor een  tweede keer vervolgd/bestraft wordt of dat er gekeken moet 
worden naar het te beschermen rechtsbelang van het delict waarvoor iemand wederom wordt 
vervolgd/bestraft (optie 2). Het Hof van Justitie heeft gekozen voor een feitelijke benadering. 
Uiteindelijk heeft ook het Straatsburgse Hof voor een dergelijke benadering gekozen in de 
baanbrekende uitspraak Zolotukhin. Het leek dan ook dat de onrust in de juridische literatuur 
over de twee verschillende benaderingen van het EHRM en het Hof van Justitie, maar ook 
over de weinig coherente lijn van het EHRM zelf, weggenomen was. Toch bracht het EHRM 
in A en B t. Noorwegen wederom een juridische benadering terug bij de beoordeling of een 
dubbele vervolging/bestraffi  ng mogelijk is, door de bis-voorwaarde in te kleuren aan de hand 
van het rechtsbelang dat beschermd wordt met de bepaling waarvoor de vervolging wordt 
ingesteld. Er zal dan gekeken moeten worden of de parallelle of opeenvolgende vervolging 
voldoende met elkaar verbonden zijn naar onderwerp en tijd. In een dergelijk geval is er 
dan ook sprake van één samenhangende vervolging. Om te beoordelen of dit het geval 
is, moet er ook gekeken worden naar het belang dat beide bepalingen waarvoor vervolgd 
wordt beschermd. Het was na deze uitspraak van het EHRM aan het Hof van Justitie om 
te beoordelen of de jurisprudentie wederom uiteen moest gaan lopen tussen beide Hoven 
of niet. Uiteindelijk heeft het Hof van Justitie niet voor een geheel andere aanpak gekozen. 
Desalniettemin is de aanpak wel verschillend. De factoren die het EHRM meeneemt om te 
bepalen of er voldaan is aan het bis-criterium, gebruikt het Hof van Justitie om te bepalen of 
een restrictie van het ne bis in idem-beginsel gerechtvaardigd kan zijn op basis van artikel 52(1) 
van het Handvest. De Nederlandse strafrechter lijkt deze discussie aan zich voorbij te laten 
gaan en hanteert een consistente aanpak ten opzicht van het ne bis in idem-beginsel. Om te 
bepalen of een dubbele vervolging of bestraffi  ng is toegestaan, moet er bekeken worden of er 
sprake is van dezelfde feiten. Het idem-criterium wordt naar Nederlands recht ingevuld aan 
de hand van een tweevoudige analyse. Er moet naar het te beschermen rechtsbelang gekeken 
worden en naar de feitelijke constellatie. Ieder van deze twee beginselen kan in zichzelf al 
beslissend zijn om te bepalen of er sprake is van dezelfde feiten. Deze aanpak is bekritiseerd 
in de Nederlandse juridische literatuur aangezien het EHRM, sinds Zolotukhin, slechts naar de 
feitelijke constellatie kijkt en niet naar het te beschermen rechtsbelang van beide bepalingen 
waarvoor vervolgd/bestraft wordt. Desalniettemin is, zoals aangegeven, de juridische analyse 
terug gekomen in de jurisprudentie van het EHRM en in de jurisprudentie van het Hof van 
Justitie. Toch lijkt het er niet op dat de Nederlandse rechter nu eenzelfde aanpak heeft ten 
opzicht van dat van de Europese rechters. Aan de andere kant blijft de Nederlandse rechter 
onverstoorbaar in zijn aanpak en dat is zeker bewonderenswaardig, terwijl de Europese 
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rechters zoekende zijn naar de juiste manier om het ne bis in idem-beginsel uit te werken. 
Het ne bis in idem-beginsel in het Engelse strafrecht is slechts zeer beperkt besproken in dit 
onderzoek, aangezien dit beginsel niet voorkomt in mededingingsrechtelijke jurisprudentie 
van de rechters uit het VK. 
De bewijslast rust in strafrechtelijke procedures, aldus het EHRM en het Hof van Justitie, op 
de bevoegde autoriteiten. Dit kan, afhankelijk van het door een lidstaat gekozen systeem, de 
openbare aanklager of een rechtbank zijn. Deze bewijslast is een evidential burden of proof maar 
ook een legal burden of proof. Daarnaast is het mogelijk dat er een zekere bewijslast rust op een 
verdachte, al leidt dit strikt gesproken niet tot een bewijslast, maar eerder tot een bewijsrisico. 
Een verdachte die geen tegenbewijs aanlevert zal het risico dragen dat de zaak tegen hem/
haar bewezen wordt verklaard. Daarnaast kan het ook nodig zijn dat een verdachte een 
uitsluitingsgrond bewijst. Het is niet geheel duidelijk in het Unierecht of onder het EVRM of 
een bewijslast in deze situaties slechts een evidential burden of proof inhoudt of dat er bewijs 
geleverd moet worden tot een zekere standaard (legal burden of proof). De bewijsstandaard
voor autoriteiten is niet geheel duidelijke in beide Europese regimes. Aangezien het niet 
duidelijk is of er een legal burden of proof kan rusten op een verdachte, is het ook niet duidelijk 
wat de standaard in een dergelijk geval zou moeten zijn.
Het concept van een bewijslast past niet goed in het Nederlandse strafrechtelijke systeem. Zo 
heeft bijvoorbeeld de Nederlandse rechter de mogelijkheid om zelf onderzoek te verrichten 
en moet het Openbaar Ministerie ook ontlastend bewijs aanleveren. Desalniettemin kan er 
beargumenteerd worden dat het Openbaar Ministerie de bewijslast draagt. Dit zou dan een 
evidential en een legal burden of proof inhouden. Ook kan er in sommige situaties de facto een 
bewijslast rusten op een verdachte, al moet ook hier gezegd worden dat dit strikt genomen 
niet een bewijslast is, maar een bewijsrisico. Een verdachte zal zijn/haar uitsluitingsgrond 
bijvoorbeeld willen onderbouwen, zodat het niet gelijk verworpen wordt. Een verdachte zal 
daarnaast een betwisting van de bestandsdelen van een delict aannemelijk moeten maken. 
Dit zou gezien kunnen worden als een evidential en een legal burden of proof, namelijk een 
bewijslast waarbij de standaard van de aannemelijkheid geldt. Het is onduidelijk of deze 
bewijslast rust op een verdachte waar hij/zij een beroep doet op uitsluitingsgronden. De 
bewijstandaard in het Nederlandse strafrecht lijkt verder de standaard van beyond reasonable 
doubt te zijn. Een verdachte kan pas veroordeeld worden als de rechter overtuigd is van zijn/
haar schuld en dus als de schuld buiten redelijke twijfel vastgesteld kan worden. De bewijslast 
en de bewijsstandaard passen beter in het Engelse strafrechtelijke systeem. De aanklager in 
Engeland draagt de evidential en legal burden of proof, terwijl de verdachte dan het risico draagt 
om tegenbewijs aan te leveren, aangezien een veroordeling anders zou kunnen volgen. De 
meeste verdedigingen moeten in Engeland slechts bewezen worden tot de evidential burden 
of proof, al zijn er een drietal verdedigingen waarbij een verdachte nog steeds bewijs moet 
aanleveren tot een zekere standaard. De bewijsstandaard is in algemene zin de standaard van 
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beyond reasonable doubt. Een verdachte moet, indien op hem/haar een legal burden of proof rust, 
zijn/haar verdediging aannemelijk maken. Het lijkt er ook op dat indirect bewijs weerlegd 
kan worden met een plausibele alternatieve verklaring, terwijl dat moeilijker is voor direct 
bewijs. 
Het legaliteitsbeginsel en het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel kwamen als vierde aan bod in dit 
onderzoek. Strafrechtelijke regels moeten voldoende helder en toegankelijk zijn. Over het 
algemeen gebruikt het EHRM drie stappen, of richtlijnen, om te bepalen of een wet voldoet 
aan het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel. Allereerst zal gekeken worden of de wet op zichzelf al 
voldoende helder is. Mocht dit niet het geval zijn, dan kunnen de consequenties voortvloeiend 
uit de wet nog steeds voorzienbaar zijn op basis van jurisprudentie. Tot slot kan een wet 
ook nog steeds voldoende duidelijk zijn als de consequenties voor een persoon voorzienbaar 
hadden kunnen zijn indien hij/zij op voorhand juridisch advies had ingewonnen. Het Hof van 
Justitie is minder helder over de toepassing van het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel. Dit is niet zo 
verwonderlijk, aangezien het Hof het vaak aan de nationale rechter overlaat om te bepalen of 
een wet voldoende helder is. Onder beide systemen is het wel helder dat het legaliteitsbeginsel 
een retroactieve toepassing verbiedt van het strafrecht. Wel moet de meest gunstige sanctie 
retroactief toegepast worden (lex mitior). Er is ook wel beargumenteerd dat deze regel niet 
alleen ziet op de sanctie, maar ook op de wet zelf; bij decriminalisatie zou iemand dan 
ook vrijgesproken moeten worden. De toepassing van het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel en het 
legaliteitsbeginsel in het Nederlandse strafrecht is veelal hetzelfde als dat van het EHRM. Alleen 
bij de lex mitior-regel handhaaft de Nederlandse rechter de regel dat de nieuwe regel slechts 
wordt toegepast als er een wijziging in inzicht is geweest van de wetgever of de strafbaarheid 
van bepaald gedrag. Dit is een strikter criterium dan het EHRM hanteert. Ook in het Engelse 
strafrecht wordt veelal gekeken naar de toepassing van het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel en het 
legaliteitsbeginsel door het EHRM. Het lex mitior-beginsel is dan wel beperkt tot sancties. De 
Engelse rechter zal beoordelen of de maximum sanctie die opgelegd had kunnen worden ten 
tijde van het overtreden van het strafrecht hoger is dan de maximum sanctie die opgelegd 
kan worden ten tijde van het sanctioneren. De mogelijke maximum sanctie bepaalt dan welke 
wet er toegepast wordt. In de praktijk kan dit inhouden dat de sanctie hoger is dan onder de 
huidige wet, zolang de maximum sanctie maar niet veranderd is. 
Het laatste beginsel dat besproken is, is de proportionaliteit van sancties. In principe is er 
naar een tweetal aspecten gekeken, namelijk de rechterlijke toetsing van de proportionaliteit 
van een boete en de factoren die meegenomen moeten worden bij het bepalen van de boete. 
Het EHRM beoordeelt over het algemeen de proportionaliteit stricto sensu, terwijl het Hof 
van Justitie de manifest disproportionality-test gebruikt. Het is niet mogelijk gebleken om een 
lijst met factoren te distilleren uit de jurisprudentie van de Europese rechters. Dit is ook 
niet geheel onlogisch, omdat het vaak aan de nationale rechters wordt overgelaten om te 
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bepalen of een sanctie proportioneel is of niet. De jurisprudentie in het Nederlandse strafrecht 
over de proportionaliteit van een sanctie is ook schaars. Dit is wederom niet verwonderlijk, 
aangezien de focus van de Nederlandse rechters zich met name richt op de strafrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid. In Engeland is geen codifi catie te vinden van het proportionaliteitsbeginsel. 
Wel is dit beginsel inherent in de sanctierichtsnoeren. Deze richtsnoeren zijn bindend voor de 
rechter, al mag een afwijking hiervan plaatsvinden als dit in het belang van een rechtvaardige 
sanctie is. 
Het mededingingsrecht
In hoofdstuk 5 tot en met 8 is nader ingegaan op het mededingingsrecht. Deze hoofdstukken 
bespreken per jurisdictie de toepassing van de vijf beginselen. Over het algemeen kan er 
gezegd worden dat het EU-systeem het best ontwikkelde handhavingssysteem heeft van de 
drie bestudeerde jurisdicties. Hier is veel jurisprudentie over de vijf beginselen. Het huidige 
mededingingsrecht in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk stamt uit 1998. Hierdoor is er 
logischerwijs ook minder jurisprudentie, al is het gebrek aan jurisprudentie over bepaalde 
beginselen in het mededingingsrecht in het VK wel opzienbarend. De handhaving van het 
Nederlandse mededingingsrecht is dan ook weer sterker ontwikkeld dan de handhaving in 
het VK. 
De toepassing van het nemo tenetur-beginsel in het Europese mededingingsrecht stamt uit 
de Orkem-zaak van 1989. In deze zaak werd de basis gelegd voor de huidige toepassing van 
dit beginsel. Het nemo tenetur-beginsel strekt zich slechts uit tot belastende antwoorden. 
Feitelijke antwoorden moeten altijd gegeven worden en documenten moeten altijd overlegd 
worden. In het algemeen geldt dat dit beginsel slechts van toepassing is als er sprake is van 
dwang. Uiteraard is dwang iets anders dan een medewerkingsplicht. Dwang is er slechts 
wanneer niet-medewerking gesanctioneerd kan worden. Dit houdt onder meer in dat het 
clementiebeleid of verzoeken om informatie niet tot dwang leiden. Aan zogenoemde fi shing 
expeditions en brede verzoeken om informatie hoeft dan weer niet meegewerkt te worden. In 
het Europees mededingingsrecht blijft de vraag wel open wie zich namens de onderneming 
kan beroepen op het nemo tenetur-beginsel. In principe zijn hier twee antwoorden op mogelijk. 
Alle werknemers zouden dit mogen, aangezien zij voor de duur van hun arbeidsrelatie 
onderdeel zijn van de onderneming, of slechts de wettelijke vertegenwoordiger mag dit, 
aangezien foutieve antwoorden, gegeven door die vertegenwoordiger, gelijk leiden tot een 
sanctie. Antwoorden van gewone werknemers mogen namelijk nog gecorrigeerd worden 
door de onderneming. Bij een schendig van dit beginsel lijkt uitsluiting van bewijs de meest 
logische consequentie, al is het niet duidelijk hoe de Unierechters hiermee om zullen gaan. 
Een vergelijkbare aanpak is te vinden in het Nederlandse mededingingsrecht. Het zwijgrecht 
is gecodifi ceerd in het Nederlandse mededingingsrecht. Het bredere nemo tenetur-beginsel 
is daarentegen niet te vinden in de wet. Wel passen de rechters hier het EVRM toe. Het lijkt 
445
SAMENVATTING
Sa
m
en
va
tti
ng
erop dat eenzelfde aanpak is gekozen in Nederland als op Unieniveau. Desalniettemin is 
er niet veel jurisprudentie over het bredere nemo tenetur-beginsel. Het zwijgrecht strekt 
zich in Nederland uit tot alle werknemers van een onderneming wanneer een onderzoek 
is ingesteld naar een mogelijke inbreuk op de mededingingsregels door een onderneming. 
In mededingingsrechtelijke jurisprudentie in het VK komt het nemo tenetur-beginsel slechts 
zijdelings ter sprake, waardoor er geen gedegen bespreking van dit beginsel kon plaatsvinden. 
Het ne bis in idem-beginsel kan een dubbele vervolging/bestraffi  ng van de mededingingsregels 
verbieden. Over het algemeen zal een dergelijk verbod slechts gelden wanneer de Commissie 
voor een tweede keer een onderneming voor hetzelfde gedrag wil sanctioneren. Een drietal 
factoren wordt door de Unierechters gebruikt om te bepalen of een dubbele vervolging/
bestraffi  ng is toegestaan. Er dient uniformiteit van de overtreder, de gedraging en het te 
beschermen rechtsbelang te zijn. De uniformiteit van het te beschermen rechtsbelang wordt 
gebruikt om de jurisdictie van de Commissie te beschermen. De Commissie kan altijd een zaak 
beginnen, nadat een andere mededingingsautoriteit een boete heeft opgelegd. Wel moet de 
Commissie in sommige gevallen de eerder opgelegde boete meenemen bij het bepalen van de 
eigen boete. Deze verplichting – het zogenoemde accounting-beginsel – geldt alleen wanneer 
een andere mededingingsautoriteit binnen de EU een boete heeft opgelegd en dan alleen 
wanneer de feiten hetzelfde zijn. Volgens de Unierechters zijn de feiten altijd anders als een 
mededingingsautoriteit van buiten de EU reeds een boete opgelegd heeft. In het Nederlandse 
mededingingsrecht zijn niet veel zaken te vinden over het ne bis in idem-beginsel. De 
toepassing van het ne bis in idem-beginsel lijkt sterk beïnvloed te worden door de rechtspraak 
van de Unierechters, al blijven bepaalde aspecten onbesproken. De rechters uit het VK hebben 
zich in mededingingsrechtelijke zaken nog niet uitgelaten over de toepassing van het ne bis in 
idem-beginsel. Wel is het accounting-beginsel opgenomen in de mededingingswet van het VK. 
Een bewijsstandaard is moeilijk te vinden in het Europese mededingingsrecht. Over het 
algemeen gaat het dan ook over de overtuiging van de rechter en zullen de Unierechters 
kijken of het bewijs in het geheel, aangedragen door de Commissie, voldoende coherent en 
precies is. Ondanks de bewijslast die rust op de Commissie, doet een onderneming er wel 
goed aan om te proberen bewijs te weerleggen. Hier lijkt een regel uit te ontstaan waarbij een 
onderneming om direct bewijs te weerleggen met ander direct bewijs moet komen, terwijl 
er bij indirect bewijs volstaan kan worden met een plausibele alternatieve verklaring. Een 
wat subtielere aanpak is te vinden in het Nederlandse mededingingsrecht. De Nederlandse 
rechters leggen minder de nadruk op de aard van het bewijs, maar meer op het geheel 
aan bewijs. Zo kan het voorkomen dat direct bewijs met een enkele ontkenning al terzijde 
geschoven wordt. Het mededingingsrecht in het VK heeft wel een bewijsstandaard. Dit lijkt 
de aannemelijkheidsstandaard te zijn, al is de Competition Appeal Tribunal hier niet altijd geheel 
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duidelijk over. Een onderneming kan direct bewijs weerleggen met ander direct bewijs, en 
indirect bewijs met een logische alternatieve verklaring. 
Het legaliteitsbeginsel en het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel worden zelden succesvol door een 
onderneming ingeroepen. Over het algemeen geldt in de drie jurisdicties dat een voorzichtige 
handelaar de mededingingsregels moet kenen. Ook kunnen mededingingsautoriteiten 
altijd de richtsnoeren voor de boetes verhogen. De Unierechters weerleggen argumenten 
over de verhoging van de boetes door toepassing van boeterichtsnoeren door te wijzen 
op het ongewijzigde boetemaximum. De Nederlandse rechters daarentegen weerleggen 
een dergelijk argument inhoudelijk, door erop te wijzen dat een onderneming kan weten 
dat de boeterichtsnoeren gewijzigd kunnen worden, waardoor een dergelijke wijziging een 
voorzienbare wijziging is. Wederom geldt dat de Engelse jurisprudentie marginaal ontwikkeld 
is. 
Er zijn veel factoren die meegenomen moeten worden bij de beoordeling van de 
proportionaliteit van sancties. De factoren willen per jurisdictie soms nog wel wat 
verschillen, al is er wel wat overlap in de toepassing van bepaalde factoren. Met name de 
rechters uit het VK willen de factoren nog wel tegenstrijdig toepassen. Soms wordt een factor 
als strafverminderende omstandigheid meegenomen terwijl dezelfde toepassing in een 
andere zaak juist leidt tot een verzwaring van de boete. De toetsing van een boete wordt 
met name gedaan door te kijken of alle factoren zijn meegenomen en of deze correct zijn 
meegenomen door de mededingingsautoriteit. Alleen de Engelse rechters zullen na een 
dergelijke beoordeling kijken of de boete in het licht van alle omstandigheden proportioneel 
is. De proportionaliteit wordt in het VK dus niet alleen ingevuld aan de hand van de vraag 
of alle factoren (correct) zijn meegenomen, maar ook of de rechter de boete in het algemeen 
proportioneel vindt, ook al zijn alle factoren correct meegenomen bij de bepaling van de 
boete. Dit is dus een iets andere proportionaliteitstoets dan de toets uitgevoerd door de 
Unierechters en de Nederlandse rechters. Deze laatstgenoemde rechters gaan ervan uit dat 
het 10%-boetemaximum beschermt tegen excessieve boetes, waardoor een dergelijke extra 
toets niet noodzakelijk is. 
Is er een impact van het strafrecht op het mededingingsrecht?
Hoofdstuk 9 bespreekt de mogelijk impact van de vijf strafrechtelijke beginselen op het 
mededingingsrecht. Deze impact kan expliciet plaatsvinden, waardoor er dan gesproken kan 
worden over een invloed van het strafrecht op het mededingingsrecht. Het is ook mogelijk 
dat de rechters niet expliciet verwijzen naar het strafrecht wanneer een beginsel vergelijkbaar 
wordt toegepast. In een dergelijk geval wordt er gesproken over een vergelijkbare aanpak, 
maar blijft het onduidelijk of de rechters het strafrecht als inspiratiebron hebben gebruikt. 
447
SAMENVATTING
Sa
m
en
va
tti
ng
Tot slot is het ook mogelijk dat de beginselen geheel verschillend worden toegepast in het 
strafrecht en in het mededingingsrecht. 
Het ne bis in idem-beginsel is het enige beginsel waarbij er in het strafrecht en het 
mededingingsrecht in de drie jurisdicties een geheel andere aanpak is. Voor het 
legaliteitsbeginsel en het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel geldt dan weer dat de rechters uit het 
VK en de Unierechters beïnvloed worden door de jurisprudentie van het EHRM, en, in het 
geval van de rechters uit het VK, ook door hun collega’s in strafzaken. De Nederlandse 
rechters laten niet blijken of ze beïnvloed worden door het strafrecht. Ten aanzien van de 
andere beginselen is een vergelijkbare aanpak tussen het mededingingsrecht en het strafrecht 
zoals vormgegeven door het EHRM. Dit lijkt met name te komen doordat de Unierechters 
niet afwijken van de rechtspraak van het EHRM in strafzaken. De nationale rechters laten 
zich in mededingingszaken dan weer veelvuldig beïnvloeden door de Unierechters in 
mededingingszaken, waardoor zij dus ook een vergelijkbare aanpak hanteren als het EHRM in 
strafzaken. De vergelijking tussen het nationale strafrecht en het nationale mededingingsrecht 
is minder gemakkelijk gemaakt. Hier zien we met name verschillen in de toepassing van de 
beginselen.
Over het algemeen komt er uit dit onderzoek naar voren dat er niet een eenduidig antwoord 
te vinden is op de vraag of er een impact van het strafrecht op het mededingingsrecht is. 
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt hier nader op ingegaan. Ook komt er uit dit onderzoek naar voren 
dat rechters vaak zoekende zijn naar een juiste toepassing van deze belangrijke beginselen 
in mededingingsrechtzaken. Dit is ook niet zo vreemd, aangezien de wetgever weinig tot 
geen aanknopingspunten heeft gegeven. Langzaamaan worden deze cruciale beginselen dus 
ontwikkeld door de rechterlijke macht. De huidige auteur is van mening dat de wetgever 
hier steken heeft laten vallen. Het is aan de democratisch gekozen wetgever om te bepalen 
wat de reikwijdte is van de verschillende beginselen. Het aan de rechter overlaten leidt op 
den duur misschien wel tot een volwassen rechtsdomein, maar het neemt niet weg dat er 
nu nog veel discussie is over de toepassing van bepaalde beginselen. De wetgevende macht 
heeft dan ook de mogelijkheid om meer duidelijkheid te creëren, zodat ondernemingen, 
mededingingsautoriteiten en rechters weten waar ze aan toe zijn. 
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ANNEX – CASE LAW ON THE PROPORTIONALITY OF COMPETITION LAW 
SANCTIONS IN THE EU AND THE NETHERLANDS1
EU competition law
1. The gravity of the infringement is determined by numerous factors
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 92;
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 234; 
GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 196; 
ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 58; 
ECJ, C-272/09 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 49; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 241; 
ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 
P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 465; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 177; 
GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 104; 
GC, T-418/10 (Voestalpine and Voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 411; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 278 and 282; 
GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 257; 
GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 138; 
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 76 and 88; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 234; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 749; 
GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 85 and 221; 
GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 373; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 32; GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 270; 
GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 63; 
GC, T-141/08 (E.ON Energie v Commission), par. 287; 
GC, T-39/06 (Transcatab v Commission), par. 191; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 215 and 233; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v 
Commission), par. 193; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265; 
GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 262; 
1  In some footnotes in Chapter 5 and 6 reference is made to this annex. 
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GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 350; 
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 317; 
GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; 
GC, T-456/05 and T-457/05 (Gütermann & Zwicky v Commission), par. 267; 
GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 82; 
GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 171 and 175; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 68 and 114-115; 
CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 343;
CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 342 and 344; 
CFI, T-101/05 and T-111/05 (BASF v Commission), par. 65; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 481; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 98; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 213 and 227; 
CFI, T-304/02 (Hoek Loos v Commission), par. 85; 
CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 37; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 76 and 101; 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 58; 
CFI, T-279/02 (Degussa v Commission), par. 95;
CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 146; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 137; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 63; 
CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 78; 
CFI, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (JFE Engineering and others v Commission), par. 
532; 
CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 229; 
CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 157 and 166; 
CFI, T-352/94 (Mo och Domsjö v Commission), par. 352.
2. No binding or exhaustive list of factors
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 241; 
ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 
P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 465; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 278; 
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 76;
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 GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 749; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 32; 
GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 64; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 215; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v 
Commission), par. 193; 
GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 262; 
GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; 
CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 343; 
CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 344; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 481; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 98; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 213; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 76; 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 58; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 137; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 157; 
CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 307; 
CFI, T-352/94 (Mo och Domsjö v Commission), par. 352.
3. Particular circumstances of the case should be taken into account
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 241; 
ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 
P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 465; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 278; 
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 76; 
GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux v Commission), par. 150; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 234; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 749; 
GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 221; 
GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 373; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 32; 
GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 85; 
GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 270; 
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GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 64; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 215; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v 
Commission), par. 193; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265; 
GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 262; 
GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; 
CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 343; 
CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 344; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 481; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 98; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 213; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 76; 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 58; 
CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 146; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 137; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 157 and 166; 
CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), 
par. 101; 
CFI, T-352/94 (Mo och Domsjö v Commission), par. 352.
4. Context of the case
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 241; 
ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 
P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 464; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 278; 
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 76; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 234; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 749; 
GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 221; 
GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 373; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 32; 
GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 85; 
GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 270; 
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GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 64; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 215; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v 
Commission), par. 193; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265; 
GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 262; 
GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; 
CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 343; 
CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 344; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 481; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 213; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 76; 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 58; 
CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 146; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 137; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 157 and 166; 
CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), 
par. 101; 
CFI, T-352/94 (Mo och Domsjö v Commission), par. 352.
5. Deterrent eff ect of fi nes
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 822-823; 
ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 16; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 241; 
ECJ, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 
P (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission), par. 464; 
GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 235; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111 and 176; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 278; 
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-519/09 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 284; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 76; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 234; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 749; 
GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 221; 
GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 373; 
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GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 32; 
GC, T-204/08 (Team Relocations v Commission), par. 85; 
GC, T-235/07 (Bavaria v Commission), par. 270; 
GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 64; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 215; 
GC, T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 (ThyssenKrupp v 
Commission), par. 193; 
GC, T-141/07, T-142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 (Otis v Commission), par. 384; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265; 
GC, T-217/06 (Arkema and others v Commission), par. 262; 
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 317; 
GC, T-29/05 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 228; 
CFI, T-12/03 (Itochu v Commission), par. 92-93; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 117; 
CFI, T-53/03 (British Plasterboard v Commission), par. 343; 
CFI, T-410/03 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 344; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 481, 523-527 and 540; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 216; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 141; 
CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 146 and 254-260; 
CFI, T-64/02 (Heubach v Commission), par. 180-181; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 137; 
CFI, T-368/00 (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 69; 
CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 242; 
CFI, T-31/99 (ABB v Commission), par. 152, 157, 166 and 167; 
CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), 
par. 101; 
CFI, T-352/94 (Mo och Domsjö v Commission), par. 352 and 355.
6. Size of the relevant market
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112 and 176; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 46; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 88. 
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Specifi c reference to the product market is made in: 
GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 285; 
GC, T-12/06 (Deltafi na v Commission), par. 233; 
GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 174-175.
 Specifi c reference to the geographical market is made in: 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 271.
7. Relative importance and market share of an undertaking
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265; 
CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 152.
8. Market shares of all undertakings involved
GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 285; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 176; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 271; 
GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux v Commission), par. 150; 
GC, T-519/09 (Toshiba v Commission), par. 282-283. 
As the General Court has ruled, the worldwide market share shows the “best adapted 
representation of the capacity of those undertakings to cause signifi cant damage to other 
operators in the European market and give an indication of their contribution to the 
eff ectiveness of the cartel as a whole or, conversely, of the instability which would have 
aff ected the cartel had they not participated [...]”, see GC, T-519/09 (Toshiba v Commission), 
par. 283.
9. Repeated infringements
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112; 
GC, T-343/08 (Arkema France v Commission), par. 65 ff ; 
GC, T-133/07 (Mitsubishi v Commission), par. 265. 
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The Commission may only take a repeated infringement into account when the infringement 
is similar. This means for competition law proceedings that the Commission cannot take a 
previous abuse of a dominant position into account when it imposes a fi ne on the basis of a 
cartel infringement and vice versa, see GC, T-57/01 (Solvay v Commission), par. 508-512.
10. Volume and value of goods
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 42; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 58; 
ECJ, C-272/09 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 49; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 177; 
GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 104; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-543/08 (RWE v Commission), par. 218-226; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 89 and 256; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349; 
GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 350; 
CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 214; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 77; 
CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 188; 
CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 83; 
CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 280.
11. size and economic power of undertakings
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 42; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
ECJ, C-389/10 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 58; 
ECJ, C-272/09 P (KME Germany and others v Commission), par. 49; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96; 
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ECJ, C-289/04 P (Showa Denko KK v Commission), par. 16; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-265/12 (Schenker v Commission), par. 246; 
GC, T-267/12 (Deutsche Bahn v Commission), par. 177; 
GC, T-270/12 (Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and others v Commission), par. 104; 
GC, T-92/13 (Philips v Commission), par. 217; 
GC, T-91/13 (LG Electronics v Commission), par. 101-102; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 262; 
GC, T-117/07 and T-121/07 (Areva and others v Commission), par. 350; 
CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-43/02 (Jungbunzlauer v Commission), par. 214; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 77; 
CFI, T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 (Tokai Carbon Co Ltd.
and others v Commission), par. 239; 
CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 188; 
CFI, T-220/00 (Cheil Jedang v Commission), par. 83; 
CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 280.
12. Turnover on the relevant product market
GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 261; 
GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 232; 
GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 477; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 326; 
GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 197;
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 316-318; 
GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 186-187; 
CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; 
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 316-318; 
GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 83; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 118; 
CFI, T-15/02 (BASF v Commission), par. 146; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; 
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CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 149; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 67-68; 
CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 280.
13. Overall turnover
GC, T-216/13 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 261; 
GC, T-208/13 (Portugal Telecom v Commission), par. 232; 
GC, T-566/08 (Total Raffi  nage Marketing v Commission), par. 477; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 326; 
GC, T-357/06 (Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission), par. 197; 
GC, T-446/05 (Amann & Söhne and others v Commission), par. 186-187; 
CFI, T-175/05 (AKZO Nobel and others v Commission), par. 139; 
CFI, T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and 
T-136/02 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 468; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-62/02 (Union Pigments v Commission), par. 149; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 67-68; 
CFI, T-23/99 (LR af 1998 v Commission), par. 280.
14. Nature of the infringement
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 340; 
GC, T-92/13 (Philips v Commission), par. 218; 
GC, T-91/13 (LG Electronics v Commission), par. 197; 
GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux v Commission), par. 150; 
GC, T-370/09 (GDF Suez v Commission), par. 414; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 69; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 271; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 176; 
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 317; 
CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 108; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 117; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 101; 
CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 35; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-38/02 (Groupe Danone v Commission), par. 145; 
CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 69; 
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CFI, T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 (Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission), 
par. 99.
15. Context of the anti-competitive conduct
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349.
16. (Actual) impact on the market
GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622; 
GC, T-336/07 (Telefónica v Commission), par. 390; 
GC, T-151/07 (Kone v Commission), par. 61; 
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 317; 
GC, T-448/05 (Oxley Threads v Commission), par. 83; 
CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 108; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 117; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 101; 
CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 35; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 69. T
his does not mean that the actual behaviour has to be taken into account: 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 94-95; 
CFI, T-322/01 (Roquette Frères v Commission), par. 179.
17. Whether the cartel is implemented
GC, T-379/10 (Keramag Keramische Werke and others v Commission), par. 363; 
GC, T-91/11 (InnoLux v Commission), par. 150; 
GC, T-264/12 (UTi Worldwide and others v Commission), par. 271.
18. Geographical size of the aff ected market
GC, T-155/06 (Tomra v Commission), par. 317; 
CFI, T-161/05 (Hoechst v Commission), par. 108; 
CFI, T-73/04 (La Carbone-Lorraine v Commission), par. 117; 
CFI, T-59/02 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 101; 
CFI, T-330/01 (AKZO Nobel v Commission), par. 35; 
CFI, T-329/01 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 99; 
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CFI, T-224/00 (Archer Daniels Midland v Commission), par. 189; 
CFI, T-223/00 (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co v Commission), par. 69. 
The commission should “provide specifi c, credible and adequate evidence with which to 
assess what actual infl uence the infringement may have had on competition in that market” if 
it wishes to use this factor, see GC, T-286/09 (Intel v Commission), par. 1622.
19. Number and intensity of incidents on the market 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 790; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112 and 176; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349.
20. Conduct of the undertakings
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 93; 
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 42; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 256; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111 and 176.
21. Role in cartel
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 93; 
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 42; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
GC, T-146/09 (Parker Hannifi n v Commission), par. 100-102; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
GC, T-409/12 (Mitsubishi Electric v Commission), par. 150; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 280; 
GC, T-398/10 (Fapricela v Commission), par. 255; 
GC, T-587/08 (Fresh Del Monte v Commission), par. 817 and 880; 
GC, T-204/08 (Team Releocations v Commission), par. 85; 
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GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-418/10 (voestalpine and voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 411-412; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 349; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 256; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349.
22. Size of an undertaking
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 93; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 256; 
GC, T-372/10 (Bolloré v Commission), par. 225; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349; 
CFI, T-44/00 (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission), par. 242.
23. Deliberate and coherent strategy
GC, T-458/09 (Slovak Telekom v Commission), par. 59.
24. Profi ts derived from cartel 
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 93; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96;
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 256; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349.
25. Bargaining power of the buyers from the cartelists
GC, Case T-72/09 (Pilkington v Commission), par. 285.
26. Threat which the infringement poses to the objectives of the Union
ECJ, C-619/13 P (Mamoli Robinettaria v Commission), par. 93; 
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 789; 
ECJ, C-534/07 P (Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission), par. 96; 
ECJ, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and 
others v Commission), par. 242; 
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GC, T-418/10 (voestalpine and voestalpine Wire Rod Austria v Commission), par. 411; 
GC, T-413/10 and 414/10 (Socitrel v Commission), par. 279; 
GC, T-389/10 and T-419/10 (SLM v Commission), par. 138; 
GC, T-406/09 (Donau Chemie v Commission), par. 256; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 235 and 349; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 111 and 176.
27. Damage to the economic public order
GC, T-427/13 (Lundbeck v Commission), par. 790; 
GC, T-486/11 (Orange Polska v Commission), par. 112 and 176; 
GC, T-558/08 (ENI v Commission), par. 167; 
GC, T-551/08 (H&R ChemPharm v Commission), par. 310; 
GC, T-154/09 (MRI v Commission), par. 349.
28. Legislative background
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 40.
29. Economic context
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 40.
30. Conduct of the undertaking during the administrative procedure 
ECJ, C-618/13 P (Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission), par. 41.
Dutch competition law
1. Reference to Article 6 ECHR when discussing the judicial review of the proportionality of a sanction
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 19; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5779, par. 10; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5782, par. 10;
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5781, par. 10; 
RB Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 18; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5722, par. 8; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NLLRBROT:2017:5774, par. 8; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5777, par. 8; 
Rb Rotterdam (16 March 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:1907, par. 4.1; 
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 63; 
CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 7.3.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 10.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8610, par. 18.1, 
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Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 16.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 9.17; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 10.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 9.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5884, par. 10.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4;
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
2. Wide margin of discretion for the ACM
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 17.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.6; 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
CBb (20 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BW3671, par. 4.3.7; 
CBb (31 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6711, par. 3.3.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 9.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
3. All the circumstances during which the infringement took place should be taken into account
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5744, par. 21.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 13; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.1; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2; 
CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3; 20145, par. 72, 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
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CBb (18 November 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU5581, par. 3.3.4; 
CBb (12 July 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6386, par. 3.2.12; 
CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; 
CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
4. Repeated infringements
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (11 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK6975, par. 2.5.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
5. Degree of participation in the infringement
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 7.3; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.11; 
CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.11; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.11.; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2.
6. Ceasing of the infringement on the undertaking’s own motion
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Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (11 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK6975, par. 2.5.2; 
CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.6.4.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
471
ANNEX
An
ne
x
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; R
b Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.6; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
7. Profi ts made by the anti-competitive behaviour
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
8. Dominant position on the market
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
9. Size of the relevant market
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
10. Short period in which the collusion took place
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.9.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
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11. Structure of the market
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.9.2; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
12. Specifi c economic context
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5822, par. 9.24 and 9.26; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
13. Nature of the goods or services concerned
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26.
14. Eff ects on the market
CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 8.3.4; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2.
15. Consequences of the anti-competitive behaviour in general
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
16. The nature of the infringement
CBb (12 October 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:325, par. 7.3.4-7.3.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (16 March 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:1907, par. 6.3; 
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 73; 
CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 8.3.2; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.9.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3.
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17. Damage suff ered by third parties
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3 and 4.14.7; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
18. Cooperation in the investigation
Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 74; 
Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.6; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.16.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
19. Justifi able unfamiliarity with the prohibited nature of the behaviour
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
20. Degree of culpability 
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 13; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 6.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 15; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 16; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10174, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2172, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2173, par. 12; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 12; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, par. 12; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 13; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 13; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 15; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 14; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5930, par. 7.1; 
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CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.2-12.3.3; 
CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3; 20145, par. 72; 
CBb (18 November 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU5581, par. 3.3.4;
CBb (12 July 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6386, par. 3.2.12; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; 
CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26 and 9.26.4.
21. Number and size of undertakings
Rb Rotterdam (20 October 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:8059, par. 73; 
CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 8.3.2; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 12.3.8; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5830, par. 10.10; 
CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.10.3; 
CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9349, par. 3.10.4.3; 
CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0545, par. 3.8.4.3; 
CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN9357, par. 3.10.4.3; 
CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0952, par. 3.8.4.3; 
CBb (7 July 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN0540, par. 3.8.4.3; 
CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0961, par. 3.8.4.3; 
CBb (13 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO0973, par. 3.8.4.3; 
CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.11.4.3; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; 
Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6; 
CBb (12 March 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO6479, par. 6.3.
22. Lack of action by the ACM in the investigation
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
23. General and specifi c deterrence
Rb Rotterdam (23 June 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:4738, par. 13.2-13.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 9.4.3; 
476
ANNEX
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5;
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
24. Being a fi rst time off ender
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
25. Potential bankruptcy and the fi nancial capacity of an undertaking
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5722, par. 11; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5774, par. 12; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5777, par. 12; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 26; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5779, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5781, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5782, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 January 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:637, par. 6.3; 
CBb (6 October 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:272, par. 10.3.1-10.3.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 8; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 22.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 22; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, par. 21.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 15.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, par. 15; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 17.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 20.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 21; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 19.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 20.1; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 7.3.2-7.3.6; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 14.3.2 and 14.3.6; 
CBb (24 March 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:56, par. 4.9.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (20 March 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2045, par. 93; 
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Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
CBb (18 November 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU5581, par. 3.3.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
CBb (12 July 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6386, par. 3.2.12; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.14.7; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI6696, par. 2; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3818, par. 5.8; 
CBb (10 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3816, par. 5.8; 
CBb (8 February 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP3817, par. 5.8; 
CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6911, par. 3.9.4; 
CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.4.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
CBb (17 March 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BP8077, par. 9.26 and 9.26.6; 
CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6629, par. 7.15.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4.
26. Legislation which is in place
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.9; 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0440, par. 2.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (13 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4035, par. 2.6.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (19 July 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY4888, par. 2.4.6; 
CBb (28 May 2004) ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AP1336, par. 6.4.2.
27. (Reluctant) implementation of the anti-competitive behaviour
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
CBb (3 July 2008) ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BD6635, par. 7.8.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4.
28. (Small) participation in the infringement
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 17.8; 
CBb (12 July 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6386, par. 3.2.13; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2.
479
ANNEX
An
ne
x
29. Leading role of an undertaking within the cartel
Rb Rotterdam (17 July 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5849, par. 9.16.
30. Impact on the economy
Rb Rotterdam (30 April 2015) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2912, par. 17.1.
31. Overlap with another infringement which was already sanctioned
CBb (14 March 2012) ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BV9430, par. 3.5.
32. Financial consequences for an undertaking besides the fi ne itself
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2171, par. 8; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10129, par. 22.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 December 2014) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:10173, par. 22; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2165, par. 21.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2181, par. 15.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2185, par. 15; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2186, par. 17.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2189, par. 20.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2190, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2192, par. 17; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2196, par. 21; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2201, par. 19.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (7 April 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2211, par. 20.1.
33. intensity of collusion and the nature of the anti-competitive information exchanged
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.6.
34. Whether competition remains possible on the market
CBb (11 January 2017) ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:1, par. 7.2.7.
35. Termination of an infringement on own motion
Rb Rotterdam (12 May 2016) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:3477, par. 18.5; 
Rb Rotterdam (1 July 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM9911, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (4 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI8190, par. 2.4.3; 
Rb Rotterdam (11 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK6975, par. 2.5.2; 
CBb (18 November 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO4962, par. 3.6.4.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (9 January 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BC6212, par. 2; 
CBb (8 April 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM1588, par. 6.6; 
Rb Rotterdam (24 July 2007) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BB0750, par. 2; 
CBb (4 October 2011) ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BT6521, par. 4.9.3; 
CBb (12 August 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN3895, par. 7.7.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8428, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 May 2006) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX8425, par. 2.5.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (18 June 2003) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2003:AH9702, par. 2.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 November 2002) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2002:AR4219, par. 2.3.4.
36. An appeal on the bad fi nancial situation of an undertaking should be substantiated with ascertainable 
and verifi able evidence
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5722, par. 11.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5774, par. 12.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:BL:RBROT:2017:5777, par. 12.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5765, par. 26.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5779, par. 17.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5781, par. 17.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (27 July 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5782, par. 17.1; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 January 2017) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:637, par. 6.3; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:185, par. 12.3.2; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:186, par. 14.3.2; 
CBb (14 July 2016) ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:188, par. 7.3.2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
CBb (1 September 2010) ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN6911, par. 3.9.4; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8225, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8227, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8231, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8245, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8255, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8259, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8261, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8265, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8268, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8272, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8275, par. 2; 
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Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8517, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8523, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8526, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8550, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8558, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (23 July 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD8569, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0948, par. 2;
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0949, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0951, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0953, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0954, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG0955, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (30 October 2008) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BG2730, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1202, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI1203, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (17 April 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI2195, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (14 May 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI4893, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:BI7165, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI7388, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1431, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 June 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1478, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (10 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ3041, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (15 July 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BJ2895, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (26 October 2009) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BK1215, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (8 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK8717, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (22 January 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL1020, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (2 February 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL2968, par. 2; 
Rb Rotterdam (5 March 2010) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BL6828, par. 2.
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